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Introduction 
 
Many natural phenomena are irregular. The wind, certainly, temperatures, rain, floods, 
geysers, etc. Usually opinions are mixed about whether the changes are worsening or if they 
are subsiding, or even disappearing. Take the case of the French site of Fontaine de Vaucluse 
in Provence. The visitor cannot fail to be impressed, just as the poet Petrarch was, by the 
magnificent setting of this curious geological phenomenon which provides abundant pure 
water in glowing colours. Depending on the time of year, the basin of the spring is full and 
overflows in a fiery stream feeding the river Sorgue, or it looks like a partially filled hole, the 
water escaping through secondary springs lower down. But what is the evolution of the water-
flow in this deep karst phenomenon ? If one asks the old inhabitants of the country, they 
remember not just seasonal changes, but also extreme events, times where the level of the 
river was above the arches of the bridge and the little town of Isle-sur-Sorgue was flooded, or 
periods of low water, when people wondered if the bowl would ever fill up again. Scientists 
took many measurements and tried to model this complex phenomenon where rainwater 
travelled through unknown cracks in the limestone to feed spaces and drains underground1. 
There is an approximate correlation with rainfall in the basin, with a delay whose timescale 
depends on where the rain fell. But on the question of changes caused by urbanization, which 
is significant in Provence, or by partial deforestation in the mountains of the Luberon, or 
changes in the Mediterranean climate itself, researchers cannot say anything very definite. 
The flow-rate at Fontaine de Vaucluse is too irregular for any trend to be discerned. 
 
           
Records of the water-flow at Fontaine de Vaucluse do not allow any long-term trends to be easily discerned. A 
similar phenomenon occurs in Florida in the easy of the city of Ocala, source of the Silver River. Here scientists 
have  detected a slight decrease in the average flow, without, however, being able to tell if this trend will 
continue or not. 
 
 There are two types of imperceptible phenomena : very slow changes, and average 
trends with very irregular dynamics. 
 The first type is well known and is no surprise since, as human beings, we know that 
we only see what our senses are capable of feeling, just as the philosophers Locke, Berkeley, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, for example, P. Fleury, V. Plagnes and M. Bakalowicz "Modelling of the functioning of karst aquifers 
with a reservoir model: Application to Fontaine de Vaucluse (South of France)" J. of Hydrology 20 Oct 2007, 
38-49. 
	  	  
Pascal and many others have wisely noted. This was why the movement of plate tectonics 
was not noticed for so long, and then guessed only because of the shape of continents. It has 
only recently been measured thanks to the precision of instruments currently available, which 
allowed us, for example, in 2004, to measure the drift of the Peloponnese from the Greek base 
during the construction of the Rion-Antirion bridge2. Similarly, we do not realize that certain 
country houses are sinking, by the influence of alternating dryness and humidity, because the 
motion is so slow. In a different sphere, we do not notice how the voices of our loved ones 
change their timbre over time, getting deeper as the years go by.  
 The second type, however, is more insidious because it concerns volatile situations 
where we clearly see “movement”. The generic example is the sea whose waves slip onto the 
beach. From looking at them for a few moments, it is hard to say whether the tide is rising or 
falling. Another typical example is the evolution of species that has only lately been 
established scientifically, because the variations between individuals of a population blur the 
overall drift of evolution. Trends are drowned by natural fluctuations in offspring compared 
with their parents in a group with diverse characteristics. 
 For these irregular phenomena, what enables a trend to be detected is always the 
presence of a cumulative indicator of the long-term effect. 
 For example, in the bay of Mont Saint Michel, it is the sand. Tides and storms bring in 
and take out the sand. What is the role of structures such as the causeway that leads to the 
mount, or the dams on the adjacent river Couesnon? It would be hard to say precisely, but the 
sand serves as a witness, just as the sediments have testified since long ago around the city of 
Aigues Mortes in the Camargue. The same thing happens with glaciers. The mass of ice, the 
slowness of its motion and natural melting, provide a very visible cumulative indicator which 
tells us clearly about the amount snow fall and current global warming. 
 In the case of waves on a beach, the area of wet sand is a cumulative indicator of the 
rising tide, but it would be a mistake to think that the succession of maxima always gives an 
idea of the trend. Extrema describe the magnitude of the variability of the phenomena. We try 
to forget as little as possible about the extreme levels of flooding because they indicate the 
thresholds of danger to habitats. The ancients certainly noted vernacular knowledge on this 
subject before building works and creating cities, as evidenced by the Pont du Gard and the 
Roman Bridge at Vaison la Romaine which still stand today. But it is not the extremes which 
show the average slope, if this exists. In an irregular phenomenon with no trend, and average 
value zero, something easily described mathematically, the greater the number of maxima 
achieved over a long period, and the higher they are, the more complicated is their relation 
with possible trends. The values of extrema could well increase while the underlying trend is 
downward. 
 This is often seen in everyday conversation and in commentaries on radio or 
television. One sees unusual events, such as torrential rainfall in Ouagadougou in September 
2009, or temperatures of 22°C in Montreal in March 2012, ….  “We haven’t seen anything 
like that in ten, fifty years…” Does that mean that the climate of Burkina Faso is becoming 
wetter? Or that Quebec is getting warmer? If that were the case, these events would be more 
frequent and one would not need to go far back in time to find the last occurrence. In climate 
change it is hard to see the trends because it is very irregular. One has, rather, the impression 
that it is the irregularity that is increasing.  
 Thus cumulative indicators are essential for the trends to be detected, without such 
markers they cannot generally be seen. Very slow regular phenomena often constitute such 
indicators themselves or are accompanied by secondary damage that is easily seen. Cracks in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 the magnitude of the drift is about 1.5 cm per year, cf. Bernard P. et al. "Seismicity, deformation and seismic 
hazard in the western rift of Corinth: New insights from the Corinth Rift Laboratory (CRL)" Tectonophysics 426 
(2006) 7-30. 
the wall of a house are indicators of differential deformations in the foundations. Creep, in 
stone that is under stress, is very gradual and happens over many centuries, but it can be 
clearly seen in some of our cathedrals, such as Salisbury or Wells, because the curvature of 
the pillars is a highly visible indicator. However, an irregular phenomenon does have any 
memory itself. It erases its past, more or less completely. And thus its underlying direction is 
often highly important for decision and action. 
 
 What I will show in this book is that the free market economy is a social system 
which, ascribing fundamental importance to the notion of market, creates values that are 
irregularly volatile, namely prices. And it does this so well, especially in the financial 
markets, that these values completely hide the underlying trends which constitute the most 
important and essential information for the future. These values are the basis for decisions 
taken by all economic players, as well as those taken by households, by large companies and, 
to a large extent, by governments. 
 In all areas where humanity influences the environment, whether that be natural 
resources, other living beings, waste, technological risks, etc., the cumulative indicators are 
always found outside the realm of economics, provided by gauges built not from market 
prices.  
 The very notion of fluid market today implies the relentless and complete erasure of 
trends in the evolution of prices. It results in the great mass of inhabitants of this planet – who 
live mainly trying to manage with the prices put to them by globalization – not seeing in their 
universe of reference, the evolution of natural quantities. Or, to be more precise man, in the 
current economic universe, cannot act in a way that takes account of trends, except by 
forgetting the economic framework, i.e., forgetting the elementary rules of community life 
necessary for living with the least harm and, often, necessary for survival. 
 The economy leads the world while hiding the trends. This is the fundamental issue.  
We will study its causes and analyse its most serious consequences. 
I) A non-Marxist critique 
 
It will be helpful to clarify the intellectual fulcra of this work. In this chapter, we will look 
over the historical genesis of the liberal economy, tracing it all the way up to the 
contemporary period in which the financial markets flourish. We will also investigate the 
highly fundamental question of how to know which bases might provide a firm foundation for 
sustainable development in its social dimension. Since the Rio Conference, this has been the 
issue at the heart of the debate. 
 Let us first of all make it quite clear that we are not about to deny here what Karl 
Marx brought to our understanding of capitalism, nor even what the Marxist current brought, 
via its turbulent history, to contemporary civilization. However, it must be stated that as soon 
as any strong, clear opposition to economic liberalism appears, it triggers an immediate outcry 
and, in the confusion, finds itself subject to a counter-offensive tying it to communism, to 
collectivism, and to the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Greens have often fallen victim to 
this in Europe, as have the ecologists in the United States, from the Republicans. 
 The position I adopt is perfectly clear. The arguments put forth in this work do not 
feature – at the time of writing – in the literature of the Left. This last criticizes the financial 
markets for other reasons, mainly those enunciated by Keynes, in that a distinction is drawn 
between those who gamble on markets like a casino – the speculators – and those who strive 
to direct the economy well – the entrepreneurs. The line of argument which I advance is 
different and, in fact, its sole point in common with the critique of the Left is an attack on the 
philosophy of market economy; however, the objectives pursued are by no means the same. 
As we shall see, they disagree on the most essential of issues. 
 It makes sense, then, to first clarify the issues involved, which is the object of this 
chapter. My subject is situated at the crossroads between ecology and economy, hence 
between nature and free trade, but also between social dignity and the rationality of profit. It 
was this selfsame dichotomy which was realized by the Brundtland Report in 1987, and 
subsequently the 1992 Rio Summit, under the label of ‘sustainable development’, with its 
three main aspects: the economic, using the term ‘sustainable’ to communicate an objective of 
growth and of economic efficiency; the social, expressing the fact that this development must 
take human needs as its starting point, and therefore must answer to an objective of social 
equity; the environmental, meaning that the objective of sustainable development must 
contribute towards handling, improving and promoting the environment and preserving 
resources for the long term. The current balance sheet resulting from this impetus is not zero, 
but is very modest given the objectives which had been declared and approved. It cannot be 
said that the term ‘sustainable development’ has not been sufficiently broadcast; nowadays, it 
is to be found everywhere. Here then is a sort of enigma to which this work brings a scientific 
response, supplementing some unfortunately rather more commonplace considerations. 
 For such a clarification, we must on the one hand take a step back regarding the idea 
of ‘market’ which currently saturates our society, and on the other hand investigate values of 
solidarity, both as they have been perceived in the Marxist line and from an ecological 
perspective. 
 
1. Free trade: an ancient idea, today hyper-institutionalized 
The market has not always existed. Today, as a mindset, it is so ingrained that one imagines 
nothing other than introducing it to where it still does not exist. It is seen in an equally 
positive light by the housewife, the industrialist and the political official. In Europe, the 
services of the Brussels Commission dedicate all their energies to helping it gain ground. 
Currently, it is at an all-time high, having been refined 25 years ago in an enormous 
mathematical machine: the organized financial markets. How have we reached this point? Let 
us examine several historical milestones in the genesis of this phenomenon. 
 
The Akrotiri Civilization 
Archaeologists today seem to agree on the fact that the stamped metallic coin did not 
historically appear in order to simplify commercial exchanges, as Aristotle had thought, but 
rather for reasons linked to the power of the State and to the payment of salaries, notably of 
the military. As proof, the first electrum coins correspond to a soldier’s monthly salary, too 
large for circulation. Measures and standards existed before stamped money for the 
comparison of quantities based in commodities. 
 The coin probably made its first appearance in Lydia and Persia. In the Greek world, it 
emerged towards the middle of the first half of the first millennium B.C. At this time, trades 
were subject to psychologically rigorous social customs called ‘codes of transaction’. 
According to J. Parry and M. Bloch3, as well as S. Von Reden4, the use of coins flowed 
smoothly into the transactional orders making up the invariants of trade: the long-term, whose 
aim was to contribute to the permanence of the group, and the short-term, whose approach 
was neutral as long as the stability of the group was not threatened. These constants structured 
all types of transaction, and money progressively found its place in them. On the other hand, 
transactions conceived as ends in themselves were doomed. 
 As a result, the Minoan civilization in Crete, and the extraordinary Akrotiri 
civilization which archaeologists are still in the process of uncovering on the island of 
Santorin – brought down in the 17th or 16th century B.C. by the volcanic eruption which 
collapsed the centre of the island and buried the city under ashes, thereby protecting it until 
the present day – these highly refined civilizations functioned without money. What historians 
emphasize, however,5 is that the “commercial” agreements of the time usually consisted of 
what we clumsily call “term contracts”. In other words, instantaneous exchanges were often 
discovered to be unbalanced, thanks to contingent necessities, and it was necessary to 
remember at a later point what was owed from previous exchanges. We see that the 
relationship between parties was certainly not that of a “market”, in which anyone can take up 
an offer, but rather one of trust, even honour. It is surely this which allowed the transaction of 
rare objects, perfumes, golden figurines, vases, or even live animals imported by sea, such as 
the blue monkeys faithfully depicted by the painters of the Akrotiri frescos. 
 We are most certainly not talking about Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s ‘noble savage’ who 
lived before the social contract came to serve and service the liberty of all, but about highly 
evolved societies, fully implicated in the social distribution of tasks and responsibilities. 
Today, we are provoked to reflection by the high level of refinement of these 17th century BC 
civilizations, as demonstrated in the form of the vases, the furniture – a three footed pedestal 
table has been found which is so ornate in its decoration as to be mistaken for the Louis XV 
style – and the clothes and finery of the women, as depicted on the walls of ordinary houses. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Parry, J. and Bloch, M., (eds.) Money and the morality of exchange. Cambridge University Press, (1989). 
4 S. von Reden, Exchange in Ancient Greece, London (1995). 
5 R. Descat "Monnaie multiple et monnaie frappée en Grêce archaïque" Revue Numismatique, 6ème s., t. 157, 
69-81, (2001). 
 
 
The beneficial effects of the market 
Let us jump forwards in time to Europe in the 17th century AD, when thinkers on agriculture 
and trade, known as the physiocrats (Turgot, Dupont de Nemours, Quesnay, etc.) were 
discussing and philosophizing over the “causes” and the “effects” of the economy.  
 If demand increases, prices rise, just as if supply diminishes, and vice versa. This 
commonsensical idea is to be found everywhere; however, it does not clearly or automatically 
possess a framework allowing it to be granted the status of a scientific law. Where does this 
phenomenon operate? “Just considering”, notes Turgot, “a single isolated sale between two 
private individuals, it is evident that the exchange would be perfectly equal and that neither of 
the two could be wronged; since the exchanged goods can have no price other than that 
which has been attributed to it by the desire of each of the two contracting parties and since 
they alone can judge this desire”6 In order for supply and demand to play the role of a 
mechanism, it is necessary that competition should influence behaviour: “In the case of 
reciprocal competition between sellers and buyers”, he adds, “the price is fixed by the debate 
between the totality of the sellers, on the one hand, and the totality of the buyers, on the other, 
instead of by debate between two sole individuals”. Turgot chose to situate the phenomenon 
in its entirety, the whole world being the arena where competition ultimately plays out. He 
was already using the term ‘equilibrium’ for this situation of abstract reference: “A kind of 
equilibrium is established between the value of all the products of the soil, the consumption of 
the different types of goods, the different types of work, the number of men occupied therein 
and the price of their salary [...] This being granted, if weight is added to one part of the 
balance, it is impossible that the result should not be a movement throughout the machine 
which tends towards re-establishing the old equilibrium [...] I know well that this effect will 
not be sudden and that any complicated machine will contain frictions slowing even the 
effects most infallibly proven by theory. The level, even in a perfectly homogenous fluid, only 
re-establishes itself with time, but with time, it always re-establishes itself. The same applies 
to the equilibrium of the values we are examining.”7 
 These ideas, prudently expressed by the physiocrats, will be seized upon by more 
audacious thinkers, the classical economists, in the second half of the 18th century, and 
developed into a true realization of the important practical and philosophical consequences 
that can be drawn from the phenomenon of supply and demand. 
 There is, however, a sizable epistemological problem to overcome: the circumstances 
of life in society are never perfectly repeated, and even in a situation of competition, the 
various decisions taken follow on from each other in a specific and changing context. In the 
face of this difficulty, the classical economists daringly reverse the problem, postulating the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Turgot, Plan d'un ouvrage sur le commerce, la circulation et l'intérêt de l'argent, la richesse des états (1753-
54) : "A ne considérer qu'une seule vente isolée entre deux particuliers, il est bien évident que l'échange serait 
parfaitement égal et qu'aucun des deux ne pourrait être lésé; puisque les choses échangées ne peuvent avoir 
d'autre prix que celui qu'y a mis le désir de chacun des deux contractants et qu'eux seuls peuvent juger de ce 
désir... Dans le cas de concurrence réciproque entre les vendeurs et les acheteurs, le prix est fixé par le débat 
entre la totalité des vendeurs, d'une part, et la totalité des acheteurs, de l'autre, au lieu de l'être par le débat entre 
deux personnes seulement... 
7 Letter to D. Hume, quoted by T. Vissol in Turgot, économiste et administrateur, ss la dir. de Ch. Bordes et J. 
Morange, PUF 1982: "Il s'établit une espèce d'équilibre entre la valeur de toutes les productions de la terre, la 
consommation des différentes espèces de denrées, les différents genres d'ouvrages, le nombre d'hommes qui y 
sont occupés et le prix de leur salaire [...] Cela posé si l'on charge l'un des poids, il est impossible qu'il n'en 
résulte pas dans toute la machine un mouvement qui tend à rétablir l'ancien équilibre [...] Je sais bien que cet 
effet ne sera pas subit et qu'il y a dans toute machine compliquée des frottements qui ralentissent les effets les 
plus infailliblement démontrés par la théorie. Le niveau, même dans un fluide parfaitement homogène, ne se 
rétablit qu'avec le temps, mais il s'établit toujours avec le temps. Il en est de même de l'équilibre des valeurs que 
nous examinons.” 
law and imagining the benefits which would ensue from it if society were to be stripped of all 
the complications holding back the free expression of this mechanism. 
 However, agriculture and the craft industry were already no longer the only productive 
activities, and the novelty of the problems required new explanations. When Adam Smith 
wrote “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect 
our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their 
humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their 
advantages...”8 it was 1776, the industrial revolution was blooming, and manufacturing based 
on energy from mills was being developed. 
 Adam Smith posits that the individual can forget society, thinking of nothing more 
than his own interest, because the market will translate this selfishness into a global benefit: 
“He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he 
is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends 
only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be 
of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, 
led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention”. Thus Smith 
enunciates this principle which challenges all planned economic thought and even thought 
partially controlled towards a social goal, wherein we find, in embryonic form, the modern 
doctrine of liberalism: “By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the 
society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it”.9 In other words, it is no 
use trying to define the collective interest and applying oneself to serving it; it is enough to 
optimize one’s own business, and the framework of unrestricted commercial trade will do the 
rest. At the beginning of the following century, Jean-Baptiste Say was to dissipate all 
misunderstandings regarding this veritable philosophy of life in society: “Have we found 
society’s government in all this? No. And the reason for this is that the government is not an 
essential part of the social organization. Note that I am not saying the government is useless; 
I am saying that it is non-essential, that society can exist without it, and that if associates 
were happy to attend to their own business and leave me to my own, society could, if it had to, 
function without government.” This disciple of Smith’s provides, on the same page, a 
profoundly significant detail for the modern reader. As Jean-Baptiste Say cannot find an 
example of a nation without a government, in order to illustrate his theory he chooses to cite 
the immigrant settlements in Kentucky – at the time, the new frontier in the conquest of the 
empty spaces of the United States: “there are townships where firstly a single family 
established itself; then another in the vicinity of the first; then a third; eventually villages 
form, houses and children are produced; they are dressed, they are nourished, so far so good, 
many households cannot provide for themselves on Jean-Pain-Mollet road, and wait! Oh, 
how terrible! There is no Government”. Here we have an instance of a conquering economy 
in an infinite world, an ideal example of free trade! And this allows a France emerging from 
its Revolution and Droits de l’Homme, then from its Empire and Napoleonic Code, to 
develop of a vision worthy of the “Tea Party”: “Our government will exercise, they will say, a 
favourable influence on your commerce. Bah, leave me alone! What influence could be more 
favourable to me than my rest and my liberty! When the focus of the government is deployed 
internally, when the mania to regulate, to influence on actions and opinions, enters in, what a 
hellish vision!”10 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 A. Smith, Wealth of Nations (1776), Book I Chap II. 
9 ibid Book IV Chap II. 
10 "Avons-nous trouvé le gouvernement de la société dans tout cela ? Non. Et la raison en est que le 
gouvernement n'est point une partie essentielle de l'organisation sociale. Remarquez bien que je ne dis pas que 
le gouvernement est inutile; je dis qu'il n'est pas essentiel; que la société peut exister sans lui; et que si les 
associés voulaient bien faire leurs affaires et me laisser faire la mienne, la société pourrait à la rigueur marcher 
 Before the idealized market could be posed as a mathematical model, as the neo-
classical economists would do in the 19th century, it was essential to create a place for it in the 
world of ideas, by idealizing the society in which it wholly functions. It is here that the 
economic arguments have their value: “the proportion between supply and demand”, writes 
David Ricardo, “may, indeed, for a time, affect the market value of a commodity, until it is 
supplied in greater or less abundance, according as the demand may have increased or 
diminished; but this effect will be only of temporary duration”11. 
 Evidently, the very same mathematization which would debut with Jules Dupuit and 
Augustin Cournot and would be continued with the equilibrium theories of Leon Walras, 
Jevons, Menger, Pareto, etc. – to which we shall be returning in greater detail in chapter III-2 
– was instantly accompanied by a vigorous philosophical bias in favour of a social 
organization in which this harmony was in force. Dupuit accompanies his technical invention 
of marginal utility with flatly ideological intent: “general, universal competition forms the 
law of society, and whosoever tries to escape it, by whatever means, violates the social pact 
and deserves to be punished”12. 
 The fundamental point upon which we are invited to reflect by this rather fascinating 
period in the history of ideas is that the phenomenon of supply and demand is not to be found 
in a pure state in the observable world, and has therefore been idealized. And it has been 
idealized in a static fashion. The curve of demand, expounded for the first time by Augustin 
Cournot, but which as we have seen underlies many of the earlier theories, does not exist 
experimentally, because the world unfolds in real time and time is absent from the neo-
classical representations of the market. Analogously, we can compare it to what in 
mathematics is called a ‘projection onto a co-ordinate plane’ – that is to say, a simplifying 
approach which completely erases one dimension of reality, meaning that philosophically 
speaking we omit certain factors, certain phenomena which make sense and yet which we 
consider negligible. 
 In order that the reader might fully understand, let us immediately state that in the 19th 
century, at the time of the neo-classical economists, the unique nature of events unfolding in 
the temporal dimension was a secondary consideration and did not, in itself, disqualify their 
ideas. The real markets were cursorily organized, and the assessed markets were but fantasies 
of an ideal organization advanced by committed intellectuals. On the other hand, we shall see 
in just a minute that the markets currently extant in our neoliberal financial world realize the 
idea of the market in all its philosophical and mathematical purity and that, consequentially, 
the temporal has major consequences regarding the role of the market on the decisions of 
agents and the functioning of society. 
 
The financial markets 
Up until the Second World War, finance was essentially a professional practice, with all its 
institutional and legal aspects. It used actuarial calculations to work out credit and 
conversions to current value in the frameworks provided by the micro and macro-economy. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sans gouvernement... il y a des cantons où une famille vient d'abord s'établir; puis une autre dans le voisinage 
de la première; puis une troisième; finalement les villages se forment, on y fait des maisons et des enfants; on les 
habille, on les nourrit, très bien, mieux que beaucoup de ménages ne peuvent se nourrir dans la rue Jean-Pain-
Mollet, et pourtant, oh ! malheur ! il n'y a pas de Gouvernement... Notre gouvernement exercera, dira-t-on, une 
influence favorable à votre commerce. — Eh qu'il me laisse tranquille. Quelle influence me sera plus favorable 
que mon repos et ma liberté ! Quand la pensée du gouvernement se déploie dans l'intérieur, quand la manie de 
réglementer, d'influer sur les actions, sur les opinions, s'en mêle, quel enfer !" 
11 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation 1817, Chap 30. 
12 "la concurrence générale, universelle, est la loi de la société, et quiconque tente de s'y soustraire par un 
moyen quelconque viole le pacte social et mérite d'être puni ". Cf. O. Coutard "Jules Dupuit et la théorie 
économique : l'invention de la notion de surplus" Ann. des Ponts n°82 1997. 
Since the 18th and 19th centuries, it had touched on issues of risk with problems of maritime 
insurance, and for this purpose it used statistics and probability calculations. From 1848 
onwards – the date of the creation of the Chicago Board of Trade, followed in 1874 by that of 
the Chicago Mercantile exchange – term contracts on the cereal trade were quoted and 
exchanged. It was this role of the financial markets as a place of negotiation on speculative 
risks that was to take on a considerably larger scale at the end of the twentieth century. 
 Reflections on the 1929 crisis provoked significant developments in economic thought 
during the post-war period marking the third quarter of the twentieth century. Finance became 
the object of a robust theory, strongly marked by the American school (Arrow, Debreu, 
Allais, Linter, Markowitz, Miller, Modigliani, Samuelson, Sharpe, Tobin, etc.). The most 
significant constructions were the theory of portfolio selection, risk analysis, and market 
models, notably the CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) and its numerous improvements. 
As for the institutions, the most important changes were those which followed the decision to 
suspend the convertibility of dollars into gold and the worldwide development of derivative 
markets (optional and term products), with the quotation of currency options in Chicago from 
1972, then interest rates options and the opening of derivative markets in London (LIFFE 
1982), Singapore (SIMEX 1984), Tokyo (TIFFE 1985), Paris (MATIF 1986, MONEP 1987) 
and Frankfurt (DTB 1990). 
 Globalization and the development of derivative products were two concomitant, 
overlapping phenomena – one spatial, the other qualitative – and were to imbue finance with 
a new power, leading to the start, under the mandates of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald 
Reagan, of the neoliberal period in which we currently find ourselves. We have quite rightly 
discussed at length the first of these phenomena, a major historical change encouraged by the 
collapse of the USSR and by a new ease of communication and trade with considerable 
consequences, and a change consecrated by the 1994 Uruguay Round with the creation of the 
World Trade Organization. Finance can certainly be said to play an important role within it, 
but is neither its only aspect nor its only cause. The scale of the theatre of relations between 
the financial world and the economy has changed, reinforcing the necessity to better 
understand market functioning and the link with economic politics. For this, however, it is 
necessary to further examine qualitative change, as it is this which conditions the constraints 
surrounding not only behaviour, but also the phenomena of opinion and risk assessment. 
Moreover, it is relatively unknown, and therefore merits further explanation. 
 In 1973, a major epistemological rupture came about, characterized by the intrusion of 
highly advanced mathematics into the operational knowledge of the banking world – 
mathematics previously taught only at the level of a Master’s degree or higher. 
 
The “Black-Scholes” Revolution and options hedging 
In the 1970s in the United States, and the 1980s in Europe, there was a veritable 
epistemological rupture, in the sense described by Thomas Kuhn. It was noticed that one 
could fix a price for options consisting of contingent assets and “hedge” them by managing a 
portfolio over their duration such that the risk was completely negated. This demanded the 
use of relatively advanced mathematics. Brownian motion, semi-martingales, stochastic 
differential equations and partial differential equations, all of these made their appearance in 
finance. The key idea – the principle of non-arbitrage – is that true value prevents both seller 
and buyer from making a risk-free profit. Mathematics allows a multitude of consequences to 
be drawn from this single principle. 
 The effects of this “revolution” made themselves felt at different levels. Firstly, by the 
establishment of derivative markets in all the important financial centres. Contingent term 
contracts, or options, found themselves henceforth easily manageable and thus multiplied, 
providing businesses with protection against the random fluctuations of prices, especially of 
currencies. 
 Then, we saw a transformation in the professional profiles of financial practitioners. 
Instead of having a background in economics and human sciences, they were recruited fresh 
out of engineering schools or university mathematics courses. Accompanying this were 
renovations in education, giving more precedence to probability theory, stochastic analysis 
and the differential calculus developed by the Japanese mathematician Kiyosi Itô. These 
improvements in the financial markets, combined with new profiling techniques, had the joint 
consequence of reinforcing the power of the financial world, thanks to a kind of symbiosis 
between the opposing social backgrounds of university research and of decision-making in 
the business world. 
 Following this paradigm shift, although it was thought at the time that all the main 
tools were already in place, the last twenty years have seen a curious continuation of this 
mathematization. 
 
Rate models, the securitization of debt 
Given that short term and long term rates are not the same and vary amongst themselves over 
time, the study of yield leads to the study of a two-variable function (starting date and 
maturity), thus representing rates by a surface – a random surface, obviously. The principle of 
non-arbitrage applies here as well, and allows us to propose models for the price and the 
management of what are termed “rate derivative products”. 
 In this field, mathematics is applied even more skilfully than it is to options. Certainly, 
the deductions made from the principle of non-arbitrage are unassailable on a theoretical 
level, but these models concern the rationality of agents in a distant future (when stock option 
duration is in general 6, 9 or 12 months) and constitute a probabilistic schema of the future 
which is but one vision among many possible. Moreover, these models are “calibrated” 
according to the data we have today, and a lot can happen in 10 or 15 years’ time... 
 The theoretical advances of financial mathematicians have also improved risk 
management for banks in the handling of their complex portfolios. We shall go into a little 
more detail, as this narrative is loaded with important philosophical consequences. The 
“improvements” brought to risk management by the application of remarkable theoretical 
tools – which even have a certain beauty, on an intellectual level, comparable to that of the 
major theories in physics – did not prevent these establishments from falling into the “trap” of 
the subprime crisis. How was this possible? 
 In order to understand risk, a very simple notion, initiated by the bank JP Morgan at 
the beginning of 1990s and spreading to become the most used method until recently, was 
founded upon the threshold principle. The “value at risk” (VaR) represents the maximum 
loss that one has probability p (= 0.95 or 0.99) of not exceeding at a given due date. It 
therefore qualifies the limits of an area, outside of which one ignores whatever happens, but 
inside of which one stays with the probability p. It was realized that the Value at Risk criteria 
had a fault. It does not allow the correct estimation of risk on the merger of two portfolios 
knowing the risk on each of the two. 
 To alleviate this failing, and to better take into account what happens when the 
threshold is crossed, the expected shortfall was introduced, supplementing the VaR, and able 
to be calculated if one knows the law of loss probability. More generally, it was able to be 
shown that any risk criteria confirming the commonsensical rules expected is necessarily of a 
certain mathematical form. Such criteria are called coherent risk measures. These are used to 
estimate the value of debts, to buy or sell them on the market, and also to calculate the risk 
exposure of banking establishments, keeping in mind their complex portfolios. 
 These techniques of risk quantification favoured the selling of risk on the market, a 
process which received the name of securitization. If insurance companies, or banks, are to 
manage the risks in their field or region, which are correlated, and if these risks are 
independent from one company to another, or less correlated, they have an interest in trading 
risks. To establish a risk market, sellers and buyers need to be capable of quantifying risk, 
hence the interest in mathematization previously brought up. The idea of organizing 
reinsurance in a market where the participants are insurance companies, and where the goods 
traded are risks, was an “amazing” idea which had already been studied by Maurice Allais 
and Kenneth Arrow in the fifties. It is equally applicable between banks, to manage all their 
risk. In the Arrow model, each dealer has their own subjective probabilities. Considering the 
fact that these dealers have different risk measurements from one to another, as they interpret 
the underlying realities behind each asset in a different manner, and that moreover they have 
differing aversions to risk thanks to their differing functions and purposes and hence behave 
differently when faced with the uncertain, risk-for-payment trades were found to be of interest 
for both seller and buyer. Prices can be calculated under ideal conditions of modelling taking 
into account the information to which each dealer had access. 
 In this way, risk markets developed, accompanied by new derivative tools, with a 
stronger role given to opinion on the quality of files given by rating agencies. We will return 
to the debt market and securitization in chapter III-7, as it demonstrates specificities 
distancing it from the classical image of the market. 
 Let us however state right now that certain configurations of derivative credit products 
do not incite banks to prudence. In the case of the CDS (Credit Default Swaps), the most 
current type, a bank rids itself of counterparty risk on a debt or group of debts by transferring 
it to a buyer of risk against payment of a quarterly premium. The bank considers from then on 
that its credit is riskless and that it no longer has to weigh capital against this credit. From the 
other angle, the bank buying up risk, as long as the possible default remains unrealized, is 
remunerated for an invested capital of zero, which is the nec plus ultra, provided that all goes 
well. On the other hand, if there is a default, a significant sum will have to be paid by the 
buyer of risk, who then has an interest in aiding, through supplementary intermediaries, those 
borrowers having difficulty with repayments. We see that, by putting them on the market, a 
bank which is going to rid itself of its counterparty risk tends not to attach too much 
importance to the fine details of the circumstances surrounding the loan it grants, and contents 
itself with the standard evaluations provided by rating agencies. 
 
 However, most risks have a purely semantic and interpretative component which rests 
on a reading of the economy, and, for such risks, trusting in the assessment made by general 
opinion – as one does by putting them on the market – is a logical error, since the majority of 
dealers base their judgements on a prior mathematization, drawn from the evaluations of 
agencies, and therefore bring nothing to the general shortcomings in understanding. In other 
words, it only makes sense to put risk on the market in perfectly calibrated and statistically 
informed situations. 
 The market is poor at playing the role of interpreting subject in more doubtful cases. 
All its methods have the innate failing of considering the interpretative process as being 
closed. Yet on the contrary, far from being fixed, it is in a state of permanent emergence. As 
soon as a new interpretation appears, it engenders new risks perceived only by those who 
understand it. If in 2006 no-one saw the rising property prices and shrinking in household 
savings in the United States as a phenomenon open to various interpretations, the 
corresponding risk was not perceived. The mathematization of the risks eliminates these 
difficulties in hypotheses concerning the extremes of the laws of probability. It is not enough 
to say that these last are poorly understood. They are by nature provisional, fluctuating 
according to the interpretative knowledge agents provide by their understanding of economic 
phenomena. 
 
Practically perfect markets 
In this vast adventure we have just traced, several traits must be stressed as carrying a deep 
significance for the evolution of society in the modern world. 
 The financial world is a gigantic international institution. It reaches extremes in its 
political and economic power, in the hypersophistication of the techniques it uses, and in the 
high level of intellectual capacity it demands, irrigated by university campuses. However, it is 
incapable of restraining this technical nature, of not agreeing wholeheartedly with the 
amplification of the role of mathematical tools. It behaves in this regard like any other 
technology, as philosophers have astutely noted; one could compare it to the nuclear industry, 
in that it constitutes a theoretical and practical world in itself, perfecting itself in the 
esotericism of a specific language composed solely of a group of aristocratic specialists 
sharing a single ideology. It is this which explains how, despite all these highly evolved 
systems, it continues to lurch from crisis to crisis, shaken as if by tectonic plates, because its 
mathematics can only create a normal, monistic science, incapable of making way for a plural 
interpretation of the world. 
 It is strongly self-referential. Financial practitioners concentrate, above all, on their 
screens.  ‘Risks’, for the trader, means the activity of on-screen ‘spots’. No need to go and see 
what is really happening in businesses, nor to make judgements on the impact of the 
innovations foreshadowed by prototypes, let alone to keep track of the global effects of 
progress, of pollution, or of the degradation of natural equilibria. This excessive self-reference 
is the trademark of the new neoliberal period; before, banks needed engineers to understand 
what was happening in industries and services, to know the potential impact of the projects to 
which they were providing credit. The financial world is a kind of technical agglomeration far 
from the real world of the meanings and motivations that weave a tapestry of relationships.  
 The essential point we have to underline here is that the financial markets are quasi-
perfect markets. 
 They are highly imperfect from an economic point of view. They are incomplete, 
which means that, with reference to economic theory, the prices that they indicate only 
contain partial information. In the case of the debt and securitization market, we could even 
say that they function based on abridged information which only takes into account a fraction 
of what would be useful for a correct management of loans. However, they are perfect in that 
they are fluid, instantaneous, and accompanied by auxiliary markets of all predictions 
imaginable. 
 Whilst the markets in merchandise and labour are, for Cournot or Marx, somewhat 
hidden phenomena, which need explanation in order to be demonstrated, the financial markets 
really exist, and are a place where anyone can buy or sell whatever he or she desires, prices 
directly following supply and demand. 
 Except, and this is something we need to examine in more detail, they are not at all 
like the classical or neo-classical economists’ conception of a market. They follow very strict 
laws, imposed by their very perfection – the stochastic laws. 
 
 For the left-wing mindset, the financial markets today represent the designated 
adversary, the source of all evils. The themes and slogans of Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s campaign 
for the French presidential elections of 2012 clearly express this particular reading of the 
international scene, of European politics and of the behaviour of business leaders forced to cut 
jobs and lower social benefits. 
 In fact, denouncing the markets certainly does not have to mean taking a position in 
the slipstream of a tradition constructed in an apparently limitless world of manufacturing and 
consumption. 
 Today, we can no longer conceive of problems in the same way as before. In 1987, the 
Brundtland report, and five years later the Rio Earth Summit, opened the eyes of all of 
mankind to the gravity of environmental damage and the responsibility of leaving the planet 
in an appropriate state for our children and grandchildren. New paradigms appeared and have 
been collected under the ambiguous umbrella term of ‘sustainable development’. Today, this 
new consciousness must be taken into account if we are to tackle the moral questions that 
arise naturally from any criticism of liberalism. 
 It is therefore necessary to return to the two faces of the socialist movement: the 
organization of production for the material well-being of the working classes and against the 
private income of the wealthy; and the ethical issue of greater justice throughout the world, 
following a humanist philosophy which takes precedence over religion, although this latter, in 
fact, has hardly lost its historical importance. 
 
2. What is the ethical basis for the social pillar of sustainable development? 
The Rio Conference was a milestone in the evolution of ideas on a global scale about the 
importance of environmental questions and the need for quick decisions. The main idea put 
forward at the summit, that development could be redirected so as to not harm the 
environment, and even that a real synergy could be found between the true, received 
unanimous agreement; a new path opened up and had to be taken. The Brundtland Report, to 
prepare for the Rio summit, reconciled ecologists and economists. The principle of 
sustainable development was designed along two axes: maintaining the balance between all 
the factors of quality of life, and an obligation to leave future generations a social, economic 
and environmental situation, with enough resources, that will allow them to enjoy a standard 
of living at least as high as ours. This philosophy is based on the three "pillars of sustainable 
development": the economic, reflecting an aim of growth and economic efficiency, the social, 
expressing that it should be based in human needs and thus that development should work 
towards social equity, and the environmental, emphasizing that sustainable development must 
care for the environment, preserving it and its resources for the future. 
 We will shortly give some snapshots from the balance sheet of what happened 
regarding the economy and the environment. But we first need to examine the evidence of the 
social aspect of sustainable development. Why did the Conference emphasize that the 
reference should be human, that the action should be based on the objective of equity, that 
balance and reconsideration of the North-South relations were needed? Some believed that it 
was a simple question of protocol, made necessary by the UN framework, where benevolent 
language was required to achieve the necessary consensus. History shows that humans 
scarcely know how to do anything other than fight each other, so these words were merely a 
form of politeness whose meaning would be forgotten. 
 And that is indeed what happened, albeit beyond all expectations. Facing 
environmental concerns, the selfishness of "everyone for himself economically" was 
amplified to an impressive extent. With a spontaneity and facility that was disconcerting on 
all levels, the burden of solidarity was dropped as an unnecessary encumbrance. This was also 
encouraged by the economic formulation of the desire for actions. The issue became a 
groundswell; it became the big issue: the social dimension of sustainable development. It 
cannot go unconsidered; one cannot pass it by without examining it. 
 What about left-wing values in this respect? 
 
Socialism: a humanism of the productive world 
If we focus on Marxism as one of the historic roots of socialism, it cannot be said to have 
come originally from an ethic of solidarity. On the contrary, it fought against religion (the 
"opium of the people") and all the great narratives – militant, positivist, Saint-Simonian, 
Fourierist, Proudhonian – as well as against social experimenters – Colins, Godin, Leroux, 
etc. Some of these currents wanted to inherit the social cement that religion gave; others saw 
science as the only common basis on which a social consensus could rebuild popular beliefs 
into a "religion of humanity". In contrast, Engels and Marx positioned themselves very clearly 
as atheist materialists only concerned by the clarity of economic forces and the role of human 
labour in the production of history. 
 Marx is Hegel’s heir in some ways though not in others. He retains the dialectic of the 
conscience and of the desire and of that of the master and the slave, the role of man and of 
work: "The outstanding achievement of Hegel’s Phänomenologie and of its final outcome, the 
dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating principle, is thus first that Hegel 
conceives the self-creation of man as a process, [...] that he thus grasps the essence of labour 
and comprehends objective man – true, because real man – as the outcome of man’s own 
labour."13 But, of course, Marx opposed the Berlin master’s idealism "Hegel fell into the error 
of considering the real as the result of self-coordinating, self-absorbed, and spontaneously 
operating thought"14 and the failure of the abstract is what he reproaches all social 
philosophies that indulge in utopia for: "What Hegel has done for religion, law, etc., M. 
Proudhon seeks to do for political economy"15. 
 The relationship between the various streams of socialism in the 19th century and 
anticlericalism, the substitution of a form of brotherhood in place of religious faith, or the 
vision of science as the true basis for a glorious future, are complex and much more nuanced 
than the binary image generally held today16. Among these social and philosophical 
innovations, Marx’s position avoided all appeal to morality, to empathy or to anything that 
could lead to a matrix of good and evil: 
 "Next comes the humanitarian school, which takes to heart the bad side of present-day 
production relations. It seeks, by way of easing its conscience, to palliate even if slightly the 
real contrasts; it sincerely deplores the distress of the proletariat, the unbridled competition 
of the bourgeois among themselves; it counsels the workers to be sober, to work hard and to 
have few children; it advises the bourgeois to put a judicious ardour into production. The 
whole theory of this school rests on interminable distinctions between theory and practice, 
between principles and results, between idea and application, between content and form, 
between essence and reality, between law and fact, between the good side and the bad side.    
 The philanthropic school is the humanitarian school carried to perfection. It denies 
the necessity of antagonism; it wants to turn all men into bourgeois; it wants to realize theory 
insofar as it is distinguished from practice and contains no antagonism. It goes without 
saying that, in theory, it is easy to disregard the contradictions that are met with at every 
moment in actual reality. This theory would therefore become idealized reality.  The 
philanthropists, then, want to retain the categories which express bourgeois relations, with 
out the antagonism which constitutes them and is inseparable from them. They think they are 
seriously fighting bourgeois practice, and they are more bourgeois than the others.    
 Just as the economists are the scientific representatives of the bourgeois class, so the 
socialists and the communists are the theoreticians of the proletarian class.  So long as the 
proletariat is not yet sufficiently developed to constitute itself as a class, and consequently so 
long as the very struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie has not yet assumed a 
political character, and the productive forces are not yet sufficiently developed in the bosom 
of the bourgeoisie itself to enable us to catch a glimpse of the material conditions necessary 
for the emancipation of the proletariat and for the formation of a new society, these 
theoreticians are merely Utopians who, to meet the wants of the oppressed classes, improvise  
systems and go in search of a regenerating science. But in the measure that history moves 
forward, and with it the struggle of the proletariat assumes clearer outlines, they no longer 
need to seek science in their minds; they have only to take note of what is happening before 
their eyes and to become its mouthpiece. So long as they look for science and merely make 
systems, so long as they are at the beginning of the struggle, they see in poverty nothing but 
poverty,  without seeing in it the revolutionary, subversive side, which will overthrow the  old 
society." 17 
 As many commentators have observed, Marx cultivated a subtle position between that 
of a neutral observer, scientifically unassailable, and that of a militant engagement for a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Marx, Manuscripts of 1844, Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole. 
14 Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy 1857. 
15 The Poverty of Philosophy, 1847. 
16 Cf. M. Angenot Les grands récits militants des XIXe et XXe siècles, religions de l'humanité et sciences de 
l'histoire, L'Harmattan 2000. 
17 The Poverty of Philosophy. Chap II The Method. Seventh and Last Observation. 
specific cause. This is particularly clear in this splendid expression: "they have only to take 
note of what is happening before their eyes and to become its mouthpiece", which contains 
the germ of all the historic ambivalence of the Communist party’s actions.  
 In fact, there is a strong ethical choice at the centre of the economic analysis proposed 
in Das Kapital. Marx believes that it is unfair to deny the worker the benefits of his work and 
that it is inevitable that, sooner or later, this will lead to an economic catastrophe in the world. 
It is thus essential to organize the economy to ensure a fair allocation of the worker’s salary. 
But Marx wants to hide this humanism, one could even say that he represses it, in an 
economic argument showing the inevitable collapse of capitalism and hiding the values 
underlying this reading as much as possible. 
 In this critical argument, is Marx identifying the market as a key element of the 
deleterious device of exploitation of the proletariat ? 
 
Marx and the market 
The stock exchange had existed for a long time in Paris and London, but Marx did not put the 
financial markets the heart of the economy’s dysfunction18. However, he often uses arguments 
about the mutual effect of supply and demand. He saw the responsiveness of prices to supply 
and demand, like most economists who at this time were between the classical and neo-
classical views, as a governing principle in all things, and not as a detailed mathematical law. 
 He saw this "law" operating slowly through a change in the decisions that are made, 
for example when the supply of one commodity decreases, capital will irrigate one sector less: 
"Except in the case of a branch of industry which has become obsolete and is therefore 
doomed to disappear, the production of such a commodity (that is, its supply), will, owing to 
this flight of capital, continue to decrease until it corresponds to the demand, and the price of 
the commodity rises again to the level of its cost of production; or, rather, until the supply has 
fallen below the demand and its price has risen above its cost of production, for the current 
price of a commodity is always either above or below its cost of production."19  
 Marx does not see the dynamic interplay of these changes as an evolution similar to 
that of a damped spring that oscillates towards an equilibrium, but as being made of irregular 
movements; the price of one commodity can go above or below the cost of production. "But it 
is precisely these fluctuations which, viewed more closely, carry the most frightful 
devastation in their train, and, like an earthquake, cause bourgeois society to shake to its very 
foundations – it is precisely these fluctuations that force the price to conform to the cost of 
production. In the totality of this disorderly movement is to be found its order. In the total 
course of this industrial anarchy, in this circular movement, competition balances, as it were, 
the one extravagance by the other."20 
 This also applies to the price of labour. For Marx, those who offer their labour, the 
workers, also have their production costs, to feed their family, to learn and train, etc. And the 
adjustment is made also by disruptions such as those caused by industrial disputes or other 
changes. 
 Clearly for Marx the fluctuations in the market are mechanically due to variations in 
supply and demand but these do not explain the actual prices reached for a given level of 
goods. "You would be altogether mistaken in fancying that the value of labour or any other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 We even know, from a few lines in a letter addressed to Lion Philips on June 25th, 1864, that Marx had 
dabbled on the stock exchange "I won £400 in this way and I will start again when the confusing political 
situation opens a new field of action. This way of working does not take much time and it is worth taking some 
risks to extract money from one’s enemies." Marx et Engels, Correspondance (1862-1864) volume VII, Ed. 
Sociales 1979. 
19 Wage Labour and Capital. By what is the price of a commodity determined? (1847). 
20 ibid. 
commodity whatever is ultimately fixed by supply and demand. Supply and demand regulate 
nothing but the temporary fluctuations of market prices. They will explain to you why the 
market price of a commodity rises above or sinks below its value, but they can never account 
for the value itself." 
 Like many economists, Marx thought that behind the oscillations in the market there 
were some "underlying" fundamentals, which could be determined, not only in the large, as 
one might get an idea of the climate of a region based on its daily weather, but with precision. 
For that he relies – repeatedly – on a logical argument about the case where supply matches 
demand, such as if there are ten houses for sale and exactly ten buyers. Marx replies that the 
sellers cannot sell for less than the cost of production and that this cost will therefore be the 
price. "Suppose supply and demand to equilibrate, or, as the economists call it, to cover each 
other. Why, the very moment these opposite forces become equal they paralyze each other, 
and cease to work in the one or other direction. At the moment when supply and demand 
equilibrate each other, and therefore cease to act, the market price of a commodity coincides 
with its real value, with the standard price round which its market prices oscillate"21. Or again, 
"it must be borne in mind that, despite the fluctuations in the prices of commodities, the 
average price of every commodity, the proportion in which it exchanges for other 
commodities, is determined by its cost of production"22. 
 We see that Marx understood the market of goods and work in a very different way to 
the way we understand financial markets today. He thinks that when supply and demand 
reach a state of permanence and equilibrium, then the value is visible and there will be no 
further oscillations. One has found the true value. This is what most economists of the time 
thought. Even today liberal doctrine believes that free trade works with real markets, which 
are variants, due to various discrepancies, of pure markets which would give the true 
economic values of which they are approximations. This is not at all what happens on the 
finance markets, which are the purest realization of the concept of a market. One never knows 
if the "underlying trend" is flat, rising or falling, that cannot be seen objectively, the only true 
value is the spot price and this is inevitably volatile. So to precisely quantify the underlying 
prices of the "real" economy is highly problematic. We will, of course, come back to this. 
 The famous notion of surplus value is based on this analysis, the prices of goods being 
in reality above the cost of production thanks to the fact that wages are kept low by 
unemployment. Marx then explains, over many pages of careful reasoning, how this leads to 
the accumulation of capital. 
  
 The fact that Marx’s analysis of capitalism is very relevant and is confirmed by some 
very recent events in the process of wealth-accumulation, is rather a hindrance to turning 
political concerns towards problems other than those of the production of objects for 
consumption. This is a situation that causes a real obstacle to change in the current political 
life of western countries. Because the struggle between employers and trade unions is 
obviously not a zero-sum game, the two camps both benefit when there is growth. The fight is 
not to decide a fair division of the benefits given by society to one or other, within the 
framework of constraints on resources and environment, imposed by the finiteness of the 
world.  Managers and employees agree that when there is strong growth, the dialogue is easier 
for the two sites at the negotiating table. Also socialists in general and left-wing parties, 
except for the Greens, are in favour of promoting growth whether by public investment, 
reducing interest rates, or by any other means of recovery. The Greens advocate alternative 
energy and green development rather than directly arguing for the decrease which is currently 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Value, Price and Profit. Chap IV supply and Deamand 1865. 
22 Wage Labour and Capital.  The General Law that Determines the Rise and Fall of Wages and Profits (1847). 
inaudible. There is growing criticism of the market today, in that its technical excesses are 
contrary to the good operation of the economy, especially with Keynesians, who see 
competition as creating instabilities that need regulatory action by public powers. 
Environmentalists find support in Keynes’s complaints about speculators who interfere with 
an appropriate distribution of funds, in that those speculators do nothing to help achieve the 
changes needed to deal with long-term concerns. 
 One could say that the aim of pure universal solidarity, which existed at the start of 
social philosophies and of socialism, has found itself so insignificant in the balance of power 
and collective organizations in historic struggles, that its trail is left to others, to charities, 
humanitarian NGOs, etc. and that it will take a long time to be revived to carry some new 
effectiveness. 
 Let us return, then, to the three pillars of the Earth Summit. What conclusions can we 
draw and what is that famous social aspect? 
 
The path outlined at Rio has not been followed 
The ideas of sustainable development were based on numerous studies. We relied a) on a 
decrease in the energy intensity in the countries of the North, i.e., of the energy necessary for 
the production of one unit of GDP, by an improvement in the yields of machines, a reduction 
in waste and the use of raw materials that needed less energy. b) It was thought that 
developing countries would be able to use new technologies whose energy efficiency would 
be similar to that of the most recent discoveries. c) A virtuous expectation that would make 
renewable energy quickly profitable was forecast. 
 These studies only aimed to show feasibility. But the correlation between the 
development trajectory of a country and its energy consumption was underestimated, whereas 
it is actually very strong. 
 Indeed, the situation of the Third World has been dominated by a violence increased 
by economic forces. Vernacular economies in competition with global demand in a global 
market are weakened, and the intense exploitation of the soils and subsoils has not benefited 
human development in these countries. Pollution has grown and urban life has deteriorated. 
Today we see that the peasants of the Third World have fewer choices; if they are to survive 
they cannot also protect the environment. 
 Within the principle of sustainable development, there was the idea that conflicts of 
interests or opinions about risks, damage and pollution would be handled with public debate 
and precaution. This represented a serious change from the one-track thinking of western 
civilization. It was a much more revolutionary aim than the talk of balance and synergy would 
lead one to think. It admitted, ultimately, that there was a need for political management of 
the diversity of the socio-natural realms, and for a new form of coexistence. Yet neither 
behaviours nor the economic principles have really changed, they are still dominated by 
consumption and technology. 
 Instead, in twenty years, the consensus about competition has strengthened. The 
difficulty in balancing the natural pregnancy of economic logic has not been calculated. The 
obstacle lies in the funds necessary for the redirection towards a more proactive and united 
international cooperation. 
 
The absence of distant solidarity 
 It was widely believed, in the West, that the economy was an activity of relation and 
interest that could serve as a basic principle to promote coexistence. It was this basis that John 
Dewey used as the foundation for democracy in a country, the US at the start of the 20th 
century, that was segmented by languages, by race, by the most diverse immigrant religions, 
adding, however, the importance of education23. The same idea is used today for liberal 
globalization. It appears to many political scientists and sociologists as a means of opening 
up, a way of using the practical convenience of manufactured objects to enter into daily life 
and, thus, to open up behaviours that are otherwise governed by immovable religious rules. 
This is undeniable, and it is even likely that it is one of the approaches that could actually, in 
time, change the place of women in traditional societies – and thus influence demographic 
trends – especially if one considers the length and difficulty of establishing legitimate 
international bodies to act for global aims24. 
 When it concerns not only objects but services and media, the effect can be faster but 
this rapidity causes more clashes with deeply held religious reference points. The 19th 
century atheism and anticlericalism of Schopenhauer, Marx, Comte, Mill, Proudhon, Renan, 
etc. established a new political legitimacy of secular life. Then, in the 20th century, Max 
Weber and the philosophers (Heidegger, Habermas, Jaspers, Jonas, Ellul, etc.) insisted on the 
strength of disenchantment and were worried by the invasive and uncontrolled power of 
technology. But what do we see today? Beliefs are stronger than ever. Everyone balances, 
every day, between an individualism conforming to the models of economic theory and a 
strengthening of the links with a local community sharing our feelings. Humanity finds the 
physical limits of our objective material condition. One hesitates to think that these limits are 
absolutely final. They are present in our minds, but simply felt as an increased difficulty in 
managing our life as before.  
 Among the competing interests on the global environment, what is lacking is 
solidarity, and the globalized economy does not provide this. Instead it is an apprenticeship in 
individualism where there was little before. 
 Solidarity has never been very strong; it has never played a decisive role in history, of 
course. The new fact is that it is dormant also at the level of ideas, those philosophies, 
doctrines and wisdoms, which gave it the right to speak, have been gradually silenced. And 
this has not come from an adherence to a different vision. Nobody really believes in 
Nietzsche’s superhuman fantasies or the transhumanists they inspired. What interests us in 
Nietzsche is his contribution to the formation of ideas, how the pursuit of this quest led him to 
relativism of knowledge and to see the world as an infinity of interpretations. The end of his 
life, where the will to power resembled the visions of President Schreber25 and recalled the 
perverse empathy that dictatorships rely on, was a morbid delusion that sends chills up the 
spine. 
 Solidarity has withered when we most need it to give an operational structure. This is 
the real disaster of our time; everything revolves around this problem. We discard the efforts 
of philosophers to make man something other than a generality, and we build a "we", small, 
pretentious and cruel. 
 What is solidarity now? Is there any left? Without repeating the genesis of this fragile 
idea – to keep things simple – let’s say that it is still alive today 
a) in some left-wing thinking, which is not based solely in balances of power and is 
not ashamed of its altruistic ethical basis, 
b) in the universalism of Christianity, which is only one part of that body of beliefs, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Dewey J., Democracy and Education 1916. 
24 About the obstacles the traditions and religions pose to political dialogue, see Latour B.,  Gagliardi P., eds,  
Les atmosphères de la politique, dialogue pour un monde commun, Les empêcheurs de penser en rond 2006. See 
also Paul Heelas et al. Detraditionalization Blackwell 1996. 
25 D. P. Schreber (1842-1911), a German judge affected by paranoia, who had described his own delirium in a 
book used by Freud as the foundation for his psychoanalytic interpretation of paranoia. 
 
c) in the ecological vision of mankind at the heart of the biosphere. That is to say, the 
idea that man is not the philosophical reference point as the victorious species in a 
competition that picks out those humans who will continue this selection without mercy, but 
as one of the expressions of what this sphere of life can allow in the constraints and 
interrelations which characterize it and which increasingly show it to be hugely fragile. 
 
We have already discussed this first point. The second deserves clarification. It is possible 
that man needs religion like he needs sunlight, that it is a characteristic of his emotional 
configuration, pace Freud, to have a sentimental and social bond which relieves him of his 
guilt and of his moral distress at his own desires and actions. But this religious dimension, 
which resembles an exchange, which speaks of redemption, of a benevolent god, of god’s 
love, which establishes a warmth among the faithful alone, this religion-comfort only tends to 
strengthen the status quo. Universalism is a social project. Distant solidarity can only be 
based on ecology, i.e., a view of man with the other living species in a system, sensitive and 
fragile, linked to time scales that the economy does not understand. The adventure of 
technological progress does not, in itself, work towards solidarity. 
 I do not say that it will be easy to establish distant solidarity. Certainly not, we will see 
in the last chapter. I think instead that people in distress and in growing misery are brought to 
live by their wits and that this makes the young more receptive to ideologies of courage and 
of unwavering dedication, so that they are easily exploited by networks of extremist 
ideologues, totalitarianists or mafioso. 
 
 Where is the economy in all this? Here is the question that really concerns us. It 
appears as a dissimulation device. It hides its intentions, its responsibilities, the damage it 
does to the environment. In this book we discuss one of the reasons for this dissimulation, 
linked to the formation of market prices, which has a major role at the level of major global 
issues. But similar phenomena concern other aspects, in particular the organization of credit, 
etc. We have chosen to focus on one single point, because it is insoluble. Capitalism, as 
sociologists have often noted, is extraordinarily adaptable. Criticisms of it often help it change 
its practices, as is relatively easy, the rules which it follows being fundamentally just 
provisional pragmatic conventions between interests recognized as such and thus adaptable 
through negotiation. But "the teeth of the market" are the market itself in its intrinsic logic. 
The problem raised in this book is so constitutive that it escapes all reform. No rule intended 
to settle capitalism down, or make it moral, can be sufficient. Why insist on a question 
currently without solution ? Because, as a mathematician, I know that it is the most difficult 
problems that produce the really new ideas. 
 
II) Collective blindness comes from the economy  
 
When the Club of Rome’s first report appeared in 1972, there was already an acute awareness 
of the problem of governance of technology. War, the arms industry, extermination camps 
and the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs had all shocked minds, like uncontrolled outbursts of 
barbarian impulses. Faced with such extremities, philosophers contemplated the weakness 
and fallibility of the quest for philosophical wisdom, and averred that the dangerous toys of 
science were fostering mankind’s foolhardiness. Heidegger saw the technological system 
(Gestell) as imposing itself through its own insidious logic, imperilling civilization (Essays 
and Conferences 1954). Karl Jaspers abandoned his wise professorial restraint for a violent 
appeal to reason against nuclear technology (The Atom Bomb and the Future of Mankind, 
1963). A number of thinkers engaged in a critical analysis of the technological adventure and 
its uncontrollable consequences on social organization and the environment. Among these 
was Jacques Ellul (The Technological Society, 1954). 
 In parallel with the philosophers, scholars developed their understanding of the 
relationships between physics and living beings, notably making the rather surprising 
discovery that the great issue of explaining the apparent gap between inert matter governed by 
the law of increasing entropy and living beings capable of stockpiling information, a duality 
which had long been a major dilemma for the moralists, found a simple resolution in the 
concept of the open system as shown in the works of Ilya Prigogine (Thermodynamic Theory 
of Structure, Stability and Fluctuations, with P. Gransdorff, 1971), which underlined the 
importance of flux (of energy and of matter). Some were already calling attention to the 
failings of the current body of economic theory in view of the breadth of the problems with 
which it concerned itself. Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen stated that the economy would never 
manage to seize the historicity of economic changes (The Entropy Law and the Economic 
Process, 1971), and bases his argument on the finite nature of the planet as a battleground 
against the laws of entropy as they relate to pollution. 
 No sooner had the Rome report appeared than Dennis Gabor, physicist, Nobel Prize 
winner, and member of the Club, raised the problem of the governability of technology given 
the democratic and liberal structure of Western societies (The Mature Society, 1972). In 
France, René Dumont pitched his candidature for presidency of the Republic (1974) around 
the theme, “What world will we be leaving to our children?” 
 The reception of the Club of Rome’s report was highly negative among economists on 
both the right and the left, and it was nearly accused of sparking the petroleum embargo 
decided upon by the member countries of the OPEC in 1973, which brought on a heavy 
recession. The term ‘Malthusianism’ was used in a pejorative manner towards these views,26 
and the theorists behind them were criticized for not practising real economics, not taking into 
account prices which, thanks to their regulatory role, would modify these forecasts.27 
Democrat Jimmy Carter was aware of this global crisis, and had the courage to broach it: 
“The symptoms of this crisis of the American spirit are all around us. For the first time in the 
history of our country a majority of our people believe that the next 5 years will be worse than 
the past 5 years. Two-thirds of our people do not even vote. The productivity of American 
workers is actually dropping, and the willingness of Americans to save for the future has 
fallen below that of all other people in the Western world”.28 He lost the 1981 elections, and 	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“theoretical” and puts himself back in real economic logic by carrying out neo-classical calculations on the 
prices of exhaustible resources, in the tradition of Hotelling. 
28 20 July, 1979. 
his successor, the republican Ronald Reagan, saw the crisis as temporary, like all economic 
crises, and undertook a vast program of deregulation, following the example of Margaret 
Thatcher in the United Kingdom, in order to create more competition and suppress monopoly 
positions. This policy, coinciding with the historical boom of the financial markets and the 
expansion of international commerce, marked the beginning of the neoliberal period in which 
we find ourselves still. 
 However, public opinion was gradually swayed by the breadth of damage caused by 
material imprudence; the series of technological catastrophes seemed unstoppable: the 
Torrey-Canyon shipwreck (oil spill) in 1967, the Amoco Cadiz shipwreck (oil spill) in 1978, 
the Three Mile Island accident (nuclear) in 1979, the Seveso accident (dioxine)  in 1976, the 
accident in Bhopal, India (pesticides) in 1984, the Chernobyl catastrophe29 (nuclear) in 1986, 
the Pepcon accident (explosion) in Nevada, 1988, the Aznalcollar mining incident (pollutants) 
in Spain 1998, the Erika shipwreck (oil spill) in 1999, the Ievoli Sun shipwreck (pollutants) in 
2000, the AZF factory incident (explosion) in Toulouse, 2001, the Prestige shipwreck (oil 
spill) in 2002, the Tasman Spirit shipwreck (oil spill) in 2003, the Probo Koala affair, Abidjan 
(toxic waste dump) in 2006, etc. 
 Ulrich Beck showed that our society is constructed in such a manner that it produces 
risks affecting more than just the creators of the initiatives. There are two major sources of 
faits accomplis: industrial innovation within the framework of the liberal economy, and 
science itself, in the current functioning of research (Risiko Geselschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine 
andere Moderne, 1986). Moreover, science does not have an exclusive claim to reason. 
Science is implicated through the patent system (the GMO problem). It is essential to be able 
to defer decisions releasing discoveries to commerce when science has still not explored the 
consequences of these innovations. The principle of precaution is contested, and French 
economists are mostly in opposition to it; nonetheless, it was written into the French 
Constitution in February 2005. 
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1. Finitude 
In addition to issues of technology, the question of the finite nature of mankind’s estate is 
steadily becoming an issue of public awareness and the focus of debates both philosophical 
and political. 
 In his remarkable work, cited above, Georgescu-Roegen listed several fundamental 
problems from a scientific point of view, notable among which is the eponymous issue of 
entropy – the question of dispersion. We can recycle telephones and used cars, recovering the 
materials by careful handling, notably by favouring an economy of functionality in which 
goods are not sold but merely lent for use, but ordinary pollution disperses, coins erode and 
we cannot recover the metal. The scale of time over which biological processes have created 
sediments, rocks and mineral veins is beyond human horizons. This question of entropy is 
real and incontestable. However, it is not this that is seizing humanity by the throat. It will 
become one of the chains constraining us, but later. For now, the problem is exponential 
growth coming into collision with the limits of material magnitudes. 
When Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen wrote The Entropy Law and the Economic Process 
in 1971, we were approaching, though had not yet reached, the end of a long period spanning 
roughly a century in which we were wondering how living beings seemed to be governed by 
laws different to those of inanimate material. 
This began towards the end of the Third Republic in France, when Claude Bernard 
described his method for approaching living beings as a physicist. It was noticed that animals 
and plants are often composed of dissymmetrical molecules (stereochemistry) which are not 
to be found in the mineral world. Distinctions were made between chaotic complexity and 
organized complexity, and attempts were made to incorporate statistical determinism 
(Blotzmann, Gibbs) and quantum indeterminism (Bohr, de Broglie, Heisenberg, Dirac, Fermi, 
etc.), the improbability of the appearance of living organisms (Charles Eugène Guye, 
Physico-chemical evolution, 1947) which contradicted the laws of thermodynamics thanks to 
some specific faculty, a kind of intelligence (Brillouin’s negentropy) or vital spirit (Bergson, 
Creative Evolution, 1907), in which humanity would have a specific place (Teilhard de 
Chardin, The human phenomenon, 1955). From the date of Boltzmann’s formula on the 
probabilistic interpretation of entropy (1875) until about 1975, there was heavy pressure for 
research to explain the specific nature of living beings, a specificity which would explain why 
they were not dragged down by the phenomena of degradation or increasing entropy, 
conforming to the second principle of thermodynamics. Many religious people throughout 
this period sided with a specificity of life making it incommensurable with inert matter. We 
are still very strongly marked by this dualistic mentality which constituted the accepted 
framework in the time of our parents and grand-parents. 
 This great question, however, found itself resolved by the study of open systems in the 
1970s, to which the name of Ilya Prigogine is notably attached. Living systems in no way 
breach physical laws, but are simply systems outside of the equilibrium subject to material 
and energetic flux; moreover, they have the property of being reproductive open systems, 
thanks to the interplay of a macro-molecule with a double-helix structure – DNA.30 A simple 
response, which drew acceptance less from Prigogine’s calculations on fluctuations outside of 
equilibrium than from numerous examples of open systems possessing curious properties 
similar to living beings although formed of inert material. 
 The result was a different way of viewing the problem. The specific properties of self-
organization found in a living organism are not due to a particular gift or faculty inherent to it 
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30 whose central role had been detected before the epistemological breakthrough (Cf. E. Schrödinger What is 
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energy flux and therefore upon the sun sustaining the planet. We also know that violent 
radiation destroys molecules, and that we therefore depend upon a narrow range of 
conditions. The notion of ecological footprint is an overly-simplistic expression of these 
constraints. This also shows the artificial and risky nature of nuclear power, a source of 
violent radiation weakened only by the very specific circumstances of the terrestrial 
atmosphere and ionosphere. 
 Whilst finitude is obvious to certain scientific minds, who refer once again to 
Aristotle, it remains unthinkable for liberal economists, who see in it nothing more than a 
crude strategy for the installation of a policy of planned economy. The term ‘limit’ is argued 
over. Old mathematical debates are revived, on the subject of actual infinity, potential 
infinity, Kronecker’s finitism against Cantor’s transfinite. What should we make of it all? 
Mathematicians have many concepts; we say ‘finite’ for the expressed magnitude of a real 
number, ‘bounded’ for a region coverable by zooming out to view the neighbourhood of a 
point, etc. Another fundamental mathematical notion is that of a compact set, whose 
definition is more subtle but in simple cases means closed and bounded, that is to say, limited 
and including its boundaries.  Environmental finitude means that usable space is limited and 
available energy finite (stocks are finite and the flux is finite). It insists on the fact that 
problems cannot be thought of simply as a pack of equations “floating in the air”. Symbolic 
representations make no sense if we do not specify the boundary conditions, especially in 
economics where this is generally not done, either because they are not known, because they 
are thought not to influence reasoning, or because it is thought that some invisible hand will 
take care of them. 
 These considerations, however, do not prevent humans from being able to carry out 
activities lacking in intrinsic limits if these are unrestricted by the limits of their material 
realizations. It was this that the Club of Rome itself aimed to underline in writing No Limits to 
Learning, 197931, in which it insisted upon the crucial importance of education for limiting 
population growth. In fact, this epistemological non-finitude extends to all categories of 
knowledge or practices of a combinatory nature. It thus concerns language, literature, 
philosophy, chemistry and medicine (molecularly combinatorics), information technology 
(formally combinatorics), mathematics via its contemporary representation in the language of 
formal logic, and therefore also the sciences which concern both language and mathematics. 
 These clarifications being made, the general realization as shown by the Club 
concerns the approaching end to all activity of conquest on this planet. When the most up-to-
date version of the report made by the MIT Meadows team (Limits to Growth: the 30-year 
update, 2004) appeared, an enormous body of work confirmed this preoccupation with limits 
to growth and even to economic decline, among which must first be cited the IPCC, an 
epidemic of associations and NGOs, and numerous independent or affiliated authors: Lester 
Brown, Jared Diamond, André Gorz, Jean-Pierre Dupuy, Amartya Sen, Nicholas Stern, Will 
Steffen,32 Tim Jackson, plus the political parties and a myriad of lesser-known authors who 
have entered into the debate via the invention of new economic possibilities.33 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 No Limits to Learning: Bridging the Human Gap, J. W. Bodkin, Pergamon Press 1980. 
32 whose team working for the Climate Change Institute at the Australian National University published the 
important Global Change and the Earth System, a Planet under Pressure, Springer 2004. 
33 Replying to a highly pertinent point from Georgescu-Roegen: "One may think then that the first task of 
economics is to establish some general criteria for classifying all known economic systems into genera, species, 
and varieties. Unfortunately, our economic knowledge in this direction is so little that even an economic 
Linnaeus would not be able to design a system of classification." The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, 
Harvard Univ. Press, 1971, p330. 
Limits to growth 
Let us examine in more detail this collective work from the Club of Rome. Such an 
examination is highly important to an understanding – which is our goal in this work – of why 
this modelling has had so little effect until today. 
 At the time of the report in 1972, most economists, and many industrialists and 
politicians, saw it as an aberration that there could be limits to growth. But subsequently this 
idea, based on solid foundations, has carved out a path. Today, we have been able to see that 
the 1972 report has conformed closely to the events that unfolded over the next thirty years.34 
The first report was reworked a few years ago in order to better take into account certain 
interactions and more accurate and recent data. The variety of different potential futures 
identified and the quality of the commentary lend this study a certain force. Currently, the 
reproaches made towards the team centre more around the fact that these scenarios were not 
assessed in dollars, and therefore could not serve as a basis for any economic prospective, as 
other integrated models do. It was a voluntary choice of the modelling. As the authors 
explain, they considered that it was not clear that one currency could be a reliable unit of 
measurement for conceptualizing the future, especially if one wants to be able to envisage 
economic decline. Firstly, because currencies fluctuate in relation to each other over time, and 
secondly, because to calculate today what the “national accounts” will be for the whole world 
come 2050, using as a unit the current value of the dollar, is a highly risky enterprise, upon 
which economists disagree even amongst themselves. 
 The balance-sheets established by the Meadows team are relatively independent from 
subjective economic interpretations, by virtue of being based on calculations of quantity, 
energy received from the Sun, cultivable areas, population, etc., leading the authors to express 
themselves in terms of specific indicators which they describe quite clearly, these being 
“human welfare” and “ecological footprint”. The general conclusion is that without a highly 
vigilant collective policy, we will always arrive at an “overshoot-collapse” pattern – that is to 
say, excessive growth followed by a large subsidence. The major question, prudently left 
unasked by these authors, is what happens after these collapses. 
 Let us now explore several scenarios presented by the Meadows team, all following 
the overshoot-collapse pattern. 
 1) Society continues on a traditional trajectory as far as is possible without major 
political changes in comparison to the 20th century. The lack of investment in goods and 
services other than non-renewable energies causes a decline in production and leads to 
decreases in nutrition and health. 
 2) Allocations to renewable resources are doubled and improved extraction of primary 
materials (gaining an extra twenty years) is assumed. The population levels off at 8 billion in 
2040 then shrinks, thanks to pollution and a decrease in cultivated surface area. 
 3) Stricter control of pollution achieves a reduction of 4% per year. The profile 
follows the same path, extended over a longer period of time; food production ends up 
insufficient. 
 4) A host of technologies are thought up, significantly increasing agricultural yield per 
hectare. The quantity of agricultural land diminishes nonetheless, and the regime cannot 
sustain itself. 
 5) Techniques to preserve agricultural land, by limiting the extension of urban areas, 
are applied; this postpones the collapse to the end of the 21st century.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Cf. G. M. Turner "A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with 30 years of Reality" Global 
Environmental Change 18 (2008) 397-411. 
 6) Stress is placed on new technologies to reduce pollution, increase agricultural yield, 
preserve cultivatable land, and also economize non-renewable resources. Too high an increase 
in the cost of these technologies renders them unworkable. 
 These scenarios are just illustrations. The principal thesis, well demonstrated, is very 
simple: surface area and available energy are finite, indefinite growth is impossible, and 
current exponential growth, whatever the sector of activity in question, leads to a population 
collapse and a peak in pollution.35 The authors take care to stress that their modelling can only 
be completely indicative after the moment the summit is reached: "we do not describe the 
behaviour of any model element after the point where one significant factor has started to 
collapse. Clearly a collapse of population or industry in the "real world" would change many 
important relationships and thereby invalidate many of the assumptions we have built in the 
model" (p153). The “comedown” details, after the period of exponential consumption of 
available resources, is where these works are notably silent. Policy must take over and 
imagine the plurality of eventualities. Let us stress that the prospective analyses carried out by 
this team do not take into account biodiversity as such, and that the economy they model has 
no military sector. 
 The inertia of the economic supertanker is enormous. Private or public agents are only 
replaced at the rhythm of recruitment and retirement; everything involving good management, 
competence, performance, and methods of evaluation is currently difficult to change.36 
 
The models 
The results obtained for the first scenario have the following shape. As we have mentioned, 
figures in dollars are nowhere to be seen. 
 
scenario1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 We must “cut the bump with a tunnel”, an image taken up again under the term “energy tunnel” in the press 
and association sites, cf. on this point and on sociology and the “off” debates of the Party Conferences, A. Dahan 
“Entre Poznan et Copenhague : le régime climatique au milieu du gué" Natures Sciences Sociétés 17, 2009. 
36 Statisticians do not want to modify their time series: the INSEE’s Tables of the French Economy dedicated in 
its 2008 edition two out of 88 articles to the environment. Changes in indicators take time to be updated, cf. 
Bovar, O., et al. “Les indicateurs de développement durable” INSEE 2008 and the report http://www.stiglitz-sen-
fitoussi.fr de septembre 2009. 
 
scenario1 
  
scenario1 
The other scenarios are similar. 
 I draw the reader’s attention to one essential point: the curves are smooth. We get the 
impression that they are regular, differentiable functions. They have in fact been created by 
mathematical equations which provide regular solutions. This is normal, given the objectives 
of such a model to represent real quantities and to show evolutionary trends. What does ‘real 
quantities' mean here? It means aggregates which have been simplified to make them more 
meaningful and to resemble management tools; for example, ‘industrial production’, 
‘resources’, ‘population’, ‘pollution’, ‘food’. What is of interest to us in such models is the 
logic of quantities which influence each other. 
 
Causes of the neoliberal turning point 
The first report from the Club of Rome was in 1972; the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. The years 
from 1980 to 1990 mark the beginning of what is customarily called the ‘neoliberal’ period, 
with the first consequences of the deregulation policies in Britain and in the United States, the 
globalization of trade on a worldwide level, and the creation of organized financial markets as 
discussed in the first chapter of this work. 
 It is vital not to underestimate the importance of this turning point if we want to shed 
light on some of the difficulties in which we find ourselves today. During the Cold War, there 
was already an acute awareness of environmental problems, and even before the Club of 
Rome and the Stockholm conference on humanity and the environment in June 1972, authors 
such as René Dumont,37 Jacques Ellul,38 Gunnar Myrdal39 in Europe, Barry Commoner40 and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Candidate for the presidential election in France in 1974, on the theme “For another civilization: What Earth 
will we leave to our children? Indefinite growth is impossible”, and author of a score of books on the protection 
of the environment. 
38 Le système technicien Calman-Lévy 1977. 
39 The Challenge of World Poverty, a World Anti-Poverty Program in Outline, Pantheon 1970. 
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen41 in the United States, to cite but a few,42 had arrived at the 
unambiguous conclusion that technological and economic development could not continue as 
it was. The issues of pollution, of the polluter-payer principle, of externalities and how to 
attribute a value to “common goods”, had already been raised. Moreover, the direct 
responsibility of profit and economic competition in the exploitation of exhaustible natural 
resources was absolutely clear, and explicitly alluded to. Commoner wrote in 1968, “no 
economic system can be regarded as stable if its operation strongly violates the principles of 
ecology. To what extent is this true of the present economic system?  In the case of the private 
enterprise system, this question has already been answered in part, for there does seem to be a 
tendency for that system to enhance productivity — and therefore profit — by means of 
technologies that also intensify environmental stress. A more theoretical basis for the 
incompatibility between the private enterprise system and the ecosystem relates to the matter 
of growth”. This biologist had already realized a profound incompatibility, seemingly 
somewhat overlooked today, which is that ecosystems have different rhythms from one to 
another: “the natural turnover rate of a soil system is considerably lower than the intrinsic rate 
of an aquatic system (e.g. fish farm).” As a result, businesses based on one or the other will 
not have the same rate of yield, and in the competition of the market, the rapid cycle will 
prevail over the slow cycle: “an enterprise which is based on an ecosystem with a relatively 
slow turnover rate is necessarily economically “marginal” – if it is to operate without 
degrading the environment. Such enterprises are of obvious social value, but, given the profit-
maximizing tendency of the private enterprise system, are not likely to be operated for 
long”43. 
 All the ecological ideas were already present, just with less factual data on disquieting 
damage. However, the Cold War, and materialist and productivity-oriented competition 
between the two blocs, prevented any transformative policy regarding environmentally 
friendly technology on a large scale, for fear of being overtaken by the other bloc. Ecologists’ 
propositions were not well received by policy-makers, as they were read as arguments aiming 
to clandestinely benefit the other side. Progress, under these conditions, was impossible. The 
negative reception of the Club of Rome’s 1972 report was largely due to such interpretations. 
 After the surprising end of the USSR, unarguably due to the lucid and independent 
personality of Mikhail Gorbachev, this geopolitical issue disappeared, and it would be 
reasonable to expect that ecologists’ arguments would gain gradual acceptance. The situation 
was virtually unique in history: the very real dominance of a single country, whose academic 
and scientific world was the most advanced globally, and which therefore had all it needed to 
act as a responsible leader in this field, for the constitution of a Mature Society, to use the title 
of Dennis Gabor’s work. 
 However, this is not at all what happened. On the contrary, competition was 
exacerbated in the West and extended to the rest of the world, as if the most important 
concern was to preserve the system of free trade and even revive it, rather than seriously 
consider the exhaustion of resources and the finite nature of the planet. It seemed that, the 
adversary being defeated, it was necessary to find replacements to continue the fight. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Science and survival Viking Press 1963 and especially The Closing Circle, Nature, Man and Technology, 
Knopf 1968. 
41 The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, Harvard Univ. Press 1971. 
42 Let us also mention the collective works organised by Urban G. R. Can we Survive Our Future? St. Martin’s 
Press, 1972 
43 Commoner B. op. cit. 
Suddenly, twenty years later, superpowers such as China, Brazil and India have been thrust 
into the same race, a race we no longer know how to stop.44 
 The environment is seen as a battlefield. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The world’s savings now come from developing countries which, by their placement among the richer 
countries, accentuate the pressures of production-consumption. 
2. Individualist collapse 
As soon a money-related crisis comes about, those in control of our society immediately 
take action. The subprime crisis triggered a media circus surrounding systemic risk – a type of 
risk known in principle for some time, but which financial establishments had never seriously 
studied, despite their considerable means. In rapid succession, the public was alarmed, the 
governments helped the banks back to their feet, and the main fires were quickly 
extinguished. State debts became worrying, and the subject of constant discussions. 
The situation is very different for climate change. For over twenty years now, we have 
been aware of the upheavals awaiting us, scientists have examined the issue from all angles, 
and nothing has been done. As for the crisis of resources and growth limits, its simple 
arithmetic is well-known, but all turn a deaf ear to the issue. 
Regarding these upcoming crises, state and business interests run contrary to the general 
interest. Logically, we are talking about a no-sum game involving divergent interests, of the 
‘prisoner’s dilemma’ variety.45 
Where the climate is involved, international negotiations make no real progress. 
Proposed actions are suspected by some to be inequitable for historical reasons, and by others 
to be ineffective because of being deferred until a future time. No real discussion has yet 
engaged the topics of growth, resources and the asphyxiation of the environment. Policies in 
this area are unsystematic and, to greater or lesser extents, primarily concerned with their own 
back yard. The economy, in the time of globalization, allows guidance of the behaviour of 
billions of individuals. The real question is whether, using this leverage, an international 
accord can produce satisfying collective results for the climate, for the problem of mineral and 
energy resources, and for the deterioration of the environment. 
Let us firstly examine climate change, a domain in which considerable work has been 
carried out and which is symptomatic of the new conflicting situations. 
 
The IPCC, bogged down 
What an impressive accumulation of intelligence, at once conscientious and without 
naivety, has been mobilized since the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change in August 1988! Four reports have been accepted and disseminated, with a fifth in 
progress, bringing together the opinions of scientists, across numerous countries, carrying out 
measurements and creating models, all taking slightly different approaches in processing 
considerable amounts of data.46 These works have served as “common knowledge” for the 
successive meetings of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), whose delegates from the 192 signatory countries should have defined how we 
follow up on the Rio Earth Summit and the Kyoto Protocol. 
Firstly, physical models were created. Originally, they were met with disbelief. As 
precision of measurements (of glaciers, ice floes, etc.) improved, there was less reticence, and 
now, the responsibility of mankind in this field is almost universally accepted. In parallel with 
this, the second group of experts examined the consequences of the phenomenon and the third 
group drew up models and economic scenarios in order to put decision-making tools at the 
disposition of governments. 
During the twenty-four years the IPCC has existed, the works it has co-ordinated have 
essentially consisted of modelling. Some economic hypotheses have reached the ears of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Cf. B. Walliser, Théorie des jeux, e-thèque 2006, p26 et seq. If everyone follows their own interest, the 
result will be worse for all concerned than if all work together. 
46 via the global integrated models IMAGE, DICE, TARGETS, GUMBO, IFs, etc. (cf. R. Costanza et al. 
"Integrated Global Models" MIT Press 2007) or lighter modelling targeting certain phenomena or specific 
scenarios. 
wider public, such as the question debated at Kyoto of whether it is better to act on prices, via 
a tax increasing the cost of carbon, or on quantities, by rationing out or auctioning off 
potentially marketable rights of emission, and by progressively reducing emissions worldwide 
in order to reach objectives on the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.47 
These two methods are not equivalent, thanks to uncertainties which translate differently in 
each of the two cases. The economic modelling is highly complex and sustains an immense 
academic literature on problems of conversion to current value, on optimal choices in the face 
uncertainty, and on reaction speeds in behaviour and in technological transfers.48 Experts try 
to capture the behaviour of households, of businesses, and of states. Individuals, economic 
agents, will however be lead by their own interpretations of the situation and of the future, 
interpretations which we do not know and which many try to hide. The economic prospective 
is highly sensitive to the intentions of actors, intentions which constantly change and depend 
in an unknown manner on physical and social modifications. We are advised to concentrate 
on what is ‘politically possible’, an incredibly ambiguous expression which mixes physical 
and economic quantities. 
The only explanation for the absence of reaction is that the economy – by a mechanism 
that it makes sense to clarify – by governing behaviours, prevents us from seeing reality. 
Agents are dazzled, seeing only prices. 
 
Balance sheet: the vehicle just keeps on accelerating 
Worldwide emissions of carbon dioxide are not decreasing. This is the major fact. 
Carbon dioxide has a very long lifespan in the atmosphere, which means that the effects of 
global warming worsen progressively, becoming more and more aggravated year on year. 
Global emissions, currently in the region of 50 gigatonnes of CO2eq,49 have increased by 
roughly 3.5% annually in recent years. In absolute terms, grosso modo, we could say that the 
rich countries that represent a quarter of the global population emit as much as the rest of the 
world and make up three quarters of the GDP. In terms of trends, the increase in annual 
discharges is mainly due to a group of Asian countries (India, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Korea, Japan, etc.). This asymmetrical situation poisons international negotiations. Any 
dialogue immediately stumbles over the issue of responsibility: on the one hand, the 
developed countries, listed in the Kyoto Protocol’s first annex, admit that the present situation 
is, historically, largely due to their own economic development; on the other hand, they wish 
that China, notably, would participate in the diminution efforts in a give-and-take 
compromise. 
Two very different natural phenomena serve to complicate the affair.  Firstly, the 
“distance” between the potential actions which would be taken by governments and what will 
really happen, the “quality” of governance being highly disparate between countries. 
Secondly, the fact that a significant portion of the energy expended in developing countries 
goes towards making products for consumers in developed countries. The concept of carbon 
footprints is an attempt to tackle this phenomenon. Lastly, Russia is in a special position: the 
recession from which it has suffered since the 1990s has reduced emissions, and the country 
might possibly not be bothered by a slight warming of the climate. 
What is of utmost importance in the case of climate change and should be seriously 
considered is that the effort required is minimal. This will certainly not be the case for the 
crisis of economic decline, but where climate is concerned, as Nicholas Stern stated in his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Action on quantities is also known under the term “emissions trading”, or “cap and trade”. 
48 Cf. the recent theses by R. Crassous http://pastel.paristech.org/4809/ and O. Sassi http://www.imaclim.centre-
cired.fr/spip.php?article28. 
49 CO2eq denotes a weighting for the representation of all greenhouse gas emissions. 
famous report,50 only a very slight lowering in standards of life is needed for the countries of 
the OECD, and even less for developing countries. The calculations are carried out by 
economists via comparisons with the evolution of the GDP. The curves showing the GDP of 
regions and countries have to be represented according to time as growing, even accelerating. 
These last five years, the global GDP has grown by 2.5% - 4.9% per year. In the high 
hypothesis (the most costly) of the Stern report, the angle of the curve would still be growing 
and accelerating, just lightly shifted downwards by 5%. In a country whose growth is at 2.5% 
(that of the US in 2010), the disruption – although more complex – is on a scale comparable 
to stopping growth for just two years.51 In a country growing at more than 5% per year, like 
China currently, a stationary regime is returned to for less than twelve months. These figures 
should be compared with natural fluctuations in the GDP. That of the whole world is fairly 
regular, but those of individual countries are much more varied, relatively speaking. 
Germany’s GDP remained stationary between 2001 and 2002. The GDP of the US fell by 1% 
in 2011. Moreover, the ups and downs felt by households are even more significant given the 
variability in return on different sectors of activity.52 
It will not be the same for the “comedown” after the period of exponential consumption 
of available resources. In the case of global warming, it would be incorrect to say that no 
political decision has been made. The US and Europe in particular have committed to a series 
of measures, among which is the putting in place of negotiable rights of emission (cap and 
trade), which will allow the brakes to be applied in the forthcoming years.53 In fact, for now, 
the restrictions are planned from 2012, and it is doubtful that the Brussels Commission and 
the Washington Congress will be very attentive to the state of progress in international 
negotiations before tightening the belt. 
 
Red light, green light 
It is worth spending an afternoon watching children play this subtle game. Sometimes 
the rhythm is regular, “red light, yellow light, green light!”, and seems to authorize a regular 
progression; sometimes a brusque turnaround, “red light.... yellowlightgreenlight!”, catches 
more confident players red-handed. The game amuses girls and boys alike, and the best 
strategy is unclear. You have to be able to instantly freeze, becoming perfectly motionless. 
But how then to still arrive first at the wall you are all aiming to reach? 
 
Talks on energy and climate have been set up in a game where everyone is told to slow 
down but where being first to finish still means victory. 
 
According to physical models on the greenhouse effect, the IPCC has quickly become 
involved in economic studies. It obviously seemed enlightening to better know what the costs 
were and to be able to compare strategies and efforts in economic terms.  That it is necessary 
to pose the problem in economic terms has become an axiom for the IPCC. We know now 
that the climate will deteriorate. This has already begun. The question is the breadth of this 
degradation and its unequal repartition according to region. If we think of negotiation in 
purely economic terms, be it a globally managed coal price or an absolute limit on emissions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/ sternreview_index.htm 
51 In the United States, within the framework of energy policy (the American Clean Energy and Security 
Act of 2009) aiming to "promote to the United States an economy of clean energy", the Environmental 
Protection Agency has conducted studies and comparisons of models in order to assess the trajectories of 
reductions in emissions as envisaged in the document Waxman-Markey Discussion Draft. It reaches 
comparable orders of magnitude. 
52 To give an idea of the orders of magnitude involved, let us note that the savings rates of households in 
OECD countries ranged from 2.7% to 12.7%. 
53 On the European climate and energy package, see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/climate_action.htm 
and marketable rights, or any other mix-and-match formula, it is clear that the health of a 
nation-state in 20 or 30 years time, faced with the real, serious, even dramatic difficulties 
which will arise, essentially depends on the vigour of its development from now until then. In 
other words, the “economic all”, which again thinks of the future as being organized solely 
according to the rules of current liberal globalization, necessarily leads to generalized 
dissimulation behaviour. 
Why, in our capitalist system, are agents strongly encouraged to carry out business as 
before? The general atmosphere is given by economic media, which are more resistant to any 
form of regulation and contest the justification behind any change not dictated by profit. For 
example, an editorial from the edition of The Economist dated May 18th to 22nd, 2009, 
opposed regulation of the system following the sub-prime crisis: “Smarter regulators and 
better rules would help. But sadly, as the crisis has brutally shown, regulators are fallible. In 
time, financiers tend to gain the advantage over their overseers. They are better paid, better 
qualified and more influential than the regulators. Legislators are easily seduced by booms 
and lobbies. Voters are ignorant of and bored by regulation. The more a financial system 
depends on the wisdom of regulators, the more likely it is to fall catastrophically.” 
In more concrete terms, the breadth of uncertainties we face wherever the environment 
is concerned prevents us from trying new approaches. If we base our figures on estimates 
from the IPCC, for a goal of stabilizing CO2eq at 550 ppm,54 the marginal costs of reduction 
in 2030 would be between $5 and $80 per tonne, an interval ratio of 1:16. Under these 
conditions, any industrialist attentive to the energy-carbon calculations of his business must 
evaluate investments whose marketability, even with various supports, is extremely uncertain 
when compared to a long-term interest rate of the type with which the financial markets 
provide him today. Rather than being the first among his competitors to throw himself into 
such an adventure, he is practically forced to wait for the range of prediction to narrow. 
I am not insisting on the system planned since the Kyoto Protocol, known as the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), which authorizes industrial countries committed to 
reducing emissions to invest in projects which reduce emissions in developing countries as an 
alternative to onerous reductions at home – a reasonable idea, but one which opens the door to 
various hard-to-control schemes of diversion, denounced today as “carbon leakage”. 
The key point here comes from the fact that public policies create and buy intentions. 
Regulatory paths of action compatible with a liberal economy are essentially incentives, and 
the key today is agreements, paid in financial aid, on future behaviour of businesses. If the 
compensations are hypothetical advantages down the line, the uncertainties become 
paralysing, as we have seen; if they take place from the beginning, the risks are real and 
asymmetrical. Objectively, the notion of intention is blurred and even impossible to define. 
Years go by and the question of knowing whether or not the initial ruling is being followed 
becomes problematic.55 Public expenditure or a fiscal advantage against a promise of action, 
meaning a mitigation of emissions, always carries the risk of non-delivery on the public side. 
Over the ten or twenty years to come, many things could happen: mergers, splits, buyouts of 
failing businesses, relocations across borders, changes in legislation due to political and social 
necessities, all of which means that the transmission of commitments is not assured. The 
owners of an enterprise – in other words, stockholders – are not the signatories of such 
agreements, so commitments are in constant play with new constraints, and in any case non-
profitable actions will not be implemented. Capitalism allows various ways to keep promises 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 ppm meaning ‘parts per million’. 
55 Knowing whether someone is following a rule of conduct or not is not simple. The philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein showed that observation of behaviour is not usually enough to say. See Ph. de Lara L'expérience du 
langage, Wittgenstein philosophe de la subjectivité, Ellipses 2005, p83 et seq. 
made – the term used is to “cover” commitments – by means of new promises.56 The most 
flagrant and spectacular proof of this is the fact that many countries, including the US, have 
for a long while lived above their means with a balance deficit, perennially. “Sustainable 
development”, then is founded on a system of debts corbelled on each other like bridges built 
over a void, held up by successive voussoirs.57 
Leaving as much freedom as possible to economic interplay in climate negotiation is a 
path besmirched by iniquity, as it is the industrialized countries who have most polluted and 
who owe a great deal of their current prosperity to said pollution. However, it would be 
similarly unjust in terms of the future. If we compare GDPs, it would mean that one quarter of 
the world would be able to buy up the largest portion of emissions remaining between now 
and stabilization.  
In any case, economic reasoning slows the intelligence of actors. Paralysed and 
obsessed, they become incapable of applying the brakes.  
 
From denial to fatalism, or to the argument of authority 
Firstly, there are claims made following the pattern, “I am a scientist and I think 
everyone is mistaken, therefore climate change is not a scientific reality”. These modern 
equivalents to Herostratus do not deserve any more citation here, given that journalists 
already give them undue attention in the name of a “balanced” discussion.58 
Also worth mentioning is the particular style of encyclopaedias which prefer to take the 
position of listing a sequence of objections rather than assume the responsibility of venturing 
an opinion. I think that anyone willing to change their habits and do their best to combat the 
greenhouse effect on a daily basis would have only to read the Wikipedia articles on the 
subject and they would revert to their old habits as if nothing had happened. It is a mockery of 
knowledge based on multiple speculations: it becomes impossible to speak of a bay horse 
without one person calling it darker, and another lighter, than chestnut. The result is a lack of 
unity, thanks to minor details which take on an excessive importance; for an example, see the 
“hockey stick” controversy surrounding graphical reconstructions of chronological histories 
of temperature, which gives the impression that the whole subject is similarly shambolic. 
Seeding doubt is another explicit strategy practised by a number of economic actors. 
David Michaels showed, remarkably, how scientific controversy is perverted towards purely 
commercial ends in the United States in the matter of harmful pharmaceutical products or 
those with serious side effects.59 Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway established that these 
marketing techniques, which insinuate themselves into scientific uncertainties, have been 
simply and directly ported across from the case of the tobacco industry to the case of global 
warming, and by the same people.60 Nor is the current wave of climate scepticism, highly 
vocal in France and recently experiencing a vigorous resurgence among Republicans in the 
US, without links to the economic interests of subjects related to oil production.61  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Cf. P.N. Giraud Le commerce des promesses, Seuil 2001. 
57 The fact that this situation has now spread to most of the countries of the OECD (cf. the IMF April 2012 report 
on global financial stability) renders this "equilibrium" even more "metastable". 
58 I refer for example to the article by J.C. Hourcade and V. Journé, "Monsieur Homais, les guides de 
montagne, le maître nageur" Critique Internationale 2003. 
59 Michaels D., Doubt is their product, How Industry's Assault on Science Threatens Your Health, Oxford Univ. 
Press 2008 
60 N. Oreskes and E. Conway Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues 
from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming, Bloomsbury Press 2010. 
61 See Zaccai E., Gemenne F., Decroly J.M., Controverses climatiques sciences et politique, Presses de Science-
Po 2012, as well as the series of conferences from the University of Lausanne 
http://www.unil.ch/gse/page89167.html	  
Even more explicit, and worthy of more attention, are those pseudo-pragmatic positions 
of the type which claim “whoever tries to be an angel will act like a fool”, calling for 
vigilance against lowering our guard vis-à-vis international competition. Such is the case of 
President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing who writes, “Once these fossil fuels have been extracted 
from the ground, they will be consumed in any case, and will produce emissions of carbon 
dioxide. If it is not us who do so, it will be others, and the level of emissions will remain 
exactly the same. The only solution would be to limit the extraction of oil, natural gas and 
carbon, but there is no worldwide consensus allowing the proposition of such a thing”.62 Let 
us insist upon three points:  
1) Renewable energies cannot provide the power (energy over unit of time) of the 
resources currently consumed. 
2) The argument “if it not us who do it, others will” is unacceptable because it 
encourages all kinds of barbarity: corruption, child labour, trade in organs, opium farming, 
etc. The relaxation of ethical principles being a source of profit, it finds itself already the 
beneficiary of much neoliberal reasoning.63 
3) Petroleum resources of varying ease of extraction, bituminous sands, shale oil, 
natural gas, lignite, and coal all form a considerable continuum which, if exploited with our 
current voracity, will mean a climactic catastrophe on a much larger scale than those 
envisioned by group II of the IPCC, and will lead to massive disruption of human colonies 
and natural fauna at an unprecedented rate. 
We also find analyses which are perfectly valid, but lead to such an overly poetic 
emphasis that the issue seems to actually pass us by. 
Finally, we come to a line of argument which permeates far more deeply into Western 
society and the academic world, and which arrives at its economic position by returning to its 
traditional core – neo-classical theory. For example, William Nordhaus, an expert on the 
economics of climate change and a professor at Yale, has long believed that the best solution 
would be to internationally agree an objective, a temperature rise not to be exceeded,64 
because the DICE model responded to this constraint in the least onerous scenarios, despite 
the fact that political reality would not allow the problem to be approached in this way. Jean 
Tirole, for his part, supports a quantity control for negotiable rights of emission, with 
questions of equity being resolved by initial allocations of quotas.65 However, Nordhaus 
believes today that this procedure is ineffective and speaks in favour of an internationally 
harmonized tax.66 In all these cases, little place is left to politics. It is seen as a toolkit for 
putting economic truths into action. 
Economists are incapable of seeing the economy’s responsibility in this matter. We fall 
into a ‘red light, yellow light, green light’ scenario, supplemented by a handicap system based 
in initial allocations or on taxes. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Preface from Ch. Gerondeau’s CO2: un mythe planétaire, Toucan 2009 : "Dès lors que ces énergies 
fossiles sont sorties du sol, elles seront de toute manière consommées, et produiront des émissions de gaz 
carbonique. Si ce n'est pas fait par nous ce sera fait par d'autres et les émissions de gaz carbonique 
resteront au même volume. La seule solution serait de limiter l'extraction du pétrole, du gaz naturel et du 
charbon, mais il n'existe aucun consensus mondial pour le proposer" 
63 For example, a recent edition of The Economist recommends legalizing trading in kidneys in order to shrink 
waiting lists and avoid the black market (Nov 16th 2006). 
64 W. Nordhaus "Discounting in Economics and Climate Change, An Editorial Comment" Climate 
Change 37, 315-328, 1997. 
65 J. Tirole Politique climatique, une nouvelle architecture internationale, Doc. Française 2009. 
66 W. Nordhaus "Economic Issues in a Designing a Global Agreement on Global Warming" Keynote 
available on the Internet, March 2009. 
 
Each point represents a Nation-State. The diagram shows that the cloud of points tends towards zero 
tangentially with the x-axis (most of the population is under the line which connects the origin with 
Russia). This shows that making everyone pay the same price for carbon across the world is a harsher 
constraint on the way of life of poorer countries. This amounts to a tax which takes more from low incomes 
than the tax on personal income does in the countries of the OECD. 
 
Unspoken Malthusianism 
The positions Malthus took towards the end of the eighteenth century met with a harsh 
reception, partly for being an explicit dissociation with the poor, and partly because they did 
not inspire confidence in progress as a solution to problems. In his Essay on the Principle of 
population (1803), he writes that “the perpetual tendency in the race of man to increase 
beyond the means of subsistence is one of the general laws of animated nature which we can 
have no reason to expect will change”, and that this is the cause of misfortune and vices. His 
principle theory is that “Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. 
Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio”. This theory is flawed in a growing 
economy, as has been shown by both economic theories and figures from periods of 
expansion such as that from which we are still yet to emerge. Malthus was opposed to the 
Poor Law Amendment Act67 of 1834: “it appears to me that we are bound in justice and 
honour formally to disclaim the right of the poor to support”. He published his metaphor of 
the world banquet and denied the right of the poor to children: "A man who is born into a 
world already possessed, if he cannot get subsistence from his parents on whom he has a just 
demand, and if the society do not want his labour, has no claim of right to the smallest portion 
of food, and, in fact, has no business to be where he is. At nature's mighty feast there is no 
vacant cover for him. She tells him to be gone, and will quickly execute her own orders, if he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Cf the interesting introduction by J.P. Maréchal to Malthus, Essai sur le principe de population t1 and 2, 
Garnier-Flammarion 1992. 
does not work upon the compassion of some of her guests. If these guests get up and make 
room for him, other intruders immediately appear demanding the same favour. The report of a 
provision for all that come, fills the hall with numerous claimants. The order and harmony of 
the feast is disturbed, the plenty that before reigned is changed into scarcity; and the 
happiness of the guests is destroyed by the spectacle of misery and dependence in every part 
of the hall, and by the clamorous importunity of those, who are justly enraged at not finding 
the provision which they had been taught to expect. The guests learn too late their error, in 
counter-acting those strict orders to all intruders, issued by the great mistress of the feast, 
who, wishing that all guests should have plenty, and knowing she could not provide for 
unlimited numbers, humanely refused to admit fresh comers when her table was already 
full."68 
 Malthus was wrong in both his intentions and his recommendations when he thought it 
necessary to instruct the people that man has no a priori right to food: “it is not the duty of 
man simply to propagate his species, but to propagate virtue and happiness; and that, if he has 
not a tolerably fair prospect of doing this, he is by no means called upon to leave 
descendants”.69 His extreme utilitarian ethics, dividing up and sharing out a “moral 
arithmetic”, and the religious clothing with which he covers it, are naught more than 
justifications of the privileges of the old regime in the face of the ideas of the French 
Revolution. Marx and Proudhon are for once in agreement when they denounce this 
sycophant in the service of the ruling classes: “The economists were the first among us to, by 
an inconceivable blasphemy, elevate the theory of Malthus to the level of holy dogma. I am 
not accusing them any more than I am slandering them. The economists are in this acting in 
the best faith, with the best intentions in the world. They would love nothing better than to 
bring happiness to the human race; but they cannot conceive how, without some organized 
system of homicide, equilibrium can exist between population and subsistence”.70  
  Proudhon did not realize when writing these lines to what extent the limits of the planet 
proved his subject right. Malthus, the economic priest, the simplistic moralist, had advanced 
using bad arguments an idea which was two centuries ahead of its time. Is it not that which 
Malthus advocated which is now in full progress? 
 For this to be possible when all civilized minds condemn his theories, it has to happen 
without anyone really wanting it. Here the economy comes in as the great dissembler. Modern 
liberal society applies Malthus with the utmost efficiency, that of unawareness. 
 
Cassandra is a Leftist... 
The denialist programme is especially noxious when you take into account the fact that 
it clearly harms the weakest among us. In addition to the material difficulties from which 
many peoples of the southern hemisphere suffer, they also have to bear the weight of a 
growing number of insidious criticisms: 1) their economy is “dirty” because it produces a 
higher amount of CO2 in relation to their GDP, 2) their forests are shrinking, 3) their 
governments are inefficient, even incapable, when it comes to applying economic measures. 
(It is unclear how this could not be the case, given that these governments represent a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Essay on the Principle of Population, 2d edition 1803. 
69 ibid  book IV chapter IX. 
70 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Les malthusiens (1849) : "Les économistes ont les premiers parmi nous, par un 
inconcevable blasphème, érigé en dogme de Providence la théorie de Malthus. Je ne les accuse pas plus que je ne 
les calomnie. Les économistes sont en cela de la meilleure foi, comme de la meilleure intention du monde. Ils ne 
demanderaient pas mieux que de faire le bonheur du genre humain; mais ils ne conçoivent pas comment, sans 
une organisation quelconque de l'homicide, l'équilibre entre la population et les subsistances pourrait exister." 
negligible financial presence, powerless compared to multinational firms, except in the case 
of dictators).71 
I believe, in the vein of Jean-Pierre Dupuy, that alarmism is all in all more useful than 
dyed-in-the-wool optimism. The population is subjected to endless optimistic ramblings in 
order to inspire confidence in them. Is the goal to keep them behaving in the same fashion as 
they already are? The great turning point of this is that optimism becomes unreliable footing, 
“rotten floorboards”, when it comes to collective morality. Many systems of thought which 
praise progress for the sake of progress, regardless of its destination – and they are numerous 
– find themselves at odds with this. 
 
... but she causes people to vote for the Right 
Alarmism, in a strongly mediatized democracy, worries people and reinforces the 
propensity towards possession for self-protection. It draws middle-class, and even working-
class, votes towards the Right.72 The major media generally take the individualist point of 
view and try to give the best advice to allow households to avoid inconvenience. Since its 
inception, capitalism has implanted a highly effective popular mindset, which thinks of daily 
life in terms of a small, well-directed business with its assets and its accounts. This has 
become the immediate understanding of everyone, from old ladies in Paris or London, to 
vendors in North-African medina quarters, to Brazilian or Russian ministers. 
The attitude of difficulties and decline will, in all likelihood, reinforce an attraction 
towards the upper classes and accentuate the value of comparative goods. Although this 
means a convergence towards a regime in which everyone limits their environmental 
footprint, privileges of all kinds will tend to become marketable goods acting as a form of 
insurance. 
Elections in democratic countries obstruct the emergence of political powers whose 
programme consists of restrictions to help the planet. Objections in Europe and current 
political debates advance extremely scattered criticisms of liberalism, falling into either the 
historical camp of Marxist and socialist arguments in favour of growth, or into that of the 
nationalist Right which advocates an economic development just as it was before 
globalization. 
In the corridors of the meetings of climate-change experts, the argument repeated ad 
infinitum can be summed up in the following formulation: “The Chinese and the Indians 
understand nothing but the economy.” To this, suspicion is added regarding the capacity of 
the governments of these countries and those of the third world to really govern. Agreements 
with them would be worthless and would not modify the way of life of these populations. 
The only issue would be to “find a virtuous economic mechanism”. 
Here, we find a fundamental contradiction, which we shall examine in more detail in 
chapter III:1, regarding common goods. It constitutes a misunderstanding of the reality of 
divergence of interests, thought of in an economic framework. We cannot look to desire to 
prevent a system founded on desire. This is an oxymoron and, like all contradictory 
injunctions, is paralysing and buries problems without resolving them. 
 The future depends on the potency of a non-Marxist critique of liberalism. 
 
 
The spiral of indispensable warfare 
Scholars can see a sombre future ahead – catastrophic, if nothing is done. Blowhards 
denigrate it, acting on all kinds of motives. Finally, each human being comes to perceive the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Some directors of large firms earn more, on a personal level, than the GDP of certain African countries. 
72 This complex phenomenon was analysed in detail in the case of the State of West Virginia in the work 
of Thomas Frank What's the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of America, 2004. 
general problem and finds him or herself caught up in personal constraints and anxieties. 
Situating collective talks in an economic framework via negotiations (“I’ll give you some of 
my rights to pollute, you bring me a bit of clean technology, we’ll agree on the price and both 
win...”), whatever the terms might be, leads to an impasse, as it can only accentuate the 
imbalance of interests in favour of individual views and to the detriment of collective visions. 
Following the agenda of trade, few societal advances would have seen the light of day: the 
abolition of slavery? Or of the death sentence? Minimum wages? Etc. For humanity to realize 
that it is necessary to limit economic reasoning and make way for collective politics – hence 
endowed with power and means – are we going to need the next two generations to live 
through some highly eventful years?  
Ecological footprint is an indicator. Originally introduced by Mathis Wackernagel to 
evaluate how much nations use from nature, it has been adapted by the Meadows team to 
qualify how much a human being uses in terms of square metres of soil for his food needs, 
material goods and services, and for the clean-up his consumption generates. This assessment 
can be carried out in various ways, notably in accordance with the role played by nuclear 
energy. As a simplistic and evocative image, we can say that ‘ecological footprint’ indicates 
the shadow each human casts on the Earth, once everything is taken into account. 
Undoubtedly, many uncertainties pervade this kind of calculation, but it seems clear enough 
that the countries of the OECD are, by the quantities of non-renewable resources they 
consume, living above and beyond the means of what the planet can support on average. 
As a result, it seems highly probable that people from poorer countries will never 
become well-off in the same way – with the same ease – as we currently are. There are not 
enough resources. This remark, present in the initial works of the Club of Rome, did not echo 
widely enough. It shows as mistaken the idea that population control can be realized through a 
process of behaviour modification due to increasing standards of living, similar to what has 
happened in Europe, but following more the type of restrictive rules we see nowadays in 
China. A complete reversal is in the process of occurring. This reinforces what was said above 
about the injustice of setting a fixed price on carbon, as some experts stubbornly advocate.73 
Whilst until now, in general, commerce was an appeasing factor in hostilities between 
peoples, in a situation of shortage, the setting-up of trade eats even more into rare resources. 
Social imbalances and instabilities tend to worsen: economic development risks exacerbating 
the causes of discord. 
Economists have a tendency to believe that, by noting that man is not good, they justify 
the methods and arguments of their discipline. But this argument does not work. Without 
doubt, modern man, his intelligence multiplied by communication technology, is less inclined 
to compassion and altruism insofar as he senses the correlation between problems and the 
number of his fellow creatures. However, he is appealing more and more strongly to an 
effective political structuring which can save him from this slippery slope. Recently, the 
worldwide Union for the conservation of species published a quadrennial report, the most 
exhaustive representation of planetary biodiversity ever realized, which confirms a fall in the 
number of extant species between a hundred and a thousand times faster than those of the 
great periods of extinction of the past: “We can only state that the international community 
which, in 2002, set itself the goal of curbing this tendency by 2010 has failed”. This failure is 
widely felt to be the result of economics as a whole. 
 
Two recent facts, which attracted numerous comments, are telling of a new attitude 
towards economic difficulties. Firstly, the demand made to taxpayers to bail out banks in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 In addition, poorer countries are relatively more vulnerable to damage due to climate change, cf B. 
Quenault, "Changements climatiques et risques sécuritaires multiples" in Une économie politique de la 
sécurité, Cl. Serfati ed., Karthala 2009. 
distress under the pretext of safeguarding against systemic risk, and then secondly, the 
proposition made by certain firms (British Airways) to their employees of working for free 
out of altruism towards the company. 
The appeal to the argument of extreme necessity and this type of blackmail, using 
threats of unemployment, show that economical logic can go tremendously far in influencing 
behaviour. 
Since Rio, negotiations on climate have been directed towards the field of economics. 
The agreement, by stating that we should get involved “to allow economic development”, 
blocked any collective decision which could have restricted growth. Political principles have 
not been built equally for everyone in the boat but only according to the value of what each 
castaway possessed, because political institutions were and are gravely insufficient. We know 
that we are facing a huge crisis and we pretend not to see it. Some think, without saying so out 
loud, that the worst is reserved for others and that the more time passes, the more they will be 
proportionately better off, so that if conflict erupts they will emerge dominant.74  
But such an idea, historically, does not stand up. It has a gaping flaw, which is the 
impossibility of knowing the nature of the reactions that frustrated and humiliated people will 
have. 
 
At this point, it would be helpful to reread the remarkable work (his first book) 
published by Keynes in 1919 shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, in which he 
warned of the ill-considered risks with which this treaty was weighing down the future: “A 
policy of reducing Germany to servitude for a generation, of degrading the lives of millions of 
human beings, and of depriving a whole nation of happiness should be abhorrent and 
detestable – abhorrent and detestable, even if it were possible, even if it enriched ourselves, 
even if it did not sow the decay of the whole civilized life of Europe”.75 The issue, recall, was 
that Germany should pay compensation, assuming sole responsibility for the war and for all 
the damage done to the civil populations of the Allies and their property. Following the 
principle of “Germany must pay”, the representatives at the conference proceeded to carry out 
economic evaluations which Keynes reports and discusses in detail.76 His aim was above all to 
consider the future consequences of the Treaty’s economic decisions...77  
 For very old civilizations like those of India or China, and not forgetting Iran, the great 
leap forward carried out a century and a half ago by the West can be seen as an adventure, the 
damage caused by which should be repaired by the trouble-makers who led it – in any case, 
powerful ideologies can feed off this kind of reasoning. When parts of Bangladesh are 
underwater and India and Pakistan are faced with legions of millions of incoming migrants, 
the calls for compensation will be even more vigorous. 
 
Refusing to participate in the indispensable economic effort will lead us into a spiral of 
“justified hatred” similar to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and our children will ask us how 
such a thing could ever have been born. 	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A new orthodoxy reunites “the neo-classical analysis of conflict” and neoliberal 
thought. It sees war as the result of pre- or anti-capitalist groups, and the solution as lying in 
the globalized neoliberal system, hence the need for war since its earliest beginnings in order 
to create beneficial conditions (rogue states and terrorists) and the interest in maintaining high 
military spending.78 However, people in distress will not abandon their beliefs or the hope for 
descendents in the way that the Native Americans took the Spanish for the beloved of the 
gods. They will fight to the death because history validates them, and can sacrifice part of the 
population in order to exert influence. All sides will believe they have the “best” reasons for 
using force to defend the environment and survival. 
What leads people into such traps? The conviction of being in the right. The question is 
not only how to dismantle the false claims of the economy, but also whether this mindset is 
capable of accepting other interpretations of the world. 
 
Fuel is needed to vanquish inertia 
We are at an impasse. The importance of the crises to come is not inspiring the forces of 
society to action. The necessary general awareness has not arisen. The new concerns we face 
resist integration with the economy, and do not penetrate it. Partial solutions can be found, but 
global problems are accumulating and we still arrive at the conclusion pronounced in 2001 by 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan: “We must stop being so 
economically defensive, and start being more politically courageous”.79 
In fact, it would be necessary henceforth to undertake a constructive project of global 
governance. Never in history have such good arguments been presented for this. The current 
organization of the United Nations and its constituents was established to ensure lasting peace 
following the Second World War; the issue now is of taking notice of the incapacity of states 
to act together in the long-term to undertake a political process of world government. The first 
matter of urgency is to acquire means of efficiently collecting accurate information and 
objectives on pollution, water, forests, soil erosion, population, renewable and non-renewable 
resources, etc. This means the formation of an international scientific and technical network 
of observers led by the UN. We already know much, but the system of measurement is a basis 
of credibility. In parallel with this, a pragmatic and open study must be conducted on the 
paths to follow if we are to arrive at legitimate political institutions – this being the key word 
here. A group similar to the IPCC would be set up, consisting of lawyers, political scientists 
and historians from all countries, which would work out syntheses of various procedural 
options and decisional stages to be taken by the UN, the only current international body 
possessing even a hint of legitimacy. Numerous works can serve as points of departure, such 
as those of Pierre Calame and of the Charles Léopold Mayer foundation.80 It is clear that, in 
order to be useful for anything, worldwide political authorities must be legitimate, which 
means certain procedures will be needed as an obvious condition a) for them to be entrusted 
with a control and intervention force to ensure decisions are followed, and b) for them to be 
able to carry out a restructuring of taxation, working with states where internal processes are 
concerned, and in its own name for the preservation of collective goods – oceans, glaciers, 
fauna, etc.81 
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So, in pursuit of resolution of the climate dilemma, we have come to this (even more 
difficult) issue, the setting-up of global government. The supra-nationality in the European 
construction already shows the reticence demonstrated by a large part of the population. 
Leaders and the elite have similar reservations, fearing an end result of an enormous 
bureaucratic machine run by a restrictive executive, poorly informed when it comes to social 
and local realities. And, above all, the worry is that the legitimacy be hijacked and power 
captured by one or another particular category. 
We arrive at the conclusion that the only means of action likely to demonstrate 
efficiency equal to the level of difficulties posed by this enormous problem is to use the 
money of the rich, for the pure and simple reason that money is needed to get things moving. 
A recent report from the World Bank arrived at the same conclusion.82 It goes further, 
showing that a pragmatic taking-into-account of this commonsensical fact dissipates the 
logical conflict paralysing the system in the prisoner’s dilemma: it is also in the best interest 
of developed countries. 
The reasoning is as follows. As those who are most responsible for the situation, 
developed countries cannot do nothing, but their action alone is in any case insufficient. They 
must therefore set in motion a process of significant reduction of emissions and help 
developing countries rapidly move towards economies which do not produce extravagant 
amounts of carbon. A partial climate agreement concerning only industrialized countries 
leads, necessarily, to a temporal discrepancy in global results and therefore to additional costs 
for reductions – costs which will be borne by the richer countries. As a result, it is in the 
interest of these countries to create motivations for all countries to take on projects of 
reduction as soon as possible. All this can be calculated, and is sketched out in the report. The 
central point (already stressed by multiple authors) is that the increase in cost due to 
procrastination is a wasteful dead loss, bringing no increase in well-being. We must then get 
used to the idea that rich countries must dedicate sufficient amounts of funds to actions 
benefitting countries outside Annex I, so that these latter might see their developmental 
economy differently and consider it possible to take on objectives in 2012 rather than waiting 
until 2020. 
The World Bank poses the problem in a lucid manner. It is not at all a case of increasing 
development aid, development being thought of in the classical fashion. However, there 
remains a double difficulty: a) the dilemma exists both between rich countries and within 
these countries, an immense difficulty in societies where competition is king, and b) 
supplementary expenditure83 (in relation to the efforts made to reduce their own emissions) to 
aid the transformation of countries outside Annex I needs, in order to be implemented, a 
whole programme of efficient political and economic systems, in order to stop, notably, 
deforestation and corruption – up to now, globalization has actually been aggravating these 
phenomena.84 
The category of ‘the rich’ can be thought of in several ways: on a state level, on the 
basis of GDP, or on the accumulation of value via successive annual GNPs. A team from the 
universities of Harvard and Princeton, high places of management, just published a note to the 
American Academy of Sciences explaining the concept of ‘the rich’ as being the people with 	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the highest revenues in each country, and proposing basing the climate problem on their 
finances.85 Whichever one of these variants is adopted, the only issue seems to be thus 
financing all transitions towards a lasting economy, that of the rich, the less-rich and the 
poor, on the conditional of having an effective international check under the aegis of the UN 
and to make use of this dynamic – which at last possesses a fuel source – to drive towards the 
progressive foundation of an authority of legitimate global government.86 Even if the rich 
dedicate a significant part of their annual revenue – let us remember that the government of 
the United States, to save the banks in a highly relative ‘situation of peril’, did not hesitate to 
spend between $1,400 and $1,700 billion dollars, more than 10% of the GDP – this will 
certainly constitute, upon reflection, the best choice for the future. 
 
Situating a priori the international climate discussion within the standard economic 
framework of commercial negotiations, in the spirit of that which the West has set up and 
practiced for mineral and fossil resources useful to its material development, is a severe 
option. Its consequences can only be extreme. Apparently “obvious” and effortless in the 
minds of most, it is in fact immature. It does not allow us to escape the rut we are in, the 
dilemma of divergent interests. By continuing the dissimulation it has engendered, it 
endangers the environment much more than is generally thought and progressively leads to 
conditions of armed conflict. 
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3. The eyes of humanity can no longer see anything but prices 
The philosopher Karl Jaspers makes a fundamental distinction between belief and reason, 
essential, in his eyes, to an understanding of the workings of the world: “The mindset of belief 
invents and creates. Its prescriptions can be executed, and multiply its achievements by 
repeating them indefinitely. The result is an organization of the world in which some minds 
construct machines, creating what might be termed a second universe wherein the masses 
subsequently serve as executing agents.” Belief is that which does not involve the will of the 
people to decide what will give sense to their lives; its operative rationality is what allows 
utilitarianism to function. “The other way of thinking, that of reason, allows no execution 
dependant on instructions given to the masses, but demands that everyone think as a free man, 
returning to the origin of things. Here, truth is not revealed by a machine, reproducible at will, 
but is attested to by choice, by decisions, by the actions each person accomplishes in their 
own right, in this way realizing a common spirit with others”.87 Reason, like belief, irrigates 
society but in a different way. It provokes citizens and associations to action in order to 
achieve goals and political action.88 
 The issue we face is that the economy is well on the way to completely replacing 
reason with belief. “How much does it cost” governs all behaviours, including the strategies 
of governments. The most immediate observation when it comes to non-renewable resources 
or to greenhouse gas emissions is that nothing is done. Business continues as before. Nothing 
important happens. Copenhagen, Cancun, Durban – the only real novelty is that negotiators 
now openly admit that they have no desire to take any action. 
 What the French refer to by the English phrase “business as usual”, and is related to 
what in English is called “laissez-faire”, is thus a considerable force, and one which has been 
greatly underestimated. The immense quantity of whistleblowers goes unheeded. What I am 
trying to explain is that the economy is a paralysing anti-anxiety agent. 
 
On the causes of ‘business as usual’ 
As we have already seen via the illustration of the game ‘red light, green light’, in the alliance 
of nations, or any system of competition, the injunction of a global slowdown is 
contradictory. Each participant still has an interest in easing off the brakes to gain an 
advantage against the other participants and find himself in a better position when the 
difficulties become tangible. Typically, the injunction is of a dual constraint kind, as 
described by Gregory Bateson. When a mother tells her adolescent son “it is time you became 
independent, stop doing what I tell you”, the youth is paralysed, trapped in a universe with no 
way to act freely. It is the same with economic decline; there is an immobilizing fascination, 
like that of a rabbit trapped in headlights, or of Al Gore’s frog sitting in a pot. The 
temperature is slowly raised, and the frog sapped of the energy to escape. 
 The economy does not know how to harmoniously guide contraction. If we take our 
foot off the pedal, the vehicle topples over. Of course, in the past there were highs and lows in 
the economy, depending on people and period, and the recessive phases often led to violent 
phenomena such as war and dictatorships. However, these dramatic episodes, such as 
famines, industrial or financial crises, were originally sparked by lack of foresight, 
imprudence, or unpredictable natural disasters – in other words, by negative phenomena and 
not by a smooth running of the economy and the wealth of nations. What is new is that all the 
precepts of the ‘classical’ economists – those 18th century thinkers who defined the basis for 
the organization of society for the following two centuries, and who developed Francis 	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Bacon’s ideas on progress through new reflections on production and trade, ideas which are 
today entrenched in individual behaviour – these precepts reinforce the business-as-usual 
attitude. These authors, Smith, Malthus, Say, Ricardo, and possibly adding Bentham and Mill, 
took the position of welcoming in new values to replace the moral rules of, notably, 
Catholicism and aristocracy. They stated that one had the right to say that favouring trade was 
a good thing, that it benefitted society and established moral principles which could rival the 
religious precepts so clumsily enacted far beyond what faith dictated. It is these same sturdy 
ethical bases for utilitarianism and pragmatism which are today being brutally called into 
question. 
 However, the ‘classical’ moral bases are omnipresent. The day-to-day strains imposed 
by modern society, such as study, intelligence, compromise in order to maximize our 
children’s health, leisure, travel, professional work, all prevent us taking a philosophical 
pause to reflect on finitude. We live as in a dream of excess activity, saturated with worries. 
The deep anchoring of these values can be seen in the mundane fact that accounting 
optimization spreads its behavioural influence by spite. Whosoever does not know that he can 
negotiate when it comes to his loans, his rate, his overtime, profit from promotional offers, 
take advantage of rising house-prices, employ an under-the-table worker, etc. – in other 
words, whosoever has not discovered how to extract personal advantage, that person is stupid. 
In discussions on street corners or Internet chat rooms, friends and neighbours share 
information on how to get by and shrewdly slip through the system. The ignorant person, or 
the person who lets himself be guided by general ideas, is a fool, and too bad for him. And, 
vice versa, he who optimizes his personal affairs is intelligent, one admires his lucidity, and if 
he does especially well, he is a genius. Aptitude at economic optimization becomes 
synonymous with intelligence. However, this is a purely self-centred game – that is, one cares 
nothing for the collective, and even less for the universal. Sooner or later this selfishness 
clashes against other selfishnesses and it becomes an issue of victory, of conquest, and of the 
whole ideological paraphernalia of warfare, as old as barbarism. 
 
Use value and exchange value 
This distinction is extremely old. Marx traced it back to Aristotle. The classical economists, 
Adam Smith and Jean-Baptiste Say, spoke with varying levels of clarity about it. Proudhon 
too, although he used particularly confused and emphatic terms, such as the ‘ceremonial 
forms’. 
 Marx is very clear on the subject, distinguishing the two notions in the very first pages 
of Das Kapital, and his subsequent analysis of exploitation invokes only exchange values, 
which endows it with a much larger strength of conviction. This was because use value is a 
difficult notion, as delicate as ‘sense’ or ‘interest’. It is related to the meaning an asset has for 
the user who professes a desire for what it is. This triggers one of the largest problems in 
philosophy. It appeals to the Kantian thing-in-itself, a notion considered as contradictory by 
the philosophers of the 19th century because the noumenon exists only since if it did not 
“appearance would exist without anything which appears”, but we can say nothing about it 
because only phenomena are accessible to us. This thing-in-itself was then to become the Will 
in Schopenhauer and subsequently in Nietzsche. This concept of use value provides 
economists with an explanation for propensities to buy or sell, but the calculations are always 
done working from the idea that the exchange realized gives an economically significant 
value. 
 One point, however, is to be noted for taking on a new significance today. The use 
value of an item is multidimensional. This characteristic allows it to be clearly distinguished 
from market value. Marx, a materialist, was not interested in the multiplicity of interpretations 
which can be attached to an item depending on personal experience or on symbolic 
significances from family or life in the city. However, he speaks of the various units of 
measurement used for different goods, of which there were still many at the time: “Different 
use-values have different measures appropriate to their physical characteristics; for example, a 
bushel of wheat, a quire of paper, a yard of linen”.89 These ancient measurements, many still 
in use in the UK, the US and the countries of the Commonwealth, were evidence of a 
comparability linked more directly to a category formed by history and customs than to the 
interplay of abstract and general monetary value. Marx adds that looking at an object itself 
does not show us the social process of its production – “From the taste of wheat it is not 
possible to tell who produced it, a Russian serf, a French peasant or an English capitalist” – 
and this is the reason why “use-value as such, since it is independent of the determinate 
economic form, lies outside the sphere of investigation of political economy”.90 
 Today, however, in the efforts which have been made to escape the rut of globalized 
liberalism, the multidimensional character of use value (due to the fact that tastes and 
opinions cannot be classed according to a sole criterion) is the basis behind ideas of 
introducing multiple currencies into a single economy, according to various categories of 
goods or services, in order to provide more efficient levers for ecological transition. 
 Not only did the classical and neo-classical economists stress the importance of use 
value, but American pragmatic philosophy at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries even took 
up the challenge of removing all intrinsic consistency from use value by bringing back its 
usage to the possibilities of actions in the economic world. I am thinking of Charles Peirce 
and John Dewey rather than William James, who remained attached to pluralism in an almost 
pantheistic sense. The key work here is The theory of valuation,91 written by Dewey in 1939, 
well after his fundamental works on democracy and education. First, there was a 
philosophical forcing of a positivist nature, started by Peirce in his article “Logic of Science: 
How to Make Our Ideas Clear”,92 which consisted of thinking the possibilities of an 
individual’s actions to be objectively knowable. Then followed the idea that observation of 
behaviour sufficed to “understand” or to “direct” communal life; this experimental 
determination was recognized as difficult by Dewey, but seemed to him possible in practice 
for all most subjects. Without saying so as such, Dewey was not far from thinking of use 
value as a function of utility (a plunge which had already been taken, of course, by the neo-
classicists). A reading of this treatise clearly shows that cost-benefit analysis (of which we 
will speak more later) fits perfectly as an application of pragmatist ideas, and we find in this 
operational neo-pragmatism the features of unique scientific truth, of the confusion between 
belief and interpretation, of the mistrust for the real base capacities of man to envisage 
choices based on ideas – the same features found in the monist positivism of contemporary 
neo-liberalism. 
By dint of believing man incapable of determining his behaviour regarding abstract 
objects, we create a society where Jaspers’ separation of belief and reason can no longer 
operate. In more concrete terms, we no longer see anything but prices. 
 Here we must again distance ourselves from Marxist thought. A fundamental theme of 
Marx’s philosophy was attributing to the materiality of life the real role of history on the 
consciences of men – unlike Hegel, who saw history as writing itself through ideas in 
constant dialectic interplay. Everyone knows this famous reversal: “For Hegel, the process of 
thought, which he even transforms, under the name of the Idea, into an independent subject, is 
the demiurge of reality which no longer constitutes anything but its external appearance. For 
me, inversely, the ideal is nothing other than the material translated and transposed in a 	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human mind”.93 Nevertheless, the very history of Marxism leads us to think that Hegel had 
the right of it, and that it is ideas which move men. Today, the materiality seen by man is 
purely economic. The ozone layer, the level of CO2 in the atmosphere, the melting of the 
permafrost, the using-up of fishing resources, the shifts in ocean currents caused by an influx 
of fresh arctic waters, the pollution of ground water, none are perceived by humanity.94 We 
hear only highly indirect allusions to them in scientific discourse, and must decipher the 
message by stripping it of all the clever phraseology of profit-led communication. So, we can 
agree with Marx when he writes, “The question of knowing whether there is a place for 
recognizing an objective reality in human thought is not a theoretical question, but a practical 
one. It is in practice that man must prove truth, or reality, and the power of his thought, in this 
world and for our time. The discussion on the reality or unreality of a thought which 
withdraws from practice is purely scholastic”.95 However, this reflection, in the present 
circumstances, is merely bringing water to the liberal-productivist mill and its business as 
usual approach. Marx believed that the conscience of the proletariat was concealed by the 
dominant bourgeois ideology and that the real conditions of the workers would necessarily 
cause it to emerge. We can consider him as correct, but it is not the conditions of the working 
class which will reveal what is hidden today, nor even those of the third world. It is ideas that 
we must value. Mankind has a responsibility of knowledge, and the intellectual elite have one 
of altering the causes of this blindness. 
 It is necessary to restore a space of symbolic values. The collective interest disappears 
because we cannot ‘reward’ it. However, man has a base desire that the global framework of 
his life should not deteriorate, he wants to be able to act at this collective level. The issue is of 
the values which liberal society prevents us from taking into account. If Peirce, Dewey and 
William James had lived a century later to see the impasse in which we now find ourselves, I 
am convinced that they would be especially sensitive to this contradiction, these men who 
drugged themselves on logic, like Bertrand Russell, and whose philosophy was based around 
constructing general ideas to improve communal life. 
 
Vitalist economic ideology 
The theoretical and real importance of Darwin and his theory of natural selection and 
evolution (1859) for liberal economists is well known, and has been the subject of numerous 
works. In this theory, they found not only a legitimization of competition, but also the 
conviction that, by organizing goods, services and work in markets, they were carrying out a 
natural task, ontologically of the same essence as that which produced the most wonderful 
and beautiful examples of fauna and flora. 
 However, a second threshold was then crossed in this process of justification a little 
over a century later, in the period of the 1970s, marking the beginning of the neoliberal era. 
Discoveries were made relating to the thermodynamics of systems outside of equilibrium and 
showing that the specific nature of living beings, a subject which had been heavily 
philosophized over, was essentially due to the fact that they were systems, receiving and 
ejecting matter and energy. These discoveries served to corroborate the natural standing of 
globalized liberalism, wherein man finds himself needing to ‘eat’ and spend money in order 
to live. Money thus becomes completely substituted for the archaic physical quantities of 
animals and plants. Man, through his intelligence, has constructed an extension of nature 
following its selfsame principles. 	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 Consequences ensue and the human, the consumerist animal, always wants more. 
Criticism of the consumer society (Thorstein Veblen, Henri Lefebvre, Victor Lebow, Jacques 
Ellul, Noam Chomsky, Jean Baudrillard, Ivan Illitch, André Gorz, etc.) constitutes a 
misunderstanding of the essential nature of man. This last is demonstrated by, for example, 
the rebound effect. If, following the advice of ecologists, someone buys a car which consumes 
half the fuel his previous vehicle did, his nature will in the long-term, in perfectly good 
conscience and knowing himself to be in the right morally, lead him to drive much more than 
before. 
We thus arrive at a point where economics comes to touch on the major metaphysical 
questions: who are we? Where do we come from? Where are we going? In other words, we 
come to the domain of the religious. 
 
Origin of the economic faith system 
If we define religion as a collection of beliefs which influence behaviour through enlightening 
the individual on good and evil, then we first have the revealed religions, founded upon texts 
produced by supernaturally inspired sages or prophets, following a process received by 
believers as a superior spiritual heritage. But we also have non-revealed religions, similarly 
definable as a collection of beliefs directing the individual towards doing good, but produced 
by the careful reasoning of minds pursuing the goal of analysing exactly what actions are 
desirable. 
 What is the difference between a “philosophical system” and a “non-revealed faith”? 
They are fairly close, both approaches being founded on reflection and reason. One factor 
distinguishing them, however, is the way in which they approach the novice. Philosophical 
texts aim to convince by appealing to reason, independently of the particular situation of the 
individual concerned, and hence possibly clashing with his particular customs. For example, 
Kant evokes situations of categorical imperative, “you must, so you can”, which could 
potentially trouble the conscience of the initiate and cause a distancing. Non-revealed 
religion, on the other hand, always tries to welcome current customs as being part of what is 
acceptable, and the focus is more on peripheral improvements. 
 An example is to be found in the positivism of Auguste Comte, who has the benefit of 
openness because his creation is explicitly a religion, a cult. Compte carefully provides an 
inclusive vision: religions are in the nature of man, and it is possible to reconcile them. 
Citizens can be lead to a cultural practice and an educative movement thanks to science, this 
being positive religion: the religion of humanity.96 Hence the sneers of the “true religious” 
towards this ersatz, this facsimile, and their concern for keeping the widest possible gap open 
between science and morality. What certain sociologists of the sciences today term the “great 
divide of the modern” is largely the result of this concern to contain science, to keep it as 
harmless knowledge which does not threaten religious, political and cultural values. It was the 
pursuit of this concern which led intellectuals to spend over a century worrying about the 
ontological rupture between the living and the inert, seeing it as the most fundamental 
question there was, with major consequences for what it meant to be human. Many did not 
hesitate to use episodes of progress in physics to consolidate the mystery of these two 
“irreducible” worlds. 
 However, when the aforementioned solution of open systems arrived, the battle 
against the religious pretensions of positivism had already been won. Apart from a few traces 
in Brazil, the religion of Auguste Compte had been forgotten. Moreover, serious difficulties 
had appeared regarding the pertinence of the positivist doctrine, even in the domain of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 A century later, the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey would take up again this interrogation of the religious 
as faith without institutionalised religion, and propose a similar solution: transmit to future generations the 
values of human civilization in its interactions with nature (A Common Faith, 1934) 
science. After the subtleties introduced by quantum mechanics, as discussed by Bohr, 
Heisenberg and their colleagues, after the epistemological contributions of Bachelard, Popper, 
Lakatos, Kuhn, Feyerabend, and especially after the new global awareness of the damage 
science and technology were causing to the world, positivism was seen as moving too fast and 
too superficially, unabashedly lauding the benefits of science by defining it as the consensus 
between the different fields of knowledge. Positivism’s “desire to be a religion” was too 
flagrant, and it could no longer function as a non-revealed religion. It subsisted only as a 
minimal epistemological doctrine, able to render certain basic services but generally 
unenlightening as a whole due to its limited character and its adaptability. 
 The second branch of positivism, that of John Stuart Mill, was much more perceptive; 
instead of plotting philosophical limits to scientific knowledge as Compte had done by 
discarding first causes and ultimate goals, instead of declaring that science was the discovery 
of laws governing nature and society, he trusts in the real social practices and intelligence of 
people. Mill established the foundations of a non-revealed religion which remained 
incomplete in its precepts but which was sure to function where its anchoring in the day-to-
day was concerned, as long as society allowed a certain freedom of expression and individual 
action. This is what is striking about Mill’s utilitarianism. It works without offending anyone 
in any political system which leaves the individual a sufficient margin of freedom to think, to 
express himself and to act within the classical limits of not impinging upon the freedom of 
others. For this, it is necessary that cults do not gain juridical nor political power – terms 
which mesh well with Protestantism but in fact do not exclude any obedience bar violent 
interpretations of revealed dogma. 
 Why did Mill’s positivism not experience the same decline as that of Comte? Unlike 
Comte, and Marx, Mill did not seek to define the organization of a harmonious society. He 
does not take the dialectic progression all the way to synthesis. Moreover, his System of 
Logic; Ratiocinative and Inductive was not a binary logic but a plural one, since it appeals to 
diversity in points of view. 
 Mill is the author of a moral and political doctrine compatible with mid-19th century 
life in Europe, giving a valuable reference for political action in a time where the risks of 
societal rift due to industrialization were enormous. But where the philosophy of Marx 
concludes in favour of changing the world, because history is the result of transformations in 
material conditions realized by man, where it calls on workers to seize the means of 
production in the political movement of Communism, where Comte considers that only 
science can be a valid foundation for society and that it produces a wisdom as valid as that of 
any religion, Mill does not elaborate upon any ultimate utopia. Instead, he defends, with 
biting and sarcastic eloquence, the sole idea that the possibility of pluralist debate is in itself 
more important that the conclusions of political sparring. 
 By leaving open-ended questions to one side – an important characteristic which 
Popper would take up in his diatribes against communism – Mill’s positivism did not 
collapse, and in fact barely even aged, because it could be relayed by liberal economics. 
 Today then, we find in it a gargantuan doctrine, a temporal and spiritual powerhouse 
which succeeds as a non-revealed religion where other attempts failed. The problem is 
obviously that it succeeds too well, preventing us from seeing problems outside of the field in 
which it was conceived. Compte and Marx are dead, but John Stuart Mill continues to impose 
on us his solutions to the problems of the 19th century. 
 What is the god of this religion? The entity positively conceived, which turns up and 
sorts things out through its mere presence, is obviously the market, upon which we project all 
that is left unsaid about hope, regulation and wisdom. 	  
III) The teeth of the market 
 
We shall now tackle the key issue of the dangerous absurdities arising from the financial neo-
liberalism with which we wrestle today. It will be seen that there is an insurmountable reason 
why the world cannot continue with its present economic structure. Some believe a 
catastrophe to be imminent, perhaps in the form of an implosion of the financial system.97 
 What I am going to show is that nowadays, given how finance functions, the market 
should not be considered an angel that provides for human failure, but as a shark that knows 
only how to use its teeth. 
 We will handle the problems step by step, beginning with the question of externalities, 
before then studying the origins of this rationality known as neo-classical language, and 
finally investigating exactly what the financial markets can do and what is completely 
forbidden to them by their very design. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Cf for example Yves Cochet “Devant la catastrophe” in Où va le monde ?, Mille et une nuits 2012.	  
1. Non-marketable collective goods 
 Garett Hardin’s famous text “The Tragedy of the Commons”, published in the 1968 
edition of Science, presents as a generic and archetypal situation a shepherd who selfishly 
takes advantage of communal fields that are free to use, and ends up exhausting this resource, 
acting in his own interest in order to increase the size of his flock for his own private benefit; 
meanwhile, the disadvantage arising from the rarefaction of the grass is a shared problem for 
all who use it. 
 We can exploit this observation in multiple ways. From the point of view of an 
economics which would, as Georgescu-Roegen asked, set out to understand and classify the 
various systems possible, the most interesting question is how the system of communal lands 
was able to survive for so long, and under what social rules it could both fulfil its duty and not 
succumb to the greed of one or another person who had obviously understood the issue raised 
by Hardin. 
 Common assets and, more generally, non-marketable goods pose a question to those 
who imagine a society governed solely by an invisible hand, like that modelled by the 
equilibria of neo-classical language. 
 When the “collective” was viewed as what was happening on the other side of the Iron 
Curtain, and general interest incarnated by the communist party of the Soviet Union, it was 
relatively easy to denounce this abuse, to show that it was via force, and sometimes 
propaganda, that certain people had taken power whilst pretending to represent the common 
interest. However, after the (surprising) collapse of this stratocracy and the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, there was no longer anyone claiming to represent the collective but the fragile and 
disparate United Nations. Hence, political forces in favour of liberal economy found 
themselves directly confronted with the lack of collectivist thought and the serious 
consequences this brought up for the environment. The solution most commonly suggested is 
to somehow find a way to include common assets in the ad hoc laws of economic dealings. 
 
Externalities 
To reach this kind of economization of the environment, it is enough to consider it as an 
external resource not governed by the market. This resource being limited, the will of agents 
must be susceptible to the creation of prices reflecting the propensity to preserve it, as 
happens with all rarities. 
 Those whose mentality is completely immersed in the language of economics do not 
even reason in terms of environmental preservation but denote as ‘externality’ a certain term 
of linkage in economical equations, in that the action of a particular agent has repercussions 
on others without these last having had any say in the matter. This situation can require the 
State or a community to play a role in correcting these effects.  
 It is stunning that, in the face of the current dramatic inertia noted and denounced on all 
sides, people still dare to reason about the environment by considering humanity as a planet-
wide enterprise with an internal heritance and an external heritance, governed by a production 
function, a small parametric equation (two parameters in the case of a CES function – 
constant elasticity of substitution), of the type used to calculate the balance sheet of a business 
in micro-economics. Even today, this is still the modus operandi of many of the highest 
academic bodies. For example, in 2010, extending Nicholas Stern’s teachings on climate 
problems, a symposium was held at the Collège de France, in Paris, on the economy and the 
environment, and the above approach was presented in all seriousness by eminent researchers. 
This is a sham. Economic logic is functionally incapable of conceiving its own limits. It tries 
to choose the cheapest policies, a clear demonstration of its prior assumption that the 
preservation of economic science takes precedence over any other consideration.98 
 In any case, it is not enough to construct models. Prices must be assigned to all things 
social, significant and interpretative, things which are neither bought nor sold – this is the 
object of cost-benefit analysis. 
 There is a deeper philosophical argument, often found implicit in the numerous 
arguments pleading the case for “economizing” common assets and assigning a monetary 
value to them. It is founded on the idea that the environment is not a clear notion in itself, but 
is defined by man and depends on historical society and linguistic developments. The 
difficulties we face with context depend on politics and the economy, which contribute to the 
definition of this context, qualifying and modifying it. Hence the only real context is an 
economic framework acting throughout history to create society. 
 This argument convinces some, but I personally find it highly ambiguous and 
dangerously capable of justifying any behaviour. The strength of the damage reports already 
published seems to me in any case to be worthy of public awareness.  
 
Cost-benefit analysis 
A revelatory welcome greeted the report published by Nicholas Stern,99 who made use 
of all his talent as an economist to sound the alarm, and who had the courage to produce 
daring and striking new summaries, such as comparing the climate problem to the cost of 
World War II in order to alert journalists and provoke media discussion. Immediately, 
numerous articles appeared in the so-called A-ranked journals, accusing Stern of 
overestimating the costs of damage caused by climate change and underestimating those of a 
conversion to clean technologies when compared to what a “standard cost-benefit analysis” 
would have concluded. What then is this method, so well-established in the academic world, 
which allows a more scientific handling of communal decisions? 
Cost-benefit analysis, henceforth referred to as CBA, was originally a tool used by the 
administration to make the most efficient use of state funds. In France, the Bridges and Roads 
Corps has made use of it since the 19th century (Jules Dupuit, 1848); in England, the 
economist Alfred Marshall developed a formal framework for it; in the United States, the 
Corps of Engineers set similar motions in practice. The golden age of this technique was 
1970s France, in the time of the Rationalisation des Choix Budgétaires (Rationalization of 
Budgetary Choices) or RCB, based heavily on the American “Planning Programming Budget 
System”, or PPBS). It revolved around the economic selection of projects. How to decide 
between improving an extant motorway or setting up a motorway extension which would be 
more expensive, but would save quarter of an hour for millions of commuters per year? The 
problem is compounded if human lives are involved, or if there are significant impacts on the 
environment. A CBA takes the totality of criteria into account. 
The main difficulty is in assigning prices to non-marketed commodities, but this is not 
the sole issue when environmental changes are concerned. Economists have suggested 
multiple methods within the framework of “the neo-classical economy of well-being”,100 to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Robert Solow had already reasoned thus: “if the elasticity of substitution between exhaustible resources and 
other inputs is unity or bigger, and if the elasticity of output with respect to reproducible capital exceeds the 
elasticity of output with respect to natural resources, then a constant population can maintain a positive constant 
level of consumption per head forever” cf “The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics” Ely 
Lecture, The American Economic Review, Vol. 64, No. 2, (1974), 1-14.	  
99 Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/ 
sternreview_index.htm	  
100 See D. Pearce, G. Atkinson, S. Mourato “Analyse Coûts-bénéfices et environnement, développements 
récents” OCDE 2006, a document without any critical discussion. 	  
evaluate immaterial impacts and non-market goods or, in other words, to internalize 
externalities. 
The first is that of revealed preference techniques, which uses various approaches to 
extrapolate these values from the prices of market products. For example, one would approach 
the cultural commodity of “being able to see the sea” by means of the difference in pricing 
between hotel rooms with or without a sea view. Or, as another example, one would make use 
of the figure which represented the total expenditure of households or users to protect 
themselves from nuisance. Thus, to evaluate the service provided by green spaces, statistics 
are examined on the pricing difference between properties situated by parks and forests and 
those in similar urban locations but lacking in green spaces.101 Other methods for analysing 
the costs of pollution raise the issue of costs due to illnesses, etc. 
However, this approach is insufficient when the project has truly new characteristics, 
when there is nothing to compare it with. Here the method of stated preference techniques, 
also known as contingent valuation, is brought in. It is based in questionnaires which ask 
individuals concerned how much they would be prepared to pay to enjoy certain advantages 
or avoid certain nuisances, or how much they would be prepared to receive to accept the 
nuisances or miss out on the benefits. Using this information, plus a certain number of 
aggregations and discountings to match it to current monetary values, we are in a position to 
estimate and classify any kind of project. 
Cost-benefit analysis in the modern world has become a political force in its own right. 
The weaknesses and the primary feature of this packaging – creating artificial markets for 
goods neither bought nor sold (such as good health, a long life, or clean air) – have often been 
denounced.102 Numerous aspects of this approach often translate in practice to “abuses of 
power”: 
- the rich are prepared to pay more to avoid the same inconveniences. 
- there is no “statistically” average user. The transition from a multi-criteria situation to 
a valuation uses an average here or there, but the result depends on the importance accorded 
to various parameters. Replacing a category or sub-category of the population by some 
nebulous “average” under the various criteria is not only crass, but generally speaking self-
contradictory: a man of average height is not necessarily of average weight.103  
- Individuals, in fact, want to take care of other individuals, and are not guided by 
simple selfishness. There is a rejection of the principle of trading in moral values. 
- Irreversible damage cannot be compared to losses of money. 
- The future is trivialized in today’s discussion columns. 
I refer the reader to the article by Ackerman and Heinzerling,104 which contains examples so 
excessive that they reveal the distrust of society that is behind this primary approach. A 
general point worth stressing here is the reductionist simplification with which the temporal 
dimension is treated. Philosophically, time is what changes. Thanks to mathematics, not only 
through price adjustment but also through the very fact of fixing tastes as monetary totals, 
preferences are frozen in advance according to lists of categories. This leaves no room for 
adaptation to incorporate new information, issues or threats. The principle of a deliberative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 An example of this immense literature : Morancho A.B. (2003). A hedonic valuation of urban green areas. 
Landscape and Urban Planning, 66(1):35-41. We have not yet, to my knowledge, used the price of lands 
purchased by foreign companies in Africa to “economise” the ecology of this continent.	  
102 See, notably, N. Hanley, “Are there Environmental Limits to Cost Benefit Analysis ?” Env. and 
Resource Economics 2 (1992) 33-59, and especially the remarkable article by F. Ackerman et L. 
Heinzerling “Pricing the priceless : Cost-Benefit Analysis and Environmental Protection” Univ. of 
Pennsylvania Law Review Vol 150 (2002) 1553-1584.	  
103 Cf. A. Desrosières La politique des grands nombres, La Découverte, 2000.	  
104 F. Ackerman and L. Heinzerling “Pricing the priceless : Cost-Benefit Analysis and Environmental 
Protection” Univ. of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol 150 (2002) 1553-1584.	  
process is inherently flawed. The philosopher Mark Sagoff reports that his students, when 
interviewed about a proposed ski station to be built by an area of wild country, were opposed 
to the idea as citizens, but as consumers expressed a desire to make use of the station if it 
were built.105 There is no contradiction. Voting is not the same as buying. Where risks are 
involved, CBA falls into the basic trap of formalization, of fixing signifiers in mathematical 
writings so that they gradually become more and more separated from the actual risks they are 
supposed to signify.106 There is a bypassing of the political institutions intended for the 
representation of citizens. 
The use of CBA remains tempered by other considerations in the framework directives 
of the European Commission but for ancillary reasons, thus preventing a clear denouncement 
of the simplistic nature of these practices. Developments in environmental sciences and in the 
sociology of public decision-making have shown that decisions relating to urban areas are of 
such complexity that these methods are essentially useless, and that topics such as the 
disruption of natural areas, or water management, need much more elaborate decision-making 
procedures. Nevertheless, a network of active supporters continues to defend CBA as a 
solution to all societal issues,107 and we still teach future engineers that we can use the 
economy to predict happiness levels long in advance. 
 
The bulldozer of substitutability 
Since the problem arose of how to internalize externalities, CBA, previously a method for 
selecting public projects, found a new use: the economization of the whole environment. This 
was for a long while the great idea of the liberals. In 1990, Claude Allègre wrote Economizing 
the Planet (‘Economiser la planète’), in which he began the process of planting seeds of doubt 
around the works of scientists who did not agree with his views. In France, following the end 
of their Eleventh Plan, the General Commissariat of the Plan sought to unite ecological 
thinking and “economic rationality”.108 This was contemporary with the Rio Summit and the 
rise of the idea of sustainable development. Since then, CBA has been the subject of 
continuing works, including the particularly tricky question of biodiversity.109 
 Under the enlightening title of Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, it is seen as THE 
solution when it comes to thinking of the ecology in economic terms: “The economic 
evaluation of biodiversity is characterized by three stages. The first stage is the modelling and 
evaluation of the role of biodiversity in the providing of ecosystemic services. The second 
stage is an estimation of the biophysical impact of changes in the level of biodiversity on the 
quantity and quality of these ecosystemic services. The third and last stage refers to the 
assessment of welfare following changes to the level of supply of ecosystemic services, 
depicting these changes in monetary terms wherever possible” 110 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 M. Sagoff The Economy of Earth : Philosophy, Law and Evironment, Cambridge Univ. Press 1988.	  
106 Cf N. Bouleau, Risk and Meaning, Adversaries in Art, Science and Philosophy, Springer 2011.	  
107 Recently, on an programme on France-Culture on July 20th, 2009, the director of a joint INRA-CNRS 
laboratory, who was in favour of GMOs, called for a cost-benefit analysis to decide on the moratorium 
concerning Monsanto 810 maize.	  
108 L'économie face à l'écologie, prefaced by Bertrand Collomb, Group Report chaired by Christian Stoffaës, La 
découverte/ La doc. française 1993.	  
109 Cf B. Chevassus au Louis, J;-M. Salles, J;-L. Pujol, Approche économique de la biodiversité et des services 
liés aux écosystèmes - Contribution à la décision publique, Rapport du Conseil d'Analyse Stratégique, La 
découverte 2009.	  
110 http://www.maweb.org/fr/index.aspx; “Dans cette approche MEA, l'évaluation économique de la biodiversité 
est caractérisée par trois étapes. La première étape est la modélisation et l'évaluation du rôle de la biodiversité 
dans la fourniture de services écosystémiques. La deuxième étape est l'estimation de l'impact biophysique des 
changements de niveaux de la biodiversité sur la quantité et la qualité, de ces services écosystémiques. La 
troisième et dernière, étape se réfère à l'évaluation du bien-être des changements dans les niveaux de l'offre des 
services écosystémiques, dépeignant autant que possible ces changements en termes monétaires.”	  
 In these works, and in those just published by France’s Strategic Analysis Centre 
(Conseil d’Analyse Stratégique), quantification is based on a division into two categories of 
species. On the one hand, remarkable biodiversity denotes those considered on an ad hoc 
basis to be threatened; for these, costs of maintenance and upkeep are calculated as with 
historical monuments. On the other hand, we have ordinary biodiversity, comprising all the 
other species; for these, we calculate the ecosystemic service they provide, from prokaryotes 
such as bacteria to eukaryotes (more complicated species), using the classical methods of 
cost-benefit analysis. This leaves us in a position to buy and sell any section of nature, or to 
exchange it against goods and services already quantified by the economy. 
 Some works are more elaborate, more nuanced, and show traces of multiple viewpoints. 
Economic logic is more diluted within them, but although harder to detect it remains the sole 
reference presented as intersubjective. The section “Sustainability and Well-being” in chapter 
3 of the MEA report is pure politeness towards a few authors and leaves the issue 
unresolved.111 The dominance of economic logic is reflected in the asymmetry between on the 
one hand a CBA analysis, presented as a utilitarian but perfectible approach, and on the other 
hand a multitude of irrational viewpoints: “Non-utilitarian value proceeds from a variety of 
ethical, cultural, religious, and philosophical bases”. These works were continued in the 
TEEB study (The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity), which demonstrated a desire 
to apply CBA when context makes it easy, and to keep a value which is not a “zero price” in 
other cases. The concept of value follows, throughout these texts, the line of early 20th century 
pragmatist philosophy discussed earlier. 
 On the erosion of biodiversity and the inertia with which the problem worsens, the data 
are overwhelming. I will not reproduce them here, but instead refer the reader to websites on 
the CBD (Convention on Biological Diversity),112 notably, where the five principle causes of 
this erosion are discussed: demography, economic activity, level of international commerce, 
per capita consumption linked to individual wealth, and scientific or technological change. 
 Most important to examine in more detail are the causes of laxity in this area – in other 
words, the reasons why we do not change course. The growth in human population is one 
cause of erosion but the demographic factor is not, in itself, the real explanation for this 
incapacity to alter our approach. This can been seen in the fact that if current population 
growth were to stall but no other changes occurred  – i.e., the same economic principles on 
increases in production and wealth were followed – everything leads us to believe that this 
erosion would continue unabated. Certain traditional beliefs are obviously a factor behind 
inertia, as in any area, but this effect should be qualified, as some common beliefs can 
actually be, according to the circumstances, the most respectful towards biodiversity. On the 
other hand, if we take a historical perspective, a look at the data reveals that modernity and 
technological development can certainly not be exonerated. Hence the question: are there not, 
in the course taken by Western civilization, historically and even now the most influential 
civilization, too many good reasons for believing the irreparable to be reparable? 
 The exact point I am trying to emphasize is that we must draw a parallel between the 
inefficiency of these international reports when it comes to halting the erosion of biodiversity 
and the inability of economic logic to perceive its own limits. 
 
Economic theory pardons irreversible destruction 
As knowledge, it remains intimately interwoven with beliefs. The economy, calling upon the 
reasoning of neo-classical theory, demands adherence. It proposes a mindset which needs to 
be trusted in. However, when faced with windfall profits and the aforementioned damage, its 	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confidence-capital tumbles. Let us now clarify a few points: 
 It can no longer be believed that the scarcity value of the environment can protect it. It 
is not a market commodity. So, even if we use clever analyses to assign a value to it, it cannot 
be resold nor generate profits: take a specific area of marshland in destructive competition 
with a deposit of fossil fuels, and you will see that the two rarities do not evolve in the same 
fashion. There are lively, random fluctuations in the progress of the fossil fuels (anticipatory 
speculation) and progressive adjustments in the calculations of “ecological services”. The 
deposit will one day or another eventually be listed higher than the clever estimates calculated 
for the swamp.  
 We can no longer believe in the relevance of institutions for the economic assessment of 
“ecosystemic services”. As with rating agencies, they can only see problems a posteriori, by 
which time the damage has already been done.113  
 We can no longer believe that the economy leads to good behaviour, be it for managers 
of powerful international corporations or for the small-time fisherman in Oceania who scrapes 
the seafloor with his trawl-net. 
 Money is a convenient way to manage household life, to organize production, work and 
certain collective decisions. We could, nevertheless, imagine a very different financial 
system. However, we can no longer believe it possible to conceive of life on this planet as an 
interplay of free enterprise open to anyone with means. This idea is deceitful. 
 Instead of seeking to mathematize everything in order to extend the reign of economics, 
we must, instead, curb its domain. The idea of “ecological services” calls up a nomenclature 
of chemical and biological effects, some of which could be achieved by other means, 
technical, artificial and cheaper. Cost-benefit analysis gradually justifies all these 
substitutions on the basis of technocratic pseudo-equivalences. 
 To this is added the pressure exerted by patents. Artificial products are susceptible to 
appropriation by private enterprises, which will then use all the means at their disposal to see 
that these substitutions are accepted. The limits to patenting are constantly pushed back 
because the authorities making this decision have no other ethical reference in mind but the 
logic of economics. 
 From an epistemological point of view, technical innovation, highly rewarded in our 
current economical structure thanks to the patent system, depends on a conception of science 
which should be more intensely questioned. The idea, following Popper, that we have the 
right to try out theories just “to see” shows a spirit of conquest and adventure under whose 
spell we no longer fall. It inspires fear. If there is one thing we should mistrust, it is the 
domineering temperament and audacity of humankind. Instead, we must develop a scientific 
understanding which accompanies and cares for natural equilibriums, and which takes into 
account knowledge constructed by the social groups in question. A higher quality of 
understanding. In other words, an understanding which inspires greater confidence given the 
current social and geopolitical situation of mankind without writing out a blank cheque to 
specialists passionate about their field.114 
 
Contingency analysis as a conservative political response 
Use of cost-benefit analysis to estimate non-market commodities is destined to fail where the 
price of artificial services is concerned, thanks to the teeth of the market. Carrying out 
estimates for collective assets, even if periodically readjusted, will sooner or later put them in 
a situation of competitive weakness. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 On the role of credit-rating agencies in the subprime crisis, cf. F. Lordon Jusqu'à quand ? Raisons d'agir 
2008, p45.	  
114 Cf N. Bouleau “On Excessive Mathematization, Symptoms, Diagnosis and Philosophical bases for Real 
World Knowledge”  Real World Economics. n 57, 6 September 2011, 90-105.	  
 This argument is absolutely fundamental for management both long- and medium-term. 
Currently, however, liberalism is in the driving-seat, and we must use modern methods to 
react to the damage caused by mere profit-seeking. The serious accidents of pollution due to 
risks calculated according to schema in which the environment does not matter, the impacts 
resulting from lucrative projects, and the various faits accomplis arising from innovation seen 
as desirable as long as it has a market, all these situations demand operational responses in the 
framework of legal procedures currently in force. For lawyers of districts sullied by oil spills 
to be able to assert a polluter-pays principle, it is imperative that we have quantitative 
weapons to bring weight to bear on capitalism where it is most sensitive: the invoice. 
 In these struggles, contingency analysis can provide minimal values for estimating 
compensation, as long as the damage done to the environment is easily reparable. In the case 
of serious accidents, the costs of restoration will be much higher than the lack of ecological 
services as evaluated by method. Therefore there can only be a lasting policy of preservation 
if it is the cost of restoration which must be paid.115 
 The problem stems from the fact that there also exist situations of irreparability. As an 
ongoing strategy for the long-term management of non-market commodities, we need 
permanent credits to allow the operation of a system of measures and indicators, and to 
establish an overseeing, caretaking body to make sure that these ever numerous changes 
remain compatible with the equilibriums of the biosphere. Obviously, the capitalist does not 
follow the Kantian adage of acting according to principles one would desire to be universal 
laws; he does not follow it because he consumes far more energy and resources than he 
should, and because he selfishly contributes to the tragedy of the commons. In addition, the 
role of the State finds itself once again legitimatized as necessary for the establishment of 
these policies of care. In the United States, the federal government clearly assumes this 
responsibility for the preservation of Alaska, the Union’s “wild” state. 
 
Tradable pollution rights 
Certain economists working on environmental politics believe that a major theoretical step 
was taken with the invention of tradable rights to pollute. This highly debated notion 
surrounding carbonic gas emissions is nowadays well-known, and currently being 
implemented in Europe. The idea is that the State, or an international entity, puts quantifiable 
rights of emission up for sale, with economic actors able to buy or sell these rights amongst 
themselves, as long as the total global allocation is not exceeded. This allows a progressive 
reduction in these global rights of emission and favours changes in businesses’ energy 
policies, with an interesting flexibility in that those who pollute very little can profit by 
selling their rights to those who have not yet been able to effect these changes. Being fairly 
delicate in its operational application, the method needs very careful controls and initial 
inventory. 
 The question we are faced with is whether this idea can be considered to allow a perfect 
economization of externalities in the case, for example, of the greenhouse effect. Have we 
managed to introduce the market where it was previously unable to reach because of 
collective non-market commodities? 
 We must be precise here. We have not exactly achieved a market in the commodity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Jean-Jacques Friboulet, in a highly convincing article, concludes that “no price system can take into account 
the irreversibility which marks the evolution of the biosphere. Market mechanisms are equally incapable of 
assessing the free services provided by our natural heritage. We must then supplement monetary estimates with 
quantitative and qualitative indices of flow and resources [...] Market economics are not capable of regulating 
through their logic alone the links between the economy and the biosphere”. (“La théorie néoclassique et le 
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itself, we have installed a tax, and it is this tax which can be passed on, sold now or later, 
upon which we can speculate as with the financial markets. Negotiable rights to pollute must 
be thought of as an arranged tax. It is useful, even essential, as the works of the IPCC clearly 
show. But it is administratively difficult to control, especially when the unforeseeable occurs 
– material or economic accidents such as bankruptcies, etc. – and to such an extent that 
William Nordhaus, initially a fervent supporter, now favours a simple tax. 
 The leading role played by collective institutions crucially differentiates this from 
market spontaneity, as we will see in the rest of this chapter. The extension of the idea to the 
environment as a whole is impractical and not seriously considered by any economist. For the 
preservation of the rainforests, of territories and of ecological systems, the economy of free 
exchange has only one response: improvements to cost-benefit analysis. 
 
Calculations and good conscience 
Beyond cost-benefit analysis itself, there is also the more general rationality of accounting 
optimization. It has become extremely sophisticated among managers, who are reluctant to 
spend money unnecessarily. 
 In this way, texts on the deterioration of the environment inviting action, such as the 
Stern report, have developed an entire literature on option values which, in cases of 
uncertainty, bet on a higher technical performance which will cause useful changes to be less 
expensive later in time... hence an argument in favour of business as usual. Our current 
knowledge, upon which we found risk analysis, is what it is for now, but will improve in the 
future, hence leading to re-adjustments in the probability laws we have selected. Believing 
that results are random is not the same as believing that it is the law of probability itself which 
depends on chance and time; this allows us to carry out economic calculations using, as 
always, functions of utility and of production, which in certain cases show that it could be 
cheaper to wait. 
 Curiously, however, the economy is incapable of reasoning otherwise. In other words, it 
cannot consider the possibility that during the time before the deadline hits we might discover 
that the care we provide to contaminated patients, or the cleaning and filtering of polluted 
water, is much more expensive than currently estimated, thanks to the discovery of new 
complications or new problems with the remedies available today. 
 By assuming that progress will always be on its side, the economy cheats reality. In this 
way, it perpetuates the mindset of the private businessman who seeks profit via technological 
innovation, pulling ahead of analysis and expertise on environmental consequences and their 
translation into the legal corpus, and then, when the fait accompli effect fades and profits fall, 
simply abandons the business for another. As Barry Commoner put it: how is it that the 
entrepreneur does not worry about the perreniality and durable nature of his activity? Because 
when the goose that lays the golden eggs is killed, he has the means to simply buy another.  
 The calculation easily convinces those who think only in monetary terms when it 
advises a lack of action. 
 It is however often founded on poor arguments, and in particular on incremental 
optimization. This is very important for ecological time-scales; there is a huge difference 
between carrying out annual improvements thinking of the year to come and taking into 
account the results of our actions in 25 years time, for multiple reasons: 
 - Firstly, because it is clear from an algorithmic point of view: from the base of the tree-
branch, climbing ever higher, one can arrive at the tip of a branch without ever approaching 
the actual top of the tree. 
 - Then, there is irreversible damage, invisible on the level of individual incremental 
action. We do not see why continuing to pollute as we have already done should irredeemably 
destroy a species. 
 - Finally, and it is related, as with the environmental damage arising not in a 
progressive, gradual way but in an irregular and largely random manner, recovering causes 
after the effects is not automatic even when the causal chains that might exist are known. We 
can never be sure that other phenomena are not the real cause. 
 How can it be that calculations of cost-benefit analysis and of readjustment, despite 
their reductive character and various defects, suffice to leave defenders of the market 
economy feeling that they are acting in good conscience? 
 The first to follow this line of thought was obviously Blaise Pascal with his famous 
wager: “Not to wager that God exists is to wager that He does not. Which then will you do? 
Let us weigh up the gain and loss of assuming that God does exist. If you gain, you gain all; if 
you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without hesitation that He is. “That is very fine. Yes, 
I must wager; but I may perhaps wager too much.” Let us see. Since there is an equal risk of 
gain and of loss, if you had only to gain two lives, instead of one, you might still wager”.116 
Pascal was carrying out a CBA! 
 And it is worth re-reading what Voltaire wrote on the subject: “It is evidently false to 
say that “Not to wager that God exists is to wager that He does not”: as he who doubts and 
seeks enlightenment most certainly does not bet either for or against. Moreover, this article 
seems somewhat indecent and childish; this idea of the game of winning and losing is not 
appropriate to the gravity of the subject. In addition, the interest I have in believing 
something is not proof of existence of that something”.117 
  This last point is sound, already reflecting on the idea of performativity John Austin 
introduced in the wake of pragmatist philosophy and which would subsequently be extended 
throughout science – that is, the fact that science mixes its object of study with its action as 
intervention in social matters – including the economy, via the sociologists of science.118 For 
example, I have an interest in believing that I was “born under an auspicious star”; this 
encourages me in my undertakings but does not actually prove that I “enjoy divine grace”. We 
find here the exact same paradox which Jean-Pierre Dupuy calls ‘the paradox of Max Weber’, 
referring to the works of this sociologist on the role of puritan protestants in the birth of 
capitalism, these “saints overflowing with self-confidence”.119 
 Is it so surprising to mix religion and cost-benefit analysis in this way, in the end? 
Certainly, Christianity is probably the only religion at this point turned towards the universal, 
towards paying attention to the other, towards charity and open generosity; it confides in man 
a concrete and responsible task for the future of all. Historically, it has played a role of 
inauguration: “The concept of tolerance stricto sensu”, writes Jacques Derrida, “belongs 
firstly to a kind of Christian domesticity [...] In this way, in addition to the Aufklärung, the 
Enlightenment was essentially Christian”.120 However, we cannot fail to be struck by the fact 
that it should be the main religion in those rich countries which display the highest level of 	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selfishness on the planet... 
 
Let us return to the method. It consists of 1) acknowledging that the liberal economy 
treats the environment as an externality, 2) noting that this overwrites truly ecological and 
environmental objectives, 3) concluding that it is therefore necessary to internalize. For this, 
CBA in matters of biodiversity is based on an economic assessment of ecological services. 
This “taking into account” by the economy seems desirable, at first sight. However, it is a 
double-edged sword, and means that the same service when provided for less cost by 
artificial/chemical methods is necessarily better – leaving the door open to all sorts of 
destructive abuses.  
What must be clearly seen is that the environment, “economized” in this way, is a 
weaker configuration that the rest of the economy. These artificial procedures are slow and 
technocratic. The force obviously lacking is the market.	  
2. The idealized image of the market is a dogmatized fantasy 
 
Given the omnipresent nature of this notion today, in newspapers, on television, on the 
Internet, in political agendas, and so on, it requires only the least of wisdom – or curiosity, 
even – to wonder what exactly is covered by this term, ‘market’. We will proceed by mentally 
putting ourselves, insofar as is possible, in the position of the 19th century economists, those 
neo-classicists who attempted to state in mathematical terms what had already been 
understood by the philosopher-economists of the preceding century, the classicists. 
The historical direction of their ideas would demonstrate the power of reference to 
mechanics, a highly elaborate and accomplished science at the time, and one which served as 
a canonical model of scientism. 
 The economy models itself on mechanics by a very close parallel, the equations being 
identical to those used in the balancing of heavy bodies, but the work remained unfinished 
and incomplete because the neo-classicists never managed to develop economic laws relative 
to time. They limited themselves to mathematical representations of an instantaneous state – 
or rather, a variety of instantaneous states, for each one of which they stated the direction of 
its evolution but without ever stating exactly how this evolution happened. As for the kinetics 
of economics or the equations governing economic systems in relation to time, the page was 
left blank. 
This deficiency was not a small oversight or accidental negligence of some kind. It has 
a crucial epistemological importance, intimately linked to the problems debated in this very 
work. 
 
Cloud-functions 
In order to better understand the epistemology of neo-classical economics, we will begin with 
a completely different domain, so as to demonstrate how a conceptual contribution came 
about thanks to a highly specific type of mathematization of reality. 
 In a very well thought-out work, the paediatrician Aldo Naouri examines the 
relationships between father, mother and child.121 One of the important ideas he advances is 
that the influence of the mother diminishes as the child gains in years, and that, conversely, 
that of the father increases. For obvious reasons, the mother has a nine-month head start in the 
matter, and Naouri illustrates his theory with the following diagram, in which the ascending 
straight-line represents the period of gestation.  
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Since the father’s influence is rising while that of the mother decreases, the two curves must 
eventually cross. This defines an important moment in development which Naouri assigns to 
adolescence, a time when references shift dramatically and adult attitudes and childhood 
tastes find themselves mixing together. Naouri then traces an intermediary line between that 
of the father and that of the mother, representing parental influence as a whole, which passes 
through the point of intersection and is decreasing, but more slowly so than the line of the 
mother. 
 This is interesting, and highly suggestive. However, we must keep in mind that these 
curves are not actually there. If we were to elaborate an experimental protocol to give an idea 
of what these dependencies might be, following a child and its parents over twenty years and 
questioning them, either explicitly or by indirect observation, we would obviously obtain a 
scatter plot, or cloud of points, and not these rising and descending curves. As the influence 
of one of the parents can only be appreciated in the context of a particular situation, it is 
perfectly possible that this influence changes enormously over the course of a single day, 
depending on the activity of the youth. Naouri’s Law is a very general one, found “behind” an 
observable reality which is by necessity widely dispersed, as the psychological and social 
phenomena in question are very poorly defined under the sole term of ‘influence’. 
 In this case, Aldo Naouri is perfectly aware of the scope and limits of his 
mathematization, but a more scientific approach might possibly be able to use it as the point 
of departure for a theory, invoking for example the derivatives of the curves in the area of 
adolescence to explain certain phenomena. Essentially, this is the positivist approach taken by 
the sociology of Auguste Comte – there are laws, and the points in the cloud are due to the 
particularities of experimental circumstances. Supporting such a schematization is in itself a 
complex psychological phenomenon; the apparent innocuousness of the design contributes 
towards not feeling the need to reject it. In a way, the existence of such hidden laws also 
reassures us, as we feel that are not in completely unknown territory. 
 In the 19th century, the neo-classical economists took the same approach, but went 
further in their calculations.122  
 Let us take the case of Jules Dupuit (1804-1865), the inventor of what is today known 
as marginal utility. In France, as the Bourbon Restoration was ending and the Second Empire 
beginning, the notion of utility was under debate. Dupuit saw it as a quantity, a property of 
the object exchanged and its price, divided up according to the advantages held by the seller-
manufacturer or those of the consumer. “Political economics”, he writes (as opposed to social 
economics), “must take as a measure of an object’s utility the maximum sacrifice each 
consumer is willing to make to obtain it”. He uses the now famous example of a toll bridge: 
“[the utility of a toll bridge] is always divided into two main parts: 1) the lost utility 
corresponding to the crossings which would have taken place were the toll abolished and 
which have not with the current price; 2) the utility produced corresponding to crossings 
carried out. This utility is itself divided into two main parts: a) utility for the producer, or the 
product of the toll; b) utility for the consumer, or the difference in value between service 
rendered and price it costs”123 	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Since then, Dupuit, to recuperate the largest section of utility possible (cf. ‘b)’ above), 
advocated the setting of tariffs according to categories of users: “There is the fine, the very 
fine, the extremely fine, and the super fine, all of which, despite being cut from the same cloth 
and showing no other difference than that of a superlative in the label, are sold for very 
different prices”.124 “So when the bridge is completed and the state establishes a tariff, it no 
longer has any regard for production costs, and charges less for a heavy cart which causes 
more wear and tear than a suspension cart. Why two different prices for the same service? 
Because the poor man does not attach the same price to the advantage of crossing as the rich 
man does, and raising the tariff would only prevent him from crossing”. 
 “The aim is always the same”, he explains. “It is to cause the service rendered to pay 
out not what it is worth, but what the buyer estimates its worth to be” [ibid]. Dupuit invented 
market segmentation in 1840. 
Moreover, Dupuit realized that, through the thought experiments which defined it, his 
notion of utility was difficult to measure. He recognized that it was abstract. “It will perhaps 
be objected that the calculation for which we have given the formula depends on data which 
no statistic can provide, that we will thus never be able to express with a precise figure the 
utility provided by a machine, a road, by whatever type of work...” 
If we were to obtain measurements by varying the pricing of the toll, to evaluate how 
much traffic would remain and how much would disappear, we would not obtain a curve but a 
scatter plot. This is due to the fact that social reality is much more complicated than Dupuit 
had thought. Implicitly, he had made various assumptions of independence for the 
construction of his utility-function: 
- independence from the opinion of other buyers: buyers do not consult each other. 
- independence of buyer behaviour from details of daily historical reality. The cloud of 
“traffic relative to the toll” depends on the weather, the time, the season, and on a thousand 
other factors,125  
- independence from other ways of crossing the river, other toll bridges, ferries, and 
their tariffs 
- independence from general trends. Dupuit’s user is a consumer. He did not foresee 
that the buyer could also resell his toll ticket, like when one purchases a work of art (or even a 
common object nowadays, on e.g. Ebay or Pricemaster). This is obviously the case in the 
financial markets. 
Let us emphasize an important feature of his method, which was to mark all economic 
thought until the present day: Dupuit’s reasoning was local. 
- geographically local: other river crossings, and other rivers, are not taken into 
consideration. What would happen if the State were to apply his reasoning to all bridges? 
- economically local: Dupuit reasons as if all things were equal. If another provider in 
the transport service modifies their prices in relation to Dupuit’s toll-bridge, the problem 
becomes more complicated, even instable (as was the case for Hotelling’s ice-cream sellers).  
- above all, mathematically local: the reasoning is a differential calculus (developed on 
page 375 of Ann. des Ponts, 1849), which was to open the way to the marginal analysis at the 
heart of neo-classical theory. Boundaries and limit conditions are absent. We will see below 
that the neo-classicists were heavily influenced by the laws of mechanics formulated, by 
Euler and Lagrange, as the result of an optimization: typically we examine the derivative of a 
functional to see where it vanishes, in order to find its maximum point. Or, equally, we might 	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calculate the relative derivatives (elasticities) to see if they are equal, or we might translate a 
curve to see how the intersection shifts. 
If we keep in mind that we are in fact talking about scatter plots, do these little 
variations of marginal analysis have a concrete meaning? Let us not forget that in the 
economy everything happens within time, and that here time is absent. 
 
In fact, several years prior, Augustin Cournot had already asked similar questions about 
the demand function D=F(p), which gives the quantity of the good resulting on the market 
from a certain price level p. “As so many moral causes, impossible to enumerate or measure, 
influence the law of demand”, he writes, “it is clear that we must not expect this law to be 
expressible by an algebraic formulation, no more than with the law of mortality or any of 
those laws determined within the domain of statistics, also known as social arithmetic. It 
would then be up to observation to provide means of drawing up, between appropriate 
boundaries, a table of corresponding values of D and p; [...] and we could stretch the solution 
of problems to numerical applications.126  
 A fine philosopher, however, he realized the difficulties we described above, and he 
adds: “But even if we never reach this goal (because of the difficulty in procuring 
observations both numerous and exact enough, and also because of the progressive variations 
in the law of demand in a country which has not reached an appreciably stationary state), it 
would still not be unreasonable to introduce...”, and he continues by pleading for the interest 
mathematical analysis holds for general functions, allowing the relations between functions to 
be shown, thereby reducing the number of them needing to be empirically determined in order 
to deduce all the others. Dupuit and Cournot knew that utility and demand were difficult to 
measure, and even seem to admit it as impossible, but both trust in mathematics for their 
considerations to contribute to a lasting scientific knowledge. Dupuit, because the idea that 
the integral of a curve is different to a subjacent rectangle seemed to him robust in itself – not 
model-dependent, we would say today. And Cournot, because he believed that, even if the 
functions themselves were not known, it was still possible to find the laws linking them, such 
as there being a demonstrable relation between the mortality curve and the age curve in a 
country with a stationary regime, even if neither is explicitly known. 
 
Economic models, begun in the neo-classical period, are of a very particular type. They 
propose a simplified vision of the world, as with all models,127 but this simplified vision is 
calculative; in the language of simple “calculus” mathematics, functions are regular, 
indefinitely differentiable, with simple analytic expressions. Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen 
makes the following distinctions: “In physics a model is also 'a calculating device, from 
which we may compute the answer to any question regarding the physical behavior of the 
corresponding physical system'.128 The same is true for the models of engineering economics. 
The specific role of a physical model is better described by remarking that such a model 
represents an accurate blueprint of a particular sector of physical reality. But the point, which 
I made in “Economic Theory and Agrarian Economics” and which I intend to explain in 
greater detail now, is that an economic model is not an accurate blueprint but an analytical 
simile.”129 Georgescu-Roegen insists on the fact that the economic model is a concept so far 
removed from reality as to be insufficient for directing our actions: “To illustrate now the 
difference between blueprint and simile, let me observe that one does not need to know 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses, (1838).	  
127 Cf N. Bouleau, Philosophies des mathématiques et de la modélisation, du chercheur à l'ingénieur, 
L'Harmattan, 1999.	  
128 P. W. Brigman The Nature of Physical Theory Princeton 1936, emphasis from GR	  
129 The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, Harvard Univ Press 1971.	  
electronics in order to assemble a radio apparatus he has purchased in kit form. All he needs 
to do is follow automatically the accompanying blueprint, which constitutes an operational 
representation by symbols of the corresponding mechanism [...] Many graduate students too 
feel greatly frustrated to discover that, in spite of all they have heard, economics cannot 
supply them with a handbook for banking, planning, taxation, and so forth. An economic 
model, being only a simile, can be a guide only for the initiated who has acquired an 
analytical insight through some laborious training. Economic excellence cannot dispense with 
'delicacy and sensitivity of touch' — call it art, if you want.” 
In fact, if we accept that economic models are abstract, conceptual models, such as that 
of Aldo Naouri, then we cannot reproach them for seeking simplicity. When Georgescu-
Roegen wrote “why should economic laws, or any other laws for that matter, be expressed by 
analytical functions?” he was thinking of the most accurate representation possible of the 
scatter plot, but this was not the intent of the neo-classicists, who wanting to create an outline 
for running a business or developing public policy. The accomplished philosopher and 
economist Augustin Cournot had already realized this distinction, and informs the reader of 
his plan to ensure that “the solution to the general questions arising from the theory of wealth 
should depend mainly [...] upon this branch of analysis whose object is arbitrary functions, 
obliged only to satisfy certain conditions”.130 The points forming the cloud are forgotten, and 
can even be replaced by theoretical individual behaviours conforming to the model. 
Let us see how economists reason. The curves of supply and demand in the main work 
of Léon Walras look like this: 
 
 
 
Below now are some diagrams taken from Jean Tirole’s work, The Theory of Industrial 
Organization,131 and we see that the functions do not need to be very sophisticated, and in fact 
are even simpler than in Walras. The various arguments are explained with straight lines or 
with convex or concave curves – that is, symbolically using first and second derivatives. Note 
also that the arguments are local, and that limit conditions – highly important in real 
mathematical problems, and in practical economics, of course – are not mentioned. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 A. Cournot Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses (1838).	  
131 MIT 1988.	  
  
 
Neo-classical language consists of an immense simplification, aiming to increase 
understanding of trends which are not immediately observable and of the ways a system 
reacts when certain parameters are changed. The simplification is reminiscent – curiously – of 
that carried out by the Meadows team of the Club of Rome. In both cases, we have smooth 
curves, and in both cases, the equations governing the system are determinist and not 
especially complicated. 
In this respect, the criticism William Nordhaus made of the works of the Club of Rome 
shortly after their publication is a blatant case of the pot calling the kettle black. Having 
reproached the Club of Rome’s works for being purely theoretical, his response took the form 
of a modelling in the exact same ilk, based, as is normal in neo-classical language, on a few 
determinist equations ‘à la Hotelling’ which give a more optimistic prediction of long-term 
trends by assuming that technology will improve: “Over the next century or so, many low-
cost energy resources will be largely depleted, leaving more abundant but also more 
expensive resources. Ultimately, if and when the transition is completed to an economy based 
on plentiful nuclear resources (either through breeder or fusion reactors), the economic 
importance of scarcity of resources will disappear, and capital and labor costs alone will 
determine prices”.132  Without going into topics we shall explain in more detail later, let us 
note for now that Nordhaus makes the serious error of trusting completely in the regulatory 
effect of prices, even though in his opinion term markets (of options, futures) are not 
sufficiently developed on resource markets : “The absence of futures and insurance markets 
rules out the theorems usually drawn from general equilibrium theory.” We will see that, on 
the contrary, the presence of a term market does not stabilize prices at all, but, instead, 
completely prevents all stabilization. 
The reality of markets providing quoted prices and interest rates, which are the data 
agents use to make decisions, is very different from the images given by neo-classical 
thought; it is stochastic, and cannot be understood without its chaotic temporal dimension. 	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The amazing principle of least action 
What made the neo-classical economists of the 19th century believe it possible to cleave to a 
purely local line of argument based in stylized cloud-functions, using neither measurements 
nor border conditions? The answer is the equations of mechanics and the example of light. 
 Science as envisaged by Dupuit resembled the optics of Euler-Maupertuis, and their 
principle of least action: it is resolved in the search for an optimum. 
 Maupertuis and Euler’s principle of least action strongly impressed upon 18th century 
minds, like a splendid discovery bringing proof of the harmony of God’s creation. It has 
remained at the centre of scholarly debates since the formal improvements to mechanics made 
by Lagrange, because it gives to understand that natural laws can be obtained as an 
application of the calculus of variations. It exercised a religious fascination on the minds of 
the 18th and early 19th centuries: “It is not then in the small details, in these areas of the 
universe whose relations remain too unknown to us, that we must seek the Supreme Being: it 
is in the phenomena whose universality suffers no exception and which their simplicity 
exposes to our view [as with the laws of light]. This is the principle of least action: a wise 
principle, so worthy of the Supreme Being and to which nature seems so constantly attached 
[...] What satisfaction for the human mind, in contemplating these laws which are the 
principle of movement and rest for all bodies of the universe, to find in them the proof of the 
existence of He who governs it!” (Maupertuis, 1748)  
That the differential calculus used in mechanics was the explicit inspiration of the neo-
classicist economists is attested to by Léon Walras: “Open the analytic mechanics of 
Lagrange, and you will see there that P and Q being two forces or powers applied to two 
points of a system, dp and dq being the virtual speeds of these forces measured by the 
infinitely small spaces susceptible to being crossed in a same instant by their points of 
application and depending on their directions, and Pdq and Qdp being the moments of the 
forces P and Q, following the definitions laid down by Galileo, then the equation 
Pdp+Qdq=0 expresses the equilibrium of the two forces. Well then, let us change the terms. 
Instead of force, put scarcities or intensities of the last needs fulfilled; instead of ‘virtual 
speeds’, put virtually exchangeable quantities, or infinitely small quantities susceptible to 
being added, via purchase, to quantities already possessed or to be cut off from them by sale 
in a trade. Then, the same equation will express the maximum satisfaction of an individual’s 
needs or of economic equilibrium. In this way, if economics is not mechanics itself as applied 
to the balance and movement of cash, then it is at the very least a science analogous to 
mechanics”.133 
 Obviously, in this analogy, Walras is omitting the crucial role played by boundary 
conditions in resolving the problems of continuum mechanics. Just as with the principle of 
least action, we know today that the property of light waves which leads them to take the 
shortest optical path when crossing an interface gives the appearance of a purely local 
concern, thanks to the shortness of the wavelengths. Maxwell’s equations on electromagnetic 
waves assume, as with all problems in physics, that the boundary conditions are known. 
 These salient features – independence of agents presented as an approximation, 
approaching prices and quantities as concepts, then over the 19th century as a function of 
production, the resolution of problems by local differentiation – were to become the 
framework for neo-classical theory. Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger, Léon Walras (general 
equilibrium), von Böhm-Bawerk, Vilfredo Pareto (theory of optimality), Irving Fisher, etc. 
created an evocative language of great flexibility, used to this day. 	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 It is interesting to compare this epistemological approach to that which Condorcet had 
proposed, at the end of the preceding century, for another kind of mathematization of the 
social which can be seen as a still fledgling form of the theory of information or of survey 
techniques. 
 Condorcet, a highly capable mathematician, believed that the truth of uncertain 
assertions was delicate, and that “calculus becomes necessary whenever the truth or falsehood 
of opinions depends on a certain precision in values”. His plan was to apply probability 
calculus to the social, in order to understand how the “reason to believe” spread and was 
propagated – a notion somewhat similar to that of utility, but relative to the veracity or 
falseness of judgements. He pushed this idea, leading to his mathematically beautiful 
discovery of the “voting paradox”,134 but did not think it could be extended to calculating 
behaviours. 
 
“The universal quantity of merchandise or that of a particular merchandise can 
be approached via numbers; but the desire to buy and to sell is not susceptible to 
any calculation, and yet variation in price depends on this moral quantity, which 
itself depends on opinion and passions. Attempting to submit everything to 
calculation is a beautiful idea, but look at the greatest geometricians of Europe, 
the D’Alemberts and the Lagranges. They examine the movement of three bodies 
mutually attracting each other: they suppose that these bodies are masses without 
extension, or bodies very similar to spheres, and this question, as limited as it is 
by a hundred facilitating conditions, has occupied them for over twenty years, and 
continues to do so. The effect of the forces acting in the head of a stubborn 
salesman are even more difficult to calculate”. (Letter to P. Verri, 1773) 
 
Condorcet’s reasoning moves away from the concept, the reason to believe, and towards a 
mathematization through probabilities. His epistemology is an extension of that of Laplace: 
we cannot determine everything, principles, laws of forces and the way in which they act, etc. 
– all that is relevant is calculus of probabilities. The approach is an a priori limitation of 
science. Condorcet needs to make explicit all his assumptions, independence or correlation of 
opinions, etc., before carrying out calculations, as the results he obtains are highly sensitive to 
the laws of probabilities chosen, while for Dupuit and the neoclassicists these hypotheses can 
remain implicit. 
  
How can we “reduce” cloud-functions? 
A natural question, which comes to mind upon seeing Jean Tirole’s diagrams, is whether 
these little lines and curves should not be epistemologically thought of as the result of 
statistical analyses of observed data. They would express correlations, and be lines of 
regression or curves of non-linear regression from the clouds measured. The laws of neo-
classical economics could be shown as the result of principal component analyses or as 
estimates of conditional probability laws. 
 On a more fundamental level, it is the precise function of econometrics which finds 
itself under debate here. Edmond Malinvaud’s famous manual,135 for example, is intellectually 
situated between neo-classical theory and reality. In fact, the work is entirely dedicated to 
statistics, with economics a mere pretext; it could equally well be a work on medicine and 
barely any changes would need to be made. The features of economic activity it does mention 
are given a very cursory examination. Econometrics finds itself in an ambiguous position. On 	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the one hand, it moves away from the real and towards a conceptualization, following an 
interpretative approach typical of statistics; on the other hand, it gives to understand that the 
neo-classical laws can be extracted from reality by use of inferential procedures. 
Econometricians will maintain that they do not postulate neo-classical economic hypotheses, 
markets are incomplete, competition is imperfect, the world is “second tier”, etc. The fact 
remains that neo-classical language is the main interpretative tool used, in addition to normal 
statistical tools. Econometric studies, in order to make sense, draw their resources from both 
sides, using circumstances and translation of observed conditions in economic situations, and 
taking from theory the tools to discuss these observations. 
 
 
 
Scatter plot as provided by statistical studies applied to the social. Extract from a survey on “personality 
indicators”, in M. Loriaux and D. Remy, La retraite au quotidien, De Boeck 2005. 
 
 If we admit that neo-classical theory is a mechanistic model of certain social facts, 
then econometrics is a means of assigning these mechanisms to precise, dated social 
situations. However, as with the curves of maternal and paternal influence on the child in 
Aldo Naouri’s model, the law as realized in the context of real facts has great difficulty 
relying on what is observed, because the breadth of social reality represented has little in 
common with its small curves. This is where statistics come in. 
 Econometrics based on statistics return to the basic assumption that the world is a neo-
classical model disrupted by chance, which statistics allow us to correct. This idea is 
completely false. 
 a) Firstly, it is not chance which distances the real world from mechanical models and 
their laws. Chance is only ever a bit-part player, neutral and mathematized, standardized in its 
meanings and its risks. The world is not ruled by chance, because there is no chance to be 
found in that which makes sense and motivates people. These are vitally important 
philosophical questions, which I discuss in my earlier work Risk and Meaning. The 
probabilistic world is a kind of standardization that is incompatible with meaningful 
understandings of the world. This leads to the issue of the “tails” of probability laws, which 
are never known and yet which concern the rare events which matter most to us. It also affects 
sample size in statistics and the epistemological place of qualitative surveys and case studies 
such as those used by sociologists, which are the only tools able to unearth notions not 
already present in the investigator’s model.136 Think of what we call the labour market, and 
how it is a world infinitely more complex than that posited by chance and laws relying on 
regression curves. 	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 b) Above all, however, chance is on the side of economics because of finance. The 
shocking lie of econometrics is that it acts as if financial hazard did not exist, despite it being 
the main cause of disruption in the world, and as if it could be simply forgotten that neo-
classical economics is composed of regular curves which are nowhere to be seen in reality, 
especially not in the speculative markets making up the heart of the economy – i.e. those upon 
which futures positions can be taken. We must accept the revolutionary idea that finance is 
one of the predominant factors in the complete distancing of the real world from neo-classical 
models and the ideas of the classicists. Econometrics is absolutely incapable – thanks to all 
the statistics that would be required – of giving the underlying trend of a quoted quantity in 
such a market. It is logically impossible. We will examine the reasons for this more closely in 
the final section of this chapter. Still, these immeasurable tendencies are those which would 
inform economic actors on the direction they should take for the “wealth of nations”, taking 
into account global constraints and limits on resources. 
 
Two types of market 
This discussion leads us to introduce a distinction: there are markets and there are markets. 
When Marx and Say talk about the market and discuss the notions of value and 
surplus value, the markets they speak of are not the same as those markets about which Black, 
Scholes and Merton reasoned in terms of Brownian motion. Contrasting the categories, we 
can give the name type 1 or socially distributed markets to trade situations where each buyer 
is recognized as separate, as is each seller, and the sale and article exchanged are strongly 
established both geographically and socially. The description of the article and the sale 
necessarily includes within itself elements pertaining to context. “I call ‘market’ that place”, 
wrote Auguste Walras in 1831, “where buyers and sellers, i.e. traders, meet, that is to say the 
place where we find on the one hand men with needs and, on the other, rare utilities suited to 
meeting these needs. Property, the fruit of limitation, and monopoly, which follows from 
property, are the reason why these rare utilities can only fall into the possession of those who 
need them through an exchange, containing at once a sale and a purchase”.137 For example, 
the idea of the labour market is an aggregate, to help understand the role of savings, 
investment, unemployment levels, salaries, production, etc. Each real element is a candidate, 
with his or her own idiosyncrasies, for a particular job in a given business in a certain region 
at a particular date. The transaction will be subject to a contract, and the salary paid out over a 
period of time during which the worker hired cannot ‘resell’ his employment contract and hire 
a sub-employee to fulfil his role. “But rare utilities and the needs requiring them are not 
floating in mid-air, nor lost in space”, continues Auguste Walras. “Men cover the earth, and 
rare utilities propagate around them. One always finds, in a particular place, a particular 
quantity of people and a particular quantity of limited commodities. In this way, scarcity is 
created, determined and applied. It is always in a given place that we see the emergence of 
this highly remarkable disproportion, indicated above and long hinted at by common sense, 
between the totality of certain goods and the totality of needs which would possess them”. 
Similarly, the real estate market is a type 1 social-repartition market. It concerns buildings 
identical to each other only in that they might share a location; the procedure takes time, and 
the possible speculative behaviour of the buyer must necessarily take into account the 
individual characteristics of the building and urban change in the area, in addition to other 
general indicators contributing to spot price. 
 On the other hand, the financial markets are type 2, or speculo-valued, markets. The 
marketed item is standardized to allow the definition of a standard unit, as with continuous 
quantities in physics, and the exchanges are made more fluid, meaning that one can buy and 	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resell whatever quantity one wants, whenever one wants. This then concerns currencies, 
which fluctuate in relation to one another whilst always retaining the property of transitivity 
in rates, shares in important companies, representing dozens of thousands of businesses, and 
bonds and rates, which are the tender of the loans given out by states or banks. However, it 
also concerns standardized raw materials: oil, gas, and various other petroleum products; 
metals both precious (gold, platinum, silver) and base (iron, zinc, aluminium), plus rare 
metals used in electronics, notably listed on the London Metal Exchange; agricultural 
products (wheat, soya, wool, cotton, rapeseed oil, palm oil, cocoa, rice, coffee, etc.), notably 
listed on the Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange (New York). These markets form the basis 
of the world economy, in the sense that any small business sees its supplies of basic 
commodities conditioned by these prices, and any agricultural enterprise sees its opportunities 
restricted by the same, via wholesalers. Financial markets provide a certain competition for 
the listing of these standardized products by remaining historically specialized; these markets 
are of course accompanied by derivative markets, trading in the classical derivatives and 
allowing the buying and selling of futures and options. Obviously, speculation plays a part not 
only as regards the function of rarities satisfying needs, but also plays a fundamental 
structural role. The rigorous logic of arbitrage theory shapes everything that happens in these 
markets. 
 Recent sociological studies often seem to blur the distinction between type 1 and type 
2 markets, thanks to concepts relative to the social constitution of markets (economization, 
socio-technical arrangements, agencies, networks, performativity, etc.). The specific features 
of the quoted financial markets are that agents are at once buyers and sellers, and that 
mathematization is pursued to the creation of formulae, inducing a structuring of calculation 
agencies and of complex socio-technical agreements for the estimation of product prices.138 
These sociological analyses thus contribute to a better understanding of the historical 
emergence of contemporary finance and of some of its new institutions, but on the other hand 
they leave aside the essential characteristic of these markets – namely, that fixed prices are 
created by speculation itself, following a process which no-one understands in detail unless it 
produces an extremely convulsive result and said result conforms to theory. This 
characteristic is, in my opinion, the reason behind a completely new relationship between 
these markets, the problem of the entrepreneur in decision-making, and externalities. 
Dyed-in-the-wool fans of “free trade” think it an excellent idea to try to convert all 
type 1 markets into one or more type 2 markets. They call this process fluidification, or giving 
more flexibility to the market. European officials in the directorates-general dedicate huge 
amounts of time and energy to this absurd, ideological cause, which aims to standardize 
listable units by rendering goods fungible and lifting all bans which might be the cause of 
black markets. From the resale of valid but unused railway tickets – which exists on the 
Internet, and is harmless in itself – to the market in organs and passports, etc., the limits to 
unacceptable transgression are being forever pushed back.139 And this political error is 
accompanied by a theoretical one: type 2 or speculo-valued markets, have nothing to do with 
those conceptualized by Walras junior, and the neo-classical theorists. 
 The distinction between markets of type 1 (socio-repartition) and type 2 (speculo-
valued) naturally leads us to ask whether it would not be possible to completely separate both 
kinds of market and take measures designed to diminish, even suppress, the influence of type 	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2 markets on the economy, and thus obtain an economy without the problems caused by 
speculation. 
 The reality is not so simple. In fact, while the two types represent two extreme 
positions, in practice we find all sorts of intermediary situations. When someone buys a 
painting, a beautiful old book or a country house, is this merely a social purchase, or is there 
not also an idea of being able to resell the object? An entrepreneur who optimizes the costs of 
his raw materials is, after a certain fashion, speculating on his stocks. More philosophically, 
use value seems to be influenced, even contaminated, by exchange value, as we are social 
beings and our tastes linked to those of others. It is hard to separate production and usage 
from commercial activity. However, if we cannot make this separation, then criticism of type 
2 speculo-valued markets has a more fundamental impact on market economy as a whole. 
 
Inside or outside the model? 
We find ourselves now in the presence of two ideologies: the financial and the neo-
classical. What then is the epistemological role today of neo-classical terminology, with its 
analytical utility function models and its production functions with exponents α and 1-α? 
These conceptual representations, while very simply mathematized, are shrewd and even 
amusing. It is quite enthralling to watch how putting pressure on savings causes investment to 
rise and unemployment to fall, etc. However, as with Aldo Naouri’s model discussed earlier, 
this is all “in the air”. A utility function is exactly the same thing as the curve of paternal 
influence on the child, being extremely far removed from reality. And this becomes 
dangerous, just as a psychological model would, when used as a reference for good conduct, 
being both ideological and without limits. 
 Using a little mathematical system to recognize “laws” between notions relating to 
“wealth” by quantifying them goes far beyond a theoretical exercise – a job for philosophers – 
when this model becomes the primary reference for most actors. 
 The model remains a mechanistic image of an abstract human being, far removed 
from reality on both the individual level (think of the immensity of the fields of psychology 
and psychoanalysis) and the collective (think of the variety of usages and cultural values, and 
of the epistemological complexity of sociology). 
 Let us take an example external to neo-classical theory itself but a product of its 
aftermath: the Nash equilibrium, in game theory. In a game with multiple players, a Nash 
equilibrium is present if each player’s strategy is optimal when the strategies of the other 
players are fixed. We can, on reflection, show under certain hypotheses that if time passes or 
parties succeed each other, a stable situation will be a Nash equilibrium, because if this were 
not the case, at least one player would not be playing as well as he could. The game dynamic 
is a more complicated matter, and can be strange in some cases. To remain within a Nash 
equilibrium, each participant seeking to optimize their position, it is also necessary that even 
if one player makes a slight adjustment, the other players are not obliged to alter their 
strategies. (We see mathematically that there is a need for a contractive dependence condition 
between the various strategies in a suitable normed space). 
 If we apply these ideas to the case of the market in credit derivatives as it was 
organized before the subprime crisis (which will be examined in further detail in the sixth 
section of chapter III), we must consider that the trading of securitized portfolios between 
financial institutions, the risks of which were safely assessed by coherent risk measures 
themselves calibrated by the market in credit derivatives, was not far from a Nash 
equilibrium. In fact, the prices indicated on the market allowed any establishment to 
mathematically optimize the prices of their own contingent assets. Moreover, it was the very 
idea of the Nash equilibrium which strengthened securitization and credit derivative 
procedures during their introduction at the turn of the 21st century. 
 But what lesson are we to take from the historical reality of the subprime crisis, now 
so widely known? It shows us that agents – and modellers – can believe they are in a Nash 
equilibrium whilst actually being on the verge of a major crisis. This is simply because the 
notion of the Nash equilibrium is extremely model-dependent, and models require 
interpretation. Our interpretative faculties allow us to understand the world according to a 
new and different reading (here, understanding that the contraction in US household savings 
and the rise in property prices could not continue indefinitely). 
 It was precisely these interpretative faculties which Charles Peirce and John Dewey 
thought they could reduce to the possibilities of action, this being the fundamental 
reductionism of pragmatism.140  
 In the real world, players are not in game theory; the game they play is not fixed, the 
same for everyone and drawn from a common rulebook, but depends upon their own ability to 
interpret the economic world. 
 If we replace the optimizing individual (representing Cournot’s ideal economic actor) 
with the interpretative individual (coming under a more creative conception of the social 
subject), neo-classical theory as a whole collapses, as does game theory, which had supported 
it. The interpretative individual has a permanent interest in what causes a certain 
mathematization of the world to be partial, incomplete, unworkable. It manufactures counter-
expertise and counter-modelling. It sees things differently.  
 We are all interpretative, and only allow ourselves to remain within the rational of a 
particular model if we are made to by political force.  
In fact, that is not exactly what happens. In reality, economists consider themselves 
interpretative beings, eschewing some models and constructing others, etc., and believe 
ordinary humans (and market agents who fail to predict crises) to be the prisoners of reductive 
models. 
 
Why is there no economic kinetics? 
The neo-classical economists were inspired by mechanics, but not enough as to take time into 
account. A very large number of economists, feeling constrained by this mindset which is still 
taught to students today, noted this deficiency and worked to better understand the reality of 
an economics in which time played a role. The first stage in progressing from a static 
formalism which tried to perfect the theory of general equilibrium would have been the study 
of kinetics – that is, economic phenomena involving the actual speeds of changes in 
quantities. In mechanics, this opens the door to the phenomena of viscosity, vortices, 
turbulence, etc., which are all very current and well represented mathematically. In a science 
like chemistry an analogous issue arises, that of moving beyond simple descriptions of 
equilibria wherein the concentrations of the constituents are stabilized and on to the role 
played by speed of reaction – thus leading to an understanding of catalysis and the discovery 
of a vast, surprising phenomenology.141 Kinetics has a clear importance in life sciences. It is 
therefore only natural to ask: if economics is susceptible to arguments similar to those of 
equilibrium in heavy bodies, why is there no corresponding body of reciprocal arguments 
incorporating speed in relation to time – that is, trends? 
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 One way to answer is to say that real economics, in fact, does take place in time and 
finds there all the complexity and creativity of life itself. It is therefore out of the reach of 
formalisms. 
 A highly popular critique in this vein was developed towards the end of the eighties. 
Epistemological thought on physics and biology had been a turning point for systems 
sensitive to initial conditions, open systems, and chaotic systems. Similarly, environmental 
philosophy had alerted public opinion to the unexpected advance of technology and the links 
between pollution and entropy.142 It seemed essential to mark the intellectual paucity of 
reference to neo-classical schemas compared to the finesse and fertility of these new ideas. 
The rallying point of this renewal was the study of the consequences arising from the fact that 
economics à la Walras had not taken into account the irreversibility which seemed the 
keystone of both the dialectic tradition (Hegel, Marx), which insisted on the driving role of 
creativity in human efforts for the evolution of societies, and of the new discoveries and 
possibilities appearing in the natural sciences. 
 The 'tâtonnements'143 of the market unfold in real time, and the first observation to be 
made is that the order of players is not unimportant. In the labour market, when it comes to 
discussions between the head of a business and trade unions on the issue of pay rises, having 
the initiative and “going second” are not equivalent, as the action taken by the first to move 
then alters the conditions determining the choice of the second. 
Another aspect in the interplay of supply and demand with relation to price is that the 
responses of the “players” take a certain time to be played out. They are then consequential to 
what is taking place but with a certain delay, which easily produces cycles and prevents the 
reaching of a fixed point. To this must be added the fact that the magnitude of the response 
can be excessive. Sensitivity to changes is often governed by threshold phenomena, meaning 
nothing happens until a certain level is reached, and then a sudden, abrupt reaction takes 
place. Even in the case of gradual responses, large levels of elasticity can cause the process to 
diverge. We thus come to what M. Ezekiel described in the 1930s as a cobweb response.144  
 Moreover, asymmetries are common between increases and decreases. A temporary 
reduction in production, leaving part of the productive capital unused, is an easier decision for 
a manufacturer than increasing production for a brief period of time. In more complex 
situations, or when thinking on a macroeconomic scale, a path effect often appears. For 
example, it has been demonstrated that purchasing power parity was not the elastic restoring 
force governing exchange rates between currencies, but that these last actually depend on the 
historical path of public policy.145  
 These works launched a highly interesting field of research on what can be called real 
economics, this being defined as an economics which takes into account the temporality of 
decisions; meanwhile, neo-liberalism was established and deepened misunderstanding, thanks 
to its heterodox academic circles.146  
 
In this, however, we have not really answered the question of the absence of economic 
kinetics, but rather that of the pertinence of the theory of general equilibrium à la Walras – an 
equally fundamental question, but a different one. There remains a real historical enigma in 	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the fact that we start theorizing but stop at the very beginning. The analogy between neo-
classical theory and mechanics is not a simple formal similarity between certain equations, as 
often happens between various theories.147 It has an important historical role in reinforcing the 
legitimacy of mathematized economics, thanks to the immense prestige mechanics has 
acquired, as we saw earlier. W. Stanley Jevons and Léon Walras argued extensively on this 
subject, the legitimacy of bringing mathematics into the human sciences being no more 
automatically accepted in that time than it is now. 
  This is the main theme of the preface to Elements of Pure Economics, and Walras 
developed it still further towards the end of his life, in the article, “Economics and 
Mechanics”.148 He stresses the formal similarity between static equations in mechanics and 
those involved in economic equilibrium by taking as examples the moments of forces acting 
on a steelyard balance and the proportionality of scarcities and prices. In The Theory of 
Political Economy (1871), Jevons expresses a similar state of mind: “the theory here given 
may be described as the mechanics of utility and selfinterest”. He refers to the virtual 
velocities – i.e., to the mechanical approach of carrying out infinitesimal changes in the 
position of the application points in order to easily discover equations (the method used by 
d’Alembert as the principle of virtual work) – which re-establish the lexicon we established 
above. Jevons devotes a whole section, called “Analogy to the Theory of the Lever”, to this 
correspondence between economic balance and that of the lever. 
 If we take an epistemological step back, we cannot avoid being struck by the partial and 
incomplete nature of this analogy. Neo-classical theory is a theoretical construction which 
provides a model of the commercial trade of a society but in a static manner. We know that 
this model is simple and mathematical, far removed from what happens in reality, but what is 
much more surprising is that it is a model in which everything moves – supply, prices, 
demand, etc. – yet which does not involve time. How can quantities evolve and change 
without time being present in the equations? From the analogy with mechanics, we 
immediately call to mind those strategies of actors governed by functions dependent on 
variables and the trends of these variables. Fundamentally, mechanical equations provide a 
material system with a relation between parameters of position and their first and second 
derivatives in relation to time. Nothing of the sort is to be seen here, as the neo-classicists did 
not study systems governed by equations of the type:  
pi = Fi (p1,…, pn,q1,…,qn, p1•,…, pn•,q1•,…,qn• ) qj =Gj (p1,…, pn,q1,…,qn, p1•,…, pn•,q1•,…,qn• )  
where the points designate derivatives with respect to time. There exists no economic kinetics 
in the way that there is a chemical kinetics which allows us to posit and calculate reaction 
speeds and is behind the discoveries of the behaviour of certain self-structuring dynamic 
systems.149 For Walras, the effect of price signals on demand, or of demand signals on price, 
is a process – 'tâtonnement' – not amenable to an explicit mathematical representation. The 
curiosities of what would be provided by chemical kinetics do not seem to him worth the 
effort of an investigation, as it would only confirm the tendency towards equilibrium. Only 
the signs (+ or -) of responses to increases can interest him in considerations of 'tâtonnement', 
as when one attempts to weigh an object by adding and removing ever smaller weights to the 
other side of a balance. 
 The price signal of goods – that is, the amplitude of price trends – is what provokes 
changes in the behaviour of economic agents, and hence has repercussions on the price itself 
of products fabricated or services provided. This loop can give rise to regular or irregular 	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cycles, such as the relations governed by Volterra equations. Prices and quantities are both 
functions of descriptive parameters belonging to the economies studied, which can 
themselves vary for exogenous reasons and require the presence of tendencies. Economic 
kinetics would be likely to cause the appearance of phenomena analogous to those found in 
fluid mechanics in dampers or whirlpools, such as stable yet non-optimal trajectories on 
indifference curves between two goods, price signals with delayed interpretation creating 
dynamic predator-prey type systems, and so on and so forth. 
 Subsequently, in the 20th century, academic studies on economics filled this gap by 
studying temporal systems in their improvements upon neo-classical theory150 and within the 
framework of game theory.151 Two main routes of investigation were followed: firstly, the 
research on intertemporal equilibria which in the 1950s basically studied the stability of a 
constant, hence exponential, growth regime; secondly, the study of problems of intertemporal 
optimization under constraints, using either classical mathematical tools (Lagrange 
multipliers), or more recent ones (the theorems of Kuhn-Tucker or Hamilton-Bellman-
Jacobi), and notably the works of Arrow-Hurwicz, around the 1960s. In these studies,152 the 
corrective mechanisms for agent behaviour according to price were modelled following 
various hypotheses. These investigations then branched out into numerous sophistications 
under the frameworks of game theory, learning theory, and the theory of dynamic 
optimization. 
 Given the fact that market price agitation was admitted into theory from the end of the 
1960s,153 what is striking in all these works is the lack of importance accorded to the fact that 
price trends from competitive markets are not visible, meaning that calculations of 
intertemporal optimization remain abstract commentary-models with no clear connection to 
real economics. An important part of these works remains within discrete-time, and the 
sophistications of neo-classical terminology rest even more today on a theoretical structure 
which is essentially static, and only marginally modified. For example, to represent the 
production capacities of a business in relation to disposable capital K and mobilized labour L, 
the production function most commonly used is still of the type Y=F(K,L), like that attributed 
to Cobb-Douglas, with a possible property of homogeneity (constant elasticity of substitution) 
expressing yield on a constant scale – an equation in which trends do not feature at all. 
Economists are still in the habit of creating intertemporal models and theories limited to two 
periods – or three periods, in order to be able to transcribe a recursion taking into account 
observed growth – as if this implicitly contained the general case, with increments providing 
derivatives when the time interval tends to zero. Also, until recently, econometrists did not 
concern themselves with tendencies. Edmond Malinvaud dedicated one page in 750 to this 
issue, and proposes a statistical test without describing the assumptions made either of its 
validity or in estimating its convergence speed as the time interval tends to zero.154 
An original historical development in economic knowledge thus emerges. On the one 
hand, we state that economic kinetics is non-existent, or at least a belated and secondary issue 	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in the structure of this discipline. On the other hand, we can see that since the creation of the 
stock exchange, though with a notable recent resurgence, a large number of variables essential 
to economic operation have become subject to listing on financial markets – markets of the 
speculo-valued type 2 where trends are not visible. 
 Let us summarize. 1) The core of the neo-liberal mindset is static, and does not 
incorporate tendencies. 2) The financial markets developed, with the importance we know, 
over the neo-liberal period covering the last thirty years, do not provide trends nor prices for 
raw materials, nor for currencies between themselves, nor for the actions taken by businesses. 
We could then believe that there is a consistency between these two phenomena and that the 
development of the modern economy does not need trends to function, that the workings of 
financial markets confirms the ideas of people like Jevons and Walras. A new harmony or a 
new alliance? 
 Not at all. The two logics are absolutely contradictory. If the contractors for materials 
and the devices required for their production, and if consumers of goods with a certain 
durability – goods not immediately destroyed by their use – were instead of reasoning in static 
terms to take into account the trends attached to these prices in order to optimize their 
choices, the result would be the beginnings of speculation. Trends above the rate of interest (a 
riskless rate) would induce purchases and this speculation would cause prices to rise. 
Similarly, downward trends would induce sales. Progressively, a term market would arise for 
these commodities or services in which... we would no longer see trends. The reasons for this 
will be given in section 4 of this chapter. 
 Economic kinetics is a contradictory notion: if agents realize the existence of trends 
and develop type 2 markets around them, the trends disappear. We can no longer see them, as 
they are completely hidden by volatility. This is for incontrovertible reasons155.  
 Let us consider a business producing fuel for domestic boilers consisting of granules 
composed of residue from sugar beet, rapeseed and leftover wood. Its unit cost p is 
determined by the equation: 
 dp/dt=F(p1, dp1/dt, p2, dp2/dt, p3, dp3/dt) 
If p1, p2, and p3 follow regular curves in relation to time, the company succeeds in optimizing 
its price to increase business. If one of the three products is put on the market as a 
standardized, globally traded raw material, nothing can be seen any longer. 
 We can express this in another way. In an economy where all commodities are the 
object of type 2 markets, objective information on tendencies can only be obtained from 
sources external to the markets, such as watchdogs for economic behaviour, specialized 
agencies, announcements from the State, etc. 
Inversely, in order for price trends to be visible and induce specific, quantified 
behaviour, it is necessary for the market in question to be hampered by rules preventing the 	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So the idea is not new, but its consequences have not been understood at their full extent. 
application of the principle of arbitrage, causing time-series to provide trends that cannot be 
immediately benefitted from. 
 
Interpretation-models and commentary-models 
Given the lack of economic kinetics, the economists who want to follow in the 
epistemological wake of neo-classical language make models in discrete time. Students are 
told that it is “customary” in economics, that it allows them to concentrate on truly important 
questions, that it does not affect anything... We will see that, on the contrary, it rather deeply 
affects the epistemological significance of the model. 
 In order to clarify our ideas, let us take one such economic model, related to climate 
change. The IMACLIM-R model, admirably produced and developed by the CIRED team in 
France, functions using successive equilibria. At each date, a division of the world into 
regions and parameters qualifies economic variables so that production, consumption, 
savings, various energy costs, the different types of investment and commercial exchange are 
calculated in such a way as to satisfy an equilibrium, which is then translated by prices. This 
is done through a numerical fixed-point method, using as a starting point equations of slightly 
improved production functions. 
 Then, we move on to the next time-step, where a similar method will be applied. The 
passage from an instant, n, to the instant n+1 is the object of a transition where certain 
variables are modified, be it by recognition of a climate policy or by studying a particular 
scenario. These modifications done, the equilibrium must be rechecked and the fixed-point 
algorithm reapplied, this time to the stage n+1, before continuing. 
 The model is constructed in this way in order to be able to say that each stage has a 
representation, static (as in neo-classical economics) and pertinent to a “possible” economy. 
 Nevertheless, the main point, which we must keep in sight at all times, is that if the 
model reflected reality and if this model was scientifically known and recognized, the 
fluctuation in price between time n and time n+1 would be used for profit by agents (not 
merely speculators, but all agents), meaning that the prices would not remain those of the 
model. The model is impossible to realize. It cannot be “true”. It is not enough that at each 
stage the economic likelihood should be safeguarded for the model to be able to claim to 
represent what will happen. 
 Purely descriptive models such as those of the Club of Rome do not have this flaw. On 
the other hand, it is incontrovertible for all models aiming to forecast, to anticipate prices. 
Suddenly, it must be asked: what is the value of such models from a scientific point of view? 
The answer is subtle. Epistemologically, these models cannot claim to represent an 
interpretation of reality, cannot compete amongst other models which propose “a possible 
world under these or these hypotheses” – in other words, amongst what are usually referred to 
in science as “theoretical models”. They can only situate themselves “beside” reality; they are 
commentary-models, just as one comments upon a theatrical play without the actors 
themselves noticing anything. 
 We now have a better understanding as to why Léon Walras confined himself to static 
models. They, at least, can claim to be interpretation-models, social laws like those Auguste 
Comte wanted to discover. 
 Moreover, I do not think that these “commentaries” are without interest. In the case 
cited, the manipulation of such a model can allow the detection of poorly identified or poorly 
understood phenomena. However, they obviously tend to cut researchers and academics off 
from the world of economic actors and decision-makers. These commentaries, if limited to 
specialized and discrete scholars, have their value. But it is not with such models that we will 
change the behaviour of business-owners, nor that of consumers as a whole. 
3. There can be no speculative market without price fluctuation 
 
Before the 19th century, economists did not believe that fluctuations in market prices could be 
caused by the market itself. All observers, including Marx, knew well that prices shifted, but 
they attributed these movements to various economic causes, such as changes in the structure 
of production, political disturbances, vagaries in agriculture or the time necessary to return to 
a state of equilibrium following an accident. 
 Today, things are different and markets are intrinsically turbulent for profound reasons 
upon which we shall expound. But many decision-makers and economists – who often 
believe themselves to be at the cutting edge of liberal ideas – still maintain a mental picture of 
the calm and harmonious markets in which the neo-classicists believed. 
 
The error of Léon Walras 
The neo-classicists, Jevons, Cournot, Whewell, Gossen, Thünen, Mangoldt, etc., did not 
provide us with a detailed study on how the effects of the law of supply and demand relate to 
and depend on time. Like many others, Walras carried out incremental arguments on a 
timescale of sometimes a day, sometimes a year. 
 There is an easily understood historical reason for this: the calculus of probabilities 
was not sufficiently advanced. Until the end of the 19th century, what we call continuous 
probabilities, i.e. calculations based not on enumeration but on differential and integral 
calculus, whilst taught by Laplace, Gauss, Poisson, Cauchy, Tchebychev, Cournot, Bertrand, 
etc., and known by physicists such as Boltzmann, Maxwell, etc., were still not especially well 
known among economists as a whole. And, above all, the very notion of stochastic process 
had not even been dreamt up, let alone mathematically mastered. It was necessarily an 
advance of the 20th century as, being technically very delicate, it could only be truly 
developed with the tools of measure theory and functional analysis in normed spaces. One 
precursor was Louis Bachelier, who at the very beginning of the 20th century proposed a 
theory of “probability diffusion”, applying the approaches of game playing to infinitesimal 
stakes and over infinitely small lengths of time in order to construct a “mathematical theory of 
speculation” (1900). However, following the mathematical tools created by Emile Borel and 
Henri Lebesgue, it is to Kolmogorov, at the start of the 1930s, whom we owe the first solid 
foundations for the theory of stochastic processes in continuous time, and he in fact cites 
Bachelier as an instigator. 
 A second reason is the idea that market formation is something akin to the carrying 
out of a regularization, a mechanism close to an average through the interplay of competition. 
Other phenomena are transitory: “We always assume”, writes Walras, “the fundamental data 
of the economic problem, that is, the quantities of capital possessed, the uses of consumable 
products and services, and net income supplement, to be invariable, so as to have an economic 
basis analogous to what is in mechanical terms known as an steady state. We assume, 
moreover, the phase of preliminary trial and error to be over, i.e. the equilibrium to be 
established in principle, and the phase of static equilibrium to be inaugurated, i.e. the 
equilibrium establishing itself in fact”.156  
 A highly revelatory aspect of Walras’s philosophy is his manner of describing what 
would turn out to be a description of a market in continuous time, and he does in fact raise the 
issue: “we still have to move from the hypothesis of a periodic, annual market to that of a 
permanent market, that is, from the static state to the dynamic state”. For this, Walras posits a 
production and consumption “both extending across all moments of the entire year, and the 
fundamental data of problems are changing from moment to moment”. Without carrying out 	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calculations, he arrives at a description based in what would today be called a stationary 
stochastic process, suggesting this idea to the reader without ever using the term ‘probability’ 
nor that of ‘risk’: “Such is the permanent market, always tending towards equilibrium without 
ever arriving there, for the reason that it only advances by trial and error, and before this trial 
and error process is even completed, it is restarted with new costs”. We get the impression 
that Walras is seeking a concept which would allow him to express a vibration around an 
equilibrium maintained by irregular impulses. He has the idea that these oscillations are 
weak: “The market is then in this regard like a lake disturbed by the wind, the water always 
seeking its equilibrium but never finding it”. This is an error on a theoretical level, as we shall 
see, for the stochastic processes representing markets are highly turbulent, more a tempest 
than a breeze. But in Walras’s time, there was no stock market seething in this manner. He 
thought, like Cournot, that these variations were weak and without repercussion for the 
behaviour of most savers.157 It had developed considerably since the time of Cournot, but the 
examples used by Walras are relative to real production and services: “There are, however, 
days when the lake surface is almost horizontal”, he continues, “but there are no days when 
the actual supply of services and products is equal to their actual demand, when the selling 
price of products is equal to their cost prices in production.” Adjustments are slow and for 
Walras instabilities are exogenous to the market: “just as the lake is sometimes violently 
disturbed by a storm, so is the market sometimes violently shaken by crises, which are sudden 
and general disturbances of its equilibrium. And we could better repress or prevent these 
crises if we had a better idea of the ideal conditions of equilibrium”.158 
 As for Bachelier, he was to go even further, seeing the trial and error process as truly 
random. As his proof, he took the correlation between his theory and the movements of the 
stock exchange: “its utility [of the theory of speculation] cannot be doubted, as the results 
provided by examining quotations are in perfect agreement with those provided by 
calculation. This correlation between theory and observation is equally interesting from a 
philosophical point of view; it effectively proves that the annuity market obeys the laws of 
chance”.159 But Bachelier was not yet in possession of the line of argument which was to 
come from gambling theory after the Second World War, today known as the theory of 
arbitrage, in order to show that – for reasons arising from the market itself – prices are forced 
to fluctuate considerably. 
 The difference between the market as implicitly seen by neo-classicists to act on 
goods and services themselves and contemporary markets is the possibility of speculation on 
the future value of the market. Neither Walras nor Jevons based their calculations on the 
assumption that buyers buy with the sole intent of reselling at a better price. They did not set 
out to develop a theory of speculation. After the First World War, with early signs appearing 
of the impending crisis of 1929, the importance of what was happening on stock markets was 
realized. Keynes, in the famous twelfth chapter of his general theory would denounce the 
irresponsibility of speculators and the potential of the real economic risks, those taken by 
entrepreneurs. 
 As a collective game of buying and selling, it has been apparent to many scientific 
minds, for some time now, that the market process is inherently unstable. I would like to 
quote here a passage written in 1947 by the great mathematician Norbert Wiener who has 
thought deeply about the issue of stable and unstable systems. “There is a belief, current in 	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many countries, which has been elevated to the rank of an official article of faith in the United 
States, that free competition is itself a homeostatic process: that in a free market, the 
individual selfishness of the bargainers, each searching to sell as high and buy as low as 
possible, will result in the end in a stable dynamics of prices, and with redound to the greatest 
common good. This is associated with the very comforting view that the individual 
entrepreneur, in seeking to forward his own interest, is in some manner a public benefactor, 
and has thus earned the great rewards with which society has showered him. Unfortunately, 
the evidence, such as it is, is against this simple-mind theory [...] in the overwhelming 
majority of cases, when the number of players is large, the result is one of extreme 
indeterminacy and instability.”160 
  
The teeth of the market have been underestimated by the Marxists 
For a while now, and especially during the period of financial globalization that occurred 
from 1970 to 1990, it has been realized that capital moved more than one would reasonably 
expect. This fuelled a long and expansive rhetoric from the Left on the theme of speculation. 
The markets attacked currencies one after another. The crisis in Mexico and then that in 
South-East Asia were experienced by local businesses and managers as artificial instabilities 
due solely to the desire for differential profits. 
 In accordance with the idea that a sufficient mass of capital allows the influencing of 
prices, these phenomena were linked to the scheme of provoking massive selloffs in order to 
cause a currency to plummet, and following up with advantageous purchases, as seen in the 
archetypal example of speculation George Soros’s speculation against the Pound in 1992. 
Other similar schemes were stigmatized as emanating from the greed of the ruling classes, 
together with a sheep-like mimicry in behaviour regarding stocks. Inspiration was drawn from 
the famous analyses realized by Keynes and his distinction between fundamentals and the 
proper allocation of resources on the one hand (a concern to which he attributes the term 
‘enterprise’) and, on the other, casino-like gambling, similar to those portrait competitions 
where the key is not to look for the best portrait, but that which will be most successful 
(behaviour which he labels as ‘speculation’ [General Theory, chapter 12 §VI]). 
 Two factors have reinforced an interpretation of market attacks in terms of a class 
warfare issue or an implicit reference to Marx’s Das Kapital or some other great social 
narrative of the 19th century. 
Firstly, the constant fact that all market fluctuations elicit explanations. Some involve 
certain evolutions or trends, provided by commentators in the economic pages of the media. 
We are inundated with such commentary. A fluctuation is attributed to loss of confidence in 
some business owner, or some movement of unspent funds towards other opportunities, etc. 
Always emerging after the fact, these explanations feed into long theses and economic 
policies debated by elected officials and party leaders. Consequently, the landscape looking 
like a battlefield, one cannot help but attribute all “moods” of the market to the deliberate will 
of certain actors, adversaries motivated by private interests linked to the wealthy classes. This 
is not a false view but simply too hasty, as the privileged classes would clearly have preferred 
securer income, both less risky and more systematic, over this bedlam which can severely 
affect even them. Moreover, it is of these risks that they will then boast in order to justify 
themselves politically. 
 It must also be added that these numerous interpretations which spontaneously 
blossom around stock information are multiple, and this constitutes the second factor. They 
are largely subjective, as has long been understood. It has also been recognized that economic 
actors can have personal “views” on the expertise of a given manager, or the chances of 	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success of a given technique, and that each one of them projects this reading onto the future, 
thus building a particular, personal law of probability on what will happen. They can make 
these specific, random forecasts whilst conserving a coherent logic, as has been brilliantly 
theorized by the school of subjective probabilities of Finetti, Ramsey and Savage. Each can 
apply probability calculus to their own judgements whilst preserving for their “reasons to 
believe” all the rationality attached to gambles in the presence of competitors who could 
profit from any possible inconsistencies. 
 However, as long there is interpretation, we are distancing ourselves from reality. The 
proliferation of interpretations does not constitute a stable, clear doctrine, and it is impossible 
to follow this directionless pandemonium. If speculators respect only their personal interest, 
there is no reason why the economy – meaning the real process of production, the division of 
skills in the social contract, the creation of facilities, investments for the future, collective 
costs of training, etc. – should be correctly orientated as a result of this ‘anything goes’ 
attitude. And as for reality, the Marxists have an accurate conception of it, based in the 
historically placed situation of means of production and the capacity of men to transform 
them in accordance with a dialectic that is concrete and material, rather than abstract like that 
of Hegel. Infrastructures and class consciousness are key to a broad vision which has been 
abundantly reworked, improved and extended upon by socialist intellectuals. These bases, 
even in their current watered-down forms, are marked by an unconditionally productivist 
scientism. It cannot strictly speaking be referred to as ‘positivism’, since for communists the 
great veil of knowledge is not raised by the scientific community alone but also by the party 
that understands and makes the historical choices which will affect the workers and hence 
production. Keynes, meanwhile, was an independent spirit who distanced himself from 
doctrinal ideologies, but even he could not resist believing in the existence of a real economy 
whose markets are uncaring, driven by short-sighted interests. The long-term is the basis for 
solid reference, whilst markets completely neglect to prepare for the future. 
 This is very true, and even a fundamental remark. “Selfish” interest, as advocated by 
Adam Smith, sacrifices common property in a Tragedy of the commons... The issue is central, 
and Keynes is perfectly correct in making it the core of his argument. However, this problem 
is in fact so huge that it goes beyond mere criticism of the financial markets to affect the 
economy as a whole and the competitive race for growth. The future is at stake in these 
struggles, and no-one can agree upon what is desirable. The future is also a policy, and 
Keynes, by claiming that there is a superior way of thinking, of organizing the economy for 
the long-term, is taking a political side. In this case, the role he gives to public stimulus has 
been favourably welcomed by those who could be called social productivists. 
 The teeth of the market have been underestimated by socialist thought. They are not 
directed against the workers, but in fact destroy everything: the variables following the path 
carved out by their environment (the smooth-curved diagrams of the Meadows team), but also 
the pretty little models created in neo-classicism. They raise up a universe of prices based on 
lotteries. We will see this in more detail in the next section. 
 
Criticism of the financial markets on the theme of speculation is insufficient 
Starting in this direction leads us to fall immediately into the rut of productivism. This is 
because, today, the generous motives of solidarity, reducing inequalities and supporting the 
dignity of the poorest among us, this humanist philosophy (as it is called), are expressed as 
politically left-wing – that is, in reference to the historical struggles conducted during the 
period of industrialization. Saying “they amuse themselves while we work” is not a criticism 
that matches the level of the stakes at play with this problem. It is insufficient for many 
reasons. 
 Firstly, it is not the taste for risk that is the motive of speculators; otherwise, they 
would play at Monte Carlo. 
 They take risks because, following a simple argument, the current theory of portfolio 
balance in an investment market concludes that fluctuating investments produce higher yields 
on average and safer investments lower yields, as the employees of commercial banks explain 
to their customers. Another reason is that the geographical locations and types of activity 
where volatility is higher, such as emerging financial markets, are more complex and the 
information work carried out by specialists, more serious than the typical ‘me-too’ behaviour 
currently followed, will be rewarded with higher profits. But they try to avoid risks as much 
as is possible. Elementary economic theory believes that investments in markets give yields 
which are generally positive on average but random, and that the higher the average yield, the 
more uncertain the investment: variance grows with expectation. In this balancing of 
expectation and risk, theory assumes that the behaviour of economic agents is governed by a 
utility function allowing us to mathematically calculate the level of their aversion to risk. 
These ideas are helpful for training students in economic calculations, but in practice traders 
do not view gains and losses symmetrically at all. 
 Given the vast range of instruments now available to them (notably options, interest 
rate derivatives and credit derivatives), each of them configures as much as possible the law 
of probability governing their position: better to be 99% sure of winning a small amount than 
1% sure of winning a large amount. Obviously, there are traders who play “long-shots”, but 
that is not the usual way of doing things. Why prefer the 99% chance of a small profit? For a 
mathematical reason, and for a strategic one. Firstly, pure chance has no memory, and even if 
yesterday fell within the 99%, today’s odds are still 99%. Even if unlucky, the “return period” 
is very long, and can be decades for a well-optimized portfolio. And there is another reason: if 
indeed unlucky, the trader will have plenty of ways to demonstrate that the circumstances 
were truly unpredictable.161 
 Secondly, economic theory fully justifies the role of speculators as agents who often 
take uncertain positions on the future in order to protect others from risk. It is normal then 
that the market should remunerate them for this service. The textbook example is the case of 
the historical appearance, in the 19th century, of options on the cereal market, of a farmer 
selling his crop in the spring before the harvest to a rising speculator. 
 Finally, this suggests that it would be enough to reform the financial markets. What 
exactly would this involve? 
 
Calming the markets? 
 The sociologist Robert King Merton, known mainly for introducing the notion of 
“middle-range sociological theory” and for his analysis of “self-fulfilling prophecies”,162 
makes a sociological distinction between retreatism and the rebellious act of rejecting existing 
cultural methods and objectives for new goals and new means. If we take the damage done to 
the planet and the inertia of the economic supertanker seriously, we are part of this rebellion. 
However, faced with the power of capitalism, the rebellion becomes illusory and its acts 
double-edged. This has been well understood by the indignant who try to act on the level of 
ideas. Obviously, this is also what I am doing with this work. 
Calming the markets is an extremely difficult operation, and one which has not yet 
succeeded. A tax on financial transactions proportional to their volatility is a promising idea, 	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but would need to be imposed by a global public power, and this certainly will not be the UN 
or the World Trade Organization as they are currently structured. We will nevertheless 
analyse this idea further in chapter III-6. 
 In the face of the infringements made upon the most obvious rules of probity by a 
given actor or financial institution, as so regularly punctuate our newspapers – the most recent 
being the Barclays Libor manipulation affair – the reaction has been to introduce 
deontological rules and accounting procedures. To this, the liberals invariably responded that 
immorality is everywhere, that it is part of human nature, and that we should punish the 
people involved, rather than the financial system which is innocent in itself. An issue, then, of 
education and social pressure. Moralizing the markets necessarily means rethinking society 
with a more modest and more controlled role given to finance. But the logic of the markets is 
a logic of liberty. 
 What we call regulations (Basel II and Basel III, December 2010) are in fact 
recommendations of “good management” from the point of view of international law, because 
the collective interest they defend believes it necessary to have as little regulation as possible. 
 The philosophy of this soft law, which governs the most powerful machinery in the 
world, began to be taken up by the European Commission in 2006, hence before the subprime 
crisis and before the 2006/46/CE directive on companies listed in the stock market. The 
conviction behind these legal practices is exactly the opposite of what the average person 
thinks. Namely, it believes that rules of constraint not only often fail to achieve their aim but 
also have the effect of distorting free competition and hence the healthy functioning of listing, 
purchases and sales. Essentially, the market operates healthily when all actors are able to 
express their interest freely – meaning their interest as they see it themselves. 
It is here that we find a principle as brilliant as it is subtle: “comply or explain”. The 
banks and businesses concerned are annually demanded to either comply with an explicit 
prudential or deontological rule (of the kind that business clubs or professional associations 
develop) or, if this has not been the case for part of the year, to explain why they have not 
complied and what they have done instead.163 We cannot help but think of overly lax parents 
who let a child get away with anything provided he is capable of defending his actions when 
asked to! 
 In fact, behind this principle lies a demand for transparency, obviously a posteriori, 
which is at least something when one considers the excess of extant fiscal paradises, off-shore 
investments and banking secrecy abuse. We note especially that the judiciary no longer has 
the job of sanctioning content, only form, leaving the actors to essentially police one another, 
in harmony with basic axioms. 
The logic of markets and liberal finance is a logic of freedom: capping rules or 
conditional authorization on certain operations can allow arbitrations which destroy fluidity. 
It will not come as a surprise that the fund manager George Soros, who made his fortune in 
speculation, extols Popper’s philosophy of “open society”, i.e. total liberty in the interplay of 
economic and scientific competition. 
Finally, in current political discourse, moralizing the markets most often means 
ensuring that they move less and better indicate the underlying trends which make up the true 
foundations of economics. This is how economists of reform generally think. However, 
markets cannot spell out trends. It is absolutely impossible on an ontological level, prevented 
by their very structure. 
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 And, on this subject, let us note that today there are no financial markets allowing 
term operations and speculations where this idea actually applies. It would be naive to think 
so. We live in the era of the Internet, of “eBay” and “Pricemaster”, and the practice of purely 
speculative purchasing and selling is very easy. As we have already noted many times in this 
work, beyond the financial markets lies the actual idea of market, whose consequences have 
not been sufficiently thought through.  The belief that organization of the economic landscape 
and creation of guidelines for the actions of households under market mechanisms is a good 
way of controlling their behaviour, this hypothesis, false on the level of financial markets and 
businesses, is also false for consumers, for the simple reason that it prevents them from seeing 
the effect of their individual action on the collective result. In any interplay of divergent 
interests, this leads to collapse. 
4. Price fluctuations will consume all of nature 
In this section, which constitutes the heart of our argument, we will examine how 
probabilistic thought as developed during the 20th century, from the discoveries of the 
pioneers (Henri Lebesgue, Emile Borel) to the sophisticated and plentiful works in modern 
financial mathematics, modifies forecasting based on hypotheses and models. However, I do 
not wish to use Ito calculus, nor differential stochastic equations, nor write even a single 
formula. The aim is to extract from the study of stochastic processes those qualitative traits 
that have significant philosophical implications for the political decision-making process. 
Indeed, we need to acknowledge that the impact of the economy on the environment is 
not a result of temperance or mitigation of natural variations but rather that the economy itself 
– in addition to the underlying trends due to growth – is a major source of perturbations 
arising from the random fluctuations in prices or values that are caused by the anticipations 
made by the agents. Consequently we need to understand the additional effects that 
randomness superimposes on arguments based on the finiteness of the world and its flows of 
energy. 
I intend to conduct this discussion without technicalities since they only obscure the 
issues. However, while I have tried to limit the mathematical background required from the 
reader, I cannot avoid assuming a certain level of knowledge, since the concepts arise from 
that subject. 
 The term nature in the title above needs to be better qualified, as it can conceal 
various different meanings, and we shall indeed do so in chapter IV-2. For now, we will in 
this section be using it in the very common sense of the simple ‘natural/artificial’ opposition. 
We do not assume that this opposition has an absolute, timeless character, and we readily 
admit that a thorough historical, biological and anthropological analysis could well reach an 
original critical point where this duality fades, but in our time the general idea of prosthesis 
and prosthetic substitution retains all its meaning as a non-spontaneous approach, the result of 
a technical-scientific process. 
 
We begin by reviewing the analysis of the Club of Rome to provide the context for 
our main discussion. 
 
Back on the Rome report: simple models and their refinements 
The issue of perfecting models is a classic trap. On the one hand, simple models have the 
disadvantage of being far from the laws of physics, biology and economics, but the advantage 
of being easy to calibrate. On the other hand, complex models seem to better reflect our 
knowledge of the phenomena being studied, but they have so many parameters that it 
becomes impossible to fine-tune them properly. Furthermore, their perfectionism gives an 
illusion of completeness: one can never be sure that they have taken everything into account. 
Ultimately, the most appropriate choice of model depends on the social use to which the 
model is being put, the sort of knowledge available, and the possible actions that can be 
taken164. The case of the Club of Rome is here typically a global reference, something for 
“everyone”. 
 What is the philosophical value of the work of the Club of Rome? After the 
appearance of the first version of the report165 numerous critics highlighted various 
weaknesses in the style of reasoning it used. Firstly, it was too simplistic: how could the 
reality of the world be captured in an algorithm whose equations comprise merely a few 
hundred lines of code? Next, and above all, it was closed: it could not take into account 	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innovation, progress arising from science or technology or, more generally, human creativity. 
All of this may change completely, even the meaning of the words used in the model, yet the 
projections are based only on current knowledge. For example, concerning nuclear power, it 
only takes into account the nuclear fuel resources, the difficulty of storing waste and the 
problem of areas rendered uninhabitable by accidents. It does not consider the success of 
fusion technology whose advantages and disadvantages are still not well understood166. 
 The new version of the report, published 30 years later167 argued that the first version 
had not been contradicted by subsequent facts168, and maintained, in the new model World3-
03, the same methodological principles. Balance sheets drawn up by the Meadows team are 
relatively independent of subjective economic interpretations because they are based on 
measurements of quantities: energy received from the sun, quantity of arable land, population 
etc, which allows the authors to express themselves in terms of specific indicators: “human 
welfare” and “ecological footprint”. Several scenarios are studied under different assumptions 
of economic policies. The general conclusion is well known: unless politicians are very 
vigilant, we will always get an “overshoot-collapse” situation, i.e., excessive growth followed 
by collapse. 
 The truth value of this report does not lie in the details but in the thesis – which 
offends most philosophies and many religious beliefs – that one may take seriously and 
scientifically the fact that the finiteness of the world and its resources means radical changes 
are required to prevent collapse. This is a change of scene from that in which economics and 
politics usually take place, and can be seen as a turning point for civilization. It allows us to 
see that many old ideas about progress are based only on a desire for instant power without 
taking into account the limits, which is then turned into a rational theory. At this level, 
obviously only a simple line of argument can persuade. 
 
 The power of simplicity applies to all models where there are conflicting interests. Let 
us now consider climate change and the IPCC with its three groups studying the physical 
phenomenon, the impact and politics of reduction and adaptation, and economic models for 
mitigation. Although the work of the third group is a priori the most delicate and the furthest 
from the objectivity of the natural sciences, it is the conclusions of the first group about 
human responsibility for climate change that have been attacked by climate skeptics. There 
remains an on-going conflict between the wider scientific community and protestors who 
claim to be adhering to scientific principles in challenging the hypothesis that the increase in 
greenhouse gases is due to human activity. 
  Human responsibility cannot be proven with absolute certainty because one 
cannot state with mathematical precision what would have happened without human 
intervention. Yet, even without absolute proof, reason affirms the human responsibility 
claimed by the IPCC, even though this clashes with and opposes economic logic. Why? Is it 
because of the seriousness of the work by various teams around the world, based on different 
models? Is it because of the fact that among those who have contributed to the work there are 
many researchers based in rich countries whose interests are not well served by raising these 
issues and that many leading climate skeptics are linked to powerful economic interests? It 
certainly is not an argument of authority (the number of renowned scientists or the prestige 
that some of them have) or a return to a positivist view of truth. But the relativism of 
knowledge – which relates to the issues discussed – seems too subtle a concern, a second-
order effect. Ultimately, what is most important is the simplicity of the argument: On the one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Cf. the discussions about the ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) project.	  167	  Meadows D. H., J. Randers and  D. L. Meadows, The Limits to Growth, the 30-year Update, Earthscan 2008.	  
168 Turner G. M., “A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with 30 years of Reality” Global Environmental 
Change 18 (2008) 397-411.	  
hand, the graph of CO2 emissions as a function of time, on a historic scale, with its clear sign 
of the post-industrial period, combined with the physical fact of the effect of CO2 on the 
absorption of different wavelengths and, on the other hand, the graph of lower-atmosphere 
temperatures, with its step-change in order of magnitude just after the industrial age. 
 It is a mistake to complicate prospective models of the environment. Excess 
mathematization is a natural path in the academic world, as a result of numerous institutional 
factors169. It is the most convenient way, in the academic world, of avoiding any commitment. 
One speaks of self-organization, of complex systems that are sensitive to initial conditions 
and, by talking of multi-agent models and other possible thesis topics170... the ethical 
conclusion gradually, without anyone noticing, evolves into the belief that it is only scientific 
research that needs to be perfected. The productivism and selfishness of the privileged classes 
are forgotten. The economy is hit hard by this tendency. 
 We therefore take this precise position: we admit the simplicity of the Club of Rome’s 
discourse as a methodological choice, but we analyse the issues from a probabilistic point of 
view. 
 
 In the most recent version, the Meadows team considered several different scenarios 
(11 scenarios are discussed). In some ways this already represents the start of a probabilistic 
line of reasoning, but without considering the consequences of stochastics on current 
dynamics. 
 In these scenarios we find the general idea of an evolution first in exponential growth 
(30 pages in Chapter 2) which, after a certain time, becomes tempered by constraints arising 
from limits in material and energy in the planet (80 pages in Chapter 3). What happens after 
the peak is only sketched, the authors emphasizing that this time of decline causes social 
changes so great that they cannot be modeled sensibly. Simplifying to dimension 1, one could 
say that there is a logistic equation, more or less refined, that leads to certain horizontal 
asymptotes for the combined balance sheets of minerals and fossils, and certain bell curves, 
with a peak and then a decline, for the marginal trends and quantities, i.e., for the derivatives. 
 Our plan will naturally be the following: first we describe the new features of 
stochastic processes with regard to deterministic trends, and then we review the consequences 
of uncertainty for the vulnerability of the environment subject to economic rationale and we 
conclude this section by highlighting the most important points. 
 
Qualitative aspects of stochastic processes 
While a deterministic quantity is completely described by the evolution of a number as a 
function of time, a stochastic process is, in some way, a piece of music for multiple voices. 
 
Probabilistic “reasoning”. 
For all evolutions (growth, decline, convergence) we should specify whether we are arguing 
in distribution, in mean or path-by-path. 
 Arguments “in distribution” or “in the mean” (quadratic mean, or in spaces of 
summable p-th power), also arguments “in probability” introduce compensations that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 I’ve gone into this in more detail elsewhere: on the philosophical level cf “On Excessive Mathematization, 
Symptoms, Diagnosis and Philosophical bases for Real World Knowledge “ Real World Economics 57, 6 
September 2011, 90-105 (http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/) and on the financial level “Mathématiques et 
autoréférence des marchés” (http://cermics.enpc.fr/~bouleaun/publications.htm).	  
170 In this way one talks of “complex adaptative systems”, “critically self-organized” systems, the “agent-based” 
or “self-generated” complexity, or of “highly optimized tolerance” etc. cf for example [Harris, 2007], Rosser J. 
B. Jr., “On the Complexities of Complex Economic Dynamics” J. of Economic Perspectives Vol.13, Nr 4, 169-
192, 1999. 
.	  
probabilistic calculus allows between the events where there is an increase and those where 
there is decrease. The evolutions thus described are in general fairly regular because the 
causes that attribute certain probabilities to certain phenomena usually have some degree of 
permanence. 
 But we are also interested in what happens for each trajectory that chance produces, 
because it is one of these trajectories that describes what actually occurs, or at least what the 
model suggests will occur. And the most fundamental information that the study of stochastic 
processes has given is that the behavior of trajectories can be very different from that which 
dynamics depicts from distributions or mean. 
 Trajectories in stochastic processes are erratic, often very erratic. There are stochastic 
processes that are smooth, but only where chance applies to only the derivatives or higher 
derivatives of the quantity. In general stochastic processes are very irregular. A good image is 
given by share prices, or the silhouette of a mountain crag. 
 What happens in financial markets – forgetting for the moment the economic role of 
these institutions – is interesting because it shows how uncertainty, and the imperfect 
knowledge that agents have of the future, result in the frantic movement of the quantity on 
which they act. Where the evolution of a currency or an action is not certain – and thus 
financiers do not agree on the likely outcome – the quantity will not take a medial path that 
would represent some sort of averaging of the opinions. Instead it will become erratic, and 
much more erratic when the uncertainty is large. This wildness, which financiers call 
volatility, is considered to be the most objective measure of the uncertainty affecting the 
economic quantities being studied [Bouleau, 2004]. 
 In other words, in general, a stochastic process doesn't possess any clear trend (no 
speed or derivative in the mathematical sense); from one moment to the next it will increase 
or decrease. 
 
figure 1 
 
Phenomenology of the exponential family. 
 The heart of the argument of the Club of Rome is to consider phenomena with 
constant relative growth rates and to show that, sooner or later, they “go to the wall”. These 
are quantities whose rate of change is proportional to their actual value, with a positive 
coefficient. In the case of many variables these can be put in a matrix calculus and the signs 
of the eigenvalues indicate which linear combinations of variables will vanish and which will 
increase explosively. This exponential growth cannot last and will necessarily by interrupted 
by some phenomenon whose role as a brake will increase progressively. Hence the 
appearance of an additional term in the equation which leads, in the simplest case, to a logistic 
equation or similar, and results in a saturation and, for the Club of Rome models, to a 
collapse. 
 One fundamental phenomenological point is that this is completely different in the 
case where the quantity has a random element to it. If a quantity showing an exponential 
character is subject to some randomness that is constant proportionally to the quantity’s size, 
then one of two things will happen. If the randomness is small, the general path of the 
trajectory will be as one would expect: an exponential curve with fluctuations, above and 
below, that gradually become larger; this case is illustrated by figure 2. But if the randomness 
exceeds a certain threshold (as often occurs in financial markets, for example) the behavior of 
the paths will be completely different from what our intuition suggests: they all end, after 
some oscillations, by tending to zero; this case is illustrated by figure 3. 
 This phenomenon is well known in the case of martingales, which are processes in 
which the mathematical expectation is constant 171. There exist positive martingales for which 
all trajectories tend to zero (figure 5). In this case the study of phenomena “in distribution” or 
“in the mean” do not at all match what happens in reality. And this is not just some sort of 
mathematical pathology; such cases are extremely common, particularly in economics. 
 
     
 
 For example, if you put your money in a fund that pays 4.5% and you reinvest your 
dividends constantly, you will achieve exponential growth. If, however, there is some 
uncertainty which increases the volatility, and this volatility exceeds 3%, the oscillations are 
such that one will frequently approach very small values, and in the long run you are certain 
to be ruined. 
 As another example, if you put your money in at 10% and each year you gamble half 
your money, the cumulative effect of the gain and the uncertainty will lead you inevitably to 
ruin. The positive martingales which tend towards zero are typical in fair games and have 
major significance in terms of collapse.  
 The same remarks obviously also apply if we consider situations where there is some 
limit on the exponential dynamic which causes some braking, leading to an equation of the 
logistic type, with a bell curve instead of something that increases indefinitely. 
 The most important philosophical point of this phenomenology is that in the case 
where there is randomness, and it exceeds the threshold we discussed, it is impossible to tell 
from the trajectory what would have happened without that randomness172. In other words, 
exponential behavior cannot be detected in what is objectively observable. Thus an 
observation such as figure 1 does not allow us to infer an underlying exponential dynamic. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Figure 4 is how one intuitively expects a martingale to behave. It’s the special case of a “uniformly 
integrable” martingale.	  
172 The general question of knowing if one can understand the deterministic trends underlying a stochastic 
process has been written about at length. The negative response is a consequence of the theorem attributed to 
Girsanov, cf. [Bouleau, 2004] p37., and for a precise mathematical formulation cf. [Lamberton et al., 2008].	  
Stationarity does not mean “always the same”. 
A somewhat similar remark needs to be made about stationary processes. In most cases, and 
especially in the normal (Gaussian) case, they exceed, after a certain period of time, all levels 
given in advance173. Thus a situation which appears to be “sustainable” when considered “in 
distribution” may turn out not to be so for every trajectory. This is because the size is 
unbounded (its marginal distribution has no compact support) and that chance makes it 
“walk” everywhere.  
One would think, then, that this phenomenon cannot occur in a finite world. However, 
we will see later that economic logic requires us to consider that prices are unbounded. (see 
below and next section III-5) 
 
In an uncertain world there are rare events, and their probability is generally unknown. We 
now turn to issues that are less descriptive, and more semantic in nature.  
If knowledge comes from statistics obtained from experiments, then distribution tails 
are poorly known; this is obvious and frequently noted. If the quantity represents a level (of 
water, or of temperature, etc.) then extreme events are badly probabilized. 
 But we must go further than this. We must consider the role played by meaning in the 
concept of rarity; this is linked to the unprobabilizable uncertainty that was so dear to Keynes. 
What does it mean to talk of a “rare event”? An event is simply a (Borel) subset of the real 
numbers. Events whose description is complicated generally have a poorly understood 
probability, for the same reasons as those related to extreme events. And the central 
philosophical point is that our interest (in the most general sense of that which attracts our 
attention) is governed by the meaning of the event, i.e., by the impact of this event on the rest 
of the world. This impact is not in the model studied but in, precisely, that which is not 
modeled. Translating this concern into the probabilistic language of models is a difficult 
operation that usually we do not know how to achieve. 
 To precisely describe the mathematical form of events that we fear is particularly 
difficult for a stochastic process. An event is a region in path-space. Why talk of this one or 
that one? One speaks of those which are interesting, those that mean something in terms of 
consequences for what matters to us, on the economy or on the environment. But the interest 
that we bring to such and such phenomenon is not at all objective and is usually highly 
subjective. That is why the forms of families of temporal trajectories that have some meaning, 
that can be interpreted, generally have poorly understood probabilities, because the rarity 
ascribed to them is usually subjective, at least in part. It is linked to the fact that the event 
matters to us, or to others.  
 Let’s clarify this tricky but important point. How does an event, which is perceived as 
rare by some people but not by others, come to have a poorly understood probability? The 
model is a summary and we extrapolate from it by different interpretations. The model’s 
output is accurate about the things that are common to all these various interpretations, 
because the model only “speaks” clearly about this common ground. Except for some purely 
physical phenomena (emission of alpha particles, Brownian motion, etc.), for most of the 
interesting situations that we are concerned with (in the environment, in economics, etc.) the 
element of chance in probabilistic models is a way of representing our ignorance, some sort of 
convention that we stop at a set of facts and interpretations, and we do not go beyond this 
point, because that is where opinions start to diverge174. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 This is true even for processes that are strictly stationary, i.e. when their marginal distributions of order n are 
invariant under translation of time.	  
174 One can read more about this in my book Risk and Meaning, Adversaries in Art, Science and Philosophy, 
(Springer 2011), especially chapters II (Cournot's “Philosophical Probabilities”) and XI (Jacques Monod's 
Roulette).	  
 
Vulnerability of the environment when subject to economic “rationality” 
Does this collection of striking features of the phenomenology of random processes have any 
consequences for our understanding of the work of the Club of Rome and, more generally, the 
question of the limits to growth? 
 The first issue is to determine whether or not there is randomness and, if there is, what 
creates it. 
 
It is the economy that adds randomness. All rated quantities – raw materials and prized 
materials, sources of energy, lands and real estate – all fluctuate in our liberal economy. We 
will go deeper into the reasons for this in a moment. But let’s note already that to reason as 
the Meadows team did, without using monetary value, is to build a model that is disconnected 
from the forces that represent the interests of agents (or at least from those forces that the 
agents believe represent their interests). The key fact that the economy exists – particularly in 
the globalized neoliberal period we find ourselves in – means that the link between an 
economic interpretation of the world, which is very random, and the deterministic curves of 
the Meadows report, is not made. 
 
The mechanism for finding a market price necessarily involves randomness. We can first ask 
whether price formation in markets is truly stochastic in nature, or whether it is governed by 
some complex, chaotic mechanism. The question might be interesting to the quants on the 
trading floors, but for our purposes it is not very important. Both representations are simply 
models. What matters is that it moves and that one cannot tell in advance how it will evolve. 
 In organized markets, for a price to be established, market makers or an exchange 
systems must work constantly to produce the current spot price. Indeed, if the dealers are split 
into two groups: the bulls who think it will rise and that the current price is too low, and the 
bears who think the opposite, what will happen to the price if the bulls buy? The price will 
rise. And if we let the bears sell, then the price will fall. The organization providing the spot 
price will therefore sometimes let one group speak, and sometimes the other, so that both 
camps always have some members. Technically it will seek to maintain good liquidity, i.e., to 
minimize the bid-ask discrepancy (for details of how markets function, cf. for example [Cont 
et al., 2010]). 
 Thus we understand that when we say that volatility is the uncertainty in the evolution 
of the price of the quantity, we may as well say that this irregularity reflects the difficulty that 
the trading organization has in achieving the balance between buyers and sellers needed to 
maintain the permanence of the pricing. 
 
A difficult point to understand: how can the spot prices of markets reach such exorbitant 
values compared to the value which common sense would attribute to the underlying product, 
or even compared to the disposable funds of economic agents? 
 It is hard to understand how in financial markets the amplitude of oscillations can far 
exceed the price anyone would be willing to pay for a unit of the underlying quantity. It 
seems impossible and paradoxical, but is in fact far from either. Prices are not bounded by 
any limit. 
 This is due to the fact that speculation works like a lottery. How does one sell a Van 
Gogh painting worth €100 million in a country where no-one has the money for such a 
purchase? Auctioning it is not an option, as that adjusts the price based on the highest bidder. 
It is then the lottery that allows this kind of sleight-of-hand. If one manages to sell 10 million 
tickets at €10 each, the case is closed. And there you have the reason for this phenomenon 
which is so typical in speculation. 
 
The price of a scarce commodity does not follow the logistic curve of the Club of Rome; it 
follows a “punk hairstyle” instead. We’ll now look at things in more detail. If we take the 
price of copper, or the price of teak, the primary characteristic of the trajectory over time is 
that it is jagged, and that no-one can say with any certainty whether it is about to go up or to 
go down, let alone predict its value in a year’s time. 
 The best example is the price of fossil-fuel energy resources. Neo-classical economists 
in the nineteenth century proposed deterministic models. The best-known examples of this 
type of thinking are the Hotelling model and its improvements. Without going into detail 
about the equations, a model that takes account of randomness will give a price graph similar 
to figure 3. We note that the prospect of depleted resources, combined with the fact that 
dealers use their arsenal of futures products on the derivatives markets to anticipate future 
prices, render these models meaningless unless they incorporate a significant random 
component. Without that, expectations would make the price explode. For this not to happen, 
it is essential that the agents believe that there is a positive probability that the price may go 
down again. And this can only happen if the prices are randomly excited. This is what 
happens in financial markets for most quantities, for similar reasons. We can even understand 
that this is not just a little bit of randomness – a light breeze that gently shakes things – but 
rather it is a massive disturbance that will completely obliterate the underlying deterministic 
curve. This reinforces the need to reason as if we do not have any idea at all when the “peak 
oil” will occur175. 
 
The “price signal” of exhaustible resources works very poorly. The consequence of this is that 
the “wise response” to the depletion of resources, that of raising prices so as to encourage 
agents to develop alternative energy sources and substitutes for the missing minerals, will not 
occur spontaneously, purely as a result of the price, because there is too much variation in the 
price signal176. The fall in the price of an energy resource, from a very high price to a low 
price, will kill the long-term investment in new technologies. 
 Indeed, it is clear that the magnitude of the financial uncertainties that we face 
prevents us from taking new directions. Using the IPCC estimates, for a stabilization target of 
550ppm177 CO2 equivalent, the marginal cost reduction in 2030 would be between $5 and $80 
per ton, i.e., a spread of 1 to 16. In these conditions, a businessman interested in the carbon 
emissions of his enterprise must evaluate investments whose profitability, even with some 
subsidies, is extremely uncertain, when compared with the long-term interest rate that the 
financial markets can provide today. Instead of stepping out and being the first among its 
competitors to begin this adventure, the business is almost obliged to wait until that spread is 
reduced. 
 This also explains why a system of tradable rights, as in Europe, or a tax on petroleum 
products, can only be effective at creating decarbonization and energy-efficiency technologies 
if it leads to the publication of a quasi-deterministic forecast of how the price will vary over a 
sufficiently long period178. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Helm D., “Peak oil and energy policy—a critique” Oxford R. of Economic Policy, V27, Nr 1, 2011, pp. 68-91.	  
176 A study of J. B. Boyce about petrol, carbon, and 78 minerals, showed no correlation between the variation in 
the price and the variation in the quantity extracted (“'It Happened Too Early': Prediction and Inference in the 
Hubbert-Deffeyes Peak Oil Model” Dec. 2011 (online). The impact of the variation in the price of petrol on the 
economy is also complex and variable, cf Lescaroux F. and Mignon V., “La transmission de la variation du prix 
du pétrole à l’économie” in Les effets d’un prix du pétrole élevé et volatil, P. Artus, A. d’Autume, Ph. Chalmin, 
J.-M. Chevalier, eds, Rapport du CAE 2010.	  
177 ppm signifies parts per million, CO2 equivalent signifies the equivalent amount of carbon dioxide.	  
178 The graphs shows that neither the TIPP in France, nor the Italian tax that has significantly increased pump 
prices, satisfy this criterion. 	  
 
Local agricultural methods are disrupted and driven to destructive practices. In agriculture 
and livestock, in addition to meteorological variations, globalization has added significant 
randomness to prices which, since the winner takes all, ends up destroying traditional, 
sustainable practices and encouraging methods that are destructive and short-sighted. These 
survival techniques may also draw on ancient agricultural and farming customs but these are 
then carried out using the available mechanized technologies (burning of forests, fishing and 
hunting endangered species) 179. 
 
The economic valuation of non-marketable common goods will relentlessly erode them. We 
can now better understand why the cost-benefit analysis evoked in chapter III-1, in addition to 
having the weaknesses we already pointed out, sees its logic collapse completely where the 
environment is concerned, due to the random nature of economic prices. 
 The refrain is always the same: 
To preserve the environment, economists usually say we must give a value to its preservation, 
i.e., put a price on it. This presents various kinds of difficulties, technical, political or legal. 
On a purely technical level, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) gives a price to non-marketable 
goods in such a way as to be comparable with marketable goods180. CBA methods are usually 
explained in textbooks181, so we will not go into detail here.  However it is done, cost-benefit 
analysis can only determine a price based on information from the past and the present. Yet 
prices fluctuate. There will necessarily come a time when randomness in the evolution of 
prices will mean that the service provided by the collective good will be valued lower than the 
substitute marketable goods that it could be replaced by. Certainly we can see that preserving 
the environment is of growing importance in public opinion and in this regard, a proper CBA 
needs to be updated to take this into account. But this concerns non-marketable goods – by 
definition, there is nothing to sell. The price estimate of the ecological service is inevitably 
calm and quasi-deterministic. It can only follow a smooth curve (a convolution) and thus a 
time will come, sooner or later, when the service provided by artificial means will be cheaper. 
 This is particularly serious for biodiversity.  In chapter III-1, we discussed the 
approach of dividing species into two categories.182 On the one hand we have remarkable 
biodiversity, which we take care of, and on the other we have ordinary biodiversity, whose 
ecological service provided is calculated by methods of cost-benefit analysis. We can then 
carry out calculations of least cost in order to work out whether the goods already appraised 
by the economy are preferable to the advantage of species variety. 
 It is clear that on each specific question, on the way to preserve such and such species 
in its current condition, the fluctuations in cost legitimize artificial substitutions and the 
irreversible destruction of habitats. Consider a specific marshy wetland area that is in 
destructive competition with a deposit of fossil fuels. The two rarities do not evolve in the 
same way. On the one side there are real and random fluctuations in the price of fossil energy 
(due to speculation) and on the other there are gradual adjustments in the calculation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 On globalization and randomness of prices cf. Daviron B., Dembele N. N., Murphy S. and Rashid S., “Report 
on Price Volatility” Draft report by the HLPE Project Team, 2011. On the complex interplay of interractions cf. 
Warren R., “The role of interactions in a world implementing adaptation and mitigation solutions to climate 
change” Phil. Trans. Royal Soc. A (2011) 369, 217–241 doi:10.1098/rsta.2010.0271. Furthermore, being unable 
to occupy space with sustainable activities, poor regions are also led to accept poorly-recycled waste from 
countries that are more technologically advanced.	  
180 Serious shortcomings in this method, when applied to the environment, have already been identified, cf. 
(Hanley 1992) and (Ackerman et al. 2002). But the point made here is, in our opinion, even more serious.	  
181 For these methods, without any critical discussion, see (Pearce et al. 2006).	  
182 Cf for example in France “Approche économique de la biodiversité et des services liés aux écosystèmes, 
Contribution à la décision publique”, Centre d'Analyse Stratégique April 2009.	  
“ecological services”. The fuel deposit will, some day, end up priced above the carefully 
calculated estimates for the marsh. We now see why this method has been called the 
bulldozer of substitutability.  
             What we have just said about the non-marketable aspects of the environment applies 
equally well to externalities as a whole. 
 
To consider the economic value of the market a moral reference is to turn the environment 
into a gambler at the casino: sooner or later, it will inevitably be ruined. 
Market value is still considered, not only by mainstream economists but also by policy 
makers, as a reflection of what people are willing to concede for the use of goods, after taking 
account of personal criteria and the collective game of social exchange. In the background is a 
picture of a harmonious world, in an equilibrium that slowly evolves with improvements in 
business performance and changes in consumer tastes. This image is a legacy of the 
neoclassical thinking of Léon Walras and others of the 19th century, who saw the economy in 
terms inspired by the minimal action principle in mechanics, and who described equilibrium 
states by mathematical methods of optimization. It is completely superseded by current 
practices which, while still relying on that philosophy, have great difficulty in thinking of 
economics without growth [Jackson, 2009], particularly in the case of the credit and securities 
market and because of the “debt-based monetary system”183. 
 But in addition to this, prices fluctuate. In these conditions the competition between a 
non-marketable good and a commercial commodity is not equal. Under the blows of the 
waves, even large fragments of a cliff can fall into the sea, but they do not rise again when the 
sea is calm184. The key point here is that in the long term the present economic organization, 
with its financial markets that govern the most important prices, is incapable of setting limits 
to prices that fluctuate. In other words, the whole world is finite and bounded, except for 
prices. 
 
From quoted prices in financial markets to prices in everyday life. We first make a remark 
that complements the arguments above. Stock prices, currency rates and commodity prices 
fluctuate in financial markets, as we have said. But the way the economy works in society in 
reality means there are certain “valves” which ensure that certain quantities stay stable or 
grow randomly, but never go down. This is generally true of real estate prices in city centers 
in Europe, and of salary levels for certain professions, etc. Without going into the 
mathematical details, the reader will understand that the existence of steps and rises creates a 
situation that is random and unpredictable, whose consequences are similar to those of a 
process which rises and falls, in so far as we never know how much it will increase in a given 
time period. 
 It thus appears that the primary source of turbulence that spreads through the economy 
comes from the financial markets185. The fluctuation in prices of raw materials is transmitted 
to manufactured products, that of currencies is added in by international commerce, and that 
of credit ratings by the balance sheets of businesses. In the end, the economy as a whole is 
built on a seismic zone. This leads us to the conclusion that this turbulence, which has such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 Cf Sorrel St., “Energy, Growth and Sustainability : Five Propositions” SPRU Electronic Working Paper n185 
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devastating effects where the economy and the environment meet, is there to allow financial 
markets to exist. Given that, should we conclude that we should get rid of them? Yes, so long 
as we measure how much this idea necessarily disrupts free trade from top to bottom. Because 
even if capital markets are the principal source of randomness, they are not the only ones 
(there is also randomness in business, in transport, in economic policy decisions, etc.). Until 
we know how to think, globally and in the details, about a sustainable economics that does 
not unduly restrict our customary freedom, in which the evolution of prices over time is 
smooth, it is essential to regulate and vigilantly resist the attacks of randomness that come 
from economic logic. 
 
An implacable logic 
It is precisely for this reason that there is randomness in financial markets. For if the trends 
were clear, they would be immediately exploited, and their clarity would disappear. In hiding 
these trends, randomness weakens the arguments that one can derive from the finiteness of the 
world and its limits. This is one reason why the warnings given by the Club of Rome were not 
acted upon: bell curves – quasi-exponential growth, overshoot, peak, decay and collapse – we 
do not see these in prices. We genuinely feel, when watching commodity and share prices, 
that the economy is still broadly in the same situation. So long as agents’ behavior is 
governed by the economic climate rather than by moral considerations, business as usual will 
continue.  
 For the ancient Greeks, chance was on the side of nature; they feared the wrath of 
Poseidon so much that they were ready to sacrifice a young girl. Until the 18th century it was 
the “elements” that were random; humans actually occupied only a tiny part of the planet. 
Now the situation has changed: a great disaster, such as the Tōhoku tsunami, may kill 20,000, 
i.e., three millionths of the world population, yet this is far lower than the number who die in 
car accidents each year. Humans occupy the majority of the planet and it is they, by economic 
reasoning and free-market logic, that is the main source of randomness. The economy is now 
the environment that the environment finds itself in. Neoliberalism has become the storm, 
against which the world needs protection. That clearly means that it is not enough to relay 
information about the current and future physical states of the world; this will not convince an 
economic agent who sees prices fluctuate. It is essential to attack the problem at its root, 
which is the way that the market economy “speaks” by imposing a screen of volatility over 
the determinism of the collapse. 
  
We choose some graphs from among the many possible, to serve as a visual aid to 
complement this section. 
 
Regarding the graph of crude oil prices, let us emphasize that the ordinate axis is starting from 
zero. This shows clearly the enormous variations experienced by market prices. The effect of 
fluctuations in crude oil is recognized as a serious problem for the world economy.186 
 
 
 
On this graph, we can see that even an index, a weighting of several food quantities, fluctuates 
considerably and is the cause of major uncertainties in agricultural organization. 
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On the subject of exhaustible resources, typically an intertemporal issue, economists, and 
especially those most lauded by liberals, continue to attempt to reason using neoclassical 
machinery, by improving Hotelling’s mathematical approaches,187 the conclusions of which 
are described as a “fundamental principle of the economics of exhaustible resources” by 
Robert Solow. The latter, in his works, refines these arguments by clarifying and diversifying 
hypotheses. It is interesting to note that even completely immersed in this mindset he still 
comes to write, “it is legitimate to ask whether observed resource prices are to be interpreted 
as approximations to equilibrium prices, or whether the equilibrium is so unstable that 
momentary prices are not only a bad indicator of equilibrium relationships, but also a bad 
guide to resource allocation”.188 And this remark is made without taking into account that 
interest rates are practically given by the financial markets and hence fluctuate randomly 
according to time and due date, nor that the current price of ore, via the game of speculation, 
has no visible tendency, as in any type 2 market. 
 The contradictory nature of any economic kinetics is demonstrated in these works. It 
is to the great credit of Robert Solow that he sensed this without eveer saying so in such 
terms. Moreover, he arrives at the following conclusion, which is completely in line with 	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what I argue in this work: “The same considerations suggest that the market for exhaustible 
resources might be one of the areas in the economy where some sort of organized indicative 
planning could play a constructive role. This is not an endorsement of centralized 
decisionmaking, which would likely have imperfections and externalities of its own. Indeed, 
it might be enough to have the government engaged in a continuous program of information-
gathering and dissemination, covering trends in technology, reserves and demand [...] In the 
case of exhaustible resources, it could have the additional purpose of generating a set of 
consistent expectations about the distant future.”	  
5. Frequently asked questions. 
For the benefit of the reader in a hurry, and to facilitate a rapid introduction to the theses of 
this book and to some technical details, I present this section in the useful form of a dialogue. 
 Its pedigree is ancient, and its effectiveness recognized ever since Socrates, all the 
way up to the 18th century philosophers, via the Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World 
Systems, in which, thanks to his open exchange between the three characters of Salviati, 
Simplicio and Sagredo, all interested in the subject but with varying levels of knowledge on 
it, Galileo managed to explain a particularly non-conventional worldview for the time. Here, I 
will not state who the characters involved are. The reader might consider the dialogue to be 
between Lester Brown and George Soros – an environmental economist engaged with 
contemporary issues and a financial expert in international markets – or between Nicholas 
Georgescu-Roegen and Louis Bachelier, representing the physicist concerned with problems 
of the planet and the theorist of market behaviour, though the dates involved render the 
discussion imaginary. It could even be between the professor of political economics Susan 
Strange and the professor of financial mathematics Nicole El Karoui. I leave it entirely up to 
the reader’s imagination... 
 
— What is the origin of price volatility in markets? 
 
Robert J. Schiller (Yale University) begins his 450-page book Market Volatility 
[Schiller, 1989] with the phrase “The origin of price movements are poorly known in all 
speculative markets for corporate stocks, bonds, homes, land, commercial structures, 
commodities, collectibles and foreign exchange”. 
 In its simplest version, finance theory says that an asset cannot have a foreseeable 
evolution unless it is deterministic and varies as the core investment, without any risk: the 
“bond”. It also says that under certain hypotheses, often framed in terms of perfect 
information – although the notion of information is simple to express mathematically, but not 
at all simple in what it represents – the uncertain assets are martingales, i.e., processes which 
have the “centre of gravity property” [Bouleau, 2004]. We know mathematically that these 
processes are very irregular. Thus we have a theory that explains the irregularities we see in 
stock prices. But this is not the real explanation of the behavior, of course, because markets 
usually function with only incomplete, partial information. 
 All studies conclude that there are two types of reason. On the one hand, the effect of 
real shocks that change the landscape of the activity: technological innovation, consumer 
tastes, social or political change, fundamental changes in currency rates, etc. On the other 
hand, there are psychological factors arising from differing opinions, changes in confidence, 
differing levels of risk-aversion, etc. 
 We have outlined above a simplified form of the non-arbitrage principle: the value of 
an asset cannot be predicted if its evolution is different from a bond, because if not, then it 
would enable risk-free profits and this would change its value. This argument does not 
explain the more complex phenomenon that the variation in the price of an asset (its 
volatility) is even larger when the evolution of the asset is more uncertain. 
 To discuss this latter phenomenon would require a definition of uncertainty different 
from that given by volatility. This is a genuine research program with a high risk of subjective 
interpretations. We are therefore reduced to recording that volatility is, often (for instance for 
currencies), lower in the more highly diversified and highly structured economies of advanced 
countries, and greater concerning the assets of developing countries where there is more 
uncertainty about the future. 
 
— How is it possible that the phenomenon of hiding fundamental trends in the evolution of 
resources by the markets, i.e. the “teeth of the market”, has not yet been singled out as a 
major problem? Are economists not aware of it? 
 
The market has become sacred. The randomness it generates is what the Ancients took to be 
‘destiny’. This has gone so far that ‘market’ is widely used as a synonym for ‘society’. 
 We live in a world where, to validate a hypothesis, we readily give credit to the 
collection of a large number of opinions. This is made easier by ever more widely used means 
of modern network communication and the proliferation of websites, blogs, wiki-style 
encyclopaedias, Delphi-like forecasting methods, etc. It is somewhat similar to the method of 
evaluating researchers in the academic world by counting citations. From a logical point of 
view this consensus method is curious, as the veracity or falseness of judgements, as 
classically expressed by Kant, comes either from experience or analytical deduction, and 
opinion has no place in either case. Even if we consider uncertain phenomena, surveys give 
no information on the state of the world, only on the actual beliefs expressed. 
 The idea that truth and shared beliefs are one and the same is the central thesis of 
utilitarianism, particularly well expressed by John Stuart Mill. This is the philosophical 
audacity of the complete socialization of truth. We do not know everything, but have 
sufficient knowledge to act in practical terms if we take into account opinions in a society 
allowing their free expression. In the Anglo-Saxon form of positivism, thanks to Mill, we find 
the idea that the validity of a judgement is based in its resistance to all attempts at refutation. 
This kind of external logic appeals to the “biodiversity” of ideas and to their confrontation. 
 At the turn of the 20th century, this current became an actual doctrine with the 
pragmatism of Peirce, Dewey and William James, in which the strength of reference to 
possibilities of action in the real world will be pushed to the extreme, made to absorb all of 
existence. It is an a-ontological theory in which Kant’s thing-in-itself is seen as to be purely 
and simply replaced by the possibilities of action of people in society. Obviously, this 
philosophy is in perfect agreement with liberal economics, as it regards ‘value’ in the 
economic sense of appeal, interest, propensity to own, as being synonymous with ‘value’ in 
the philosophical sense of ‘moral value’, or even, following Mill, ‘truth value’. 
  The serious problem with this highly efficient, highly operational conception is its 
inertia, giving undue weight to conformity of opinion. Continental positivism has the same 
issue, for somewhat similar reasons. The key point is that utilitarians and pragmatists confuse 
beliefs and interpretations,189 which causes them to miss the fundamental role dissident 
readings of the world play in the construction of knowledge and in today’s apprehension of 
tomorrow’s possibilities. 
 From the point of view of the neoliberal economists, only prices have importance. 
They reflect values and thus, according to pragmatist philosophy, they are reality; everything 
else does not exist, and the curves of the Meadows team diagrams are like unicorns, 
werewolves, or chimera. We don’t need them. 
For over two centuries, economic language has become more and more sophisticated 
by adapting to changes in daily life and managing to give individuals a framework relevant to 
their personal business in a context of growth and technical innovation, and thanks to the fact 
that this economic language, now globalized at all levels, from the managerial aristocracy to 
small traders in developing countries, has become the most trusted reasoning of today. We 
can thus take the measure of our society’s inertia on its subjects. 	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 Finally, it must be added that uncertainty does not handicap everyone equally, and is 
even an advantage for some economic actors. The existence of uncertainty as to price trends 
requires us to seek out information external to the markets, via a documented analysis of the 
physical, geographical and socio-historical factors which influence prices. Such a gathering of 
information, in order to be of high quality and capable of evaluating its own relevance, must 
be carried out be specialized teams, and is therefore expensive. If we look at the extremes, 
this kind of collection of information is easy for Monsanto but completely inaccessible to a 
poor Indian farmer. 
 
— Are there not, among economists, some who believe that trends are visible? We hear 
phrases everywhere in stock market news such as “the dollar is rising”, “the euro is falling”, 
etc. 
  
This means nothing more than the fact that the dollar has risen, or the euro fallen. 
Explanations are easier to find for the past that for the future. That said, it is true that 
numerous economists imagine that financial markets are simply sophistications, or 
complexifications, of markets as perceived by Léon Walras. 
 What is heard most often is criticism of the sophistication of the financial markets: 
that new derivative products facilitate speculation, that the self-referential nature of markets 
distances them from the real economy, that their mathematics are bloated and use up 
intelligence which could be better applied elsewhere, that term markets are myopic and do not 
take future generations into account, and so on... 
 These pertinent criticisms are however, all too often, thought of as excesses 
correctable with healthy regulation, helping the financial markets to rediscover the adjustment 
mechanism functions so useful for the economy. Textbooks often state, like Roger Guesnerie, 
that “the market is a powerful calculation tool, at once computer, program and algorithm, with 
unrivalled performance levels, able to bring about a system of signals which creates order and 
produces effectiveness in the individual decisions of economic agents”.190 This eminent 
scholar, like many economists, thinks that financial markets reduce uncertainties: “the 
sophistication of the financial markets is in part a response to the need to limit uncertainty on 
future transactions: for example, a term market where one today buys or sells a real or 
financial product negates, if not all uncertainty, at least uncertainty on future prices”.191 
 This is an error, or at least a highly ambiguous statement. Certainly, he who buys 
today to receive in three months has purchased, and for him the price is no longer random. 
But has he bought at a good price? Futures and term products do not reflect the historical 
evolution of prices as it appears in reality, always for the same reason: if it were clear today 
that a future price would be higher (or lower), this would have repercussions on its current 
spot price, which would climb (or sink). In fact, the current price fluctuates, and term prices 
even more so. 
 Beyond this, there is always a belief in the existence of an instantaneous, measurable 
trend: “it [the market] provides unambiguous signals only in the short-term”. That someone 
as competent as Roger Guesnerie should still be able to believe that such non-ambiguous 
signals are given by markets in the short-term can be blamed on a favourable over-
interpretation of neo-classical ideas, considered, in essence, to be a desirable world. 
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— If I drive my car along a bumpy road, even if I have a good suspension system, I will still 
be able to feel whether the road is ascending or descending! 
 
Shock absorbers use the viscosity of liquids in order to provide a stronger resistance if the 
speed of the pressure applied is higher, and weaker if it is slower.  On a signal, it carries out 
what is called a moving average, or convolution. The signals fall then into two categories. For 
those where this regularization allows the discovery of a trend, as is the case for a low-quality 
or paved road, the irregularity – the noise – is not so great that one cannot redraw the line that 
would have been followed were the signal not disturbed, i.e. the road in a good state. On the 
other hand, for highly random signals such as those provided by fluid markets, or the 
silhouette of a steep mountain range, we are no longer in the first category, and the moving 
average does not allow any precise forecast. Casinos are helpful for understanding the 
phenomenon. Calculate moving averages on the results for all games over a day or a week, 
and you will still deduce nothing about the next game. 
The point is delicate, but of such importance that it merits further explanation. Let us 
imagine a poorly-balanced roulette wheel, in which the numbers from 19-36 occur slightly 
more regularly than those from 1-18. We will say that market prices are rising if the result is 
between 19 and 36, and sinking if it is between 1 and 18. Under these conditions, if you 
observe results for ten or twenty games, and have no other information available, you will be 
unable to say whether the roulette is biased towards higher or lower numbers. If you observe 
results over a much longer period, the law of large numbers and the central limit theorem will 
give you an approximate distribution of the drift of this biased roulette wheel, the range 
tightening more and more as you go further into the past. But what is the point of delving into 
the past in order to predict an instantaneous tendency? Is the wheel’s bias constant? We do 
not know. 
 Neo-classical thought is so attractive that many economists see near-equilibria, like 
that of your car with its amazing suspension, all around. For example, two scholars recently 
wrote on petrol prices that “the more the price deviates from its long-run equilibrium value, 
the more fundamentalists will become active. Their orders then drive prices back to more 
fundamentally justified values. However, if the price is close to its fundamental value, the 
market impact of fundamentalists is relatively low. In such a situation, the presence of 
destabilizing chartists and/or random shocks may cause a new (temporary) bull or bear 
market”.192 They omit the fact that behaviour could easily be of the type we examined in 
chapter II-4, figure 3. 
 
— But what about derivative products? Do they not allow us to discern market trends? They 
allow speculation through taking advantage of specific changes and thus, since they are listed 
on derivative markets, this listing gives information on probable future market evolution. For 
example, if we look at the price of an at-the-money call option and it is higher than its 
theoretical value, the market assumes that the underlying price will rise. 
 
Trends are all subjective. The market says nothing clear. In your example, let us not forget 
that there is a lot of fluctuation; the expression “at-the-money” means that the exercise price 
of the call is the current value of the spot price, but the spot price moves... Also, the market 
value of the call itself fluctuates. 
 Arbitrage theory, which is nothing more than the coherent application of logical 
reasoning to speculation situations, states that it is not possible to realize a guaranteed profit. 	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It does not prevent possible profits, but gives an important rule on the subject: if you place 
yourself within a law of probability where the current has a certain trend (your conviction), 
and you use this law to manage derivative products, you are taking an additional risk. By 
taking such risks, you may profit, but you may also lose. 
 
— In any event, derivative products allow speculation. Isn’t this where the problem lies? 
  
Not exactly, or rather, not only. There is a dysfunction running deeper within the market 
itself. If derivative markets were not institutionalized, they would still exist under the counter, 
and banning them would lead to the same problems as those of the Prohibition period, when 
alcohol flowed freely. Derivative products allow speculation in this one precise sense: thanks 
to derivative products, one can take a position vis-à-vis the market. In other words, one can 
build a portfolio which will be beneficial if a certain evolution does indeed occur. This can 
even be done in a highly precise and detailed manner. With combinations of vanilla options 
(the most standard) at differing maturities, one can take a position that, for example, a price 
will be higher in three months, lower in six, and then higher again in twelve. 
 To take a position is to interrogate the market on its evolution; it will only reply later. 
And its response will just be one draw from the deck of a law of probability. To buy the 
underlying asset in order to resell it, or to buy derivative products, is to take a position – in 
other words, to speculate. This means taking risks. 
 
— Returning to derivatives, is the value attributed by theory to a call, a term contract, or 
another contingency product, correct? Is it the market value? 
 
Theory is only expressed via models, and these models can always be contested and improved 
upon by other models. Theory says exactly this: “if the model is good, we can affirm that if 
you base your decisions on a value of this contingent product different to that indicated, you 
are taking risks it is possible to avoid”. The end argument is very strong: to not follow 
arbitrage theory is to take unnecessary risks. But this argument depends on the relevance of 
the model. You tell me that speculators want to take risks! Risks they select themselves, yes, 
but not risks imposed on them from the outside, which they could avoid. 
 
— Does hedging one’s bets mean that one is no longer taking risks? 
 
Arbitrage theory provides – in the case of the most commonly used models – prices for 
options (theoretical prices calculated based on volatility), and also provides methods of 
hedging, that is, how to construct a portfolio which will behave identically to the term product 
in question. Thanks to such a portfolio, one negates the risk of the term product. 
 In fact, one only more or less negates the risk. This ‘only more or less’ is because the 
model is not quite the same as reality... 
 
— So you are saying that, using the evolution of the price of an asset up to today, one can 
deduce nothing of its trend. 
 
Nothing that allows a risk-free profit. You can use all the moving averages and convolutions 
you like, but you cannot draw any precise indication from the past as to the average or central 
value with which the law of probability will furnish a price in a week or month’s time. 
 The only thing one can objectively draw from such observation is the instantaneous 
fluctuation of a price, known as its historical volatility. It is enough to observe the spot over a 
recent period, and a quadratic variation algorithm provides this information with high 
precision. 
 
— And yet, on all the websites of financial markets, we see diagrams of “technical analysis” 
or “charts” with bands and all sorts of information – this is what people are interested in! 
 
For the evolution of a price, everyone bases his ideas on his own understanding. If it is the 
price of a share in a company, one can assume that its directors are competent, that its 
products will gain a wider market, etc. This creates a “worldview” for each market actor, a 
sort of “personal law of probability” regarding future events. Chartists’ graphs contribute by 
bringing an element of interpretation to observed evolutions. This is more superficial than an 
analysis of the geographical, institutional and technical data that govern the activity of the 
enterprise. In reality, the details of chartist methods have no theoretical relevance, being to 
finance what horoscopes are to medicine, but globally and socially speaking, the markets need 
people who believe in them – small-time investors contribute to fluidity. 
 
 
 
 
— For arbitrage theory to be applied as it is set out in textbooks of financial mathematics, in 
the language of stochastic calculus, the trajectories of prices have to be stochastic processes, 
of which the most used are semi-martingales, which have strong immediate unpredictability. 
Why would these trajectories not follow other rules? How is it that markets perfectly realize a 
stochastic process which has these properties of dissimulating trends? By what interplay of 
buyers and sellers, of those who have ‘long’ and those who have ‘short’ positions, as the 
terminology goes, does the spot price fluctuate perfectly according to theory? 
 
Quite simply, because there are teams who dedicate their time to scrutinizing all the flaws of 
the market from which profit could be drawn. With all the powerful means of statistical 
analysis provided by contemporary information technology, they track the behaviour – often 
unconscious – of traders in order to profit from it. Many are those who work at this, meaning 
that the organism which manages the market can count on a whole international army of 
“assessors”, whose speculations help give spot prices the appearance they should have under 
arbitrage theory. 
 Let us be more precise. The mathematical framework of arbitrage theory – the 
stochastic analysis of random processes – is not validated. It cannot be. We have only one 
trajectory available to us. But its logical structure and its reasoning on games of chance are so 
well applied by these teams that this logic imposes itself. 
 
— Then you believe, like most theorists, that technical analysis and all its interpretative 
principles of returning to the average, of convergence, etc. are the astrology to arbitrage 
theory’s astronomy, in the celestial mechanics of finance? 
 
The question is of knowing whether, in the end, the market behaves as if it were a sample of a 
model of stochastic calculus, or, more precisely: is the model of financial markets based on 
the framework of stochastic calculus a good model? (one sense of the term efficiency). 
Without completely answering this question, we can note that many concrete facts are well 
rendered by this model, as are many arguments and much reasoning. In particular, a simple 
fact explained here by Burton Malkiel: “whatever patterns or irrationalities in the pricing of 
individual stocks that have been discovered in a search of historical experience are unlikely to 
persist and will not provide investors with a method to obtain extraordinary returns. If any 
$100 bills are lying around the stock exchanges of the world, they will not be there for 
long.”193  
 The very existence of these purely speculative teams of which I have just spoken, who 
carry out psychological and mathematical speculation in the very short term,194 proves that the 
market is not efficient in this sense195 – but also that it is not far from being so, as in order to 
capitalize upon it, one must be better than these teams. 
 
— This very efficiency, which is not realized in practice. Does it not validate technical 
analysis? 
 
Not at all. The term efficiency has in economics almost as many different meanings as there 
are economists. This confusion becomes a vast empty rhetoric in which the ignorant, the man 
on the street, and politicians all get bogged down. 
 Eugene Fama is behind the most widely taught manner of tackling the notion of 
efficiency nowadays. Following this author, we try to connect economic properties of markets 
to mathematical properties (Markov processes, martingales, etc.) by means of the concept of 
measurability, on the mathematical side, and that of information on the economic side. “A 
market in which prices always ‘fully reflect’ available information is called ‘efficient’”, says 
Fama.196 
 Here is what is usually said: there are three levels of efficiency. 
 Weak efficiency means that the current price incorporates all information on the past 
prices of the asset involved. If it is satisfied, statistical analysis on the temporal series of the 
price’s trajectory cannot lead to any kind of profit. 
 In semi-strong efficiency, the price contains all information publically available. The 
evolution of other assets cannot, through correlations with the asset studied, provide 
possibilities of gain. 
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 In the case of strong efficiency, the price contains all economic information both 
public and private; in such a case, no-one can, on average, beat the market. 
 Using these definitions, one tries to construct statistical tests to rule on whether a 
given market is or is not strongly or weakly efficient. This has lead to an abundance of 
publications. 
 It can be seen that this approach is an attempt to link the economic notion of efficiency, 
which can mean nothing other than competent allocation of resources (capital, investments) in 
such a way as to avoid waste, to mathematical formalizations concerning stochastic processes 
(martingales or semi-martingales for discounted prices, Markov processes, filtrations). But 
this intellectual trajectory, the mathematization of the idea of sensible allocation thanks to this 
association, is highly contestable. 
The notion of information, taken from the theory of communication of signals in 
channels of transmission, is of no use for describing the knowledge and interpretations of 
economic actors; it is far too poor. Economics will never let itself be led to say that agents 
have “more or less information”, as this would be extremely naive. Agents, like you and I, 
interpret the world, which is what they call ‘understanding’ it. As Hayek says, “the 
knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or 
integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory 
knowledge which all the separate individuals possess”.197 
 As for the notion of “measurability in relation to a sigma-algebra”, as this is the issue 
in question, it is abstract in the extreme, impossible to grasp in any operational sense. Fama 
uses the term ‘information’ for what probabilists call a σ-algebra, and notes as Φt that which 
is now usually noted as Ft. When t varies, the growing family of σ-algebras (Ft) is a filtration, 
a theoretical notion used in the development of stochastic analysis, the mathematical 
framework of arbitrage theory. But let us not forget that the only reality we have at our 
disposal is of a single trajectory. The σ-algebra Ft is relative to the random process in 
question, or even to multiple random processes, but we do not know on an operational level 
these objects which cause the probability law of a trajectory or group of trajectories to 
intervene. Experience does not provide the stochastic process for the course of a listed 
quantity, only a trajectory – which is a completely different notion – interrupted at the present 
instant. We do not have the notion of measurability used at our concrete disposal. 
At both ends, the idea of efficiency is a forced one: on the side of real, experienced 
economics, the notion of information is simplistic in the extreme, while on the side of 
observed spot prices, we do not see the σ-algebras used. 
 It is vital to distinguish two methodological objectives: 
 a) description of trajectories of prices on financial markets, construction of the best 
models for describing them, 
 b) analysis of the economic functions filled by the various markets. 
In type 2 markets, where speculation is possible for the permanent buying and selling 
of any quantities, a) finds itself with an obvious partial answer: if the trend were clear, it 
would instantly modify the value of the spot price. Therefore, the trend cannot be clear. This 
argument can be improved upon if we adopt a more precise mathematical description for a). 
 As for b), it comes under the particular situation studied. It is sure that “markets react” 
to what is happening on the ground. However, the issue of knowing whether this reaction 
reflects a good understanding of what is happening is not so certain. There is a large amount 
of gregariousness. Insofar as traders mostly remain seated in front of their screens, the 
financial markets are extremely self-referential (we will return to this idea in relation to a tax 
on financial transactions in Chapter III-6). 	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 To conclude my response to the question, I will say that no mathematical hypothesis is 
necessary in order to understand that on speculo-valued markets trends cannot be seen. I 
repeat, this is due to the fact that opportunities for speculation, via all means available 
(including statistical studies on the spontaneous reactions of most traders), are pushed to the 
limit by specialized teams. 
 
— So the trajectories of listed quantities fluctuate, but why do they fluctuate more for some 
assets than for others? 
 
The most fluid markets, those which are closest to theory, do not prevent an asset from having 
a very low volatility, or that its course should barely deviate from the yield curve of a risk-
free investment. However, let us reflect further: can this be the case for the trajectory of a 
natural resource which is running out? All are convinced that the scarcity of non-renewable 
resources will have an ever stronger influence on their prices. A gentle curve bordering on a 
risk-free rate is unrealistic, and would provoke purchases today for term sales, causing the 
trajectory to rise. And in a game of opposing forces like that between scarcity and the 
discovery of new resources (shale gas, etc. for petroleum), the trajectory of spot prices will 
align itself so that it is impossible to say whether it will rise or fall. But then can the trajectory 
of this resource remain calm at a high level? There can be no calmness in this matter. 
Reduction in use of the resource due to its elevated cost will in itself act fitfully in an end 
dynamic which is ever more sensitive and instable. 
 
— And are price peaks limited by theory? 
 
No. The machinery of derivative markets means that the price of a barrel of oil, for example, 
can reach a value far higher than the amount each actor in the market is willing to dedicate 
towards this quantity of the product. This is due to the fact that the market and its derivative 
contain lotteries. We saw this in chapter III-4. How can one sell a Picasso worth a million 
Euros to buyers with no more than €1000 of disposable funds? By selling 1000 lottery tickets 
with the painting as a prize. Similarly, the market is capable of offering the object “a 1/1000 
chance of an oil-barrel”. 
 For example, a call can be seen as a set of lottery tickets. If I buy a call which is very 
far “out of the money”, it is worth almost nothing, and if I buy a lot of them, I then have a 
portfolio which resembles a ticket for the national lottery... Derivative markets allow the easy 
creation of lottery tickets on the more varied configurations of the evolution of a price. 
They also allow the inverse – the creation of a portfolio which has a small chance of 
enormous losses but generally leads to small winnings. One technique consists of buying 
derivatives to cover almost all eventualities, leaving just a slender gap... Usually, to build 
such a portfolio one must tie up a significant sum corresponding to the price of all these 
options which cover almost all eventualities. It is somewhat like buying 90% of the tickets for 
a lottery. But it is possible to borrow or take out conditioned loans, i.e. to only pay for these 
options on maturation. This adds costs, but can allow one to pay out nothing, or almost 
nothing. This is the effect of leverage. Good traders will always try to configure their 
portfolio so that these losses have only a slight probability of occurring. 
 Portfolio configuration, that is, the preference for certain portfolios vis-à-vis others 
with the same average and variance, is the subject of behavioural portfolio theory.198 
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— You say that the trajectories of financial markets fluctuate by necessity, following the 
probabilistic laws of speculation. By what process does this fluctuation appear in practice, in 
the interplay of supply and demand in markets? 
 
On this subject, neoclassical thought is again highly pervasive. Walras believed that in market 
economics, individuals “tended” to carry out the solution to the equations of general 
equilibrium which he had formulated. His idea was of a process of trial and error which, 
starting from an initial price “called out at random”, led the interplay of supply and demand to 
converge upon the solution. It was a fixed-point process, as we would say today, which 
assumed certain mathematical conditions of contraction which have since been clarified. 
Moreover, Walras judged that, during the “trial-and-error process”, changing circumstances 
would intervene and force continual re-adjustments. 
 However, the oscillations of financial markets are not due to trial and error à la 
Walras. We must not blend everything together. 
 This is because, in the timescale in which they are produced (on the more fluid 
markets present today, hundreds and even thousands of transactions per second can take 
place) the economic circumstances have not changed. There is no new information coming in 
from outside. The only thing which changes is the price trajectory itself, as a kind of 
microscopic instability which then amplifies itself up to a certain level. Also, without 
contextual modification, the trial and error proposed by Walras would converge and give a 
curve which was relatively regular in relation to time, being deflected only upon receiving 
knowledge of changes to data. 
 The inner mechanism which creates this fluctuation is delicate. Propositions of buying 
and selling according to the intentions of agents (order books) in an organized market provide 
the list price, and this is what we call the microstructure of the market. The proposing of 
models for prices beginning with a model of the microstructure is today still an area of 
investigation for researchers. Many approaches have been suggested. It is not clear that there 
is a single mechanism, as the financial markets have been organized in various ways since the 
1970s, at auction or electronically. 
One of the ways to represent agents’ behaviour in financial markets is to consider a 
mean field dynamic – that is, to simplify interactions and mutual influences of agents among 
themselves by supposing that each agent interacts only with the mean of all agents and with 
the exterior, or in other words, with a stochastic process of exogenous economic data. The 
number of equations is thus equal to the number of unknowns and allows a resolution. Each 
agent thinks that the evolution will occur in line with a trend (a drift coefficient) which 
represents his opinion.199 
 Another approach consists of considering the order books of buyers and sellers and the 
two lines which interact to represent the best bid and the best ask200. In both cases, we proceed 
to the limit for a large number of transactions. 
 Some consider it simpler to admit that each trader acting on a market is convinced of a 
probabilistic law relating to the development of the price trajectory, so for example, for one 	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trader the correct value might be 5 with a probability of 1/3 and 7 with a probability of 2/3. 
Hence, if the value remains for a long time near 5, he will judge that it will soon move 
towards 7, and will take this into account. In this representation, each trader tries to act in 
such a way that the market realizes – simulates – the stochastic process he has in his head. 
The results are all the more spread out when the a priori images are different. 
 The best understanding of the microscopic structure of the market, however, remains 
that, outlined above, of being aware that all imperfections – in relation to arbitrage theory – 
are constantly being exploited by specialized teams. This shapes the course of the price 
trajectory so that the making of any risk-free profit is incredibly difficult. 
 
Let us emphasize the fact that there is a profound dysfunction within the market, intrinsic to 
the temporal structure of prices, creating a situation which is nothing like what the neo-
classical economists expected in markets, nor what most leaders and politicians in favour of 
the “market economy” believe today. Price fluctuation, by preventing risk-free profits, also 
prevents a reading of how sensitive market price is to variation in such and such a parameter. 
In economic terms, the elasticities are invisible, which – in an era where important decisions 
must be taken regarding reorientation of choices on energy sources, on minerals, on urban 
issues, on agriculture, etc. – can only freeze behaviour and predictions, trapping them within 
traditional, conservative criteria. 	  
6. The market is inconsistent with the price signal 
We have seen that, for a standard article, the realization of an organized market like the 
financial markets, in which the price is managed in a sufficiently mobile fashion to maintain 
good fluidity, by this same functioning of expectations, blurs the underlying trends which 
become subjective. The trends can be used to take a position but this position will be risky. 
Moreover, and this is a crucial point, this phenomenon prevents us from seeing the beginnings 
of a scenario such as the Club of Rome considered, and that with the best will in the world, 
the economic players will not see anything on the dials of their cars that will make them ease 
off on the gas pedal. 
 Is this blurring restricted to environmental phenomena? Obviously not. There is no 
question of externality here. It fundamentally concerns the fact that the temporal dimension of 
price, in a fluid market where exchange term assets quotas are possible, is not as the neo-
classicists thought201, the price signal is no longer seen. 
Today critics consider very diverse aspects of contemporary capitalism. Many 
denounce the excursions of markets outside the real economy, the speculative bubbles, 
without pointing to the erasing of the price signal. These bubbles were tamed by economists 
because one can easily deal with them without upsetting the theoretical bases of the neo-
classicist corpus: they are solutions of equations with different boundary conditions. It is now 
recognized that neo-classicists had forgotten that partial differentiation problems should have 
specified boundary conditions. 
 But it is a mistake to think that without speculators the price would be the intersection 
of a smooth curves of supply and demand, both curves being stable over time, and that one 
would thus see the real economy. There is a double-error there: firstly the curves don’t 
actually exist – there are only clouds of points – and secondly it is neither simple nor obvious 
in financial capitalism how to separate speculators from entrepeneurs as Keynes advised. 
 In fact, business leaders and government officials have integrated rules of supply and 
demand into their decisions as if one could see and measure them. They use direct 
measurements – out of the markets – to take account, for example, of the increase in the cost 
of synthetic latex as compared with natural rubber latex or vice versa. Behavioural responses 
are assimilated in the spirit of actors thanks to the management courses and training. The neo-
classical theory remains the only logical structure of the micro-economic and educational 
content of the MBA. By asking directly, outside the market, about likely supply and demand, 
they also meet the same worries as the speculators, leading to the growing frequentation of 
sites of specialized information. 
 
The fundamental problem of the economy, according to Hayek 
In a remarkable, and rightly celebrated, article, Friedrich Hayek posed the question of 
establishing what is the problem we aim to solve by constructing a rational economic order. 
What is interesting is that his answer is not that it is trying to implement a model like 
Walras’s general equilibrium. His idea is much more functional and sociological, political 
even, in the sense of the search for a desirable organization of the city. “The peculiar 
character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that 
the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated 
or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory 	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knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The economic problem of society is 
thus not merely a problem of how to allocate 'given' resources—if 'given' is taken to mean 
given to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem set by these 'data.' It is rather a 
problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, 
for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a 
problem of the utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its totality. “202 
 When Hayek speaks here of resources, the rest of the article makes clear that he means 
all types of resources: natural resources, but also resources of knowledge, awareness, know-
how, everything that can be used by human intelligence. If one thinks of the sequence of 
epistemological ideas in the 20th century, it is remarkable that Hayek had seen, in 1945, 
things that would only properly be appreciated by sociologists of science in the last quarter of 
the century, namely that objective and universal facts are only a part of knowledge and that  
“the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and space” is an important driving 
force for modern society which is not a matter for big science.203 “Today it is almost heresy to 
suggest that scientific knowledge is not the sum of all knowledge. But a little reflection will 
show that there is beyond question a body of very important but unorganized knowledge 
which cannot possibly be called scientific in the sense of knowledge of general rules: the 
knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place.” 
 Hayek then emphasizes that economic decisions arise when managing change: “It is, 
perhaps, worth stressing that economic problems arise always and only in consequence of 
change” and he insists that business talent consists in knowing how to behave in the face of 
such changes. “In a competitive industry at any rate —and such an industry alone can serve as 
a test— the task of keeping cost from rising requires constant struggle, absorbing a great part 
of the energy of the manager [...] The very strength of the desire, constantly voiced by 
producers and engineers, to be able to proceed untrammelled by considerations of money 
costs, is eloquent testimony to the extent to which these factors enter into their daily work” 
and the local circumstances and special factors that constitute this local knowledge cannot be 
summarized by statistics (p524). 
 Thus the relevance of an economic order is primarily to allow the players in a situation 
to react quickly when a decision is needed: “If we can agree that the economic problem of 
society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time 
and place, it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people who 
are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant changes and of the 
resources immediately available to meet them.” For this, the manager needs, in addition to his 
own local knowledge, to align his decisions with the context; he needs a connection with the 
outside world, and that is what the price system provides. 
 Hayek then argues, in this brilliant article, that the market, or rather the system of 
management by price system, fulfils the work of coordinating the knowledge resources of the 
diverse actors, and this system “economizes knowledge” by providing only those indicators 
that the manager needs, and ignoring everything that the manager does not need, be they 
causes near or far, ethical or otherwise. 
 While this plea for the market economy is dated, between state planning and 
coordination decentralized by prices, Hayek does not truly consider intermediary situations – 
those which interest us for managing the planet – where knowledge beyond prices is added to 
the system, complementing local knowledge with global developments. 
 But that is not the point I want to address here. What Hayek said, essentially, was that 
for economic organization to be effective, in the sense of being able to use all resources of 	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knowledge, it must be based on a price system. More precisely, if we analyse his argument, it 
is the price changes that are the most highly prized signals in this organization. “Assume that 
somewhere in the world a new opportunity for the use of some raw material, say tin, has 
arisen, or that one of the sources of supply of tin has been eliminated. It does not matter for 
our purpose—and it is very significant that it does not matter— which of these two causes has 
made tin more scarce. All that the users of tin need to know is that some of the tin they used 
to consume is now more profitably employed elsewhere, and that in consequence they must 
economize tin.” The change in the price of tin propagates though all users and even to those 
of tin substitutes. “It is more than a metaphor to describe the price system as a kind of 
machinery for registering change, or a system of telecommunications which enables 
individual producers to watch merely the movement of a few pointers, as an engineer might 
watch the hands of a few dials, in order to adjust their activities to changes of which they may 
never know more than is reflected in the price movement.” 
 Price movement! The reader will have understood my point: Hayek is certainly right 
in his analysis that the price system game is essential for the proper expression of economic 
know-how, but the problem is that with markets as they currently function internally, we can 
no longer actually see the change in the price of tin. 
  
Note also that for Hayek the price system is enough to propagate all the exterior constraints 
that affect the entrepeneur who is managing his business with a certain production function. It 
is this decentralized mechanism that he sees as a remarkably efficient and economic means of 
knowledge. The remaining point is that the whole argument would apply just as well even if 
the price system were distorted by cartel agreements, corruption etc. It is the propagation of 
information that Hayek finds marvellous in this system. Conversely, if the state or other 
agents intervene, these constraints are added to the system, but its “marvellous” propagation 
still works. 
 The real issue is that it needs it to be possible to make price trends visible. 
  
Importance of the price signal: the case of carbon 
As it currently operates, as we will see, the signals provided by prices are crucial for the 
whole economy. Households sort and optimize for the cost of food, clothing, transport and 
housing costs on a daily basis, taking account of prices whose evolution is considered as a 
fundamental political indicator. Their statistics are used as reference in indexed contracts.  
 The variation today of price with respect to time, dp/dt, is the object of permanent 
attention of consumers but is also an absolutely indispensable piece of information for the 
entrepeneur. Organization of production takes time, such a process started today will not yield 
new products until subsequent years, and the marginal costs are evaluated today thanks to the 
observed trend in prices of materials and tools, labour costs and financial charges. The 
precious information for setting up projects and thus for the dynamics of the economy, is to 
be able to identify the causes of changes in price. In other words, for each factor that 
contributes to the price of an object or service, by watching how the observed price changes 
with the price of this factor one can establish this factor’s role and evolution. 
 This becomes of paramount importance if it is a question of changing behaviours. If 
one considers the finiteness of resources, pollution, the fragility of ecosystems in the face of 
technical risks are not drawbacks that can be protected against by a simple insurance policy. 
The central issue is to modify the ways of life by that, in the first place, affect them and 
influence them, namely prices. 
 For example, if one wishes to move gradually to the so-called “functional economy” 
in which one does not buy objects but leases them, the manufacturer is responsible for 
providing the service permanently, for maintaining and recycling all materials involved. It is 
absolutely necessary to pass to such a system quickly to prevent the final dispersion of metals 
and other products to the ocean depths. The system obliges industry to a detailed account in 
the medium term, it cannot embark on this adventure now, the prices of raw materials and 
energy are too volatile to see clearly. 
 
 Since the United Nations conference in 1997 where the Tokyo Protocol was signed, 
the relevant national and international bodies concerned themselves – more or less – with 
changing behaviours on emissions of greenhouse gases. For this, the idea is to make 
emissions of CO2 more costly, using the price signal204. 
 The European Union put in place a system of trading for quotas of emissions of 
greenhouse gases, the ETS (Emission Trading Scheme), detailed in the directive 2002/87/CE 
which states that the quantity of allowances given each year for all of the EU would decrease 
linearly from 2013. For 2013 the total allowance for the EU is calculated from national plans 
accepted by the Commission. Member states shall auction allowances and at least 50% of the 
profits of these auctions must be used on measures for reducing emissions. This system 
harmonized with the mechanisms called “projects” in the Kyoto Protocol (Clean 
Development Mechanism, CDM, and Joint Implementation, JI) by directive 2004/101/CE. In 
line with IPCC recommendations, the European Council in 2009 supported the goal of 
reducing emissions by 80 to 95% by 2050 compared with 1990 levels. According to the 
liberal principal that flexibility is synonymous with cost reduction, during the period 2013-
2019 the member states may deduct the following year an amount up to 5% of their annual 
quota issue (banking or carry-over). They may also transfer to other states up to 3% of these 
quotas. The European system covers more than 10,000 industrial facilities that account for 
more than half of the remaining emissions resulting from more diffuse sources (domestic 
heating, transport, agriculture, etc.). It is currently the largest market for emission rights in the 
world, but it is far from unique; similar systems exist in some states of the US, and in Asia 
(Korea, China and Japan), New Zealand and Australia.  
 The gradual extension of tradable quota systems does not preclude the use of tax-
measures as well. By the 1990s the Scandinavian countries and Finland had introduced a 
carbon tax in their tax systems and they did not abandon it when the European ETS was 
implemented. Switzerland and Ireland have also adopted a carbon tax in 2008 and 2010 
respectively. France failed to agree to such a tax in 2010, but only by a small margin. 
 Discussion of the merits of a tax or a system of tradable rights is entirely focussed on 
the development of an effective price signal and the means by which one could extend this 
price signal, in one case as in the other, to all emissions, including diffuse emissions. The 
theoretical economics literature is abundant on this topic. We learn that governance by 
quantity (tradable rights) or by prices (taxes) do not react the same way to uncertainty205. We 
must also distinguish the shape of the proposed tax, if it is a percentage of the price, like 
VAT, or if its base is the amount of material, like an excise duty. Unfortunately the debate on 
tax remains virtual at the European level, since any tax requires unanimity and can be 
imposed practically only for each member state. 
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106, 2010 ; Jaffe, A.B., R.G. Newell, R.N. Stavins, “A tale of two market failures: Technology and 
environmental policy”, Ecological Economics, 54(2-3):164-174, 2005; Fischer, C., R.G. Newell, 
“Environmental and technology policies for climate mitigation”, J. of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 55(2):142-162, 2008; Quirion, P., “Distributional impacts of energy-efficiency certificates vs. 
taxes and standards”, FEEM working paper, 18, 2006.	  
205 Cf. Quirion, P., “Does Uncertainty Justify Intensity Emission Caps”, Resource and Energy Economics, 27: 
343–353 (2005).	  
 
Price of the right to emit one tonne of SO2 and volume of transactions in the market organized by the 
Environmental Protection Agency which markets both options and future contracts on these 
allowances. 
 The system of tradable rights was initiated in the United States by the Environmental 
Protection Agency about acid rains for emissions of SO2 and NOx. The marketed rights have a 
rate and their derivative products are also marketed. Various financial markets allow trading 
in pollution rights: the European Union Allowances (EUA) are rights relating to the Kyoto 
protocol, Certified Emissions Reductions (CER) are related to the European ETS scheme. 
Beyond the EUA and CER there are also derivatives marketed in particular options and 
futures (Nymex, European Climate Exchange, GreenX, etc.). These markets also offer futures 
products on the CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) and California Emissions Trading 
Scheme – a system of cap and trade similar to the European ETS scheme. 
 
Price and volume of transactions of EUA (European Union Allowances). 
 
 If we take a closer look at these markets and their derivatives, we see the same 
phenomena as elsewhere. The price of the underlying (here the price of emitting a tonne of 
CO2 equivalent) is very volatile, and that of the derivatives similarly. Always the same ideas 
are applied here, everybody is happy that – in theory – the very existence of these markets 
resolves the excess of pollution at minimal cost. Yet it goes unremarked that the underlying 
signal is barely visible because of the volatility. 
 
 
Price of European emission rights. 
 
The case of the Chicago Climate Exchange is unique because it was a private venture set up 
to trade emissions rights in the United States on a voluntary basis for companies that 
commited to an annual 6% reduction in their emissions without there being any binding 
regulation in the whole of the US. After a fairly successful period based, more or less, on the 
idea that the exchange was anticipating legislation that the Obama administration would vote 
in, the level of transactions plummeted and the market closed. 
 
 
The short life of the Chicago Climate Exchange 
 
Beyond these unique circumstances, it should be noted that here also the negotiated price of 
these emissions rights was very volatile. 
 As we have repeatedly pointed out, uncertainty is costly and risk-aversion is strong, so a 
proper cost-benefit analysis will encourage industrial and other economic agents to change as 
little as possible. As Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline rightly observed “The main disadvantage of 
the quota market is the volatility in the price of permits, which arises from the confrontation 
between the supply of unused permits and the demand for additional permits, which in turn, 
fluctuate as a function of general economic conditions, of the expectations for the prices of 
different raw materials, of the available technologies, of the price of R&D, etc. These 
fluctuations are inherent in the operation of the market, the principle of which is to fix a price 
by mutual agreement (in their transactions) of the polluters so as to reduce the emissions as 
desired by the regulatory bodies.” But plans are always formed from a medium-term view 
because the response times are inherently long, because of the slow pace of technological 
change and of decision-making. This is even more marked in sectors with diffuse emissions 
(transport, construction). “This volatility poses a problem for environmental efficiency when 
it becomes impossible for the players to observe any reliable long-term trend since, to take the 
example of the fight against the greenhouse effect and the European market (ETS), it is the 
predictability of the price of carbon which could encourage firms to innovate and invest to 
adopt sustainable cleaner technologies […] whereas a tax makes the cost of pollution visible, 
transparent and predictable.”206. 
 But liberal ideology has complete faith in the market and believes taxes to be the 
ultimate evil. 
 
The trends have disappeared: examples  
If we study the price of two quantities such as the stock prices of two companies with 
interests in renewable energy, such as an oil company and a company producing material for 
photovoltaic cells, we will see clouds of points. Possibly, over a long time, one could deduce 
statistical points of comparison and principal components.  
 
 
Comparative evolution in the share price of an oil company (Total SA) and a firm producing silicon 
for photovoltaic cells (Renewable Energy Corporation) over six months and over two years. 
 
But certainly not trends with instantaneous significance. The share prices are extremely 
volatile and the are huge relative variations. Similarly if one took two quantities in the same 
sector, such as two textiles, e.g. wool and cotton, then the price ratio shows nothing definite 
and the price variations are not at all commensurate with the quantities produced or 
transported. 
 The only reliable thing that the markets show is volatility. We will come back to this 
in a moment, because thanks to this we can identify a typical characteristic of new market 
capitalism. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 M. Chiroleu-Assouline, “La fiscalité environnementale, instrument économique par excellence”, Revue 
Française de finances publiques, 114 (2011) p17-25.	  
                               
International prices of wool and cotton between 1991 and 2011. Note how the price can double with 
two years. 
 
 If we briefly look at the case of oil – at a global level – which is obviously at the heart 
of concerns about climate change, here again the price signal is nonexistent. 
 
One sees in this diagram, which runs from 2003 to 2011, that the quantity of oil produced has 
stayed essentially constant, despite huge variations in price. In fact, if one looks very closely, 
it seems that the supply is positively correlated with the price. This could be explained by the 
fact that the producers open the valve a little more when prices are high, and also by the 
stock-management of the oil companies. These are external explanations. Note that the y-axis 
starts at 0. If we did not know the quantity of production, it would be absolutely impossible a 
priori to deduce it from the price. 
 In an interesting article on the issue of peak oil, J. Murray and D. King offer an 
interpretation according to which production would follow demand until 2005, pursuing an 
upward trend despite the continuous increase in the price until it reached a ceiling of around 
75 million barrels a day. The process (price and production) from 1998 to 2011 followed the 
diagram on the right below: 
   
Two remarks are necessary. Firstly, the deviation from the plan is explained by the 
unexpected fall in prices caused by the subprime crisis. Then there is the fact that, according 
to other authors, untapped reserved remain abundant, and their depletion in the coming two 
centuries is totally incompatible with a moderate climate change207. Finally, the most striking 
observation is that the variation in production (and, hence, in consumption) throughout this 
period is very small – the price signal is not working. 
 Now what is the price signal “at the pump”? Oil consumers have many 
misconceptions about this and their behaviour is far from being “economically rational”. 
Motorists do not make precise calculations for their choice of vehicle under uncertainty. The 
fuel at the pump is taxed and the international market price is “damped” by the delay caused 
by the refinement process and by storage time, so it is less volatile than the market price. 
Moreover, contrary to popular opinion, the pump price reflects the market price. 
 
Pump prices in France from 2000 to 2008 
Opinion on price increases is based on a long period, the timescale of buying a new car. In 
this regard, in the five years 2000-2004 the price signal was primarily conveying stability. 
The year 2008 saw a steep decline following the fall in world prices, but what was its effect? 
In an interesting article Laurent Hivert and Jean-Luc Wingert remarked “For the last quarter 
[of 2008], we note that the vast majority of motorists say they have not changed their 
behaviour, i.e., they have continued to pay attention to their consumption, despite the decrease 
in prices. Is this just precaution? An expectation of future increases? Is it a temporary effect 
or permanent? Is it inertia and delaying behaviour of effects of a ‘media signal’ or ‘political 
signal’ that is stronger than the ‘price signal’?”208. There is undoubtedly a weak price signal, a 
blur that disperses actions. Everyone feels a general increase, but nobody really knows its 
magnitude at any given date. The economy does not provide the information and people look 
elsewhere, forming their own estimates of the long-term effects based on the benchmarks they 
remember. 
 
The theorem of the unique trajectory 
The question before us is to determine what we can and cannot see from market prices. 
Consider a commodity offered on a market, with an instantaneous price p(t). The different 
factors that characterize the commodity can be represented by a parameter λ. This represents 
either a descriptive trait of the commodity or service, or some condition of its manufacture or 
supply. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Cf. H. Prévot, Trop de pétrole, Seuil 2007.	  
208 “Pour le dernier trimestre [de 2008], on retiendra donc qu’une très large majorité d’automobilistes déclare 
n’avoir rien changé à son comportement, c’est à dire avoir continué à faire attention à sa consommation, malgré 
la baisse des prix. Principe de précaution ? Anticipation de  hausses futures ? Effet temporaire ou durable ? 
Inertie et retard des comportements, voire effets d’un « signal média » et d’un « signal politique » 
éventuellement plus forts que le « signal prix » ?”, L. Hivert et J.-L. Wingert “Automobile et automobilité : 
quelles évolutions de comportements face aux variations du prix des carburants de 2000 à 2008 ?” PREDIT 
2010.	  
 If the parameter λ is fixed, the price can be written as p(t,λ). This indicates that we are 
considering the various evolutions of the price over time of commodities with different, but 
fixed, characteristics. 
 However, in general, λ varies with time. This is the interesting case, whether we know 
much about these changes, or whether we wish to deduce this information from the variation 
in the observed price, the price signal. In this case we write the parameter as λ(t) and the price 
p(t,λ(t)). The question is then very simple mathematically: it is that of the elasticity of the 
parameter with respect to the observed price over a short period of time, i.e., to determine the 
trend of the parameter λ from the observed price. The result is the following 
 
Theorem. Given a trajectory for a price, during a finite time interval, one cannot tell if the 
trajectory is that of p(t,λΟ) or that of p(t,λ(t)). In particular, the trend in the parameter dλ/dt is 
not visible in the trajectory p(t,λ(t)). 
 
Like all theorems, this involves assumptions about the stochastic process represented by the 
price, about the function λ(t) and about the kind of dependence of the stochastic process on 
the parameter. Let’s just assume that we will make the usual assumptions of stochastic 
calculus and assume that the parameter only influences the drift and not the diffusion 
coefficient (the volatility) of the process. The mathematical basis of the argument is the 
Girsanov property, which says that changes in derivative only change the densities in the 
probability laws. 
 One cannot determine the evolutionary trends in the parameter from a single 
trajectory. But there has obviously only been one trajectory in economics, the historical one. 
This does not preclude us from determining some information about λ, but this information is 
necessarily vague, with low statistical likelihood and low confidence in general. 
 
The fundamental law of market finance 
A good economist today is someone who knows the neo-classical language and its 
refinements (cost-benefit analysis, bubbles, second-best world, etc.) and who discusses the 
improvements to Walras’s ideas that are needed to account of the present, taking offence at 
the disturbances that speculators bring to this analysis. Over half the articles published in 
economics address the problem of speculation, even among the most “academically correct”. 
This routine is comfortable and hypocritical. Ultimately, it is not the speculators that we 
should point the finger at. For over a century we have known of them and yet nothing has 
been done. Why? Because it is the institution of the market itself that is the problem. 
 Prohibit speculators and we will find the finest general balances governed by 
equations linking regular and significant variables. This is complete folly. As soon as a trend 
is noticeable enough for an entrepeneur (as defined by Keynes) to be able to use it to plan 
over the medium term, the set of expectations on the market will make it disappear. 
 I will focus here on the financial markets of the first neoliberal phrase, between 1980 
and 1990, which dealt with equities, currencies, raw materials, and their derivatives, as well 
as bonds and interest rate options209. I will then go into the phenomena that are specific to the 
debt markets organized in the early 2000s. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 It is well known that the volatility of global markets for agricultural products and currencies creates a rupture 
that is very destructive for local economies. “Exchange rates create problems, especially in developing countries, 
because they strongly influence prices both in financial markets and trade (as well as locally). Because of the 
mechanisms of the financial markets, these rates are very unstable, while the consequences of this instability, as 
the price signal for the ‘real’ economy, are far from positive, even if we could, finally, develop some short-term 
hedging.” (“Les taux de change posent problème, et plus particulièrement dans les pays en développement, car 
 Let’s summarize what we have observed in the markets. We see no trends. Moreover, 
if we want to protect ourselves from changes in any particular price, the tools exist, but they 
come at a price (one must buy derivatives). Finance is enriched by its economic inefficiency.
 The idea to overcome the erasure of the price signal is simple. It is to take out an 
insurance policy tailored to the risk that one fears; derivatives are there for this. Their simple 
types (vanilla) are listed, and complex types can then be deduced for bespoke sales over the 
counter. Their price is much higher when the volatility is greater, as the theory explains 
precisely. One could state a rule: 
 
The financial markets should be seen as a meteorological office whose forecasting system is 
broken and whose best solution is the sale of umbrellas, raincoats, suncreams and sunglasses. 
This raises plenty of money, but never tells you what tomorrow’s weather will be. 
  
 Already in 1995 Marcel Boiteux had seen the basic features of the neoliberal 
revolution that was happening. “If the entrepeneur were alone in having to face uncertainty”, 
he wrote, “he would have to resolve this. But, in contrast to the first category of risks, those of 
his own trade, the second category concerns other economic players as well. It is a lamentable 
waste that every individual should have to organize their own solutions in isolation. It is, 
obviously, much better that, with a healthy division of labour, these problems are dealt with 
by specialists, from whom non-specialists buy guarantees”210. And he adds, “In this regard, 
the globalization of financial markets and the proliferation of derivatives can only have a 
positive effect: everyone will be able to find, almost made-to-measure, the ‘product’ that they 
need to hedge against the risk that they want to avoid”211. Thus, in principle, there is less 
waste, more specialized skill, and a healthy division of labour. In practice, however, what we 
observe is quite different. The first category of risks, those locally manageable, shrink to 
nothing, with the markets controlling everything, and in the most complete obscurity because 
of their permanent and excessive self-referencing. The ‘specialists’ do not see what is 
happening on the ground, the quality of projects or people, because they are just looking at 
their computer screens trying to set mathematical traps for the market. 
 Like many economists today, Marcel Boiteux believes that the only problems arise 
from global speculation which he sees in neo-classical terms like the 19th century mechanical 
analogy “But we can ask if it wouldn’t be desirable, and possible, to give a little viscosity to 
the movement of capital – or derivatives – which now controls monetary policy: in the 
differential equation of motion, we need to strengthen the first degree term, the damping 
term.” It is absolutely necessary to abandon this misleading analogy. With respect to time, 
market prices are not governed by a differential equation; it is not simply the suspension on a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ils conditionnent fortement les prix à la fois au niveau des marchés fi nanciers et du commerce extérieur (ainsi 
qu’au niveau local). En raison des mécanismes des marchés fi nanciers, ce taux est des plus instables, alors que 
les conséquences de cette instabilité, en tant que signaux de prix pour l’économie « réelle », sont loin d’être 
positives, même si l’on pouvait, in fine, élaborer une couverture à court terme .”) M. Marcó del Pont (Argentine 
Central Bank) “Déséquilibres mondiaux et pays en développement” Revue de Stabilité Financière fév. 2011. 
210 “Si le chef d'entreprise était seul à devoir affronter les incertitudes, écrit-il, il faudrait bien qu'il s'y résolve. 
Mais, par opposition aux risques de première catégorie, ceux qui sont de son métier, la deuxième catégorie 
concerne bien d'autres agents économiques : ce serait un gaspillage regrettable que chacun doive s'organiser pour 
y faire face isolément. Il est, à l'évidence, bien préférable que, grâce à une saine division du travail, ces risques 
soient assumés par des spécialistes, à qui les non-spécialistes achèteront des garanties”, M. Boiteux, “Les 
marchés financiers pour le chef d'entreprise et le chef de gouvernement” in Risques et enjeux des marchés 
dérivés, Réflexions internationales, Actes du colloque, B. Jacquillat et J.-M. Lasry eds, PUF 1995.	  211“A cet égard, la globalisation des marchés financiers et le pullulement des produits dérivés qu'on y traite ne 
peuvent avoir qu'un effet bénéfique : chacun sera en mesure d'y trouver, quasiment sur mesure, le 'produit' qu'il 
cherche pour se couvrir contre le risque qu'il ne veut pas assumer”	  	  
car with shock-absorbers. No, markets are not governed by any explicit equation. The only 
thing that is definitely confirmed practically and theoretically is that they resemble solutions 
of stochastic differential equations, which is totally different. 
 As to the question of seeing if one could apply some damping to them, this is 
complicated. I take the view that such “calming” is necessary for the next ten years, given the 
imperatives of environmental emergency. But in the long term more innovative ideas will be 
needed. 
 
Should there be a tax on financial transactions, and if so, what type? 
 There is a kind of balance between the pure market logic which prevails when 
volatility is large, and the logic of economic policy – the fundamentals – which is visible, to 
some extent, when the volatility is small. A tax on financial transactions raises four sorts of 
questions which we could categorize as follows: 
 a) if it is applied by a country or group of countries, the globalization of financial 
markets means that these countries will be penalized and the tax can be avoided. 
 b) what institution should collect the tax and what will it do with these revenues? 
 c) what is the economic basis for a tax to “calm” financial markets? 
d) is it possible to organize this tax so that is does not “kill” the management of 
options that are used as insurance for companies? 
The first question is classical and applies to any financial regulation that goes beyond the 
incentive level of “prudent recommendations”. The second is related to this, and if we look at 
what has happened about greenhouse gas emissions, it is not unreasonable to think that such 
an institution could be at the European level to begin with212. The last question is important 
from the reformist point of view so that we do not add technical obstacles or 
misunderstandings to the already numerous difficulties that there will be in implementing 
such a wise cure. 
 The third question, the key one, is thus to establish whether it is possible for the tax to 
be economically virtuous? The economic value of a transaction tax has often been 
discussed213. In general the reasoning is based on constructing a model for financial markets 
and studying the changes that the tax brings to their operation. The conclusions depend on the 
nature of the incompleteness considered. Often the tax does not reduce volatility. Sometimes 
it even increases it214. It appears, however, that these arguments do not take into account the 
fact that changing the prices will lead agents to seek information from other sources than the 
market, and thus the tax reduces the self-reference in the market.  
 We use the term volatility in the sense of instantaneous agitation of a path (local 
quadratic variation to adopt a semi-martingale model). This quantity varies in the same 
direction as the uncertainty that rules on the asset side. We know from a brief mean-variance 
analysis that situations of high uncertainty can yield more and that financial markets are very 
strongly self-referential which is one of the causes of global instabilities215. Arguments based 
on the no-arbitrage principle are very convincing in terms of the actions of an individual agent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 On these two questions and the recent history of these debates, see Damette O., “Quel avenir pour une taxe 
Tobin ?” Mondes en Développement Vol.35-2007/4-n°140.	  
213 Cf for example Uppal R., “A Short Note on the Tobin Tax: The Costs and Benefits of a Tax on Financial 
Transactions” EDHEC Risk Institute July 2011, and its bibliography.	  
214 Lanne M., Vesala T.,”The eﬀect of a transaction tax on exchange rate volatility” Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 11/2006.	  
215 Information is lost by self-reference. One would rather be afraid than verify one’s sources. Hence the 
celebrated slogan “buy the rumour, sell the fact ” which is a principle of speculation based on the efficacy of 
rumours. These behaviours were already noted by Keynes.	  
in an existing market, but they do not tell us how the market itself obtains relevant economic 
information. 
 If an economic agent wishes to make an investment involving shares of listed 
companies and currencies, there are two ways. On the one hand, he can trust exclusively in 
the market which, thanks to the listed prices for shares, currencies, raw materials and futures 
products related to these, gives him apparently all the information about the uncertainties 
involved. On the other, he can spend a set amount of money on enquiring for himself about 
the profitability of the business he intends to get involved in. This second method is the “old 
economic logic”216 that was the main approach prior to the 1970s. It involved the use of 
experts to study the projects and engineers to assess the chances of success for the business 
innovations. This method is more expensive than the first, which is free. But it does not 
produce the information in the same way. The two ways become even more different when 
the volatility is large. 
 Hence the idea of taxing in proportion to volatility. Certainly if we tax transactions 
made in volatile markets, this will not change the uncertainties involved in these markets, and 
will not reduce the volatility of these markets. But it changes the situation for the investor 
between the use of the market for information, and the use of his own information. To run a 
business using only the market tools will become costly because of the tax, so encouraging 
people to find better quality information themselves or from competent providers. 
 Why would this be of better quality? Because it can take into account factors that the 
market cannot, for example the relevant links between the investor and the geographic region 
or the category of goods involved in the project. And, ultimately, the quality of the people in 
charge given the information received. In summary then, to tax volatility is to encourage the 
players to develop better economic information taking into account all relevant points of 
view. 
 To see how we can tax volatility, we must address the fourth question of the 
incompatibility of a tax, however small, with delta-neutral insurance options. The problem 
can be described in the following way: delta-neutral management requires a great number of 
transactions whose algebraic sum is small but the sum of whose absolute values may be large, 
potentially infinite. Currently the art is to optimize the number of transactions as a function of 
the costs induced by the market itself, i.e., what is called the bid-ask. 
 One possible approach for the tax is to tax only the absolute value of the algebraic 
balance of transactions by one agent on one asset, on a weekly or monthly basis. One should 
also make the tax proportional to the square of the volatility for technical reasons that I will 
not go into here. 
 The above argument, that the tax will encourage a better allocation of financial 
resources, will only be visible in the long term. At the start there will definitely be a penalty 
on the affected financial markets. But if this penalty is of an order of magnitude far below the 
fluctuations of activities of financial markets over time, the tax will not lead to as large a leak 
as some people think. The means of implementing the tax raise legal problems as to whether 
the tax is levied only on organized markets, and whether or not the site of the transaction and 
the identities of the agents are taken into account. 
 In this respect, the European directive MIF 2004/39/CE, which was clearly aimed at 
liberalizing the financial platforms in Europe, is under review. In the eyes of the Commission 
“The result after 3.5 years in force is more competition between venues in the trading of 
financial instruments, and more choice for investors in terms of service providers and 
available financial instruments, progress which has been compounded by technological 
advances. Overall, transaction costs have decreased and integration has increased”.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Cf. N.Bouleau Mathématiques et risques financiers O. Jacob 2009, chapitre V.	  
 Obviously, the fact that the reduction of transaction costs increases the self-reference 
of the market and relaxes its economic relevance has not been taken into account. There is 
reason to believe that the importance of this question has still not been appreciated by the 
advisors of the relevant Directorates General. The Commission is obliged to recognize, 
however, that new problems have arisen which justify changing the MIF directive (cf. 
COM(2011) 656 final). In fact, internet platforms have been developed which function as 
organized markets on which marketing strategies (similar to those used by telephone 
operators) further blur the nature of the information provided by the market. Thus the 
proposed amendment imposes “the mandatory trading of derivatives on organized venues, 
specific supervisory actions regarding financial instruments and positions in derivatives and 
the provision of services by third-country firms without a branch”. 
 It is clear that it would help if the tax were installed throughout the Eurozone, because 
the transaction costs and increased uncertainty of a detour to another currency would 
discourage circumventions of the tax. However, London is the principal place where Euro 
assets are exchanged, so the decision would require a greater European agreement. It seems 
then that the legal changes would have to be done at the level of the European institutions. 
 The introduction of such a tax in Europe, even a very small one, even if the revenue 
gained is of far smaller order than our sovereign debts, would have considerable institutional 
consequences.  It would mean, effectively, that the Commission services have overcome the 
difficulties in the outline of the tax and its integration into European and international law. 
This simple fact carries a huge symbolic value, namely that Europe is politically capable of 
standing up to the spontaneous global financial order. She would then recover a credibility 
with the popular classes and those political parties (the Greens, and a good part of the left) 
that believe that international finance is running the planet badly. This issue seems to be 
motivation enough to go deeper into the technicalities of setting up the tax. 	  
7. Creating debt markets: delegating economic intelligence to agencies 
We now turn to the most recent innovation of the financial markets, the most extreme phase 
to date of the development of the market ideology. It is much more audacious than previous 
ones, and requires a special analysis. 
 Until the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, credit functioned as a market in the 
traditional sense of the word, i.e., as agreements between borrowers and creditors in specific 
arrangements of projects and contracts conditioned by explanations and understandings in 
different contexts. 
 Was there a credit market? Yes, in the same sense that there is a labour market or a 
housing market: an exchange market like those the neoclassicists have tried to symbolize. 
 But the financial revolution won the credit field at the end of the 1990s. We could call 
this the third level of financialization. As we will explain in terms of political and decision-
making power, it is the major step of neoliberalism, and has severe problems similar to those 
of the teeth of the market. 
 We will see that this market functions with truncated knowledge and in the presence 
of a conflict of interpretation under uncertainty: some have an interest in saying that things 
are going badly, which reduces the value of the debt, while others have an interest in making 
people believe that everything is working well. What has happened to the governments in 
Europe – namely that certain states that have higher rate of public deficit than of growth have 
had deflationary policies imposed on them, leading to recession – applies also to other cases 
of credit. The system cannot function properly. 
 What is new compared to other markets (currency, commodities) is that the conflict of 
interpretation, and the fact that the market has only truncated knowledge, requires the 
presence of third-party agencies to say “the truth”. The market does not automatically provide 
a price; it is these agencies that “understand” all that the market does not. 
 But these agencies are not global political governments elected according to policy 
programmes that detail their plans. They do not know the “things-in-themselves” of the 
economy, nor about the “desires” of humans. 
 In particular, they do not see the desire to save the planet.  
 Why does this market need such agencies where, say, the oil market doesn’t? It is 
because of this truncated information. On the credit market one does not buy a quantity (of 
currency, stocks, or oil), one buys an indicator of quantity: a random variable that represents a 
lifetime of activity. 
 The hope is to mediate the contradictions of the market by the wisdom of the rating 
agencies. But these agences are part of the system. The people in them are paid, they are part 
of society, their viewpoint is biased. 
  
The third level of financialization 
As we saw in the first chapter, the financial markets flourished rapidly in the 1980s 
throughout the world, and with strong connections between all the financial markets, from 
Chicago and New York to Hong-Kong, Singapore and Tokyo, thanks to computer networks. 
The match that lit these fireworks was the article by Black and Scholes, in 1973, where the 
idea of covering an option by an auxiliary portfolio (a so-called delta-neutral hedge) first 
appeared, and, behind this, the Theory of arbitrage, due to a stream of authors, including 
Robert Merton217.  
 This theory allowed one to extend, over very diverse situations, a new way to put a 
price on quantities that depend on the future randomness in the market. The price given by 	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this theory is such that neither buyer nor seller can make a profit without risk. The theory of 
arbitrage provides a unique and accurate price in the case where the market is “complete”. 
This is a mathematical property, dependent on the model used to represent the market, which 
is never perfectly achieved in practice, but is considered to be a good approximation in the 
case of options for currency or stocks. 
 The assessment of this very clever and subtle stuff in the late 20th century was that it 
was “genius”. It allowed one to market options – which served as an insurance policy for 
businesses against the uncertainties of the markets – at costs much lower than before. It 
squeezed as much as possible out of risk-management and allowed the generalization of 
commodity futures, also called derivative products, to all listed assets. Hence the spectacular 
development of the financial markets in the late twentieth century. 
 Staff with good mathematical training, including stochastic calculus, were hired in the 
trading rooms – and called quants – and in conjunction with traders they perfected the whole 
theoretical and practical machinery as much as they could. After currency and stock options, 
they applied their ideas to the bond markets, i.e., to interest rates and interest rate options. 
This is a much more difficult area, but the logic of the arbitrage theory is – in the world of 
finance – so exciting that it has been stretched to its full potential. 
 Towards the end of the 1990s and at the start of the 2000s, the whole universe of 
financial economics was impregnated by the theory of arbitrage. Everything except credit. 
This was the ultimate step: whatever the cost, the crowning glory of the theory of arbitrage 
had to be attained – the organization of a global credit market, where one could buy and sell 
loan files, or hybrid packages comprised of credits and commodity futures. Thus financial 
institutions could diversify their files and not put all their eggs in one basket. Everyone would 
benefit. Consolidating various debts and other futures contracts in packages to be exchanged 
on the market is called securitization. This packaging has become an art where probabilistic 
calculations of risk are the new music. 
  But it was harder than it seemed. I mention this here, because we will see that the 
result of this new organization of debts for sale with the new derivatives products designed to 
encourage securitization had, as a corollary, to function with very poor information about real 
economic relations.  Like the teeth of the market due to volatility, the debt market prevents us 
from seeing certain things that are fundamental for the motivations and plans of the actors in 
the economy. 
 Today, credit is organized in a global market. Banks lending to individuals and 
businesses can lend more than they hold as equity so long as they hold more than 8% of the 
risks they undertake218. Note that this system, money multiplier for banks, private loans to 
countries, credit managed solely by the risk of default, a system which is a kind of private 
Keynesian multiplier, constantly replenished, is incompatible with decrease. This is seen very 
clearly when interest rates are above growth rates, such as in the Greece or other countries 
with low or negative growth. They then enter the absurdity of economic paralysis. This 
phenomenon is characteristic of Europe, but holds generally for the credit economy itself. 
 These packages, skilfully put together, are “rated” by “independent” rating agencies, 
of which the most important are Standard and Poor, Moody’s and Fitch Ratings (the “big 
three”). These ratings are used as the basis for probabilistic calculations that estimate the risk 
as a function of the duration and term of the loans and therefore have a benchmarking role in 
fixing the prices on the market for securitized assets. 
 Like the “classic” markets in commodities, stocks, currencies and bonds, the debt 
market was completed towards the end of the 1990s by a whole set of derivative products that 	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are themselves bought and sold on the market. Among these, Credit Default Swaps (CDS) are 
the most widely used, and represent more than half of the market. Other common tools are 
Credit-Linked Notes (CLN), Total Return Swaps (TRS), Credit Spread Options (CSO), and 
structured products based on previous derivatives, such as Collateralized Debt Obligations 
(CDO). The principle of CDS, for example, is as follows: an establishment seeking to get rid 
of credit risk buys protection in the form of a periodic premium from another institution, 
acting as an insurer, which agrees to compensate the first in the event of a default or other 
event affecting the holder of the CDS.  
In these sophisticated tools, there are exchanges, groups of securities (synthetic 
CDOs), distributions following deadlines, etc. But at heart there are just two activities: the 
qualitative estimates that constitute ratings, and the probabilistic calculations that underlie the 
prices that are formed. 
  
 Having established these details, our aim is to consider the way that capitalism has 
ruled our world since the start of the neoliberal period. Two levels of analysis are possible, 
both equally important. 
 The first level is that of the philosophy of knowledge, which considers the 
epistemological limits of the economic valuation of risks. Fundamentally this is about 
whether we can believe that capitalism is capable of managing the risks that global 
developments cause in the economy by the simple process of a global risk market organized 
as we have outlined. The delicate point of this case is that the economy applies to reality – 
geography, civilization, etc. – and not just to computers on traders’ desks. What is it that this 
immense financial machinery ultimately produces? Prices. These numbers are the final 
summary determining economic decisions in the face of uncertainty. It is not because this 
mathematization seems essential to the functioning of the markets that it is philosophically 
justified and acceptable, especially if one thinks of the future and of future generations. 
The second level concerns the very nature of the economic object that is a debt, where, 
as we will see, the business of securitization applies with limited, truncated information, with 
which one cannot see the important things that are happening. The same defect as that caused 
by the volatility in stocks on organized markets can be seen here. Here it is not caused by 
volatility but because the focus is on just one economic parameter. Everything happens as if 
one believed that one could fly a plane just by looking at its shadow on the ground. 
We will consider these two levels in turn. 
 
The epistemological limits to the economic valuation of risks  
Following the alert raised by Ulrich Beck, there has been many discussion about risks and it 
has often been noted that economic calculus was an imperfect tool, inappropriate even, 
particularly because it suppresses the long-term effects under any exponential discounting and 
correspondingly overemphasizes the present interest, a catastrophe far in the future 
“weighing” the same as a minor discomfort in the present. (Note here that the concept of 
discount rate has, in fact, because of neoliberalism, lost of a lot of relevance. It was a concept 
that claimed to be very useful for accurate calculations of public investment in the time of the 
sovereign state. But today it is the financial markets that set rates. The term structure of rates 
is fixed by the bond market and is imposed on states insofar as they have to borrow on the 
markets219. This is even stricter in Europe where neither governments nor the ECB can create 
money except by express decision. “Lowering the discount rate” is a funny expression! 
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Lowering for whom? Who will pay the difference between this and the market rate? For what 
purpose? Who will decide?) 
 We need to go further with the analysis to be able to understand how the environment 
is damaged; the concept of risk needs to be studied in all its aspects, historic, cognitive and, of 
course, in society’s understanding of it. 
 Measuring risks is not a trivial operation. Among the damages that society can incur, 
let’s consider the case of a flood. Already the description of such an event is not a simple 
thing: a flood is a phenomenon that happens in time and in space. Two floods on the same 
river are never identical; some will last a long time while others are brief, some will cover a 
large area while others move the banks of the river, and the economic value of the affected 
area depends to a degree on the changes in urbanization over the years. To “economize” this 
type of risk would require making estimates of the value of things that have been destroyed 
(habitat, factories, machinery, lands) but which were not for sale on any market and whose 
valuations are necessarily somewhat subjective because they are linked to a knowledge of 
what has happened to them. 
 When making comparisons between different floods by deducing things from laws of 
probabilities, using time series models, it would be a lie to say that there is only one way to do 
this, the truly scientific method. No, even with regard to the current of the river, according to 
whether one used statistics on the water level, or statistics on the flow, one would obtain 
different and incompatible results which could not give the same probabilities for the extreme 
values that constitute floods220. Anything that requires understanding is subject to a great 
variety of interpretations, and this is absolutely normal. 
 The probabilistic representation of risk is a pair of mathematical quantities: 1) a 
probability law that governs the states that can occur, 2) a random variable, i.e., a function 
which assigns a cost, profit or loss, to each state. This representation is much too elementary 
for considering risks. One is almost never in a situation where this model is adequately 
informed. One does not know the probabilities of rare events for which there is insufficient 
data. One does not know what correlations to take to evaluate the damages. And one never 
has a complete description of what can happen. 
 Mathematical techniques give the illusion of rationalization, especially in the financial 
world. The development of stochastic calculus after the second world war, by the school of 
Kyosi Itô (1915-2008), provided a mathematical language where the no-arbitrage principle is 
expressed in broad assumptions. Whence the processes of pricing and hedging options come 
from partial differential equations. Mathematization then invaded securitization and risk 
measures. Again, a mathematical innovation needs to be mentioned. To estimate the risk of a 
portfolio of random assets, the classical “value at risk” (VaR) method (cf. Chapter I-1) has 
been replaced by the more scholarly notion of “coherent risk measure”. These new methods 
spread quickly. They enabled calculations on complex portfolios provided we assume that we 
know the probabilities of rare events, i.e., the tails of the laws that have a significant influence 
on the results. These, then, are the processes which, when one runs out of information, replace 
this ignorance with a probability law to continue the calculations.  
It has often been pointed out in the commentaries on the crisis that the new products in 
these markets, CDOs and particularly CDSs, did not encourage players to be cautious. This is 
true, but the most important fact is that people were tricked into thinking that the risk of a 
portfolio was “in” the portfolio itself. The risk is interpretative by nature, and it turns out that 
the local interpretation (rating of portfolios by criteria grids) is inconsistent with a global 
interpretation, in the same way, for example, that a Kandinsky painting like Yellow – red – 
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blue can be seen as an abstract with no meaning beyond the splashes of colour, or as an 
allegory where a whole story is told221. 
Quantifying risks is not a trivial operation because it flattens reality into one single 
interpretation. Not only does everything outside the world of markets disappear, but also the 
economy itself is flattened, reduced to a summary meter-reading. 
It is clear that the interpretative field is by nature plural and complex, and that collective 
decisions necessarily result from a political process. To mathematize a situation where 
uncertainty arises is to considerably simplify the situation, and opens the door to methods of 
“rational choice”, i.e., stochastic optimization. But does one gain anything by doing this? 
Yes, if one believes that they key is to bring reality to monetization as much as possible, 
and one is not concerned by the fact that the projection of the multidimensional space of 
meaning onto the quantitatively valuable, i.e., onto a linear yardstick, can be done in various 
ways. 
This mutilation of reality plays tricks on economic practice itself, as evidenced by the 
various crises. Obviously this reduction has extreme consequences for the environment 
because it establishes a relation of equivalence. A process, a raw material, a plant, a bacteria – 
ultimately a person, or society – is ultimately replaceable by an artificial device that is 
deemed to be “economically” equivalent. This phenomenon, already familiar in the context of 
labour and mechanization, takes on a vertiginous dimension when one thinks of biodiversity, 
where no real repairs are possible, or of the exploitation of natural resources or, more 
generally, of the inability to take account of the general interest in a situation with conflicting 
economic interests. One always ends up playing a game of “Red light, green light”222. 
This equivalence relation that is monetization evidently allows a considerable array of 
economic activity, since it facilitates all kinds of exchanges of goods and services. It is the 
reason behind the obsession with the use of cost-benefit analyses for decision-making, 
without seeing that the method itself makes a decision. A decision that is very particular and 
characteristic223. It is neither magical nor surprising, given that one has erased part of reality, 
that the solution this process gives does not satisfy all the conditions that pertain in reality. 
 
What is lost by putting debts on a market 
Now we move on to the second level. Uncertainty is everywhere in finance, but in the case of 
lending it is difficult to quantify risks because that requires understanding of the activities of 
the borrower and their context. For a long time it has been realized that this involved an 
unusual sort of evaluation which assumed that a level of credibility was assigned to the 
information provided by the counterparty and that one would be able to understand their 
plans. Thus there was often a moral, or even religious, dimension to such operations.  
 The loan is not an exchange but is a long-term relationship between the lender and the 
borrower. Under the ancien régime in France, corporal punishment and prison punished 
insolvent debtors. This rule remained mostly just a threat but was applied in a fairly random 
fashion. Pawnbroking, the usual realm of the usure, was tolerated with rates exceeding 20%.  
 In Max Weber’s famous interpretation of the birth of capitalism he recounts the 
following quote from an American: “Sir, for my part everybody may believe or not believe as 
he pleases; but if I saw a farmer or a businessman not belonging to any church at all, I 
wouldn't trust him with fifty cents. Why pay me, if he doesn't believe in anything?”224. There 
is a relationship of trust in the loan that the lender seeks to objectify but which remains 
fundamentally at the level of meaning, of understanding and of empathy.  	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 The important development is the change of banking which coincided with the Reagan-
Thatcher era of neo-liberalism. Before this, the banks lent and called upon the skills of their 
own experts whose function in this environment was to understand the processes and the 
techniques of those businesses applying for loans and assess their relevance and potential. But 
at that time a new logic was born which was based not on such understanding, but on the no-
arbitrage principle of the financial markets themselves225. For options on equities and 
currencies, this has put in place the teeth of the market that we discussed in the previous 
chapter. The extension of this idea to credit was a serious mistake for a different reason. 
 The creation of such a market seemed a good idea to everyone because it allowed each 
lending institution to diversify their portfolios by buying packages that were geographically 
and economically remote and selling a portion of its own to reduce the correlations. However, 
the subprime crisis, closely linked to these practices, no longer looks like a passing storm but 
rather the transition to an unstable and problematic regime. A number of recent phenomena, 
leading to real paradoxes, mean that one should question whether or not these good ideas 
were perhaps adopted a little too quickly by neoliberal economists driven by the fervour of 
young mathematical traders. Let’s look at these things in more detail. 
 The credit market was historically born of public debts, bonds. At its heart was the 
possibility of disposing of a debt, for reasons particular to the lender, who might want, for 
example, to obtain a divisible evaluation, in the case of matters of inheritance or legacy226. 
The existence of a credit market allowed a long-term loan to operate with successive 
creditors. This question is very important for financing the preservation of the environment, 
but as the remarkable Dexia affair shows, the current functioning of the financial debt markets 
do not allow claims handovers in good conditions between short-term loans and long-term 
loans227.  
 When the lender sells the debt on the market a variety of situations can occur according 
to the nature of the loan. In the simplest case where the loan is granted with a fixed interest 
rate, upon resale, because there is always a risk of default – even for public debts as one sees 
in the news – the value of the loan reflects this risk through a lower value. 
 This way of managing the default risk has the consequence that the capital to be repaid 
by the borrower is reduced accordingly, for the simple reason that the borrower may redeem 
the debt at this price, or buy it from a third party who has purchased it at this price. So this 
means that the lender has “taken his loss” (which is what the creditor banks accepted for the 
Greek debt, on October 27th 2011: to exchange Greek bonds that they held against new 
securities whose value was reduced by 25%). One immediately hits legal and/or political 
issues about any information that makes it more likely that the borrower will default, since the 
borrower has an interest, ultimately, in making people believe in his difficulties so as to be 
able to redeem the debt at a good price, or redeem it by an ally, at least as regards the 
management of that debt, because doing so will damage his reputation as a good borrower in 
future. Specialists therefore use two notions: the default risk, which concerns the probability 
law of a total or partial inability to repay and the credit risk, which measures the reputation of 
the bad debtor. 
 Consider the case of an entrepeneur about to embark on a project, which obviously 
presents some uncertainties, who requests a bank loan for it. Various outcomes may arise 
from the project, with varying returns, and certain circumstances may prevent the borrower 	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227 Dexia was born of the alliance between Crédit communal de Belgique and Crédit local de France, the 
successor to CAECL (Caisse d'aide à l'équipement des collectivités locales). The financial crisis had serious 
repercussions for this establishment as well as for local borrowing collectives 
from repaying the loan.  
 Currently, to enter the credit market, the project will first be classified by risk matrices. 
If the risk is high the entrepeneur will only be offered high-interest loans. The chosen bank 
will, in any case, renegotiate the loan by securitizing the file on the markets. The loan 
agreement is made by conflating into one notion the interest rate, the quality of the project 
and the default and credit risks. This conflation has several consequences. 
 It is an initial estimate of the default risk that will most often determine the interest rate 
of the loan, rather than an understanding of the viability of the project, because the 
entrepeneur has access to a credit market where the correlation between default risk and loan 
rate is very strong228. 
 The relevance of the project is thus not properly taken into account. It may even happen 
that a highly profitable project is offered loans at the same average rate as an uneconomical 
project from a different entrepeneur: the work of understanding the profitability of an 
investment is poorly rewarded. 
 Put another way: investors cannot, by means of a loan, take advantage of a very 
profitable project with low default risk, because an entrepeneur in such a situation will easily 
obtain cheaper loans. This phenomenon is even more pronounced when the overall growth 
rate is low, which explains why it arises as a paradox now. 
 On the other hand, a project whose default risk appears high, will only obtain loans at a 
higher rate, not matter how profitable the project is. When the project isn’t very profitable, the 
loan agreement is formed in the face of a self-fulfilling presumption of risk: the loan is agreed 
on the basis of an estimate of the default risk, but the interest rate specified in the agreement 
will itself significantly increase the risk of default. This is characteristic of the situation 
Greece and other European countries currently find themselves in. 
 Added to this is another difficulty, also caused by this conflation process: the default 
risk is estimated beforehand, but becomes more accurately known after the loan is agreed. If it 
increases, the bank will think that the loan is not sufficiently remunerated (the current position 
of banks holding bonds from European countries), but if the bank tries to sell this loan on the 
credit market, it will realize that the loss is made and that the rate corresponds, roughly, to the 
market value of the debt, given the new risk. Therefore the bank will prefer to keep the loan, 
and argue politically for exceptional procedures that reduce the default risk of the borrower 
(by putting pressure on the borrower so that he changes the configuration of probabilities that 
apply to him, from the viewpoint of the lender, if these pressures are effective, then the 
management of the project itself will be changed and its profitability can be severely 
affected229, cf. Greece, Italy, Spain… and the action of the banks towards European leaders). 
The banker can also buy CDS etc. 
 To this muddle is added the virtual impossibility in the securitized debt market of taking 
account of the correlations between files on both the profitability of these projects and their 
defaults. One is never protected from the propagation of interpretations triggered by the 
shocks of new information or rumours. 
 We have lost out by putting debts on a market. Creditors are encouraged to no longer 
involve themselves in understanding the entrepeneurs’ projects and a trade has been organized 
to function with limited information, thus hampering economic incentives.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 A usurer never sets the interest rate solely on the basis that the loan is likely to be repaid. The lender is not so 
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When faced with contradictions, consult an oracle 
For securitization to work, the portfolios exchanged must be assessed by agencies and 
services attached to every institution to estimate the default risk and the impact that the cost 
of the loan will have on this. But is it appropriate to consult a third party? The intentions of 
the borrower are known only to himself and he is not inclined to reveal the risks he will take. 
Whichever way one looks at credit, the default risk is caused by the borrower, but the way 
that the cost of this risk is shared, between the borrower and the backer, is poorly managed by 
the market. 
 The wise approach is to predict in advance what the two parties will do in various 
scenarios and look for a balanced agreement that can be reviewed stage by stage: If the 
project works well, for which there must be clearly agreed criteria and weighted indicators, 
then the lender must profit. If the project goes badly, then guarantees must be provided about 
the equipment acquired, land, property … We thus come back to the idea that the lender is 
involved in the project as is the case with corporate sponsorship. To keep open the possibility 
of loans changing hands over a long term, this suggests a transfer of genuine responsibility in 
OTC transactions supported by detailed contracts. 
 The key epistemological point is that the risk is interpretative in nature, which means 
that understanding it requires a level of engagement and involvement, which the 
standardization of the markets cannot provide, and of which the key is the contract. As 
Armand Hatchuel rightly emphasized, it is a humanely responsible management that 
generates wealth230. 
 What has been erased by the market? The particular details of the clauses in the notional 
contract between borrower and backer. They may provide timelines and partial criteria for 
success or failure, where the reciprocal commitments are reviewed. Such clauses can take 
account of social phenomena or exterior environments. An economy of contracts is an 
economy without anonymity. The interchangeability of creditors that the market organizes 
translates into a lack of co-responsibility between borrower and lender. This is a key issue for 
management of uncertainty and of the future. The financial markets have created 
irresponsibility. 
 Credit is just one example. There are numerous cases where the economy protects 
anonymous individualism. This leads to the idea that the contract should return to the centre 
of the economy, an idea that occurred to Michel Serres who proposed extending this to 
nature: “Back to nature, then! That means we must add to the exclusively social contract a 
natural contract of symbiosis and reciprocity in which our relationship to things would set 
aside mastery and possession in favour of admiring attention, reciprocity, contemplation, and 
respect; where knowledge would no longer imply property, nor action mastery, nor would 
property and mastery imply their excremental results and origins. An armistice contract in the 
objective war, a contract of symbiosis, for a symbiont recognizes the host's rights, whereas a 
parasite—which is what we are now—condemns to death the one he pillages and inhabits, not 
realizing that in the long run he's condemning himself to death too.”231 
 Agencies now play the role that in ancient times was played by the Oracle of Delphi, 
whose priests wrote subtle interpretations of what Pythia said while in a trance, to answer 
questions that Generals had before engaging in battles. The Oracle of Delphi had a 
Panhellenic reputation giving it a genuine role in international politics. Of the countless 
answers given by the Oracle, only 615 have been preserved, thanks to ancient authors or 
inscriptions, often in verse, and cleverly written232. The Oracle of Delphi had the same 
tendency towards social conformity, and the same links with power, more or less 	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unconscious, that ratings agencies have today. Cicero wrote in De Divinatione “By the way, 
Demosthenes, who lived nearly three hundred years ago, used to say even then that the 
Pythian priestess 'philippized,' in other words, that she was Philip's ally. By this expression he 
meant to infer that she had been bribed by Philip. Hence we may conclude that in other 
instances the Delphic oracles were not entirely free of guile”233. 
 The power of market governance over the world is quite obvious since it now treats 
nations as businesses, and businesses of average or smaller size. For sovereign debts the sums 
involved are so large that the markets become de facto the principal features in the decision 
landscape for organizations like the IMF. Insurance rates, i.e. CDS, such as one can see on the 
derivatives markets, reflect the views of stakeholders about the financial credit risk (default 
risk + credit risk) for loans made to states. In its diagnosis of the overall stability, the IMF 
uses CDS. In doing so, instead of confining itself to the work of evaluating the real situation 
like a research and study organization, which would enable it to influence the markets, it 
amplifies the viewpoint of the CDS providers who are stakeholders in the conflict of 
interpretations. 
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Figures taken from the IMF report  Global Financial Stability Report, The Quest for Lasting Stability 2012. 
 
Two shortcomings of economic logic 
The confusion and inadequacy in the way risks are treated are not unique to the credit market. 
There are two major shortcomings of liberal economic logic that neo-liberalism highlights. 
The first, particularly clear in the case of credit, is that markets take little account of 
meanings. That which gives meaning to the things we speak of, and makes them 
understandable to people, and can provide motives, this domain has always scared rationalists 
and has always been minimized by positivists, yet this is where all the essence of life is to be 
found. The second is that markets are bad at showing trends in prices. This is absolutely 
certain for financial markets, but the phenomenon is more general and has serious 
consequences throughout the economy and its relation with everything else. We will go 
further into these two shortcomings, which can actually be seen as two sides of the same coin. 
 
The fact that the markets take little account of meanings is fundamentally due to the naive 
belief that we can “weigh” the risks just as we might weigh gold. This is the counterpart of 
the fact that “the market” is the name given to an algorithm. Thus according to the teaching of 
all economics professors, the market seems to fulfil a task, as long as certain competition 
conditions hold, which is to calculate some sort of balance, between the desires of the seller 
and those of the buyer, which the neo-classicists called equilibrium. In doing so it starts from 
a social situation, necessarily complex, and extracts a number which – if there is only one 
currency – projects onto one single linear scale all the infinite-dimensional breadth of the 
world and its ideas. To buy one thing or another is not the same; the players have a past and a 
future. To sell to someone rich or someone poor does not justify the same price (Jules 
Dupuit). A car manufacturer works with subcontractors with whom a long-term relationship is 
forged. The choices are interdependent. To buy this and that is not the same thing as buying 
this and something else; economic agents have their plans. One number can never take 
complete account of a situation that concerns me and of which I only partially know the 
conditions and outlines. 
 This is the reason why some have dreamt of a globalization that is not financial: 
“Globalism reduces the new complexity of globality and globalization to a single (economic) 
dimension”, writes Ulrich Beck, “which is itself conceived in linear fashion as a constant 
expansion of dependence of the world market. All other dimensions (ecological globalization, 
cultural globalization, political polycentrism, the emergence of transnational spaces and 
identities) are treated, if at all, only with the assumption of the dominance of economic 
globalization. World society is thus truncated and falsified as world-market society. In this 
sense neoliberal globalism is a form of one-dimensional thinking and acting, a monocausal, 
economistic view of the world”234. 
 The key philosophical point is this constraint and this tension that the economy create 
by obliging everyone to base their decisions on one sole measure, a constraint that is gentle 
but firm. In the famous words of Jean-Pierre Dupuy, the economy contains	  violence, in both 
senses of the word “contains”. To oblige people to proceed to such a one-dimensional 
projection is not simple, it is the result of ongoing work by economists and the ruling classes 
to promote a political organization that promotes and facilitates this reduction. We see this to 
the point of caricature in Europe in the services of the Commission. I must admit here a 
personal response. As a mathematician, accustomed to handling large dimensional spaces or 
the famous infinite-dimensional function spaces, whose points are functions (Hilbert space 
and Banach spaces), that are so fruitful in so many problems, I constantly face the issue that 
these tools, despite their immense richness, remain an insufficient language for addressing the 
complexity of reality that is fleeting and of which we do not grasp, in physics or in 
applications, more than a few special cases. Why then impose on society such an 
impoverished way of thinking? This is a mutilation which, moreover, works very badly, 
causes enormous suffering, and does not remotely solve all the collective problems. For 
example, society can well work with a dozen currencies, each one related to a different 
register of activity and interconnected among themselves according to modifiable political 
procedures235... The heart of the matter is that this system of thought is conformative as we 
will explain in a few pages.  	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 Uncertain situations are often open to several different interpretations, each of which 
propagates in an ensemble logically consistent with its own possibilities. We see that the trait 
of pragmatist philosophers (Peirce, Dewey, William James) of bringing to the scenario a 
unique interpretation which would be that of actual utility by erasing the unexpected and 
unknown interpretations that could arise in our spirit, this trait has serious consequences for 
thinking about uncertainty. Generally we live with many interpretations. For example, the 
view that the sun revolves around the earth is convenient in everyday life and coexists 
peacefully in our spirit with the heliocentric view that is less often useful. In physics, the 
particle interpretation of light is useful for some phenomena (e.g. the photoelectric effect) 
while the wave interpretation is useful for others (e.g. interference). In psychology we know 
from Freud that we can love and hate the same person at the same time. In sociology Max 
Weber has shown, in the face of the difficult problems of the sociologist’s immersion in the 
society he studies, the methodological force of constructing idea-types that are obviously 
plural and each complete our understanding of institutions. 
To arrive at the point of monetizing everything, one must fight to enforce 
interpretative monism. And there lies a perverse use of mathematics. What is the role, 
actually, of the use of mathematics in economics? In the classical thinking of Adam Smith, 
Ricardo, Jean-Baptise Say, Stuart Mill, there is no need for mathematics. Maths appears with 
reasoning about maxima and their partial derivatives proposed by the neo-classicists in the 
middle of the 19th century (Dupuit, Cournot, Léon Walras, Jevons, Menger, Pareto, etc.), 
with a mathematical vocabulary taken from rational mechanics and the principle of least 
action, and therefore an approach to society that is simplistic in the extreme.  
And this syntax is perfected to the esoteric heights of contemporary finance, a habit of 
scientific thought that remains fundamentally reductionist. How does the mathematization of 
reality lead to a monism? Maths will not lead to monism if it is used with competing models. 
In contrast, economic monism rests on the philosophical prejudice that its mathematical 
structure is the manifestation of its truth, that it speaks the truth because it is deductive, that 
the law of supply and demand, represented by curves – and not clouds of points – is true 
because one can develop it into a coherent theory as Lagrange and Hamilton did in mechanics 
from Newton’s laws. This prejudice rests on a self-centred epistemological view that needs to 
be corrected. It can be formulated as “if our doctrine is true, then the others are not only false, 
but rubbish”. It is the prejudice of analytic superiority. It is a scientist credo not so distant 
from the neo-positivist creeds of the Vienna Circle and even Karl Popper. It makes 
economists believe that, by demanding a strict syntax, thanks to maths, they are constructing 
the only understanding of their domain that satisfies this logical requirement. But the 
principle “from fallacy anything follows” does not apply between theories; there is confusion 
between the relation of satisfaction (of a syntax by an interpretation) and the relation of 
implication (of a consequence by a premise)236. 
All this is to say that the rational agent that our economists talk of only understands 
the world in one way: as a schematized universe in which economic reduction works. But in 
the domain of understanding and economic knowledge, pluralism is essential to overcome the 
crisis, as indicated in the epistemological study I made of this subject237. 
Faced with this impoverishment of thought, I believe we quickly come to see the 
importance of contracts (which restore the idiosyncratic uniqueness of each entrepeneur), to 
fight against the anonymity of economic actions (shareholders who are only concerned with 
market capitalization, and investors who blindly entrust their savings to specialists in 	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stochastic optimization) and to consider as normal the existence of multiple currencies even 
within the same country. These are the tools that we want for ecological transition238. That can 
only contribute more relevance to make a multidimensional life possible and to take this into 
account in trade. The global economy should permit various economic systems that overlap 
without interfering. Current economic thought goes too quickly to solutions; profitable action 
has too easy a legitimacy. With its logic of equivalence and substitution it can irreversibly 
destroy, and we can no longer allow this laxity. Our garden is too small for such methods. 
 
The second serious deficiency, more technical in nature, comes from the very heart of the 
doctrine of free competition, namely that markets are bad at showing price trends. 
 Obviously this vagueness is prejudicial to economic operation: in the absence of clear 
information about trends, the head of a business is reluctant to invest because investment is a 
choice which engages with the future over a period of time and the decision is a function of 
the projections we form for the near or distant future. Moreover, many studies show that 
increased uncertainty, notably after shocks or crises, most often causes a decline in 
investment239. Regarding technological change, to take into account environmental problems, 
either local or global, this hinders the development of innovations and private involvement in 
applied research. The turmoil in global food prices and in the currency exchanges also have 
destructive effects on the agricultural economies that require choices of species and of 
material over time240. 
 Also there is an abundant literature on the disconnection between finance and the real 
economy: whole libraries of works and piles of articles denouncing financial bubbles, self-
referencing of markets, the actions of speculators and their mimetic behaviour, self-fulfilling 
rumours, etc. Such a profusion of work strongly indicates something, and we tend to think 
that these reactions bear witness to a malfunctioning reality. But often these critiques, which 
would have us believe that we just need to remove speculators, who disrupt the efficiency of 
the market, and leave the good capitalism to make the economy “real”, are an easy posture 
and politically superficial. Certain observations should be made to clarify the scope of these 
recriminations. 
 First, the classical, Keynesian, distinction between speculators and entrepeneurs is not 
clear. The amusing metaphor of the beauty contest is only partially relevant to describe 
financial markets: it is a model at just one moment in time, and it doesn’t show any of the 
volatile turmoil which is the phenomenology truly proper to finance. Keynes considered that, 
in contrast to the speculator, the entrepeneur takes choices and initiatives whose scope is the 
medium term “making superior long-term forecasts of the probable yield of an investment 
over its whole life”241. This way of thinking is echoed by all those who believe that there are 
“fundamentals” to which market prices eventually converge in virtue of all kinds of efficiency 
theorems that mark the refinements of neo-classical ideas. There are damaging crises, largely 
caused by speculators, but year after year the restoring forces operate, or at least should 
operate.  
 If we take these arguments seriously, it would mean that one could imagine – and that 
one would want – a free-market economy with non-speculative markets where the price 	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would be true, reflecting a free competition without the perversity of “casino players”. But 
such an idea is purely platonic. A printer that stocks up on paper because they think the price 
will increase is a speculator. An industrialist that moves their factories from the centre to an 
out of town site is speculating on the real estate market, and if they move town, they are 
speculating on the labour market. Where is the boundary? It would be very difficult to define 
legally. 
 One must accept the conclusion that an economy where the price trends are visible is 
impossible or, at least, would require an arsenal of constraints following a baroque logic to 
prevent agents from taking proper account of trends, trends that normally express the future 
and of which one should obviously take account. 
 How then should we interpret these critical studies that demand greater consideration of 
the real economy? “The finance market is disconnected from the real economy, which is that 
of the fundamental values,” writes Olivier Mongin. “The finance market must be reconnected 
as much as possible to economic reality, and not succumb to the virtualities of ‘taking risks 
safely.’”242 That expression refers to the fact that the speculator does take risks, of course, but 
only “watching” the world, without committing to a significant plan, permanently evading 
responsibility. In an interesting article about efficiency, David Bourghelle and Pauline Hyme 
go in the same direction “A market with plentiful liquidity naturally plunges players into an 
artificial world, erasing temporalities and exempting them from the constraints of the real 
economy”243. One could multiply the citations and economic celebrities have often ranted 
against the financial markets. How should one view the distant project implicit behind these 
denunciations so that they go beyond the myth of a market free of speculation? 
 Christian de Boissieu, Jean-Pierre Jouvet and Serge Guillon put us on the right track by 
commenting that “the financial markets, whatever their form, are profoundly different from 
commercial (or physical) markets. They are not there to buy or sell a product. […] These 
markets, by design and operation, distance themselves from the concerns of the real economy, 
even if the physical fundamentals remain the major determinants of their behaviour.”244 
 The only assumption consistent with the above remarks is to think of the real economy, 
that which is described not in economics textbooks but in geography textbooks, which speaks 
of industrial production, of quantitative flow of energy and goods, of unemployment and 
other macro-economic parameters, but also of local trade, regional resources, of reputations 
established over time, and the perseverance of the players. This economy only exists with its 
own dynamics as long as it is not driven by a system of market prices. That is the criteria. This 
means we must be able to think of a social organization in which information on trends comes 
from something other than prices. This idea is not inconsistent with an economy based on 
organized price listings. The real economy can be described, in all logic, by saying that it is an 
economy in which the price varies because there are markets, but the players do not use price 	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signals for the projections necessary for investments, since these are too vague and uncertain, 
but instead they use sources based in reality and the meanings we attach to it, information 
necessarily derived partly from politics, i.e., nation states, and partly from other autonomous 
institutions. Establishing such information motors is absolutely essential if we are to depart 
from the business as usual that financial uncertainty currently imposes. 
 The recent story that the state of North Carolina has enshrined in law that extrapolations 
about sea levels must be linear and not exponential is typical of a mentality that tries to make 
economics rule in everything, because it expresses the benefits, and tries to restrain any 
information produced otherwise245. This incident has a symbolic meaning. The legislators of 
North Carolina have not understood that a political system cannot function correctly, cannot 
move, if it restricts or manipulates the available knowledge. It is likely that other similar 
attitudes will be encountered when the information motors we have spoken of are being 
established. 
 Both deficiencies require action in the same direction: the establishment of 
organizations collecting high quality data for a description of the world, including both 
natural and social, without using temporal evolution of prices, in order to give information – 
obviously pluralist, thereby leaving both communism and capitalism – that will allow agents 
to place their real action in the multidimensional landscape of meanings. This is not the work 
that rating agencies do. They give ratings because the contradictions of the debt market 
demand a third party assessment. But they can contribute to this role if they provide not 
ratings, but structured information about the conditioning factors that they use. The Meadows 
team in Limits to Growth use grouped indicators based on quantities of: industrial production, 
food, population, pollution, resources, as well as global indices to give an idea of qualitative 
phenomena: index of human well-being, ecological footprint. The Worldwatch Institute, 
founded by Lester Brown, provides synthesized information, given in dollars, to compare 
levels of consumption (these are not prices, but indicators), and equally a large number of 
interpretative texts for complex situations that cause changes in the world246. Observatories of 
society and of nature are developing more and more, constructing motivations that the 
markets do not provide. 
 It is thanks to these watchful eyes that we can understand the world and that these 
disturbing inertias can change. We now better understand the fundamental lie of neo-
liberalism: it is in the idea that the market is capable of piloting the economy by prices. This 
is not so, and the question is therefore that of understanding what makes us believe that it is. 
The answer still lies in the neo-classical theory, which is not a theory like the others. It is an 
intellectual construction which pushes people to believe in rules of behaviour – efficient 
markets, etc. – presented and understand as beneficial even though we know that they are bad 
globally. Michel Callon, who we quoted above, uses the term performativity to describe this 
trait of changing the object of study247. 
 It is fashionable in some entrepeneurial circles to argue that academic economics is 
simply a harmless discourse with no influence on reality as has been proved, since the 1970s, 
by the debate about mathematical techniques of calibration and prediction of random time 
series, started by the book by Box and Jenkins, who showed that purely technical prediction 
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can be better than arguments based on economic models248. 
 However, the development of the financial market brings, according to Donald 
MacKenzie, an example of such an influence: the discovery of the Black-Scholes formula, 
opening the possibility to new practices of hedging, called delta neutral, by the middle office 
and actually establishing new uses and new institutions249. Michel Callon uses this example to 
sociologically analyse the relationship between scientific thought and observed practice. This 
revealed the concept of performativity250. By this concept he means to go beyond the 
phenomena of “self-fulfilling prophecies” (the effect of an announcement by a major player), 
or the “sunspots” (beliefs), and also beyond the shifts from the descriptive to the prescriptive. 
Performativity is part of the wake of the pragmatic philosophy, as a consideration of truth as 
success, by the set of socio-technical arrangements251. 
 But at this level should we not say that all knowledge is performative? That was 
basically Feyerabend’s thesis when he said “anything goes”, success as criterion between 
knowledge and illusion. Engineering, for example, obviously modifies behaviours: studying 
models of traffic and traffic-management provides service to those bodies responsible for 
traffic circulation in their daily work. Some medical discoveries have obviously changed, and 
sometimes upset, nursing practice. Calculations of fluid dynamics have changed methods of 
regulating irrigation. Nietzsche had already remarked that there could be no knowledge 
without relation to its object and, therefore, its disruption. There is also what the sociology of 
science says: that all science is performative, a thesis which is particularly provocative in the 
natural sciences, where researchers share a culture of objectivity and often work amongst 
themselves, omitting the social context and the conditioning arising from the scientific tools 
and community252. Furthermore, this thesis, in some way, weakens the specifics of economic 
knowledge and it seems hardly arguable that the economy occupies a unique position in this 
respect, because it is the referential discourse of a number of decision-makers.  
 I remain convinced that the neo-classical theory holds a privileged role in these 
phenomena. Why has it been so easy to achieve what Léon Walras wished for when he wrote 
“Mr. P[areto] believes that the goal of science is to get closer and closer to reality by 
successive approximations. And I think the ultimate goal of science is to move reality closer 
to a certain ideal; and that is why I formulate this ideal”253? 
 I think the neo-classical theory is more than performative; it is conformative. This 
concept refers to the following relational characteristic: a vision of the world is conformative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 G. Box, G. Jenkins, Time Series Analysis, Holden Day 1970. 
249 D. MacKenzie “An Equation and its World : Bricolage, Exemplars, Disunity and Performativity in Financial 
Economics” Social Studies of Science, 33, 831-868, 2003. 
250 M. Callon, “What does it mean to say that economics is performative ?” in Do Economists Make Markets ? 
On Performativity of Economics, D. MacKenzie, F. Muniesa, L. Siu (Eds) Princeton Univ. Press 2007. 
251 Cf. The seminar “Performativité et Politique : Au-delà de la sociologie économique” Toulouse 23-25 October 
2008. 
252 Cf. M. Callon, P. Lacousmes, Y. Barthes, Agir dans un monde incertain, essai sur la démocratie technique, 
Seuil 2001. Michel Callon believes that economics is performative like all sciences “Economics, like the other 
sciences, serves to represent. But to account for what it calls the economy, it has to contribute in one way or 
another to the constitution of the object that it is accounting for – like any other scientific discipline.” 
(“Elaborating the notion of performativity” AEGIS Vol 5 n1 2009, 18-28.). Nevertheless, it seems to me that 
some distinctions are necessary : a) performativity in biology with GMOs in which is also found plenty of 
engineering, b) that of astrophysics, which is perfomative because it improves and reinterprets previous 
interpretations, a category in which maths is also placed c) management, business, communications, which are 
performative through social action of those who know them, economics, while having some features in these 
three categories, is related mainly to the last where it still possess unique characteristics.  
253 “M. P[areto] croit que le but de la science est de se rapprocher de plus en plus de la réalité par des 
approximations successives. Et moi je crois que le but final de la science est de rapprocher la réalité d’un certain 
idéal ; et c’est pourquoi je formule cet idéal”, L. Walras  «Œuvres diverses», in: Auguste et Léon Walras œuvres 
économiques complètes, Vol XIII, édité par Dockès P., Mouchot C. et Potier J.-P., Economica 2000 p567. 
if, in a social context where others seem to agree with this vision, you have to act as if you 
share them as well. Violence is conformative; carrying arms in the US is a conformative 
doctrine254. Systems for assessing performance are also conformative if they have a large 
audience. If you believe that many people take such ranking to reflect reality, then you will 
also be led to take it into account. We have seen that all universities have been taken, year 
after year, by the dynamics of the Shanghai ranking. For an institution of higher education to 
not worry about quantitative evaluation processes – despite their obvious reductionism – 
would be to take the risk of being misjudged. In Hindu society, to not recognize the caste 
system is to risk being considered untouchable. This is linked to the monism of the doctrine, a 
ranking is monist by definition, but conformism works above all if one is led to believe that 
others subscribe to a monism that is totally exclusive of all other forms of thought. Thus the 
absence of empathy and altruism is a conformative ethic. More generally, the fact of being in 
the position of having to deal with individuals who refer only to their personal interest, an 
interest finally reduced to one of accounting, will oblige you to follow the path imposed by 
the discussion of evaluating everything by its price and to see nothing except for supply and 
demand. It is as striking in an annual general meeting of the apartment owners of a residential 
block as in a conference such as that of Copenhagen in May 2009 over climate change.  
 To think that humanity can organize its own evolution using a system of prices given by 
markets is a dangerous vision derived from the conformative neo-classical doctrine, the 
liberal globalization has spread with ease for the same reasons. This brings us back to certain 
ideas of Ulrich Beck255.	  
 	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 The more killings there are – such as Aurora, Colorado in July – the more supporters carry weapons to defend 
themselves against unexpected violence. 
255 Beck Ulrich, What is Globalization? Polity Press 2001. 
IV. Dispelling the mist ? 
 
When prices are what people study and the most important of these prices vary without 
indicating underlying trends, the big question is that of the overall direction and of 
governance. The global economy drives behaviours with a representation that is too poor, too 
reductionist, as if one could pilot a plane by only looking at its shadow on the ground. We 
have seen that putting debt on the market on a global level has been a decisive step in this 
reductionism. 
 In this chapter, I try to consider where the system will take us if we continue business 
as before without adopting the radical changes that are necessary to modify economic logic. I 
think that the defects in capitalism that we have highlighted in this book are so serious and 
grave that they cannot be fixed by small bandages. My goal is to raise awareness.  
 
1. What is currently happening: the default choice of economic logic 
The year 2012 marked the twentieth anniversary of the Rio summit and the twenty-fifth of the 
Brundtland report. It is time to take stock. It must be recognized that it is pathetic. We 
procrastinated, discussed the economic mechanisms of emissions trading or taxes. We built 
wind turbines and nuclear power plants. And then at Copenhagen we saw everyone take 
positions of minimum cost. We propose here to reflect on what will happen if, as up to now, 
this attitude of what is best for me? continues to govern international discussions.256 
 The result of these delays is that the Arctic ice-sheets are melting at a speed that 
surprised the scientists themselves, so that between Canada and the North Pole a new sea 
route has opened up. The economic experts from the CIA have calculated that it would help 
the exploitation of Arctic oil fields and shorten the Asia-Europe route by around 4000 
nautical miles. Already Russia, Canada and Denmark are prospecting and negotiating 
amongst themselves.  
 The passage that explorers sought for centuries finally opens. It is symbolic. It strikes us 
as the result of a certain philosophy of the future that is worth clarifying. 
 
Sustainable development: an ambivalent concept that delays action 
The Rio conference of 1992 marked a global realization of the gravity and urgency of 
environmental problems. It revealed a broad consensus that development and the environment 
should not be seen as conflicting but that a synergy was possible between these two concepts 
and that this was the way forward. Reconciling ecologists and economists, the report of the 
UN Commission on the Environment and Development (the Brundtland report) prepared the 
Rio summit which led to five texts: Agenda 21 (the Programme of Action), the Rio 
Declaration (27 general principles on the responsibility of nations), principles relating to 
forests, the Convention on Climate Change, and the Convention on Biodiversity. The 
philosophy of sustainable development followed two main lines: the concept of balance 
between the different factors that contribute to the quality of life, and the requirement that 
current generations leave to future generations sufficient social, environmental and economic 
resources for them to have levels of well-being at least as high as ours. 
 The basis for this, as we mentioned in Chapter I-2, consisted of three “pillars”: 
economic, interpreting a goal of growth and economic efficiency by the sustainable 
development; social, expressing the fact that this development should be based on human 
need and thus meet the goal of social equity; and environmental, meaning that the objective of 
sustainable development should help to preserve, improve and enhance the environment and 
conserve resources for the long term. 
 These general ideas were based on numerous studies. The scenarios published at the 
time of the conference, notably “Energie pour un monde vivable” (1988), “Noé, nouvelles 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 As Dennis Meadows told Le Monde ”Look at the major UN conferences on climate. Each delegation strives 
to avoid any agreement that would cause them more problems. China ensures that nobody imposes limits on 
CO2 emissions. The US discredits the idea of climate change. Previously, people exerted pressure for some 
meaningful action to come from these meetings. Since Copenhagen, and the utter failure of that summit, 
everyone understands that there is more pressure. Every country agrees to sign for peace and fraternity between 
people, for sustainable development. But that means nothing. The rich countries always promise a lot of money 
but never pay up.” (“Regardez les grandes conférences onusiennes sur le climat, chaque délégation s’évertue à 
éviter un accord qui leur poserait plus de problèmes que rien du tout. La Chine veille à ce que personne n’impose 
de limites d’émissions de CO2, les Etats-Unis viennent discréditer l’idée même qu’il y a un changement 
climatique. Avant, les populations exerçaient une espèce de pression pour que des mesures significatives sortent 
de ces réunions. Depuis Copenhague, et l’échec cuisant de ce sommet, tout le monde a compris qu’il n’y a plus 
de pression. Chaque pays est d’accord pour signer en faveur de la paix, de la fraternité entre les peuples, du 
développement durable, mais ça ne veut rien dire. Les pays riches promettent toujours beaucoup d’argent et n’en 
versent jamais.”), 15 June 2012. 
options énergétiques” (1989), are indicative of the key assumptions that, it was thought, we 
could build on. a) A decrease in the energy intensity in the countries of the North, i.e., of the 
energy necessary for the production of one unit of GDP. It was felt that many savings could 
be made in the capacity of machines, in reducing waste, and by the use of materials whose 
manufacture required less energy. The calculations showed that significant gains could be 
achieved by improving transport and housing insulation. b) We counted on the fact that 
developing countries would use technology whose energy efficiency was similar to that in the 
best sectors of the time and we concluded that they could achieve in 2020 the standard of 
living of the inhabitants of Western Europe in 1975-1980 using three times less energy. c) It 
relied on a virtuous economic expectation that would rapidly boost renewable energy – solar, 
wind, hydro, tidal, wave, ocean thermal, geothermal and biofuels. In 2020 these could provide 
15% of the energy needs of the North and 40% of those of the South, and two thirds of the 
global energy requirements by 2100. d) Global awareness would lead to the helping of poor 
countries by education and investment to curb population growth, so that there could be a 
harmonization of lifestyles, with the difference in energy consumption per capita, between 
poor and rich countries, reducing from 0.4 and 7.5 tons of oil equivalent in 1985, respectively, 
to 0.8 and 1.7 in 2100257. 
 These scenarios were probably not trying to predict the future, but merely demonstrate 
feasibility. Nevertheless, it is clear that the strength of the correlation between the 
developmental trajectories of countries and their energy consumption was underestimated. 
There is no need to go through the tables of figures, or the existing databases (Enerdata, 
Povcal, etc) which give a precise picture of the current situation: in thirty years it has not 
changed much. Emissions of CO2 have remained constant since 2000 in OECD countries and 
more than doubled in China, increased by 40% in India, and globally by a quarter from 2000 
to 2009258. Forested areas have decreased by 3.5%, and the decline in biodiversity and fish 
stocks has changed from being a potential threat, into an observed and measured fact. 
Negotiations are at a virtual standstill. We cannot say that nothing has been done, but the 
objective observation is that the changes over the past twenty years have had almost nothing 
to do with environmental policies. They are, almost exclusively, the consequence of 
traditional economic forces in a heightened international competition, even allowing for the 
relatively good conduct of the Western countries that is the result of very low growth.  
 Developments in the Third World have also been dominated by the violence of 
economic forces. The so-called development economics of the 1980s, which consisted in 
finding local patterns of trade and production that were suited to local ways of life, gradually 
evolving, has been replaced by the idea of a mono-economy where every country should 
adapt to the global demand in the global market259. This has resulted in an overexploitation of 
natural resources with profits poorly redistributed, taking advantage of all differences in 
wages, sanitary conditions, environmental requirements, which has diverted private 
investment in the Third World away from those sectors that are important for human 
development in these countries. The result has been an increase in the pollution and 
degradation of human life to an unprecedented level. Vandana Shiva writes “For the two 
thirds of humanity living in the South, nature's capital is their source of sustenance and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 Cf. B. Dessus, Atlas des énergies, pour un monde vivable, fph-Syros 1994. 
258 Source : OECD, January 2011. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), 30.6 gigatons were 
issued in 2010, which is 5% more than the previous record in 2008. Coal reserves in the world, in the US, Russia 
and China in particular, are considerable and prolong the climatic problem well beyond “peak oil”. Given the 
inertia (80% of emissions by 2020 are already programmed), it is now almost impossible to limit the average 
temperature rise to 2° C beyond preindustrial levels.	  
259 While the World Bank and IMF implemented the policy of “structural adjustment”, world trade exploded. It 
has grown by a factor of five since 1980 (excluding imports and exports of oil). 
livelihood. The destruction, diversion and takeover of their eco-systems in order to extract 
natural resources or dump waste generates a disproportionate burden for the poor”260. There 
are many aggravating factors: the lower one is, the more one gets pulled down. Weaknesses in 
health and education emphasize the short-time concerns and the neglect of public goods, 
resulting in the deterioration of ecosystems. The consequences for nature are often 
irreversible. Farmers in the Third World see their choices reduced, poverty and 
unsustainability are reinforced and prevent any lasting improvement in their well-being261.  
 The nuclear industry, meanwhile, is symptomatic of a search for selfish gain 
regardless of risks caused to others. Four European countries have renounced nuclear power, 
while 24 reactors are being planned in Europe, of which six are already under construction. 
Currently there are more than 340 functioning nuclear reactors worldwide. Many were built in 
the 1970s and are obsolete. The issue of waste is becoming more serious. The proliferation of 
nuclear power plants in developing countries poses serious security issues, especially given 
the problems of corruption and terrorism. Since there is no international regulation about 
waste, how can one prevent Pakistan, Iran or other nuclear countries from buying waste 
storage sites in poorer countries? Currently 65 new reactors are under construction. By this 
trend, more and more accidents will happen, leaving permanent traces. 
 At the heart of this discussion, the dividing line between the positions on nuclear 
power, is the technology of nuclear fusion. The benefits of this are clearly explained in the 
recent work of André Lebeau “Les horizons terrestres, réflexions sur la survie de 
l'humanité”262. Clean, safe, with no shortage of resources, this sector, thanks to the ITER 
project, is expected within fifty years. We have only then to “stand firm” for this time and 
then we will have boundless energy, almost at will. This position is similar to that of Valéry 
Giscard d'Estaing about CO2 emissions: the concerns are transient; the problem will disappear 
with the exhaustion of fossil fuel resources. There are two observations to make. First, since 
fusion techniques haven’t yet been mastered, one cannot know all the advantages and 
disadvantages. The development may take a century or more; should we let the dirty and 
dangerous fission plants keep multiplying until then? Also, what does it mean to have energy 
at will? At whose will? The race will begin again with renewed intensity, on a planet where 
flora and fauna have hitherto known only the solar flux. There is far too little detail about the 
idea for it to form the basis of international collective action.  
 Unquestionably academics in economics of environment have not yet managed to 
build a theory both strong enough and simple enough to completely replace the dominant neo-
classical theory. The critics of the globalized financial economy, who are numerous, possibly 
even forming a majority, have not managed to break the links between the theoreticians of 
stakeholder capitalism and the agents and decision-makers in industry and politics, nor to 
really thwart their influence in economic journals and the training of young elites. Any 
conceptual innovation to avoid the headlong rush to mathematize finance is presented as a 
“return to prehistoric economics”. Ultimately the economics of the environment is primarily 
concerned with what is feasible without any ideological or social change, and one may 
reasonably ask whether it is the environment or economic reasoning that it is trying to 
preserve. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 Shiva V. “The World on the Edge” in On the Edge, Living with Global Capitalism, Hutton W. and Giddens 
A. eds, Vintage 2001. 
261 Cf B. Lallau “Pauvreté, durabilité et capacité de choix “ Développement durable et territoires oct. 2004. A 
detailed analysis of indicators shows that African countries have a greater impact on the environment, per unit of 
produced wealth, than European countries, cf. B. Kestemont, L. Frendo, E. Zaccaï Ecological Indicators 11 
(2011) 848–856. 
262 Gallimard 2011. 
 In the idea of sustainable development, with its three components – ecological, social 
and economic – there was also the desire to reconcile the North and the South and to apply 
the principles of public debate and precaution. That really meant abandoning the monism that 
dominates Western civilization. It was a much more revolutionary ambition than the discourse 
about harmony and synergy would suggest. It meant finally recognizing, and politically 
addressing, the diversity of dimensions specific to socio-natural reality, to construct a new 
form of coexistence. But, it did not happen, the techno-economic obsession has continued 
unabated.  
 It has not been properly appreciated that to counterbalance the natural imperialism of 
economic logic required action at all levels, and thus would require a lot of money! In twenty 
years, in contrast, the consensus about competition has been reinforced. What will this lead to 
in the long term? The captains of the economy know how to win, but the fate of the losers is 
left out of the picture. The poor are left to an external providence, that they themselves must 
find, while the wealthy are able to acquire all kinds of securities. The human born with a 
inheritance today is a protected species. As for the three pillars of sustainable development, 
the economic pillar has taken account of new tastes without really changing, the ecological 
pillar has evolved in public opinion but, in fact, has declined overall, and the social aspect has 
completely failed. 
  
The default choice is an unequal dynamic 
The threats announced by ecologists have now been relayed by the media so that they are 
known by everyone throughout the world. They are displayed on the walls of Chinese 
universities and spoken of both on the internet and in the small towns of Brittany. They were 
expressed the most frequently in universalist terms (Al Gore talking of a boiling frog, Nicolas 
Hulot and the Titanic, etc.): this could be serious for everybody. In a few decades they have 
certainly provoked reactions. Movements for environmental action (local exchange systems, 
recycling, fair trade, organic agriculture, micro-finance, etc.) experienced a real vitality. 
Others have disputed the claims of the scientific community, and although few in number, 
gained a disproportionate media audience while carefully playing with the epistemological 
legitimacy of the controversies. But most people, the vast majority, taken by immediate 
family and professional constraints have decided that between ‘business as usual’, and the 
alarmist predictions of the Club of Rome, the future is likely to take a middle path. In 
developed countries one is resigned to living with clouds which darken others’ lives. 
Specifically, the poverty in the world, the destitute billions with a life expectancy below forty, 
one can do nothing, it would be a drop of water in the desert. We sort our recycling and make 
absolutely sure that we pass on our inheritance263. 
 We must therefore consider both the strength of ‘business as usual’ and the weakness 
of catastrophism. 
 Business as usual is a conformist constraint. There are many sorts of conformism. 
Insofar as some have inherited social situations of abundance, financial privilege and legacies 
of possessions and land, while for others the means of exploiting their skills are socially 
refused them, and still others, the most numerous, have to fight to survive each day. It is a 
particularly painful conformism that consists in mobilizing the microphones and spotlights of 
the media to research and focus on small and totally futile things – the history of creams and 
ointments over the centuries, the etymology of names of pets, etc. The boredom of the 
bourgeoisie is used to occupy tables in bookstores and hours of listening to the radio, so that 
nothing changes. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 In France, between 2004 and 2010, the inequality of wealth has grown, the ratio between the average wealth 
of the richest 10% and that of the poorest 50% is increased by nearly 10%, cf. Les revenus et le patrimoine des 
ménages, Insee 2011.  
 There is another sort of conformism that has been much more important historically 
and socially: The flow of money in the economy orients initiatives and professional efforts 
towards profit. The rich get richer, and there are more precious metals that come from the top 
of the economic volcano and which flow down the slopes, encouraging supporters of the 
system. Newspapers need money, films must be distributed in many cinemas to have any 
impact, radio and television broadcasts need funds, journalists must be paid. This manna is 
clearly beneficial only to those with employment and who are at a sufficiently powerful level 
that their actions can have a significant economic influence, those who will have an effect on 
the competitive performance of their employer. Thus this phenomenon tends to mark more 
clearly a boundary between those who reap and those who sow. 
 There are historic roots for business as usual, in the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill, 
of whom we spoke earlier, but also in the continental positivism of Comte. The transition that 
Comte initiated, his positivist philosophy in thinking about science leading to the religion of 
humanity, is due to a particular characteristic of Comtian sociology, namely that it is 
conceived as biology – as understood in the 19th century – applied to society: History has its 
own laws and societies must comply with them. 
Positivism by its nature tends to strengthen public order by the development of a 
wise resignation […]. It obviously can not be a genuine resignation, i.e., a 
permanent disposition to endure the inevitable ills, consistently and without any 
hope of compensation, that comes from a deep sense of invariable laws which rule 
all the various kinds of natural phenomena. It is thus essentially to positivist 
philosophy that such a disposition relates on any topic to which it applies and 
consequently also to political ills.264 
That is to say, the heavy burden of having to live, eating and sleeping every day, accepting 
illness, the weaknesses of the spirit in an unwanted social or moral context, without knowing 
the reasons or knowing where this will lead, the weight of the human condition and the 
lightness of being, positivist science can help to endure this because it is based in a consensus 
which gives the basis for the religion of humanity. 
 One of the problems apparent in this idea is that social laws are changing – Hegel and 
Marx are more to the point in saying that man, by his action, changes them – and thus, as the 
epistemology of the 20th century has shown, science does not develop as positivism 
suggested. 
 Comte’s idea is nonetheless relevant as a question: if we need to be resigned, since 
religions have been disqualified as beliefs of the pre-scientific (and even pre-metaphysical) 
ages, wouldn’t the acceptance of inevitable ills, without hope of any compensation, give rise 
to a need for scientific truth which would tend to restore positivism according to a sort of 
reality principle? 
 This is an issue exactly parallel with what we are currently experiencing with the 
economy. The neoliberal economy that has been developed over the past 30 years, is facing 
major difficulties: on the one hand there is a serious disagreement between the complex 
machinery, oiled by high-level mathematics, financial institutions and the operation of 
production and trade, and on the other, more deeply, there is the emergence of new problems 
dues to the scarcity of resources and the degradation of the environment. In this theoretical 
disarray, faced with the vast non-violent protest movement, liberal economists adopt the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 “Le positivisme tend puissamment par sa nature à consolider l'ordre public par le développement d'une sage 
résignation [...]. Il ne peut évidemment exister de vraie résignation, c'est-à-dire de disposition permanente à 
supporter avec constance et sans espoir de compensation quelconque, des maux inévitables, que par suite d'un 
profond sentiment des lois invariables qui régissent tous les divers genres de phénomènes naturels. C'est donc 
essentiellement à la philosophie positive que se rapporte une telle disposition à quelque sujet qu'elle s'applique et 
par conséquent aussi aux maux politiques”, A. Comte, Système de politique positive, Appendice III. 
strategy of applying Comte’s reasoning to the economy: the laws of the market economy are 
the only ones viable, they are based on private property and free trade, these being the only 
possible principles if we are to avoid dictatorships and preserve our freedom. It is therefore 
necessary to accept the rules of the game that consist in seeing your condition improve if, and 
only if, you earn more money in the context of a labour market ruled by neo-classical 
equilibriums. The inequalities form part of these laws; they should be accepted because they 
are the motor of economic drive for everyone. It is a strategy to make one accept the economy 
as it has been developed itself, by the game of profit and competition as the foundation just as 
undeniable as scientific truth. 
 The result is business as usual. Let’s just play the game of competition, it will generate 
innovation and hence all the problems in every aspect of life will be solved. 
 In Comte’s time there was no “alternative science” that could be brandished against 
resignation. Eventually, however, it was realized that scientific knowledge does not remotely 
follow the laws of positivism. That took more than a century.  
 Today it’s the same. We do not have an alternative economics that has strong support. 
There are many good ideas, but they are scattered. The only way possible is to prove that the 
economy, according to its so-called principles, does not do a good job of managing economic 
business, neither at the level of resources, nor at the level of people’s motivations, just as the 
naivety and fallacy of positivism were established. 
 
 Regarding catastrophism, the troubles do not come from the epithet “enlightened” that 
was given by Jean-Pierre Dupuy and is evoked in absentia by despotism; Hans Jonas had 
already envisaged a dictatorship as a last resort 265. Instead, the troubles come from the 
metaphysical sublimation of this thesis “to think of the continuation of human experience as a 
result of the negation of self-destruction […] with the hope that this future […] although 
inevitable does not occur”266. This logical formulation bears a family resemblance to 
Popperian epistemology and, like it, does not provide any concrete tools for juggling the 
interpretations that are not resolved except in the distant future. Today it is a more precise 
formulation that calls out to us: “What catastrophes and for whom?” I think, in this regard, the 
methodological foundations that Max Weber proposed for sociology are the most interesting 
to transpose here because they concretely open onto political pluralism: effectively to draw 
“disaster-types” for debate. 
 
 It’s such a reading that I propose, although obviously I accept that there are others. 
The absence of solidarity between the powerful and the weak has a long history that has taken 
a step further with neoliberal globalization and the financial markets267. Only in relation to 
periods of history that were times of progress and of the conquest of nature, now, things are 
frozen, territories, beliefs, affiliations, means of action. So that some have and others have 
not. Whatever the coefficients and the baskets of indices chosen as criteria, the standard of 
living in the world tends more and more, as a percentage, to the Heaviside function: close to 
zero for most, and close to one for the others. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 Hans Jonas Pour une éthique du futur, Payot & Rivages 1998, p 112 et seq. 
266 “penser la continuation de l'expérience humaine comme résultant de la négation d'une autodestruction [...] 
avec l'espoir que cet avenir [...] bien qu'inéluctable n'ait pas lieu”, J.-P. Dupuy Pour un catastrophisme éclairé, 
quand l'impossible est certain  Seuil 2002. 
267 At the end of the 1970s, 1% of Americans accounted for 10% of the country’s income. Now 1% account for 
23.5% of the country’s income. The other 99%, which is not just the black or Hispanic underclass, but average 
Americans, citizens, member of the glorious middle classes that are the strength of the US, where one knows that 
life is better than that of their parents and not as good as that of their children. This is called progress. Source Le 
Monde 15 Oct. 2011. 
 The Heaviside (or unit step) function gives the value 0 to the left of a certain point and 
1 to the right of that point. It bears the name of the English engineer Oliver Heaviside (1850-
1925), inventor of operational calculus. Many systems described as proportions or 
percentages, deterministic or probabilistic, asymptotically tend to 0 or 1 when their dynamic 
is local unless phenomena of transfer or coupling intervene. This is the new dynamic at work 
given the finiteness of space, of resources of minerals or fossil fuel, and of available energy 
flux. 
 Angelic universalism, naive irenicism, or simply generality, the discourse of 
sustainable development has faced a harsh reality: indifference of humans to “others” makes a 
fiction of our planet. 
 The path that emerges is wholly different: it is that the degradation of the natural and 
social environment will be such that it will limit the poor by despair and plagues of all sort 
while, on the other hand, the rich will not experience any risk to their future. There is a 
passage.  It is the new Northwest passage268. It consists in not spending money for people in 
economic decline except to limit their environmental impact on the rich. The path is narrow, 
and requires a lot of tenacity and political ambiguity, but that way the route to economic 
progress remains open! 
 Recall – see Chapter II-1 – that the work of the Club of Rome updated a few years ago 
by the Meadows team from MIT, consisted in various scenarios depending on the hypotheses 
that one makes about consumption of energy, non-renewable resources and efforts about 
pollution, which all include an “overshoot” putting an end to the period of growth sooner or 
later, and that the excess, the exponential consumptions and the inertia mean that in many 
areas the possible equilibria have been exceeded and consequently lead to a decline. But then 
the modellers pull back, declaring quite explicitly that the “collapse” phenomena, that occur 
after the peaks, are beyond the reach of the models because they necessarily entail significant 
social changes that one cannot anticipate reliably. These academics are taken, like the IPCC 
experts, by the necessity of getting as close as possible to a scientific discourse. They have 
thus avoided studying who will really be the winners and losers in this business.  
 It is striking, however, that studies on the evolution of global poverty in the recent 
decades, conducted by the services of international organizations such as the UN, the World 
Bank and the IMF, note an improvement in the situation, only a slight improvement, but one 
that is general except for singular exceptions. Equally, the Human Development Index does 
not decrease. In contrast, studies by those organizations on inequalities, between countries, 
and even within countries (the Gini coefficient), record a sharp increase in ranges. According 
to a recent study there is more inequality in the United States than between countries each 
measured by their averages: “while the ratio of national income per head of the richest to the 
poorest country is 104 to 1 (Luxembourg to Sierra Leone), the ratio of the average CEO 
salary in large US corporations to that of an average US worker is 245 to 1.”269 Everywhere it 
is the growth in income for the richest quintile that is the main factor behind the growth in 
inequality: poverty itself is not getting worse270.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 When Michel Serres wrote (Ed. de Minuit 1980) “I seek the passage between the exact sciences and the 
human sciences. Either modulo language or modulo control, between us and the world” (“Je cherche le passage 
entre la science exacte et les sciences humaines. Ou, à la langue près, ou, au contrôle près, entre nous et le 
monde”), for this project equally, the biggest challenge lies in “us”. 
269 Bob Sutcliffe “The Unequalled and Unequal Twentieth Century” in Global Inequality, Pattern and 
explanations D. Held, A. Kaya, eds, Polity Press 2007. 
270 Nevertheless, the worsening of poverty can be seen clearly between 1993 and 2003 for the poorest quintile in 
Latin America, and according to the World Watch Institute, the population with income below $1.25 per day has 
increased between 2008 and 2009 in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, and the population classed as 
undernourished has grown by 12% between 2008 and 2009, reaching 1.02 billion globally. 
 It’s curious. In twenty years the urban population has increased by 50%271.  Families, 
neighbourhoods accumulate worries. The statistics are not good at reflecting certain 
evolutions, because their tables do not see new problems. Many figures are provided by 
services more or less linked to local governments that have no interest in shedding light on 
the recession, this being synonymous with their ineffectiveness. We know that disasters can 
increase GDP. But the problem is much deeper. It is short-sighted to think that “open society” 
derives its unpredictable novelty only from scientific progress, a vision of wealthy people. It 
also produces misery, and continually, it builds new sufferings with disparate materials.  
 We again quote Vandana Shiva “Globalization is not merely a geographic 
phenomenon which is tearing down national barriers to capital. Globalization is also tearing 
down ethical and ecological limits on commerce. As everything becomes tradable, everything 
is for sale — genes, cells, plants, seeds, knowledge, water and even pollution [...] The poor 
are thus being doubly denied their right to life — first when the resources that sustain them 
are taken away from them in a free trade world, and then when the pollution and waste of the 
global economy are unequally and injustly piled on them”272. 
 Even with our criteria and indices, if we extrapolate the current curves, the phenomena 
of finiteness will impose their strict logic. Noting, for example, that after a plateau caused by 
the financial crisis, global consumption of oil has risen again to a record high of 87.4 millions 
of barrels a day, and similarly for other resources, we are convinced that major upheavals are 
in train. My thesis is that there is a high probability that they will create  in physical and 
social geography a situation that is irreversible, unequal and extreme. A paradigmatic 
example was the Hurricane Katrina situation in Louisiana and New Orleans in August 2005. 
The predictable dangers had been forecast by the meteorologists. Wealthy families were able 
to leave but those too poor to pay for hotels had to stay and weather the storm. Survivors who 
had no savings lost everything and subsequently no solidarity has worked for them, 
developers even made a profit from the disaster273. 
 It should be recalled in this respect that scientists insisted that if global temperatures 
rise by more than about 2° C, then the change in the climate will no longer be manageable in 
the sense that serious irreversibilities will occur (decrease in ice caps, in the Earth’s albedo, 
change in the cycle of general ocean currents, acidification of the sea, melting permafrost, 
etc.) and that seasonal irregularities will lead to impromptu and unforeseeable damage which 
will not allow anticipation of efficient economic and agricultural policies in the most 
vulnerable countries. 
 Everyone is afraid. The citizen does not say so directly, because of pride, shame, or 
because of concern for his family. We are afraid for the future and for all that connects us to 
the future: our legacies, our children. And when anxious, the attitude you take towards those 
who cannot reassure you goes beyond a lack of confidence; one cannot rely on them and they 
deserve only contempt. These catastrophists are worthless. The really important question is to 
know who can reassure us. Certainly not the poor, obviously. 
 The socialist former French minister of Foreign Affairs, Hubert Vedrine, wrote in 
2005 “There is currently no alternative. Certainly, there is a level of consciousness that rises 
regularly. But leading to what? To an infinity of tiny measures which do not touch the heart 
of the modern economic motor. […] we cannot completely exclude the possibility that, if our 
societies notice an imminent danger, of massive pollution, or tragic poverty, they will react 
brutally. People might perhaps be ready to support any power which claims to be able to 
maintain our way of life and consumption by authoritarian measures, notably regarding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 According to the United Nations, urban population since 2008 is more than 50% of the world population, and 
will exceed 60% by 2035, and be around 70% in 2050. 
272 ibid. 
273 Cf. N. Klein, The Shock Doctrine: the Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Picador 2008. 
energy usage. If our societies are suddenly confronted with visions of want that scare them, it 
is impossible to tell how they may react.”274 
 But Nicholas Stern’s report talked of 200 million people displaced by the middle of 
this century due to shortages of water, food or work. And Albert Jacquard concluded his book 
on global demographics, written at the time of the Rio summit, with the phrase “The only 
scenario compatible with the limits of the planet is that which admits a halving of energy 
consumption in the industrialized nations”275. That is what researchers in the subject believed 
at that time. Today this self-restraint is forgotten, not only by the leaders of the global 
economy, but also by most economics journalists, and also most households that manage a 
hard-earned inheritance. “In a world of globalized, deregulated commerce in which 
everything is tradable and economic strength is the only determinant of power and control”, 
writes V. Shiva, “resources move from the poor to the rich, and pollution moves from the rich 
to the poor. The result is a global environmental apartheid”276. The path which is becoming 
clearer and clearer does not seem to me to deserve the named apartheid, but is simply the 
result of a general cost-benefit analysis : it will be cheaper and safer to only spend money on 
preserving our environment (and some rare animals and plants in parks with full video-
surveillance), not on helping the poor cope277. All that is needed is for every decision and 
negotiation to be handled by repeatedly asking “but who will pay?” and this solution will 
emerge on its own, without any tax or global government constraints. It is likely to be some 
time before political action becomes the outworking of a project based on reason and while it 
remains the expression of economic, media or military powers, the interest of each individual 
will remain the priority over the general interest. 
 A perspective of this kind has already been considered by several authors (and I think 
that those who support this view, act without revealing their belief). This is one of a number 
of repulsive scenarios considered by two American researchers to encourage us to choose a 
different path. They called this scenario “the fortress world” and described it thus: “The 
global poor become restive, desperate, dissatisfied by images of affluence, and angry cabals 
emerge to strike out against the rich. Messianic violence increases on all sides, but it only 
reinforces the fortress pattern. Everywhere, the rich withdraw into strongholds. The richer 
regions of the world erect ever-higher barriers to immigration. New schools of “realism” 
emerge to repeat, in a thousand different ways, that nothing can be done. Xenophobia and 
garrison culture become the norm. Food insecurity and disease dominate the lives of billions 
of people. Poor countries fragment and deteriorate.”278 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 “Il n’y a pas pour l’instant de solution de rechange. Certes, il y a un degré de conscience qui monte 
régulièrement. Mais vers quoi ? Vers une infinité de petites mesures qui ne touchent pas au cœur du moteur 
économique moderne. [...] on ne peut pas complètement exclure que, si nos sociétés prennent conscience d’un 
danger imminent, de pollution massive, ou de pénurie tragique, elles réagissent de façon brutale. Les gens 
seraient peut-être prêts à soutenir n’importe quel pouvoir qui prétendrait perpétuer notre mode de vie et de 
consommation par des mesures autoritaires, notamment en matière d’énergie. Si nos sociétés sont confrontées 
brusquement à des perspectives de manque qui les terrorisent, elles risquent de réagir n’importe comment.” Le 
Monde, 26 May 2005 (our emphasis). 
275 “Le seul scénario compatible avec les limites de la planète est celui qui admet une diminution de moitié de la 
consommation d'énergie dans les pays industrialisés”, L'explosion démographique, Flammarion 1993. 
276 op. cit. and she adds “If pollution and waste migrate to the South under 'free trade' and the knowledge, 
biological diversity and wealth created from it are travelling north through the regimes controlling intellectual 
property rights such as those associated with 'free trade' treaties like GATT, the inevitable outcome of 
globalization must be environmental apartheid”. 
277 To help the poor to cope will be extremely expensive. It requires the creation of conditions of effective 
international cooperation to train teachers and doctors locally and to provide resources to promote economic 
shifts in lifestyles in accordance with the  experienced usages. Unesco’s budget is tiny by comparison. 
278 Athanasiou T., Bear P., Dead Heat, Global Justice and Global Warming, Seven Stories Press 2002. 
 What emerges clearly is the prospect of abandonment, of humanity splitting into two 
groups, not on a geographic basis, but on bases of economics and ethnicity – those who 
progress and those who regress. Those advancing come gradually to think, perversely, that 
civilization consists in winning, and that there are periods where self-confidence should 
prevail over altruism. Isn’t this confirmed by “economic science”, which is the same for all 
just like the freedom of enterprise? Thus the key reasons for exclusion must lie with those 
who are themselves excluded, and we certainly should not give them welfare. But this is 
much less thought out, reflected and Machiavellian as one might think. It is simply the force 
of the business as usual attitude doing its thing quietly and in all good faith. 
 In a famous article the economist John Kenneth Galbraith identifies six ways to feel 
good about the poor. 1) The bible: the poor suffer but will be rewarded in heaven after death. 
2) Bentham’s utilitarianism: good virtue is self-centred. 3) Malthusianism: the poor have too 
many children. 4) Social Darwinism: the elimination of the poor is natural. 5) Helping the 
poor hurts the economy. 6) The last reason is by far the most powerful in my view, namely 
psychological denial. Just as one avoids thinking of death or the arms race, which imperils the 
very survival of the human race, so one should avoid thinking of the poor, whether they be in 
Ethiopia, the South Bronx or Los Angeles. It is better to turn and think of more cheerful 
things. Galbraith believes that in recent years, the search for the best way to avoid any guilt 
about the poor has become one of the most important concerns in philosophy, literature and 
rhetoric.279 Was he thinking of John Rawls? 
 The central idea of John Rawls’s work on fairness concerns this issue. It can be 
summarized as saying that a society where the richest have 100 and the poor have 2 is 
preferable to one where the richest have 3 and the others 1. This argument, which has 
supported growth and neoliberal doctrine over the past few decades, takes an entirely different 
light in a global context where for several of the key parameters about life the total 
consumption is limited. But as the limits (of fossil deposits, recoverable solar energy, etc.) are 
not known numerically with any certainty, this line of reasoning encourages the rich to 
growth without one being able to calculate how much this will deprive the poor.280 
 In the areas of friction between the two groups the tensions are most acute. We can 
hold our position or tumble down the slope. This can be clearly seen in many societies. In 
Greece, Spain, etc., the popular classes are confronted with contradictions that are felt to be 
intolerable. Arab countries see the profits made by the richest of their coreligionists in the 
world poorly shared by their leaders. China faces vertiginous inequalities in salaries. The 
large cites are where these tensions rupture society. The need to reduce energy consumption 
in transport works in favour of the most consolidated cities that are irrigated by efficient 
public transport networks. On the other hand, cities extend more and more with peri-urban 
areas that are poor and troubled, and city centres with exorbitant land prices which set in 
stone the social allegiances281. Simply because of the liberal economy, rising transport costs 
tend not to gather the city into a coherent whole, but pauperize and disadvantage the 
peripheral areas where unemployment increases because jobs are harder to access282. Only by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279 “How to get the poor off our conscience” Harper's Magazine 1985. 
280 Cf. E. Szoc “La taille du gâteau et l'assiette du voisin, ce que Jackson fait à Rawls” in Autour de Tim Jackson 
inventer la prospérité sans croissance, revue Etopia n°9, 2011. 
281 See chapters 2 and 3 of Mike Davis’s rightly celebrated work Le pire des mondes possibles, de l'explosion 
urbaine au bidonville global, La Découverte 2006. 
282 Youth unemployment in the OECD countries rose from 13.4% to 16.7% from 2002 to 2009 and reached more 
than 20% in 11 countries in Europe, including France. Public social spending has not changed from 2000 to 
2007 as a percentage of GDP in the OECD countries. 
political effort in favour of these outlying areas can the disconnection between the beautiful 
neighbourhoods downtown and the suburbs be avoided283. 
 The growth of urban social inequality is impressive and not well known. Without 
making a complete record that would be a big job given the disparities, we note some 
examples: 
 - the numerous wealthy “gated communities” in New-York 
 - the ethnic divisions in southwestern Los Angeles 
 - India, where the urban growth is still 2.5% per year, with 35 cities having 
populations greater than 1 million, where the rural population gathers in slums. In Mumbai 
half the population live in one of the biggest slums in the world. 
 - the growing number of “safe neighbourhoods” in South Africa, in Johannesburg, 
Pretoria, Cape Town, Durban. 
 - in Sao Paolo, one of the largest cities of the world, 44 out of the city’s 70 districts are 
slums. In the central districts are the wealthy classes, in the favelas violence is present and the 
youth only have short periods of education. There are “gated communities” in the centre of 
deprived neighbourhoods. 
 In all the megacities, especially in Mexico city which has more than 20 million 
inhabitants, the Human Development Index (HDI) (which takes into account access to care, 
nutrition, housing, access to running water, education) varies considerably from one area to 
another, even for environmental quality.284 
 
 Lately, the concept of debt – more precisely the risk of non-payment – for national 
economies and public finance has become increasingly important in political debates and the 
definition of economic policies throughout the world. Rating agencies are devoutly listened to 
as the Greeks and Romans interpreted the oracle of Delphi285. The bondholders are banks, 
insurance companies and pension funds and, with some variations between countries, behind 
these institutions one finds the households of the middle class and above, of the developed 
countries. It is essentially for these anonymous creditors that budgetary efforts are being 
demanded in the most poorly rated countries, which heavily penalizes public actions for 
ecological transition. How are these anonymous people, relatively few in the number286, able 
to make elected representatives of other countries defend them? Thanks to the zeal of diligent 
economists who use the risk of a crash to paralyse politicians with fear287.  
 Debt obviously also affects poor countries. It is estimated that with the natural growth 
in population 36 countries, representing 1.4 billion people, will experience shortages of water 
or arable land in 2025. Water and food will be the decisive factors in the split between those 
who go up and those who go down in the Heaviside curve. One part of the global middle class 
will adopt the extremely water-intensive Western diet and lifestyle. This will directly impact 
on the agriculture that counts for 70% of current water usage. In addition, cereal-exporting 
countries (the US, Canada, Argentina, Australia) will devote an increasingly significant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 In the Paris region, mortgages are available at lower rates for downtown properties than for those at the 
periphery. 	  
284 Cf Grandes villes et urbanisation du monde en 50 cartes, Ed. Le Monde Autrement, CD-ROM 2009. 
285 It would have been infinitely more useful, as Marc Fleurbaey suggested, to establish an agency providing two 
ratings, one environmental and one social, for every product sold, about the conditions the prevailed in their 
manufacture. Cf. “La solidarité est-elle soluble dans l'individualisme” Et demain ? Cahiers de l'IAU n°158 June 
2011. 
286 If we consider only individual shareholders of listed companies, and not small savings accounts, then it 
amounts to 20% of the households in France, cf. Les revenus et le patrimoine des ménages, Insee 2011. 
287 It’s a case of one “disaster-type” against another. Cf. for example, the article by P. Artus and L. Boone 
“Prendre ses pertes sur la dette de la Grèce est une fausse solution. Un défaut provoquerait un effet domino 
désastreux pour la zone euro” Le Monde, 27/9/2001. 
proportion of land to the production of biofuels, which will reduce production of cereals and 
thus raise world prices. (These policies are not justified from an energy point of view, but are 
implemented for the balance of trade)288. And to this we also have to add a level of irregularity 
in global prices that is greater and more unpredictable, due to speculation and ‘weather-
proofing’ that makes medium-term policies ineffective. As well as water supply, and famine 
risks (e.g. in the Horn of Africa in 2011), the countries which are at the bottom are faced with 
the usual gangrenes – insecurity, paramilitaries, traffickers, prostitution, drugs, diseases – that 
prevent them from recovering and risk putting them into that imprecise category of “failed 
states”. 
 Of course, poverty has always existed, but it seems to change its nature. Thanks to 
economic developments the material condition improves from one time to another, and builds 
the hope of better days. As Paul Bairoch has shown, during the period of urban population 
growth in the sixteenth century in Europe, famine was avoided by using more land for 
agriculture289. The industrial revolution was a series of balances and imbalances between 
capitalist profits and wage increases resulting from trade union fights for the redistribution of 
the benefits of progress and of consumption. Now the Third World has ceased to be an 
exporter of agricultural products and its food trade deficit is growing290. Capitalism has had 
this dexterity that after the decolonization period mining grew significantly in the Third 
World without having any effect on economic development. In the last twenty years of the 
last century, to service the huge debt, high interest rates lead to a balance sheet that was zero 
or even negative on the net flow of resources from the Third World291. We knew long before 
Rio that “needs” to which we are accustomed in developed countries cannot – by simple 
arithmetic – be extended globally. This means that to preserve this (let alone increase as some 
politicians claim, talking of the growth that will soon return), most people will have to be kept 
at a lower level.  
 Returning to environmental policies, the argument repeated in all international 
conferences, that inaction may cost more than the immediate adoption of collaborative 
programmes of action, has not been convincing. Why? Because the impression has emerged 
that this argument only holds if one considers constraining measures that apply to everyone 
on the planet and that will lead to alterations and prohibitions which will limit the 
opportunities for development. Meanwhile, on the contrary, the cost may be lower and better 
controlled if one limits the spending to adaptation, to the depletion of resources and 
modifications to the environment, and that one stalls the agenda on these economically 
measurable necessities. 
 Under the rubric of “climate realism” the rich countries are managing to derail any 
international policy on reduction of greenhouse gas emissions that it is not based on a market 
in CO2 emissions. The sensible remarks made at the Copenhagen conference by NGOs, by 
the World Bank report, and by Nicholas Stern, that such a system would not allow less 
developed countries to move towards clean economic options except by large specific grants 
which were counted above aid for development, went unheeded. The idea is obvious and 
accepted even by the most neoliberal economists. These transfers of funds are needed for the 
physical efficacy of energy policy on the composition of the atmosphere and they are a 
legitimate way to mitigate the effect that market logic means that the rich countries, who are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 The US, which produces 37% of the world’s corn, devoted a third of this in 2009 to the production of 
biofuels.  
289 P. Bairoch Victoires et déboires I, Histoire économique et sociale du monde du XVIème siècle à nos jours, 
Gallimard 1997, p186ff. 
290 ibid tome III p809ff. 
291 ibid tome III p 989. In Nigeria, the population reacts to an increase in pump prices in a country that is a major 
oil producer, but what can it do? 
currently among the worst polluters, would be those most able to pay for the more emissions 
in the future. Market logic is so much thought of as normal, obviously, that these transfers, if 
they ever happen, will be seen as charity even though they are simply justice292. “Climate 
realism” prioritizes spending on adaptation rather than on reducing emissions. This literature 
is growing, with an unspoken cynicism, the main argument of which is the following: 
although climate change creates a problem for everyone with variations here and there, the 
adaptation to these changes needs significant economic and financial means that the rich 
countries are better able to handle than others, which in the short term changes the terms for 
international discussions. In other words, investments in reducing emissions and in adaptation 
are both useful, but only the latter will improve our relative position in the economic balance 
of power.  
 At the heart of the rationale for the continuation of economic progress lies a more 
elaborate theory, that of “ecological modernization” which promotes absolute respect for the 
environment thanks to innovative technological breakthroughs which allow a gradual 
decoupling between energy and economy and thus between the economy and the 
environment. Based on the order of a decentralized liberal market, it is presented as a flexible 
and cheaper solution to environmental problems. This appealing utopia has supporters mainly 
in the most advanced societies, notably in Germany, Holland, Scandinavia (and in lesser 
measure in the US), where the service economy forms a significant part of the GDP and 
where the dream of individualistic autonomy seems a possible and promising route thanks to 
micro-wind turbines, photovoltaic cells, solar panels, thermal insulation, fuel cells, hybrid 
cars running on electricity and biofuels, etc., avoiding the transport infrastructure costs of 
conventional energy, along with the gradual implementation of efficient recycling 293. This 
line of thought is spearheading an ideology based firmly on economic liberalism294. 
Experience and current achievements do not yet allow a test of the quality of life with a small, 
sustainable ecological footprint because they rely on economic structures that are still 
traditional and consuming. Nevertheless, they suggest that it is possible. This possibility 
opens a new political perspective that is very introverted. Leaving aside the “insoluble” 
problems of international negotiations with poor countries and developing countries, etc.… it 
shows an example of what needs to be done in an idealized experimental framework (while, 
back in the real world, Germany has requested an exemption from Brussels for CO2 
emissions of high-powered cars so as to not penalize the automotive industry). This ideology, 
ultimately, doesn’t solve any of the problems of the planet, and weakens the solidarity with 
the Third World while strengthening among its followers the conviction that “everything 
would be fine if we were left alone”. 
 Climate realism and the theory of ecological modernization are presented to the 
general populaces of our developed countries as an active response to the threat announced by 
ecologists. On every indicator – pollution, recycling, biodiversity, deforestation, etc – a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 The “Green Fund” announced at Copenhagen to help developing countries move towards a sustainable 
economy was reaffirmed in Cancun. But a commitment of $30 billion in 2010-12 and then $100 billion in 2020 
became a doubtful promise undoubtedly including existing development aid. It was mentioned in Durban, and 
the terms of its implementation provoked a conflict between developing and developed countries in Rio in June 
2012 that was not resolved. 
293 For a more complete analysis and a sociological reflection on the mainstream of ecological modernization, 
see Gabrielle Bouleau “Dialogue transatlantique sur la modernisation écologique réflexive : construction et 
angles morts d’une idéologie environnementale européenne”, 2011, AFSP, Strasbourg, 30 août-2 sept. (to 
appear). 
294 As Karin Bäckstrand and Eva Lövbrand note, the pivot of the argument in ecological modernization is “who 
should pay the costs?” considered in the context of liberal capitalism cf. “Climate governance beyond 2012: 
competing discourses of green governmentality, ecological modernization and civic environmentalism” in The 
Social Construction of Climate Change, Mary E. Pettenger editor Ashgate 2007. 
discourse on corrective modification of usages according to a marginal economic analysis, 
receives, thanks to the media and the internet, the support of much good will. Where will it 
lead?  
 
To take small steps towards a horrible victory, or build a dignified and sustainable 
pluralism? 
Some people think that the selfishness of the rich is, over the long-term, completely 
imaginary. That even if they had the desire, more or less conscious, to secede, they could not 
do it. Firstly, because of the fractal-like overlap of social categories, and secondly because 
with the environmental issues of protecting biodiversity or preventing climate change, we are 
all in the same boat. 
 This is not clear. The failure of various attempts of fiscal policy to protect the 
environment cannot but make us stop and think. Imagine fifty years in the future. In all 
probability we will be faced with a very run-down planet.  Will people then say “who is 
responsible? The rich must return what they took”? No, it is pointless to wash our historical 
laundry with endless quarrels. We would look at the current situation and discuss actions to 
be taken: “What shall we do?” would be the only reasonable question. It is like today: those 
who have acquired power (by taking resources) need the realism of pragmatically negotiated 
economic solutions, simply because they are in a position to impose them. Violence and wars 
will change nothing. They will simply be disqualified from public opinion and international 
bodies: one cannot build anything lasting from terrorism. In situations of conflicting interests 
the one who resists the longest is the one whose prosperity depends least on collective action.  
 Already today attitudes seem to have changed. On the greenhouse effect, the IPCC, an 
offshoot of the UN, originally had a warning function based on pooled scientific knowledge. 
But after the 4th report, the role of the scientific community has developed and evolved. By 
the international cooperation of twenty teams working on fifty models it has provided much 
better understanding of the development of climate change in various emission scenarios, not 
just in terms of global average temperatures, but also on changes in global and regional 
climates. The IPCC does not coordinate these studies but uses their data for its syntheses. In 
parallel with this, their economic studies on adaptation are enormously developed, comparing 
various global or regional energy policies to identify the least costly among those with an 
equivalent effect in terms of emissions. Inertia and adaptability are, in these models, 
translated into costs so as to facilitate comparisons. The balance is significant: it produces 
knowledge that is increasingly usable by economic agents to optimize their commercial 
expectations and their locations. The role of the UN is diminished. In these regional studies 
and investigations into the cost-effectiveness of different options, the researchers are doing 
science – certainly – but science useful for who?  To those who have the economic means to 
take initiatives. As this happens obviously under increasingly severe conditions, solidarity 
becomes an increasingly more absurd idea295. 
 At the major international conference of Fontevraud296, organized by Jacques Theys in 
September 1996, the range of views on the threats posed by technology and profit on the 
environment led to a general agreement that the climate, at least, imposed a universal point of 
view which would restore a healthy turn for research away from “economically productive” 
science. This hope was the basis of the foundation of the association “Global chance”. Today 
this idea has expired. We can see how it was ephemeral. The international scientific 
community essentially only provides tools for optimizing expenditure on adaptation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 The climate community is preparing for the 5th report of the IPCC on 10-year forecasts. These are no longer 
scenarios but extrapolations of trends made possible by inertia. The effect of these new details may not 
strengthen the links between humans but simply change property prices. 
296 “Quel environnement pour le XXIème siècle ? Environnement, maîtrise du long terme et démocratie”. 
 The question which then arises is whether the West – and the elites of those rapidly 
developing countries called “emerging” – is able to face up to this future or if it will continue 
to pretend to be unaware of it, all the while building horror under the guise of civilization and 
progress. 
 Where is this discordant world heading? We must not avoid this question. It leads 
inevitably towards two worlds, which move apart more and more while nesting one in the 
other, geographically and socially. On one side the destitute who survive burdened with all 
sorts of impossibilities and who are, in millions, left to the mercy of religious ideologues and 
manipulators. On the other side the “elite” who pursue the adventure of technological 
progress thanks to computing and biology while taking care not to let go of the levers of 
policing and military power. Over the long term this leads, in all likelihood, as several writers 
have predicted, to a differentiation of lifestyles creating two sociologically distinct strata of 
humans which, within a century or so, could end in the realization of transhumanist fantasies: 
two species that are biologically different, one improved by genetic prowess and not wanting 
to mingle with the other which is more savage, with all sorts of hereditary or societal dross. 
This is consistent with the mainstream of ecological modernization which welcomes 
microscopic high technology (generalized data processing allowing the tracking of objects in 
the economy and animals that one wants to protect, etc.)297. 
 Not wanting to take into account the finiteness that humanity currently faces, weighty 
old ideas of human biological progress are revived. “In all domains where the legacy of the 
Enlightenment proved decisive”, writes Luc Ferry, “the notion of the infinite has emerged 
[…] And it is in this very idea of this infinity that the human being, being now defined by its 
perfectibility, redevelops the question of meaning”298. The transhumanist fantasy has its origin 
in a differentialist philosophy. An extension of all the grand narratives of progress, this 
consists in seeing the future of mankind on the direction of those who have been the most 
successful in the liberal economic system. It is the fault denounced by Claude Lévi-Strauss.  
“In other words, does the distinction between the two types of history [stationary 
history and cumulative history] depend on the intrinsic nature of the cultures to 
which the terms are applied, or does it not rather result from the ethnocentric 
point of view which we always adopt in assessing the value of a different culture? 
We should thus regard as ‘cumulative’ any culture developing in a direction 
similar to our own, that is to say, whose development would appear to us to be 
significant [emphasis in the original]. Other cultures, on the contrary, would seem 
to us to be ‘stationary’, not necessarily because they are so in fact, but because 
the line of their development has no meaning for us, and cannot be measured in 
terms of the criteria we employ.”299 
But this fault goes way beyond anthropological comparisons. 
 There is a long-established idea that it would be unrealistic to try to escape a 
completely rational principle of evolution that consists in adjusting economic and political 
management according to the general competition laws of life, and that this would necessarily 
produce excluded peoples. The classical economists of the 17th century had noted that the 
rules of Christian charity were not the best advisors for the wealth of nations. Today the 
finitude of the planet changes the default ethics “at the margin” of economic development to a 
law that is implacable and numerically overwhelming. Economic ideology gets refined, and 
infiltrates itself into all the cogs, and resists, while pursuing the same monism. This indicates 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 The laissez-faire attitude to genetic modifications is supported by the theory of ecological modernization, cf. 
J. Wright and P. Kurian “Ecological modernization versus sustainable development: the case of genetic 
modification regulation in New Zealand” Sustainable Development Vol. 18, no. 6, 398 p. Nov 2010. 
298 L. Ferry, Le nouvel ordre écologique Grasset 1992. 
299 Cl. Lévi-Strauss Race et histoire (1952), Denoël 1987. 
a preference for seriously damaging nature or the climate, and remaining better endowed, 
rather than for sharing anything. But the indefinite future is at stake.  
 
Ecologico-scepticism and beliefs 
Sceptics do not deny that the climate is changing. In France, for example, Claude Allègre or 
Vincent Courtillot do not deny the general increase in temperatures, nor the trends in various 
climatic parameters. What they struggle with, and why they are heard and relayed by the 
media, is the attribution of this change to mankind. It is the anthropogenic effect that they 
question. 
 Their exercise is made possible because the trajectory that the climate has not 
followed since the start of the industrial era is, and will remain, largely unknown. How can 
we know what would have happened “naturally” if humans had not burnt coal or oil? It will 
always be the case that the anthropogenic origin is a hypothesis and not a measured fact. 
 Unquestionably, the accumulation of indices, and particularly the rapidity of changes 
already seen compared with paleo-climatic variations provided by ice cores, makes their 
position harder to sustain. But the strength of the climate-sceptic current is surprising. The 
role of lobbying on behalf of the energy industry is obviously very important300, and as Olivier 
Godard noted, these strategies of provoking doubt do not need to provide an alternative truth 
in order to be effective. Edwin Zaccai emphasized the immense difficulty of the economic 
reorientation necessary to follow the paths suggested by the IPCC. The necessary changes 
cause alarm; they risk changing the distribution of advantages and disadvantages in society. If 
we follow the recommendations outlined by experts on the basis of long-term predictions, 
isn’t there a risk, as so often in economics, arising from being the first to act?301 
 In the international context, why is there such an echo of climate scepticism in the 
United States? A New York Times survey before the November 2010 elections stated that 
“Only one of the Republicans running for the Senate accepts the scientific consensus that 
humans are responsible for global warming” (Oct.18, 2010). As for voters, a survey at a Pew 
Center on October 27th, indicated that amongst the Republican electorate only a minority of 
16% believed that the Earth is warming because of human activities. Overall, the survey 
shows a rise in climate scepticism in the US since 2006: 63% of Americans believe in global 
warming, but only 38% think that it is caused by human activity. Recently, after a press 
conference by Agence Science-Presse in December 2011, a comparative study of 10 major 
British newspapers and two from each of the following countries: USA (New York Times and 
Wall Street Journal), France (Le Monde and Le Figaro), Brazil, China and India, showed that 
80% of the climate sceptic quotations are in the British and American dailies, predominantly 
the latter. 
 Would this great country, which has always placed science at the highest of civilized 
values, abandon the principles that were the very foundation of its culture? 
 What is happening there? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 The Climate Action Network Europe (RAC Europe) published a study criticizing the funding paid by 
industrialists to American candidates. According to this NGO, “306.000 euros were paid in 2010 by the biggest 
European polluters to Senators who were climate sceptics or otherwise opposed to the law against climate 
change.”  (“306.000 euros ont été distribués en 2010 par les principaux pollueurs européens aux climato-
sceptiques et autres opposants à la loi de lutte contre les changements climatiques, élus au Sénat américain.”) 
This sum corresponds to “nearly 80% of the total funds committed by these companies to subsidize candidates 
during their campaign for the midterm elections in 2010.”  (“près de 80% du total des financements engagés 
par ces entreprises pour subventionner des candidats durant leur campagne pour les élections de mi-mandat 
2010.”) 
301 Cf  Zaccai E., Gemenne F., Decroly J.-M., Controverses climatiques sciences et politique Presses de Science-
Po 2012; O. Godard “Le climat, l’imposteur et le sophiste” Alternatives Economiques, 12 March 2010, “Le 
climato-scepticisme médiatique en France, un sophisme moderne”, Ec. Polytechnique, Sept 2011. 
 This is the first time that science has said “the whole of humanity is to blame”. But 
this is intolerable, especially to those who claim to be at the forefront. Man has always, up to 
now, needed a moral guarantee that discharges him from the burden of responsibility, this 
terrible burden of knowing how weak and prone to evil he is, inclined to odious behaviours 
that he despises. This need is very strong. Deeper than the moral values inculcated by the 
nuclear family, more compelling than the superego noted by psychoanalysis which comes 
from the childhood environment through parental and filial love, here this is historical, social, 
civilizational. The Catholic liturgy speaks of “the Lamb who takes away the sins of the 
world”. Exegesis indicates that in the Old Testament, to celebrate the Passover, a lamb was 
slain and we have kept the phrase used by John the Baptist, saying it during mass. Jesus died 
on the cross for the redemption of our sins, to allow the world to be saved and not succumb 
permanently to evil. 
 If a growth such as the West has experienced is no longer possible, if the climate is 
blowing up, if biodiversity is collapsing, it must mean that God no longer loves us. We would 
be in a vacuum, without knowing where our own absurdity will take us. The anxiety is like 
that of the Incas massacred by the conquistadors who thought that the gods they worshipped 
had lost their power. 
 It is in the land of the puritans, for whom the grace of God has such an importance 
and played a role in the birth of capitalism, that one finds the strongest climate sceptic 
reaction. Now who speaks, who accuses? It is science, that part of knowledge that Richard 
Rorty, one of the philosophers most representative of American civilization, takes as an 
example of better organization of social decision302. If God is still on our side, then that cannot 
be real science, it must be a group of self-proclaimed experts who are followed by the 
conformity of mediocre academics. 
 In Des choses cachées René Girard starts from the judgement of Solomon. Two 
prostitutes are arguing about a baby, each telling the King that the child is theirs and that the 
other has stolen it. So Solomon brought a sword and proposed cutting the infant in two so as 
to give half to each woman. One of the women accepted this, but the other refused and 
preferred to renounce her child so as to save him. In our common language we could say that 
the bad prostitute accepted the sacrifice while the good prostitute sacrificed herself to save the 
child. René Girard explains that at the beginning of his work he thought it more appropriate to 
not use the same word “sacrifice” in both situations since in the first case it concerns a real 
immolation, and in the second a renunciation “so that the child might live”. But he finally 
concluded that this evolution in the meaning of the term is rightly highly significative of 
Christ’s message. It is the passage from the ancient religions to the true sense of the sacrifice 
of the Christ, the “difference between the archaic sacrifice, which turns against a third the 
violence of those who are fighting, and the sacrifice in the Christian sense which consists in 
relinquishing all selfish claims, even to one’s own life if necessary, so as to avoid killing”.303 
 The ethical question facing the Christian today therefore is whether one should give 
thanks to Christ for having thus “taken away the sins of the world” or endeavour to continue 
this example by possibly sacrificing oneself so that “humanity can live”, sacrificing in 
Girard’s renunciation sense. In other words, it seems necessary to question the evolution in 
Christian practices by distinguishing more clearly between those two interpretations which 
merge in liturgy and worship: the one which convinces the believer that he is himself saved or 
soon will be and will be part of the flock led by the Good Shepherd, a long story in which the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302 Cf. especially Rorty R., “Science and Solidarity” in The Rhetoric of the Human Sciences, Nelson J. S., Megill 
A., and McCloskey D. N., Eds, Univ. of Wisconsin Press 1987. 
303 “différence entre le sacrifice archaïque, qui détourne contre une victime tierce la violence de ceux qui se 
battent, et le sacrifice au sens chrétien qui consiste à renoncer à toute revendication égoïste, à la vie s'il le faut, 
pour ne pas tuer”. R. Girard Les origines de la culture, Desclée de Brouwer 2004. 
Church had the role of defining the frontiers of the flock itself in the political, and even 
military, sense, and the other which insists on this message of universality that the sacrifice of 
Christ was to save all men, a message which is extremely important today and completely 
changes the role that Christianity can play in ecological transition. 
 This opposition clearly changes the context in which ordinary man perceives the 
message from the political and scientific elites. What is the actual consequence of not 
attributing climate change to human activity? In the two cases it must be taken into account, 
economic efforts are required. But if the change is not anthropogenic, the average citizen is 
unable to see the effect of their own behaviour in this business, and is thus completely 
absolved of any responsibility. The elites, the media, politicians do not agree, therefore my 
economic life remains normal and legitimate. An immense relief is thus brought to millions to 
households struggling with everyday difficulties, and that justifies them in not changing their 
behaviours except in the measure that they are obliged to by changes in the economy, prices, 
the market, resulting from changes in the climate, which is obviously very slowly. While 
doubt is common among the experts, the democratic game makes it impossible to consider 
paying for North-South transfers such as those proposed in the Green Fund project304.  
 In fact, there is a dizzying distance between the experts and the average citizen about 
whether the doubt is there. Also Christians, like all citizens, take account of the economic 
constraints they face and have not changed their “generosity balance”, except in the unique 
case where they both give credence to what the majority of scientists say and also give more 
weight to the universalism of the Christian message than to the moral comfort coming from 
redemption. To put it another way, the “tranquil” Christian life, where all goes well because 
Christ died for us, often experienced as such in the parishes, can also be a factor in laissez-
faire economics. 
 I do not speak here of Judaism, Islam, Buddhism or Hinduism, or other religions. The 
role of religions should be examined in detail, but I leave this to historians and sociologists305. 
Nevertheless, one can not fail to be appalled at seeing the wasteful and short-sighted luxury 
practised in the Emirates (Dubai, Abu Dhabi) with their oil revenues – including artificial ski 
slopes – without really contributing to helping other countries, Muslim or not, to advance in 
the global North-South problems. Their wealth, unique in the world, but ephemeral, should be 
a lever for long-term action.  
 
 Humanity is in the process of getting trapped in a dramatic shrivelling-up, of 
selfishness leading to armed conflict to safeguard our “standard of living”. As Marie-José 
Mondzain rightly says, this calls for more than just indignation, one should “take account of 
the indignity that is silent, without noise, without the expressive possibilities as those who 
have no voice, no shelter, no words, cut off from their tongue, their country. What we need is 
not an awakening of the conscience but an awakening of political action. This organization is 
cynical and rational, rational yes because it is consistent with its justifications, it has financial 
justifications, it has economics experts and it has the rationality of profits. There is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304 Transfer mechanism proposed in the Copenhagen conference, but broken down by the Rio+20 summit. Cf. 
note. 
305 See particularly Latour B.,  Gagliardi P., Eds,  Les atmosphères de la politique, dialogue pour un monde 
commun, Les empêcheurs de penser en rond 2006, cited above. We also mention John Dewey in A Common 
Faith “If I have said anything about religions and religion that seems harsh, I have said those things because of a 
firm belief that the claim on the part of religions to possess a monopoly of ideals and of the supernatural means 
by which alone, it is alleged, they can be furthered, stands in the way of the realization of distinctively religious 
values inherent in natural experience.” 
legitimacy based in the rationality itself of capital and neoliberal capitalism in its violence 
which is supported by economic science.”306 
 What makes it so difficult to change course to avoid this indignity? One key part is 
Western monologism307 with its usual weapons: the limitless affirmation of the individual, the 
cost-benefit analyses which allow one to monetarize everything, even ethics, the belief that 
technology can solve all problems and, finally, the management of the category of risk by 
throwing doubt at everything, on the causes of pollution and climate change, so that finally all 
truth fades except the true caesura between the haves and the have-nots. 
 We must abandon “sustainable development”, that ambiguous expression turned into a 
dysfunctional slogan, and focus the action on dignified, durable co-existence, placing itself 
absolutely and institutionally, at all levels, within a pluralist framework with mutual respect 
for civilizations, religions and habits. This means making its respect for different views a 
fundamental value of all doctrines including our own, and to admit that others also can 
contribute to the binding consultation that the global problems impose on us308. Now the 
Communist adventure has failed with its conquering progressive scientism, we must 
recognize the responsibility of neoliberal logic and urgently put in place the collective 
dimension of the planet in a pluralist fashion.  
 Obviously this transition and the progress of international political institutions will 
require compromise, procedures, and a lot of money. The initiative is necessarily on the side 
of those who have. 
 The background philosophy can only be pluralism. The idea is ancient and simple: 
build representative processes that allow decisions to be made as if we were a small group of 
humans. This does not obviously have anything to do with relativism, which is a common 
misconception. It does not mean accepting anything and everything, but that the world is open 
to many readings and interpretations, which in practice are not myriad and which have the 
right to exist as long as they admit, of course, that they are one of many.  
 Pluralism is not a utopia. We have experienced it in various forms in our pluralist 
parliamentary systems. Divergent interests, reconcilable disagreements, we have lived with 
each other for twenty-five centuries and seen that these are often resolved.   
 I do not remotely claim that this is easy. There are, unfortunately, many ideologies, 
religions and political doctrines currently in the world, which are not ready to make any 
concession with the others, and which turn the pride of their followers to violence. But, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 “qu'on se rende compte de l'indignité silencieuse, sans bruit, sans possibilité expressive de ceux qui sont sans 
voix, sans abri, sans parole, coupés de leur langue, de leur pays. Ce qu'on attend ce n'est pas un réveil des 
consciences mais un réveil de l'action politique. Cette organisation est cynique et rationnelle, rationnelle oui 
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capitalisme néolibéral dans sa violence qui est soutenue par la science économique.” France Culture 24/6/11. 
307 Which was also the source of Chinese materialism by the vector of Marxism and enrolled the institutions of 
Brazil in the philosophy of progress by the influence of the positivism of Auguste Comte.  
308 One has to go further than taking the “common references” that John Dewey proposed as basis for the 
American way of life (Democracy and Education 1916). I refer to the excellent article that Jean-Pierre Dupuy 
wrote about John Rawls, where he concluded “Either the world currently developed isolates itself, which would 
mean it increasingly shields itself in many different ways from the attacks that the resentment of those left 
behind will engender, each one more cruel and abominable, or another way of relating to the world, to nature, to 
things and to beings, must be invented, which will have the property of being able to be universalized to the 
scale of humanity” (“Ou bien le monde actuellement développé s'isole, ce qui voudra dire de plus en plus qu'il se 
protège par des boucliers de toutes sortes contre les agressions que le ressentiment des laissés pour compte 
concevra chaque fois plus cruelles et plus abominables, ou bien s'invente un autre mode de rapport au monde, à 
la nature, aux choses et aux êtres, qui aura la propriété de pouvoir être universalisé à l'échelle de l'humanité” ), In 
“Les béances d'une philosophie raisonnable” rev. de Philosophie Economique n°7, 2003/1, p 33-59. 
ultimately, collective action, such as the current UN peacekeepers, can have no legitimacy 
except on a basis of accepted pluralism, which global problems should reinforce. 
 All that is needed is for us to want the future to not be dictated by economic interest, 
itself identified by indicators of profit. If the only prospective studies taken into account by 
leaders of developed countries are those which scrutinize technical innovations and try to 
gauge the customers that they might appeal to, to see their impact on the economic forces 
involved, taking into account the place they can be given by the media as a function of 
journalists’ agendas, which is largely what happens today, then politics has already resigned. 
 	  
2. Seeing reality means giving up the speculative financial markets 
It is customary to conclude an essay by opening a window to the East, where the sun rises, 
and to offer reasons for hope. But in this work I am not speaking of solutions. You may ask, 
well then, what should we do? It is one thing to criticize, but to act, that is something else… 
 
 In this book, because economics is a social science, we have come to discuss themes 
touching on sociology, ecology and also history, religion, and issues concerning major 
philosophical choices. Our analysis leads, in summary, to three major conclusions. 
 Neoliberal economics is a system that is incapable of taking account of the environment 
and the planet’s limits. It rules by financial markets which prevent the expected economic 
reactions. This is without any doubt due to the fact that the system is the result of an 
organization set up to conquer the world but, now that the world is conquered, the problem is 
how to administer it. 
 Monetarization of non-marketable goods is not the answer. It is, in fact, a bad idea. That 
is not to say that we should not pay dearly for those injured by accidents or by acts arising 
from profit-driven risk-taking that are to the detriment to the common good. 
 The prospect of opening the infinite in continuing the race by the “perfecting” of man by 
biological means is a philosophy that undermines the core values of civilization and which, 
under the constraints that the planet imposes on us, will lead to a collapse of society that is 
morally intolerable. 
 In fact, of course, these three conclusions are also three unresolved questions, for which 
we need answers. a) How to theorize an economy that preserves the planet? b) How to 
achieve behaviours that look after the collective good? c) How to move towards a pluralism, 
at a global level, that has enough legitimacy to be politically active? 
 A whole book would be needed for each of these questions. I have fairly clear personal 
views on each of these points but is it really necessary to describe them here? The answers 
should not be at the level of an individual thinker but only in relevant collective action. 
 All that I will say here on question a) is that the changes needed to the market economy 
are, in my view, very significant, and much more radical than previously thought by most 
economic and political agents. 
 On question b) it is essential to construct legal and international institutional structures 
to monitor and care for the environment, and punish those who damage it. 
 Regarding question c) I lean towards an international strengthening of the links between 
moderates of all persuasions. It is the moderates at the centre of systems rooted in history 
who can fight against ideological extremes, both capitalist and fundamentalist, to establish the 
structures of a pluralism that will facilitate an international politics of instruction and 
openness. 
 The main thesis I am defending is that the state of the planet, characterized qualitatively 
and quantitatively, is not taken account of by the current operation of the economy. The 
reason that I’ve highlighted, because it concerns the boiler of the economic motor that is 
finance, is capital. But this is not the only reason. More generally it is the blindness created by 
the liberal economy which prevents the commencement of the change in direction that the 
times demand. The correct term is scotomization. Originally introduced by psychoanalysts, it 
denotes those phenomena, more frequent than one would think, of negative hallucinations. 
Where a hallucination makes one see things that don’t exist, an overinterpretation often linked 
to fears and traces of emotional traumas, a scotomization is where certain elements of reality 
disappear or are erased. You enter a room and you do not see a person because you expected 
there to be nobody there.  The economy has prefabricated an idea of the world where limits do 
not exist; they have been scotomized. Financialized free trade shines a blue light on the world, 
and everything becomes blue. Those are the prices, and you see nothing else but them. In a 
blue world, how can you explain that there are other colours? There is only one possibility in 
my opinion, it is to show that the blue light is artificial, coming from a spotlight pointing at 
the stage of our theatre. 
 This realization – that the liberal economy is not an ideology that facilitates ecological 
transition and that firstly we need to reduce the role of speculative markets worldwide – is the 
essential precondition necessary so that the actions of all committed individuals who work for 
the climate, for water, for the wetlands and for forests, who fight against famine, against the 
overexploitation of resources, against risk-taking for profit, are not to, in spite themselves, 
rapidly brought back to this monochromatic world. 
 This scotomization works by social phenomena of erasure. The most powerful is – as 
we discussed – the speculative market which hides the information essential for any dynamic 
change: information about rates of change. But there are others, in particular, with regard to 
responsibilities, by escapement mechanisms. It is rare in physics to find cases where a device 
causes an effect on a system without the system, in turn, influencing the device (this is even a 
law in quantum mechanics: the observer always disrupts and is disrupted). The most relevant 
example is the escapement in a clock. This is the mechanism which makes the regulator 
receive a push from the spring or weight, but it (almost) always makes the same movement, 
as if the role played by the source of energy were invisible, it beats its rhythm of oscillation as 
if the source didn’t exist. There is an escapement of responsibility for the shareholder: he 
contributes and he is not responsible. Capitalism as it has developed since the 1980s with the 
now global neoliberal model, gives a primary place to the remuneration of the shareholder. 
The philosophy is that one should richly reward the judicious choice of those who invest 
funds in successful or promising businesses. It is well rewarded because this act is very 
important for the growth of the economy. And moreover, from the outset, the investor is 
absolved of responsibility for what is done with the money. Pollution, environmental impact, 
sprains to labour rights, tax evasion, etc., the shareholder is immune; the worst that can 
happen is the loss of the money invested. Community is thereby deprived of a lever now 
essential to the challenges of the century. It seems obvious that the future, to reduce risks, will 
restrain or redirect these mechanisms that are very intelligent but designed for other purposes.
  
 
The idea of nature and what its degradation means 
To understand what the teeth of the market are in the process of devouring, to clarify this 
issue that is much debated but often in a confusing fashion, and to avoid the unfortunately 
numerous superficial clichés, we need to be more precise about what we mean when we talk 
of nature, something we have only touched on in one aspect so far (chapter III-4). 
 The word nature comes from the Latin natura. The root na or gna gave nascere and 
gignere and, in Greek, γιγνοµαι, to become, to be born, and the suffix turus, tri, tor, names 
the actor, so natura means then “the engenderer, the force that gives birth to”309. This all-
encompassing concept, “nature”, is not strictly a descriptive noun like a set, or a concept that 
unites beings with the same characteristics. Nature designates the totality of beings in the 
universe. But unlike the terms “all” or “being”, it adds the idea of the fecundity of the world. 
It is currently used in the sense of the order that governs existence and the succession of 
beings, and as the force that personifies this system and its laws. Also as an attribute of a 
being, it also often signifies the characteristics that come from its constitution or birth and not 
those changes caused by exterior actions. 
 If, as a first approach, we follow the advice of Ferdinand de Saussure in his Cours de 
linguistique générale we can narrow down its meaning by using its opposites; for the term 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  309	  “l'engendrante, la force qui engendre” in Littré’s Dictionnaire de la langue française. 
‘nature’ they are old and important. The first is the duality natural-supernatural, which refers 
to religious belief, in which nature brings together those phenomena that arise by themselves 
without divine intervention. Among the Greeks the distinction is not as clear as the break 
between that which is intentional and that which is necessary (automaton) as, for Aristotle, 
nature has its intentions. Light bodies rise, etc., and springs and mountains have their gods 
who, even if they are not on Mount Olympus, nevertheless have their prerogatives. Gradually 
science, in its historical development, in understanding the regularity and sequences of 
phenomena, replaced the will of Zeus or Poseidon about storms or tempests with the 
properties of nature. As the Stoic Seneca wrote: “There are differences of interpretation, 
however, between our countrymen and the Tuscans, the latter of whom possess consummate 
skill in the explanation of the meaning of lightning. We think that because clouds collide, 
therefore lightning is emitted; they hold that clouds collide in order that lightning may be 
emitted.”310 And science retains this function of emancipation and disenchantment that the 
Enlightenment philosophers developed and that the materialists use against the Church in 
support of naturality. D’Holbach wrote in his System of Nature (1781): “Do not put down to a 
God that you have never known who contradicts himself, and that wicked men of all countries 
make speak according to their interests, the rules of your duties which are clear and precise 
and that nature shows you clearly”.311 
 The second opposition natural-artificial is more delicate. Certainly things in nature 
have a spontaneous evolution that is not shared with tools which stay as they have been made. 
But when man developed agriculture, husbandry, medicine, where natural beings have been 
domesticated or diverted to new uses, the distinction became less clear. Labour disturbs the 
earth but without expelling life. The opposition took a different turn after the outcome of the 
controversy over “spontaneous creation”. Beer is an artificial product, produced from yeast. 
Mould, germs, bacteria are everywhere, and the “engenderer” seems more generous than ever. 
But the constantly growing power of technology reintroduces this rupture on a grand scale. 
“A tract of land”, writes Heidegger, “is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The 
earth now reveals itself as a coal-mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The field that 
the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order [bestellte] appears differently than it did when 
to set in order still meant to take care of and to maintain”312. Overall, technology and nature 
seem more and more to oppose each other. 
 Finally, the duality nature-culture marks a distinction about transmission. On one 
side, the bodily heritage of the animal womb of the human species and structures of the 
innate, while on the other, tools and their permanence, writing, books, education, the 
knowledge which form the aim of individual education and of collective behaviour. Here 
again the two formative sources of man which seem somehow to complete and harmonize 
themselves in the idiosyncratic traits of each individual, become conflicts at social and 
political levels when modernity comes to evict cultural habits which have always 
accompanied ethnic transmissions. There is something in culture which is thought of as 
natural and, it must be added, there is something in nature which is thought of as cultural. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310 Sénèque Questions naturelles, II, 32, quoted in G.	  Matheron,	  Estimer	  et	  choisir,	  Ecole	  des	  Mines,	  1978	  ;	  
Estimating	  and	  Choosing,	  an	  Essay	  on	  Probability	  and	  its	  Practice,	  trans.	  Hasofer,	  Springer	  1989. 
311 “Ne va pas faire descendre d'un Dieu que tu ne connaîtras jamais, recommande d'Holbach, qui se contredit 
lui-même, et que des hommes pervers font en tout pays parler suivant leurs intérêts, les règles de tes devoirs qui 
sont clairs et précis et que la nature te montre évidemment”. Fayard 1990. (This passage is taken from the 
Discours Préliminaire which is in the 1770 edition in the Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris, but is missing from 
the English editons. It could have been added by Naigeon, friend of d'Holbach and of Diderot). 
312 Martin Heidegger, “The Question of technology” (1953). 
Philosophers have talked a lot about nature, with very different intentions. Aristotle aimed to 
understand the movements of the physis (nature), while since Francis Bacon, and then 
Descartes, the clearly stated ambition has been to possess and master. Man has a Promethean 
outlook, because he is subject to God being involved in his power. He may conquer, dominate 
and transform nature. Kant’s concern is more properly philosophical. In separating the 
appearances or phenomena of things-in-themselves or noumena that we can not know but 
which underpin the very existence of phenomena, he makes it impossible to know anything 
outside the domain of science, such as beauty, freedom, ethics, and the whole noumenal 
world except for some principle generalities at the conceptual level, i.e., transcendental 
philosophy. In reaction, Goethe, Schelling and Hegel, in his early work, introduced a 
philosophy of nature (naturphilosophie) which aims to restore a metaphysical place for the 
recent discoveries in science. Hegel then departed from this way to replace nature in the 
landscape by the general coming of the Spirit: it is ordered in increasing level of complexity 
and its limit, its frontier is reached when one achieves self-awareness, i.e., in man. The 
working man, shaping the future of history, becomes the privileged benchmark, and this 
dialectic humanism, proposed as an alternative discourse to the science if its time,  would be 
the departure point for Marx’s materialist “reversal”. But Goethe, as much as Hegel, lived in a 
time so exuberant of science – it was the great bifurcation of the two cultures, at the time of 
Gauss and Cauchy who launched mathematics towards new ambitions – so their position in 
this respect was rapidly obsolete and gave way to the encyclopedic positivism of Auguste 
Comte followed by the scientist-philosophers Claude Bernard, Ernst Mach, Pierre Duhem, 
etc.  
 As a philosophy of nature, as much as a synthesis demarcating itself from science, one 
should also mention the path sketched by Bergson who aimed to judge science as a whole, 
product of an industrious intelligence, according to the model of rational mechanics begun by 
Newton and perfected in the physics of Maxwell and the thermodynamicists. The creative 
evolution applies to the Darwinian “revolution” to mark the specificity of the being to which 
man pertains. But, at the start of the 20th century, is a philosophy of nature still possible 
without going against the science whose inventive capacities it denies and whose absolute 
limits it wishes to define? That is what was tried by Maurice Merleau-Ponty313, who aimed not 
to confine philosophy to the domains of human subjectivity or history, and the logician-
mathematician Alfred Whitehead by a relational ontology, reconciling permanence with what 
is to come, and existence as a process314. 
 However, during the last century, this issue was no longer put in these terms. Firstly 
because science had changed its view of nature and provided essential knowledge about 
threats, balances, precautions, and the care needed to cease the destructive irreversibility of 
which technology is now capable. Secondly because it is no longer up to philosophy to 
respond directly to natural beings, it has been displaced and now interrogates the social 
crucible of science. Helped by the strength of the methodological foundations of sociology 
(Emily Durkheim, Gabriel Tarde, Max Weber, etc.) it studies “the nature of science”, the 
taboos of what “produces” science and its “product” technology. The 20th century is that of 
epistemology (Popper, Bachelard, Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend, etc.), of philosophy of 
technology (Heidegger, Habermas, Ellul, Gorz, etc.) and of the sociology of innovation 
(Ulrich Beck, Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, Antony Giddens, etc.). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 “whatever the nature of the world and being, we are. By nature in us, we can know Nature, and vice versa, it 
is about us that the beings of this same space tell us.” (“de quelque nature que soient le monde et l'etre, nous en 
sommes. Par la nature en nous, nous pouvons connaître la Nature, et réciproquement c'est de nous que nous 
parlent les vivants et même l'espace”) M. Merleau-Ponty La nature, Notes cours au Collège de France (1959-60) 
Seuil 1994. 
314 Nature and Life. 1934. Univ. of Chicago Press. 
 
At the same time science profoundly changed our understanding by the emergence of two 
fundamental notions which are the epicentres of the contemporary understanding of nature. 
On the one hand is the notion of a reproductive open system thanks to which physics and 
biology can develop without the old criticisms of incoherence, a non-reductive entity which 
opens up phenomena that elude mechanics. On the other hand is the notion of the biosphere as 
a set of habitats and ecosystems characterized by the interdependence of these systems among 
themselves and of their regulation over long time scales. 
 The discovery of open systems, the culmination of at least a century of increasingly 
heightened vitalistic dualism, was unexpectedly simple. We have already mentioned it. The 
notable works of Ilya Prigogine on imbalanced systems answered the big question of life, 
about which so much metaphysical passion had been invested, with the simple observation 
that open systems that are traversed by energy and material match the criteria of 
unpredictability with which we think of characterizing the living. The discovery of the double 
helix complemented this understanding and this trivialization by implementing the 
transmission of characteristics of species and the combinatorics of evolution. But the one and 
the other, thereby, revealed the immensity of ignorance we face since these “divergent” 
systems escape the determinism on which positivism had constructed its doctrine, and that 
moreover, was found in the complex mutual configurations that are ecosystems. It was “the 
end of omniscience”.315  
 “If the fear of exhaustion, of levelling of productive differences, was decisive for the 
interpretation of the second principle, it was the biological model which constituted the key 
source of inspiration about history that has been followed: the abandonment of the restriction 
of the thermodynamics to systems artificially cut from the world, its metamorphosis into a 
science of the world populated by beings capable of evolving and innovating, of beings that 
we cannot, except to enslave, make predictable and controllable”.316 
 The reasons for this unpredictability and incontrollability stem from “weak stability”, 
self-organization, divergence from trajectories, sensitivity to initial conditions, Brownian and 
quantum indeterminism, strange attractors. 
 “The first physicists had very wisely chosen objects eminently reducible to 
mathematical modelling. Objects which belong to the very narrow class of dynamical systems 
for which the trajectory can be defined meaningfully. The history of modern physics is linked 
to the discovery of the limited validity of concepts arising from such systems whose 
description can be given completely and deterministically, to the discovery, at the very heart 
of mathematical physics of the ‘sublunary’ world”.317 
 The end of omniscience gives content back to nature: the definitively 
incomprehensible. “The paths of nature cannot be predicted with certainty, the part due to 
chance is irreducible, and much more decisive than Aristotle himself understood: bifurcatory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315 “la fin de l'omniscience”. I. Prigogine and I. Stengers La nouvelle Alliance Gallimard 1979, particularly p101-
116. 316	  “Si la hantise de l'épuisement, du nivellement des différences productrices, fut déterminante pour 
l'interprétation du second principe, c'est le modèle biologique qui a constitué la source d'inspiration décisive en 
ce qui concerne l'histoire qui a suivi : l'abandon de la restriction de la thermodynamique au systèmes 
artificiellement coupés du monde, sa métamorphose en une science du monde peuplé d'êtres capables d'évoluer 
et d'innover, d'êtres dont nous ne pouvons, sauf à les asservir, rendre le comportement prévisible et contrôlable”	  
317 “Les premiers physiciens avaient fort judicieusement choisi des objets éminemment réductibles à une 
modélisation mathématique, des objets qui appartiennent tous à la classe assez restreinte des systèmes 
dynamiques pour lesquels la trajectoire peut être définie avec sens. L'histoire de la physique contemporaine est 
liée à la découverte de la validité limitée des concepts mis au points à propos de tels systèmes dont la description 
peut se donner comme complète et déterministe, à la découverte, au sein même de la physique mathématique, du 
monde «sublunaire»”, ibid. 
nature, is that where tiny differences, insignificant fluctuations, can, if occurring in 
appropriate circumstances, invade the whole system, causing a fundamentally new regime. “ 
And as these authors rightly emphasized, “the crisis we have just described burst out with 
more force as our confidence was blinder”318, confidence in science, in technology and in 
economic progress. 
 In parallel there was a renewed study of this sort of sociology of living beings, namely 
ecology. Following work of Vladimir Vernadsky, the concept of the biosphere has been 
globally accepted. One studies the open system Earth with its cycles: of water, of carbon, of 
nitrogen, etc. Biology captures the influence of epigenesis, of the context, of society on the 
ontogenetic development of individuals. Everywhere one sees the disruptive, invasive, 
constraining influence of human society319. 
 
We thus arrive at an acceptance of nature which takes account of scientific knowledge 
without taking it as a complete and absolute container but, rather, seeing its limits and 
appreciating the vastness of our ignorance that science itself compels us to acknowledge. The 
worries about nature are the translation of our judgement of dependence with regard to the 
reproductive open systems of which we are a part, and that we see being constituted in 
ecosystems with that unpredictability and uncontrollability, partial no doubt, but irreducible, 
which concerns us and is precious to us because it looks like a sister to our own freedom. 
 Thus the first reaction that comes to mind, the only one in the popular understanding 
of ecology, is to preserve, in the most absolute and rigorous sense, at least at first, those parts 
of nature to be conserved intact as a reserve, as ‘original’ regions. A huge literature has been 
devoted to this feeling of attachment to a golden age where we were still among the animals 
and in “balance” with them. 
 How should one think of the idea of a natural park? Humanity, continuing its 
technological development, would preserve, in strictly protected zones, the natural nature that 
benefits us by its climatic role and by an interface carefully controlled and filtered in both 
directions. The history of American natural parks gives a very good idea of the scope and 
limits of such an ambition. The creation of the great parks dates from the 19th century, well 
before the ecological movement, in the middle of the industrial revolution. The aim was to 
rightly preserve the beauty of American geographical sites and not let them be ruined by 
uncoordinated private initiatives that would “denature” them. It needs a cultural will in those 
countries that do not have Roman ruins, or Romanesque churches, to maintain their 
waterfalls, geysers, the wildlife and plants out of reach of urban pressure and the networks of 
land use planning. And from the start it has been understood that this work requires a budget 
just as, at the same time, for the historic monuments in Europe.  
 The management of this wilderness is, however, extremely difficult, and becoming 
more so, it seems, on two levels. Firstly our understanding of the phenomena of natural 
selection leads us to try to copy what we know to be the cause of the observed variety: the 
giant sequoias are the way they are because it has the specific advantage that it “responds” to 
the fires that spontaneously occur to varying extents. The absence of such conflagrations 
disrupted the flora and prevented the giant sequoias from reproducing. Human intervention 
was thus considered necessary to produce a certain rhythm of forest fires, the management 
and result of which is uncertain. Later invasive species, plants, insects or others, caused 	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  “Les chemins de la nature ne peuvent être prévus avec certitude, la part d'accident y est irréductible, et bien 
plus décisive qu'Aristote lui-même ne l'entendait : la nature bifurquante, est celle où de petites différences, des 
fluctuations insignifiantes, peuvent si elle se produisent dans des circonstances opportunes, envahir tout le 
système, engendrer un régime de fonctionnement nouveau.”  
“la crise que nous venons de décrire éclate avec d'autant plus de force que la confiance était aveugle”	  
319 Cf Wilson E. O. In Search of Nature, Penguin 1996, p153ff. 
considerable problems in these parks, notably today because of the displacement of species 
caused by climate change. In any case, people, visitors or janitors, unintentionally introduced 
species that accompanied them. Millions of dollars are necessary for management. The 
business is complicated by the fact that some of the parks are inhabited by people, and further 
complicated by the fact that there are some people in America with ancestral customs. “A 
discrepancy in the guiding objectives at the heart of the park plays out everyday in the 
resource managers of the National Park Service and other agencies in the management of 
wildlife”, writes David Graber. “While many culturalists have dispelled the myth that the 
parklands are not affected by past activities of the human race, they raise the terrifying 
possibility that there isn’t actually any wild life in the parks: the parks are constructions. That 
does not preclude a type of park that combines the preservation of biodiversity with the 
preservation of cultural objects. Compromise is possible. But such a site is even further away 
from wilderness.”320 It seems that creating a framework which approximately maintains what 
happens when human influence is light is more and more difficult and more and more 
expensive. 
 We thus come to the conclusion that preservation can hardly mean anything other than 
caretaking, using our knowledge to try to make spaces on the planet meet the targets which 
seem to us important in function of physical and biological laws, and also by reason of purely 
political and cultural desires specifying certain requirements. This is a very delicate and 
multifaceted art, that of being gardener of the biosphere. Basically nature is what lives and we 
do not know why, it includes certain disorders and diseases, yet we are unable to say exactly 
what good health means. This joins the emphasis placed on care by some philosophical 
currents, and that which is now called “preservation of the environment” is thus explained by 
saying that it means the work of protection-production of conditions of existence, a truly new 
mission given to economic activity “conceived as a subsystem interacting with the entire 
human ecosystem”321. 
 
Attach to this conclusion all the relevance and wisdom that is needed for the question of 
preserving nature, and it remains the case that many indicators are alarming, whose meaning 
fits perfectly with the caretaking of the preservation-production of the conditions of existence, 
without playing with words. This is a reasonably convincing programme for going towards a 
world where knowledge and resources are devoted to the maintenance of so-called natural 
equilibria, to be thought of as a “new economics” necessarily adaptive to human and social 
development.  
 But it must be admitted that this is not at all what’s actually happening. What is the 
nature of the environmental aggression that is currently worrying us deeply? This key point 
needs to be clarified. It comes from the accumulation of unwanted effects. Four significant 
problems at the frontier of the economy should be mentioned: a) The spread of waste that is 
of negative economic value and whose natural dissemination is unchecked. b) The projection 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320 “Un désaccord dans les objectifs à suivre au sein d’un parc se joue tous les jours parmi les gestionnaires de 
ressources du National Park Service et d’autres agences de gestion de la vie sauvage. Alors que les culturalistes 
ont bien dissipé le mythe selon lequel les terres des parcs ne sont pas affectées par les affaires passées du genre 
humain, ils soulèvent la possibilité, terrifiante, qu’il n’existe en fait pas de vie sauvage dans les parcs : les parcs 
sont des constructions. Cela n’interdit pas un genre de parc qui associe la préservation de la diversité biologique 
à la préservation d’objets culturels. Le compromis est possible. Mais un tel site s’éloigne encore plus de la 
wilderness.” D. M. Graber “Une approche résolue du biocentrisme : le dilemme de la wilderness dans les parcs 
nationaux” Ecologie & politique n°40, 167-178, 2010. Also see the work by John C. Miles Wilderness in 
National Parks : Playground or Preserve, Univ. Washington Press 2009, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780295990392. 
321 “conçue comme un sous-système en interaction avec l'ensemble de l'écosystème humain” B. Perret thus spoke 
of the symbiotic economy (Le capitalisme est-il durable ? Carnets Nord 2008.) 
of the components of the environment on a linear scale by means of contingent valuation or 
any other method that gives a monetarized value. This is even more reductive when applied to 
nature than to the artificial because it is poorly understood and its interpretation is open. 
Certainly the assigned prices cannot give economic information relevant to action. c) For the 
same reason uncertainty about the environment, consisting fundamentally in not knowing, 
does not allow one to probabilize to use economic optimization processes.  d) Also at the 
frontier is the question of future generations, which economists handle with such cheerfulness 
that one might ask what would happen if they tackled questions of euthanasia or eugenics in 
the same way. 
 To some extent, our optimism leads us to believe that everything that concerns the 
concept of pressure, urban, demographic etc., can be dealt with, in effect, by implementing a 
policy of care. But the worry, rightly, sees more accidents, more irreversible damage, sees the 
growth of inert zones, more erosion of species. Why are nuclear catastrophes, which will 
become more frequent with the proliferation of nuclear power stations, more worrying than 
other things? Because they definitively neutralize a part of the domain of life. Nuclear power 
is characterizes by a permanent complication of technology which has the unique feature of 
being punctuated by major accidents. Today it is impossible to draw the outline of the area 
polluted by the Chernobyl explosion because the rains and rivers have carried radioactive 
elements and deposited them far and wide, diluted or concentrated at random. The problem is 
encroachment by surprise, by irreversible deeds. Ulrich Beck was the first to have clarified 
the philosophical and sociological import of the notion of technological risk as something that 
goes beyond common knowledge and scientific understanding, and thus challenges all the 
care policies one might wish for. Certainly there have always been risks, the usual argument, 
enterprising man is necessarily always subject to uncertainty. But there is the gradual 
uncertainty and the brutal surprise attacks that extend, in small or great steps, the inert 
minerality of the powerful physical or chemical laws that technology uses and believes it 
masters because they are economically profitable. 
 It takes a degree of calm, a certain tranquillity, for the gardener to work on an 
appropriate time scale. But he is worried. This “caretaking”, is that not too naive a solution to 
the problem? What will we forget by trusting in this philosophy? It fails to take account of the 
balance of power. The economy, the main motor of human activity, has taken a pattern with 
global neo-liberalism which makes it incapable of taking account of the damage that builds up 
as unpleasant surprises and which accompany the innovations which form the origin of its 
movements322 and its progress. 
 “Surprise” has always been an effective strategy that living things use for hunting. The 
beast stops before jumping, the antlion makes the base of his sandpit explode without warning 
to send an ant hurtling towards him. It is also by surprise that prices change and that 
economic interests consume the common good and all that the markets do not see.  
 
The process by which scientific knowledge emerges is more or less fortuitous, that is to say it 
follows one path among many (the phenomenon of path dependence). The talent of the 
researchers in developing fruitful interpretations, of course, and also the role of social 
configurations in the game of epistemic development, form the two sides to this internalist 
and externalist dialectic of the history of discovery. In this vast effect of influence and 
influance (as Derrida would say) – a kind of generalized performativity science —> 
technology —> society —> science, the “open society” of Popper is looped with one sole 
fixed primary motor: financial capitalism is both for science, for society and for nature. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 Cf Boltanski L., Chiapello E.,  The New Spirit of Capitalism, Helliott G. tr., Verso 2007. 
 
 It is the market that will decide the cost of cloning a champion dairy cow, according to 
its spot price, as a function of the cost compared with a surrogate mother and an artificial 
uterus. What will be the spot price of the DNA of a Nobel prize winner, or scientist? There 
are scientists and scientists, and the rating agencies will have to clarify the criteria… 
   
And if we don’t change course? 
Before discussing where the pursuit of economic progress, which the two last centuries have 
accustomed us to, will take us, at the risk of misunderstanding, we absolutely must clarify 
some logical and philosophical problems at the heart of the question of change: what is the 
margin between the possible and what will actually happen? Can we support the idea that 
technology so strongly enframes (Gestell) an irrevocable right over man that it will, in any 
case, rule the world? 
The logical difficulty of the relation between the future and the possible is well 
illustrated by a recent article by Edgar Morin: “Our model of civilization will thus receive 
terrible blows because of these problems of energy, ecology and behaviours. And this is to 
say nothing of the enormous problems raised by science at the level of those manipulations 
that can be applied to our genetic legacy”323. Neo-liberalism needs to be regulated, he 
continues, the illusion of continual progress is collapsing. “Here are some of the things that 
prove that these processes lead us to the abyss. These are the factors which we must face, 
calmly and clearly”. According to this complacency-free picture the conclusion that Edgar 
Morin proposes can be summarized as: it is very bad but the worst is never guaranteed, there 
is the unforeseen; this might save us, it has done so in the past. “So I think that the processes 
which remain invisible and minor in the present could develop and grow, coalescing one with 
another, a metamorphism like that of the naked grub from the chrysalis which transforms, 
through a self-destruction that simultaneously reveals itself to be a self-construction, into a 
very different being, the butterfly or dragonfly, with new qualities”324.  
Personally, I do not find this picture convincing, nor encouraging. On the contrary, this 
seems a form of words calculated to make one accept the unacceptable, as, for example, in 
India, metempsychosis makes one accept and endure the caste system. What is this 
improbability that might arrive, that we should hope for? A new secular god? We observe that 
we are heading for catastrophe, but what is coming may surprise us. In other words, we see 
the wall, that is the forecast, but the possible is much greater than one can foresee. This idea, 
as we will see, is very fair and logically well-founded, but is formulated here in a passive 
form of trust which makes it too compatible with the laissez-faire mindset. Hope can only be 
based on the precise designation of the institutions that must be changed in order to change 
course. 
In this respect, Gilbert Hottois explicitly takes a stand for the thesis that these famous 
improbabilities come from the crucible of scientific research: “The disappearance of the 
universal belief in values and absolute references, based in religion and the metaphysical. All 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
323 “Notre modèle de civilisation va donc recevoir des coups terribles du fait de ces problèmes énergétiques, 
écologiques et de comportement. Et je n'ai pas parlé des problèmes énormes soulevés par la science au niveau 
des manipulations qu'elle peut opérer sur notre capital génétique”, “Here are some of the things that prove that 
these processes lead us to the abyss. These are the factors which we must face, calmly and clearly”. In “Le 
probable et l'incertain” Revue Nouvelles clés, n°43, 2004. 
324 “Je pense donc que des processus encore invisibles et minoritaires dans le présent peuvent se développer et 
créer, en s'alliant les uns aux autres, une métamorphose comme le ver tout nu de la chrysalide qui se transforme, 
au cours d'une autodestruction qui se révèle en fait être en même temps une autoconstruction, en un être très 
différent, le papillon ou la libellule, doté de qualités nouvelles”Ibid. Cf. also “Redresseurs d'espérance pour une 
planète en détresse” Entropia n°6, 181-189, 2009, where E. Morin wrote “Hope is based on human possibilities 
not yet explored, and it builds on the improbable.” (“L'espérance se fonde sur les possibilités humaines encore 
inexploitées, et elle mise sur l'improbable.”) 
values and norms appear henceforth as decided by men, individuals or collectively. This 
anthropocentricity is explained in cultural and historical relativism, in the individualism and 
pluralism of democratic societies. Since there are no more limits or transcendent prohibitions, 
nothing can in principle stop anything possible from being attempted”325.  
One thus sees that the path that Edgar Morin hoped for, being left open to the 
uncertainty beyond the probable, cannot exist unless we are able to make a general 
ontological distinction between the path that the future will take and the strictly larger field of 
possibilities. 
Science, producer of knowledge, is at the heart of the issue. If science goes, without 
anyone knowing in which direction, can one hope that it will help to redirect things? Its 
essence is normally that of taking into account things that have never been seen before. What 
do researchers in the market economy do? They rummage, they interpret and they make 
discoveries. Businesses only take those things that they hope are profitable, which they 
protect by patents. So we have a mechanism where everyone has a specific role, the 
researcher uses science and available technology, and what is economically viable is 
launched. The only obstacle is the precautionary principle in countries where this 
operationally weak legal term is applicable. Let us be more precise in our analysis. What is 
the science used by researchers? It may be the stock of universal knowledge, but it can also be 
less-universal knowledge about particular categories, social classes, specific subpopulations. 
For example, drugs or treatments which reduce the effect of genes in relation to skin colour 
will only be for people of colour. As the system we described is driven by economic profit, it 
cannot fail to be improved by segmentation of the market (cf. Jules Dupuit). It necessarily 
results in pressure on researchers to develop scientific knowledge that is itself segmented, i.e., 
tending to concern those humans who can pay and thus driven by the desires of affluent 
populations. This will be reinforced by public funding, because the higher-rate tax-payers will 
be reluctant to fund research done for pleasure or the care of people who are not paying for it. 
Changing the trajectory of humanity by science is an issue that biologists are repeatedly 
asked about. Let’s see how a great scientist addresses this issue. 
In Le jeu des possibles326, written in 1981, François Jacob shared the traditional view 
held by numerous scientists before the business of blood contaminated by the AIDS virus (in 
the 1980s), Mad Cow disease (in the 1990s) and the catastrophe of the AZF factory in 
Toulouse (2001), revived discussion of the precautionary principle. He wrote “It is true that 
the innovations of science can be used for the best and for the worst, they are sources of 
misery as well as blessings. But what kills, and what enslaves, is not science, but rather 
interests and ideology […] And evil does not only come from situations where one 
intentionally uses science to cause destruction. It may also be a distant and unpredictable 
consequence of actions carried out for the good of humanity. Who could have predicted 
overpopulation as a result of developments in medicine? Or the spread of bacteria resistant to 
antibiotics as a result of the very use of these drugs? Or pollution as a consequence of the use 
of fertilizer to improve harvests?”327 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325 “Disparition de la croyance universelle en des valeurs et des références absolues, fondées dans la religion et la 
métaphysique. Toutes les valeurs et les normes apparaissent désormais comme décidées par des hommes, 
individus ou collectivités. Cet anthropocentrisme s'explique dans le relativisme culturel et historique, dans 
l'individualisme et le pluralisme des sociétés démocratiques. Puisqu'il n'y a plus de limites ou d'interdits 
transcendants rien ne s'oppose en principe à ce que n'importe quel possible soit un jour tenté”. Le Monde, 
dossiers et documents, septembre 2004. 
326 Fayard, 1981. 327	  “Il est vrai que les innovations de la science peuvent servir au meilleur comme au pire, qu'elles sont sources 
de malheurs comme de bienfaits. Mais ce qui tue et ce qui asservit, ce n'est pas la science. Ce sont l'intérêt et 
l'idéologie […] Et le mal ne vient pas seulement de situations où l'on utilise intentionnellement la science à des 
fins de destruction. Il peut aussi être une conséquence lointaine et imprévisible d'actions mises en œuvre pour le 
These three examples are not well chosen; in each of these cases one could have 
expected more hindsight on the part of scientists who could have perfectly known the 
consequences of these technologies, thanks to their understanding, but they did not focus their 
intelligence on this line of thought.  
François Jacob’s conclusion, justifying the title of his book, is an interesting plea for 
diversity. “Diversity is a way of warding off the possible. It works as a type of insurance 
against the future […] Selection from a variety of pre-existing structures seems to be a means 
frequently used in the natural world for dealing with an unknown future: short-term future 
with molecular diversity as one observes in the production of antibodies by vertebrates, long-
term future with the diversity of species […] and especially with the diversity of individuals 
which form the main target of natural selection”328. François Jacob also addresses cultural 
diversity and thinks of this as a precious wealth for responding to possible uncertainties in the 
future. He defends this thesis without departing from a monist conception of scientific 
knowledge independent of all contextual interpretation (we are still in 1981): “In humans, 
natural diversity is further strengthened by cultural diversity which permits humanity to better 
adapt itself to varying conditions of life and to better use the world’s resources.”329 He insists 
on the importance of culture and that of our creative talent for interpretations: “Our 
imagination presents us with a continually renewed image of the possible. And it is to this 
image that we endlessly compare what we fear and what we hope. It is to the possible that we 
adjust our desires and dislikes.”330 But he does not explicitly go beyond the step of saying that 
our imagination, and thus our reading of the possibilities, is largely shaped by our culture, in 
other words, by context. Also, after reading this work, one has the feeling that cultural 
diversity is, in the eyes of François Jacob, an approval for the social landscape, but which has 
no impact on the conduct of science, and can never have, as he says: “There is no means of 
saying where a given area of research will lead. That is why one cannot choose some aspects 
of science and reject others.”331 
Twenty years later, François Jacob took a much more nuanced position332. His 
discussion of genetic engineering and anthropotechnology is primarily a history of 
eugenics333. He shows how, to Francis Galton and others, improving the species was primarily 
a concern of scientists really keen to do good, based on proven knowledge for the 
improvement of species of domestic animals. How the readings that influenced Hitler were 
scientific articles and how the gradual progression led from these to Josef Mengele’s activities 
in Auschwitz. “With the wisdom of hindsight, it is easy today to recognize that most of the 
ideas that inspired the eugenics movement were unjustified. And yet many of its followers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
bien de l'humanité. Qui aurait pu prévoir la surpopulation comme suite aux développements de la médecine ? Ou 
la dissémination de germes résistants aux antibiotiques comme suite à l'usage même de ces médicaments ? Ou la 
pollution comme suite à l'emploi d'engrais permettant d'améliorer les récoltes ?”	  328	  “La diversité est une façon de parer au possible. Elle fonctionne comme une sorte d'assurance sur l'avenir 
[...] La sélection dans une diversité de structures préexistantes semble être un moyen fréquemment utilisé dans le 
monde vivant pour faire face à un avenir inconnu : avenir à court terme avec la diversité moléculaire telle qu'on 
l'observe dans la production des anticorps par les vertébrés; avenir à long terme avec la diversité des espèces [...] 
et surtout avec la diversité des individus qui forment la cible principale de la sélection naturelle”	  329	  “Chez les êtres humains, la diversité naturelle est encore renforcée par la diversité culturelle qui permet à 
l'humanité de mieux s'adapter à des conditions de vie variées et à mieux utiliser les ressources du monde.”	  330	  “Notre imagination déploie devant nous l'image toujours renouvelée du possible. Et c'est à cette image que 
nous confrontons sans cesse ce que nous craignons et ce que nous espérons. C'est à ce possible que nous ajustons 
nos désirs et nos répugnances.”	  331	  “Il n'y a aucun moyen de dire où va mener un domaine de recherche donné. C'est pourquoi on ne peut choisir 
certains aspects de la science et rejeter les autres.”	  
332 Of Flies, Mice, and Men, tr. La souris, la mouche et l'homme, O. Jacob 1997. 
333 ibid. 
were perfectly respectable men of science who thought they were acting in the public interest. 
So where did they go wrong?” 
The answer that François Jacob gives to this question is curious. He does not renounce 
the fundamental principles of separation that he displayed in Le jeu des possibles; he believes 
that these scientists have not put the boundary in the right place. This is an essentially 
positivist attitude, because it consists in narrowing the field of knowledge to exclude the 
responsibilities which arise from the active role of the subject and its interpretative faculties. 
“Where they went wrong”, he writes, “was in not examining critically enough the very 
concept of eugenics and what it implied. In particular, they did not correctly evaluate its social 
consequences. The danger for the scientist is to not test the limits of his science, and thus of 
his knowledge. It's to mix what he believes and what he knows.” 
Less full and more attentive than twenty years earlier, François Jacob nevertheless 
remains close to Jacques Monod’s philosophy of science; he believes in a scientific 
community clearly sharing certain values. In 2000, about manipulations that affect the genetic 
heritage of mankind, he writes “it is possible, using this technique, to add a new genetic trait, 
for example, a gene that could confer certain advantages on humans. This is currently being 
done in animals and plants. But in the case of humans, the aim is different. It violates the 
genetic heritage of humankind. The point is no longer to heal someone, but to modify him, to 
mould him. And all biologists seem to agree: avoid this at all costs”. François Jacob is 
completely wrong on this last point: today most biologists, on the contrary, are completely in 
agreement with this direction. Transhumanists – whose slogans we will read shortly – are the 
ones making the most noise, but there is also a silent army, particularly in the former 
communist countries now soaked in materialism, where genetic engineering is well underway. 
Currents that one could call secular messianisms, which aim to be the last vestiges of 
encouragement and caution in a world that is totally disenchanted having completely run out 
of religious hope, and which provide ideological support for financial capitalism, morally 
support the adventurous biology of the market. These are Saint-Simonians, but two centuries 
late. 
  
The contradiction of  achieving all possibilities  
This brings us to what is often called the law of Gabor and what he himself called the 
first law of technological civilization: that which can happen will happen. Gabor put it this 
way: progress applies new technologies and creates new industries without finding out 
whether or not they are desirable334. 
Evidently Gabor strongly opposed this law. Nevertheless, he viewed it as a fact, sad but 
true, in society as it is organized today. He takes the example of the space race, attempted but, 
in fact, leading to an impasse, a prestige operation that created popular enthusiasm, but Gabor 
considers that the seam is more or less exhausted. His diagnosis is close to that of Hans Jonas 
on the dynamic that drives technology: “you can, so you should, so you do.”335 Both 
denounced the laxity that comes from only taking into account the market, what it can absorb 
and its potential appetite. 
After this finding, the theses of Jonas and Gabor diverge. Jonas turned to a dramatic 
mysticism, imagining a dictatorship as a last resort. Gabor is optimistic, having a 'boy-scout'-
like confidence in engineers, and in project-teams like the one that successfully organized the 
Apollo project, with the aim of carrying out a rescue by redirecting things. 
Today it is rather in the field of anthropotechnology that the law of lawlessness of 
technological civilization holds. A scientific and triumphalist literature builds on this idea to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334 See D. Gabor, Inventing the Future (1963) ;  “Technologie, le pour et le contre” in G.R. Urban Survivre au 
futur? Mercure de France 1973;  The Mature Society, Preager Publishers 1972. 
335 Jonas H., Le principe responsabilité, (1979) éd. du Cerf 1990. 
cut short attempts to limit research on ethical grounds. Transhumanists insist that this law 
holds and that nothing can stop it. The book edited by John Brockman, The New Humanists336, 
is worth mentioning. Some twenty distinguished scientists from leading universities proclaim 
their fabulous expectations of future society, scientific and technological, and its conquest of 
the universe: the exponential growth in intelligence of future man-machines, the fact that 
ethical concerns are not consistent with Darwinism: “The ethical debates are like stones in a 
stream. The water runs around them. You haven't seen any biological technology held up for 
one week by any of these debates”, “the very concept of technological advance is so deeply 
ingrained in our society, that it's an enormous imperative”. 
The key phrase summarizing the philosophy of these top researchers is “science is the 
only game in the city”.  
That captures the lack of reflection of these scholars on their activity, which is the only 
pleasure in the world, as well as the ignorance of everyone around them337. In the final 
discussion, other scientists, addressing their colleagues, highlight this trait: “your essay, as it 
is, is curiously paranoid. You no longer need to be! You've largely won”. Obviously, all 
genetic manipulations should be tried; mankind must evolve to conquer the universe. One 
really has to see this book in the flesh to realize the astonishing mix of bar-room philosophy 
and adolescent fantasies, struggling to be comforted by the foolish hopes that university 
professors can hold, even from UCLA, MIT, Harvard etc. 
“One will not stop all possible research from being undertaken one day” is the most 
false and misleading argument possible. It is argued, not just by transhumanists but by all 
those who see a monism leading the world and love to position themselves in this unique 
perspective. Liberals meanwhile, see it as the result of free trade itself in the sense that 
everything is possible on the market and that the variety of potential buyers gives every 
opportunity to every innovation338. Many literary intellectuals and politicians agree because 
they take scientific activity to be what the great scientists say it is, something that one can not 
understand from outside. This slogan implies that, on the fundamental issues related to 
anthropotechnology, one can only note where the technology is and, possibly, act politically 
after the event, to prevent anything that appears to be to dangerous and destabilizing. This 
conciliatory attitude is based on respect for scientific territory, as if it were a private game 
reserve. It lazily condones the ambivalent discourse of research, both pure and useful, 
independent of all cultural or historic interpretation, however socially relevant. This 
conformism to techno-science is strongly reminiscent of the political position of certain 
pacifists which have been, historically, the game of the worst totalitarian regimes. 
 
Given the crucial role it plays in what epistemological systems can tell us of the future, it is 
essential to analyse this argument in a completely rigorous way339.  
Although abandoned by most philosophers of science in the 20th century, Kuhn, 
Feyerabend, Quine, etc. but also by thinkers such as Gadamer, Lacan, Derrida, the primary 
view of scientific knowledge, as a lifting of the curtain that hides reality, is tenacious. The 
thesis fits perfectly since to lift this or that part of the curtain then does not matter. It is 
admitted that there is a commutativity of dates and research results. However, one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 The New Humanists edited by John Brockman, Barnes et Noble 2003 
337 Dennis Gabor speaks of “compulsive innovation” in Roy, R. and Wield, D. Product design and technological 
innovation, Open University Press 1986. 
338 In this respect, while the students of May 1968 took the slogan “il est interdit d'interdir” (“prohibitions 
prohibited”) they obviously demanded exactly what capitalism wanted.  
339 In what follows, our argument is distinct from that of Quine in “On what there is”, based on the notion of 
“ontological commitment”, where he writes “little real advance in such analysis is to be hoped for in expanging 
our universe to include so-called possible entities” W. V. O. Quine From a logical point of view Harper 1953 p4, 
we develop a diachronic or sequential argument.  
immediately has the feeling wherever this simplistic idea exists, that it thinks as if science did 
not change the world.  
From a logical point of view, the claim “one will not stop all possible research from 
being undertaken one day” is self-contradictory. The term “possible” here takes different 
meanings, the conditional mode and the indicative mode, just as what will be does not cover 
the same as what could be. The realm of the possible is much larger.340  
To see this contradiction concretely, let’s take the key case of anthropotechnology. As 
soon as man transformed himself – let’s simply say that in certain countries, in certain 
laboratories, men are conceived, artificially changed in their biological being by technology – 
the motivations for these future transformations, the moral values and the fantasies founded 
on the fads on which these labs attempt to build, will also be changed. The role of modified 
humans will depend on the modifications they have received. Everything can be imagined 
here, a) that these humans no longer carry certain pathological genes and seek to procreate 
among themselves so as not to damage their genetic material, thus leading to two or more 
races/classes/societies, b) that certain physical characteristics of these humans (big legs on the 
females, sexual performance in the men, etc.) foment a global fad, creating pressure on these 
labs, etc. By our reasoning, the details of this feedback are not important for their motives and 
interests, we necessarily arrive at a vision of the world in which the possible futures of 
humankind are made of different and incomparable paths according to the changes which are 
first applied. The choices, the relative effort involved, the priorities of research today has thus 
a huge impact on what will happen in the medium term. 
This argument will not convince those many people who, like Francis Fukuyama for 
example, rightly want to avoid the excesses of anthropotechnology and intend to establish 
political institutions which guarantee dignity for all human beings341. We should also take a 
step back and consider the question from a logical point of view, establishing what the 
structure is of this way of thinking: the backbone of the proof that we have outlined is the 
same as that of Cantor’s diagonal argument. In terms of real numbers (let’s say a sequence of 
0s and 1s), the future is formed by numbers that we can write or designate without ambiguity. 
It is a countable set; one could imagine these numbers written on a large parchment. However, 
the possible real numbers, those that could be written, form an uncountable set342.  The future 
cannot exhaust the possible. 
This proof would not apply if the world were so simple that chemical combinatorics did 
not diverge, for example, if molecules could not have more than 10 atoms and that one could 
therefore know all of them. The realm of the possible explodes with regard to the future 
because the combinations grow vertiginously, the combination of atoms in molecules, the 
assemblies of biological constituents - amino acids and proteins – in the cells of plants and 
animals, and because – a key factor – the context of ontogenetic development has a huge 
influence on the production of every living being. This epigenesis defies any complete 
description and the set of all situations, in the cytoplasm, in the placenta, in childhood, in 
social environment, is in perpetual motion and complexity. And, of course, we act, being 
social beings and thus construct our own story. 
Thus we arrive at the conclusion opposite to the slogan quoted (and condemned) by 
Dennis Gabor: Only some of the possible investigations will be carried out. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340 John Dewey put a similar idea at the heart of his philosophy: “All possibilities, as possibilities are ideal in 
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controlled by the unseen. For all endeavour for the better is moved by faith in what is possible, not by adherence 
to the actual.” A Common Faith 1934. 
341 F. Fukuyama, Our posthuman future, profile books 2003. 
342 I refer to online encyclopedias for a more detailed discussion. The reader interested by the more advanced 
questions of logic and of real numbers can consult http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00008321/fr/. 
 
This changes everything. The question is now that of knowing if researchers have anything to 
say, at the present moment, about the direction that has been taken. Or if these processes can 
only be the result of chance in researchers’ findings. Of course these researchers, in their 
readings, motives and interpretations, are greatly influenced by their own context. 
There can be no Manichean response; it is not black and white. Obviously no political 
institution is capable of an injunction preventing science from discovering this or that. 
Research policies can only be formulated in terms of priorities and ethical warnings. Even that 
sort of guidance would be useful, but it is not currently being given; there is no real plurality 
in the directions that science and technology are taking because public funds are being cut and 
private funds are mainly directed towards short-term profit. 
But, on the contrary, when the transhumanists write, in their triumphalist discourse: 
“The ethical debates are like stones in a stream ...”, the arrogance of these academics, certain 
of their victory, is based on the conviction that in a liberal system, any novelty that is 
perceived by someone as conveying an advantage to themselves or their offspring, will find a 
market, no matter what moral objections there might be, and can thus be financed.  
Anthropotechnology designs a future which could lead man towards the most appalling 
hatred and violence. It is worth making the effort to see this to understand that, regarding 
genetic technology, scientists today are in a situation where ingenuity is no longer relevant. 
About the scholars who contributed to the Manhattan project after the bombs at Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, Karl Jaspers wrote “It seems to me that most scholars did not fully realize the 
extent of things. Thus they did not reach the point of considering the new limit situation […] 
Also the way numerous scholars acted and thought displayed a peculiar attitude: afraid of 
what they have done, they claimed, in a spirit of peace, a solution, all the while developing the 
science further. Men of such intelligence want and do not want, they behave like children and 
speak of a tragedy”343 
Let’s review this. Suppose that one believes that Monsanto-like marketing-strategies are 
the generic example of economic operation and that the neoliberal model is the only 
sustainable reality, technological innovation will be gradually become more ethically guided 
due to the company’s financial interests, and their laboratories will only use science to patent 
more molecules and more genes. Then, de facto, one prevents the possible from taking the 
whole epistemological field, since the possible will be confined to what is beneficial to these 
companies. In such a universe, the researchers are children without social or political 
responsibility. They play their games like gifted teenagers with video games. The forces and 
means of communication strengthen the system and Morin’s improbable finds a niche in the 
lucky randomness of the devices manipulated by researchers in a confined atmosphere cut off 
from all social and environmental problems. 
The mature society, as Gabor claims, has to be completely different. It needs the 
feedback loop of monism to be broken. It needs plural readings of the world to provide open 
possibilities, and that can only be done if researchers accept their social and cultural anchors, 
and thereby have the means to deepen the representations created by users and their 
associations. Science must be organized so that it resembles pluralist parliamentary systems. 
The strictly logical argument above is simply a rigorous basis that reinforces common 
sense: at the level of the mechanisms of the market, many innovations do not succeed, such as 
the Wankel rotary engine, the betamax video system, … at the level of alternative 
technologies, respecting the environment, many things could have been done but were not. 
Only some of the possible avenues of research will ever be pursued. The choices to be made 
have, thus, full value and paramount importance for the future. Scientists have an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343 Karl Jaspers Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menchen, Piper and Co 1958. 
irreplaceable role in this analysis of the possibilities. They can no longer play the game of 
meeting innovation by chance, as one falls in love by chance344; we have too often heard this 
story which avoids all responsibility. Consideration needs to be given, firstly, to the 
organizational conditions that will allow them to make these reflections, seminars on these 
choices and open debates with civil society.  
 
The teeth of the market will continue to work 
Those serious authors who have contemplated the state of the world and the trends with 
significant impact on the planet, all reach the conclusion that the economy manages things 
badly, because it does not see the damage it causes. An excellent example of these lucid 
writers, Lester Brown, writes in Plan B “The key to restructuring the economy is the creation 
of an honest market, one that tells us the ecological truth”. To his mind the weakness of the 
current market that need to be addressed are a) ”it does not incorporate the direct costs of 
providing goods or services into prices”, b) ”it does not value nature's services properly” and 
c) ”it does not respect the sustainable yield thresholds of natural systems such as fisheries, 
forests, rangelands and aquifers”. For this, overheads need to be incorporated into prices: “if 
we want to determine the full cost of burning gasoline, we need to calculate the indirect costs 
of doing so. [...] Calculating the expenses of treating smoking-related illnesses and 
absenteeism shows that each pack of cigarettes smoked in the United States costs society 
$7.18”. Calculating the real costs, “creating an honest market”, supposes that the market takes 
account of the value of services offered by nature. In 2003 Lester Brown expressed his 
thoughts before the Copenhagen conference: by a system of taxes and the implementation of a 
proper evaluation of nature’s services (thanks to a long and appropriate cost-benefit analysis), 
it promotes the establishment of sustainable development. Its objective is laudable and we 
cannot fail to agree with the principle: “If we can get the market to tell the truth, then we can 
avoid being blindsided by faulty accounting systems that lead to bankruptcy”345. That is the 
central idea of his Plan B: make corrections by taxes so that the market speaks truly. 
 And then there was Copenhagen and its consequences. Biofuels were developed in the 
United States on fields previously dedicated to the world grain market… 
 Plan B does not work. First, of course, because it is not in the interest of the many 
economic players who seek immediate profit, and because there is a violent political reaction 
against taxes. But that is not all. A market that speaks the truth must firstly be a market that 
speaks, and thus a market that calms itself. This is the first thing that a referee says in a 
dispute “calm down!” 
 The idea of plan B is a gentle therapy. It is not a placebo; it has begun timidly to have 
some effect. But as it does nothing to calm the storm in the prices of corn, soya, oil, iron, the 
dollar, etc., it is not a policy that can change the disorder that suffocates the agriculture and 
local economic activity that most of the world’s population rely on346. 
 The wise response is to say that plan B can be a transitional step to help accept the 
idea of an increased role of national and international institutions in the management of the 
common good, and of taxes to implement environmental policies, but only as one step 
because the problem is much more serious than that. 
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346 In Prosperity without Growth (op. cit.) Tim Jackson subscribed to an idea similar to Brown’s plan B, albeit 
with a different vocabulary (that of ecological macroeconomics). He also advocates (p175-176) an economic 
valuation of natural capital as set out in the reports of The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB)  
by a cost-benefit analysis extended to living beings. This “economization” can only be a temporary bandage, for 
the same reasons. 
To further our thinking about what could happen, imagine a world which carries on as 
present, i.e., with the same means of guidance based almost exclusively on market prices, a 
world which turns a deaf ear to scientists’ warnings and which pursues the political objective 
of gaining the best economic position. This means maintaining the dominant discourse which 
consists in only considering one subentity within the overall competition: one nation, or one 
company, or household or, ultimately, one individual, pursuing the idea that, in the growing 
difficulties that may occur, the economically strongest will always be the best placed. In other 
words, suppose that the game of Red light, green light continues (cf. Chapter II-2). 
 Such a perspective is, of all the hypotheses, the most likely one now judging by the 
trends observed by all serious indicators – i.e., those quantitative measures that do not involve 
prices. It will remain the most likely for some time, for the strong reason that these objective 
quantitative changes are not relayed by prices and are from very indirect information whose 
scientific detail is complicated and difficult to follow. These come from scientific facts but 
with a pessimistic twist. Normally science is neither sad nor happy, it explains the 
observations made and, so far, by the services it has provided (in machinery, medicine, 
electronics) its announcements and even its promises have been met with optimism. Today 
the scientific discourse about limits cannot be understood in details, so does not help us to 
manage our daily lives and, moreover, is sad! At least the economy tells us how better to live 
by paying careful attention to prices! 
 Thus, by inertia, the serious consequences announced by so many specialists will 
injure or incapacitate our environment for long periods, many centuries, and sometimes 
permanently. The death of corals, for example, may have repercussions on the scale of the 
evolution of species, the result of millions of years of life reduced to something inert. The 
poor will obviously be affected the most. Unlike in Karl Marx’s time, when the capitalists, in 
their management of worth, were careful to make sure the proletariat had enough to renew the 
labour force and maintain, by their children, the population of workers, today it is no longer a 
concern. The regulation of the world’s population can now be achieved by means of the 
degradation of the common goods (air, water) and the reduction in the generosity of nature 
which affects primarily the economically weakest. 
 I want to follow this hypothesis through to the situation where the rich have “won”. 
By this I mean that they have taken the logic of ecological modernization and climatic realism 
to its limits: prioritized adaptation, increased research into technological mutations and, 
above all, adopted a pragmatic policy of give and take towards the poor countries: economic 
aid for subsistence on the express condition that the common goods like air and water remain 
in such a state that the consequences be bearable and manageable for the lifestyle of the 
developed countries. This may be hard to imagine, but it’s a hypothesis. 
 Either politicians in western democracies are short-sighted and do not see beyond the 
next election or – and this is certainly the case for the think-tanks that advise them – when 
they continue to speak of revival, of development and growth, they have in their head a long-
term image of some kind of ideal landscaped city where the environment is cared for by a 
well-managed sustainable development policy, thanks to highly active research laboratories 
which overcome the loss of biodiversity by a huge programme of genetic engineering aimed 
at creating living beings which provide the best service that one could hope for. 
 The vanishing point of complete trust in the market economy is necessarily such a 
secure gated garden city, guarded well with plenty of surveillance cameras… But the 
problems of piloting in a liberal economy dominated by speculatory-valued markets remain 
the same. Biology will be embroiled in patent systems and ownership of living and, as we do 
not always see the trends, the machine will be without any system of navigation or control. 
Volatility, temporary fads, rumours and accidents (nuclear, biological, nanotechnological, 
etc.) will do their damage inside the flowery city. 
 In fact, evicting the poor will not change this type of problem because the poor do not 
have much economic weight; their regions have only the economic weight of third-rate 
businesses. The teeth of the market will continue to chew. 
 
 We cannot avoid obstacles that we do not see. 
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Blurb 
 
Since the Brundtland report in 1987, at the start of the series of United Nations Conferences 
on the Environment and Development, the world population has grown by more than it was in 
the time of Adam Smith. Oil consumption has increased by 40% and the trend is similar for 
other exhaustible resources, such as metal and fish. The loss of biodiversity continues to 
reduce flora and fauna at an almost constant rate. Deforestation approximately equivalent to 
the area of England occurs every year. 
 Despite all the warnings from scientists, the rate of degradation is not decreasing. But 
economic activity - consumption and saving – has grown faster than the global population. 
Why does the world not adapt to the boundary conditions of the planet? Why is nature being 
devoured? 
 This work responds to this question in a very professional way: the economy is badly 
run, and not for the reasons stated by Marxists. 
 Over the past 25 years, finance has held the wheel of the global supertanker. By 
globalization, by the increase of savings, and by the technical innovations of the financial 
markets, its power over the economy has become dominant. Finance is in charge. But the 
price-signal that it produces is surrounded by fog. The author explains why this is, and 
analyses the consequences for the near future. 
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